

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

Washington journalist and CIA expert John Marks was responsible for much of the investigative reporting that revealed the CIA's experimentation with mind altering drugs on unsuspecting participants. Times Books promises that "plenty more will be uncovered" with the publication of Marks's **"The Search for the Manchurian Candidate"** (\$12.50), scheduled for October. The book opens with the CIA's launching of the quest for the "great truth serum" in the late 1940s, and proceeds to uncover how the agency recruited respected civilian doctors, university professors and Communist defectors to cooperate with the covert psychological experiments.

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

22 May 1978

UNCLOAKING THE CIA

Edited by Howard Frazier. Free Press/Macmillan, \$12.95 ISBN 0-02-910590-0

Based on a conference held at Yale University, these accounts of the CIA gone "rogue" make a clear, forceful, no-punches-pulled case for dismantling the CIA, or at least its covert operations. Although some of the book's revelations have been aired in the journalistic media, there is enough new, urgent material here to make this a blockbuster. The contributors fall into three main categories: former insiders, such as Victor Marchetti, John D. Marks, L. Fletcher Prouty; domestic critics like Kirkpatrick Sale and Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D., Mass.); and Third World figures, among them Salvador Allende's widow. Even liberal and left-wing readers will be dismayed at the extent of CIA activities revealed in these pages. Covered are William Colby's Phoenix program, responsible for over 49,000 killings in Vietnam; the backing of Lon Nol's coup in Cambodia; infiltration of U.S. universities; and the development of mind-control technology to deal with dissidents. Some of the most eye-opening sections examine CIA interference with the AFL-CIO and penetration of foreign trade unions. Comprehensive, compact, well documented. [June]

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

BALTIMORE SUN
2 June 1978Cord Meyer

Carter Gets Tough With Soviet Spies

WASHINGTON

If conciliation were his chief aim, President Carter would have quietly deported the two Soviet spies. It is significant, therefore, that he decided to indict them after a sharp debate within the administration.

The conciliatory option had strong advocates, including CIA Director Stansfield Turner and representatives of the State Department. The debate that preceded the FBI's announcement that the Soviets had been arrested marked another move by the President to deal in more steely fashion with the Kremlin.

The facts are not in dispute. As the result of the loyal cooperation of a U.S. naval officer and effective counter-intelligence work by the FBI and naval intelligence, three Soviets were caught in flagrante as they tried to bribe the naval officer into supplying them with secret data on our most advanced anti-submarine warfare technology.

One of the Russians was an attache at the Soviet mission to the United Nations who enjoyed immunity as an accredited diplomat. Having violated his status, he will be declared persona non grata and forced to leave, if the Soviets do not withdraw him.

The other Russians, both U.N. employees, have no diplomatic status. Although they carry Soviet diplomatic passports, the U.S. government has not accepted them as accredited diplomats, so they have under law no immunity. The debate raged over what should be done with them, once they had been caught in the act of spying.

Surprisingly, Turner took the lead in arguing that these two should not be arrested and brought to trial. He wanted to let them leave the country without punishment because he feared Soviet retaliation against American citizens in Russia. Traditionally anxious to avoid confrontations, the State Department supported Turner.

Turner and the State officials maintained the Soviets might retaliate by arresting American officials in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. They also voiced fears

that private U.S. citizens traveling in Russia might be arrested on trumped-up charges and held as hostages against the release of the two Russian U.N. employees.

These arguments were stoutly opposed by Attorney General Griffin Bell, speaking for the Department of Justice and the FBI. He pointed out that hundreds of Soviet citizens are without diplomatic status in this country, either in transit or on permanent assignment, whether they are U.N. employees, members of visiting delegations, exchange students, or sailors on leave from Russian ships in U.S. ports.

Bell contended it would be a mistake to make it easy for these non-diplomats to engage in espionage by letting them leave the country with impunity. Prosecution and punishment under the law, Bell argued, was a far more effective deterrent in helping the FBI to cope with the Soviet espionage operation in this country, which Sen. Daniel Moynihan, D-N.Y. recently described as "massive."

Bell went on to maintain that as attorney general it was his responsibility to enforce the laws, and that he would have to answer to the American people if his failure to do so led to the loss of vital secrets.

—o—

The President quietly came down on Bell's side. He may have been motivated as much by domestic as by foreign policy concerns. Failures after World War II to move against Soviet espionage opened a Pandora's box of paranoid suspicion. The late Sen. Joseph McCarthy, R-Wis., gained his start as a demagogue from the hesitancy of the Democrats in moving against Soviet spies.

Fear of Soviet retaliation may make discretion the better part of valor for small countries such as Finland in the shadow of Soviet power. But if the U.S. is intimidated in this way, the credibility of the American campaign to persuade the Western allies to act decisively against proven Soviet agents will be destroyed.

By his firm decision, Mr. Carter has taught the Soviets that spying in the U.S. is a dangerous game. This country cannot let fear of Soviet provocations determine whether or not its laws are to be enforced.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 17

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 June 1978

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Carter's Evidence on Cuba's Role in Zaire

Intercepted coded messages to Fidel Castro's Africa corps in Angola "covering a period of several days" before the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province make up part of the evidence to support President Carter's charge of Cuban complicity in the invasion.

In addition, the CIA has possession of "human intelligence" reports—possibly from Cuba, possibly from Angolan sources—that corroborate the intercepts.

That background explains Carter's cold anger in totally disregarding Castro's personal protestation of innocence in a Carter-Castro confrontation that may have wide-ranging international impact.

Challenged by Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) to prove his accusation against Castro, Carter ordered CIA Director Stansfield Turner to begin testimony on Capitol Hill before the Senate and House Intelligence committees, probably next week.

Turner labors under a heavy burden of responsibility to protect American intelligence agents and sources. A leak from a member of Congress could destroy sources and cost lives.

The necessity for protecting sources, then, could leave the president open to renewed challenges from McGovern and other congressmen: Supply proof positive that Castro was lying when he denied any Cuban role. That does not disturb Carter. He is certain that Congress will take his word over Castro's or Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who infuriated the president with his May 27 statement on the White House lawn that Carter's information was faulty.

Indeed, evidence now being collected to prove the complicity of Moscow, Havana and other Soviet satellites in the murderous rampage of the Angola-based Shaba invasion force leaves no possibility of doubt. A central element has been Soviet use of communist East Germany.

In his hard-hitting "Meet the Press" appearance on May 28, Zbigniew Brzezinski fingered the East Germans, but only obliquely. In fact, the record of East Germany as a chief Soviet agent in Africa is just now becoming clear.

Moscow assigned East Germany the principal communist coordinating role for intelligence and "security matters" in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and several others states targeted by the Soviet Union. A special secretariat to handle that task, and oversee supplies of arms, was created in the early 1970s under East Germany's deputy foreign trade minister. In those Soviet-targeted countries, East Germany is credited with having more on-the-scene agents than any country except the Soviet Union itself.

Special targets are the "liberation" armies now poised outside Rhodesia's frontiers under Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo and the "National Peoples' Armies" of Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique.

Early this month, in a speech in Addis Ababa, Lt. Col. Haile-Mariam Mengistu, the Ethiopian strongman, boasted that "progressive comrades" from East Germany "live with us, fight with us and die with us." When the speech was broadcast later in English, that phrase was deleted. One year earlier, a Western European intelligence service reported the capture of three East German soldiers in the Zairian town of Mutshatsha during the first (1977) Angola-based incursion into Zaire.

With such a wealth of evidence at his disposal, Carter's charge of non-African communist complicity in the 1978 invasion of Zaire is beyond dispute. But adding to the White House use of harsh rhetoric is the president's anger at the Cuban denials that led McGovern to demand that the president, in effect, "prove it."

Carter was made to look ridiculous when he volunteered on Feb. 16, 1977, that he had received "information from indirect sources" that Castro had "promised" to remove his Africa corps (then numbering about 15,000) from An-

gola. Instead of withdrawal, the force has been increased.

That was a repeat of history. Henry Kissinger, as secretary of state, informed the world on May 28, 1976, that Castro had told then-Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme in a letter that he would withdraw 200 Cubans a week from Angola. The letter indicated that Castro would send no Cuban troops elsewhere in Africa, adding, "I do not wish to become the crusader of the 20th century."

In May 1977 Castro told interviewer Barbara Walters he would send neither advisers nor troops to Ethiopia, where today some 17,000 Cuban troops are in residence.

Against that record, Carter and Brzezinski were not impressed on May 18 when Castro summoned U.S. diplomat Lyle F. Lane in Havana to deny any Cuban role in the invasion of Zaire. Castro's word is not highly regarded in the White House.

How the CIA will handle the evidence in supposedly confidential briefings on Capitol Hill is not yet known. Nor can it yet be known where the bold rhetoric from the White House about communist marauders in Africa will finally lead. What is clear is one fact: Jimmy Carter knows he has been lied to.

Foreign policy

African jungle

Washington, DC

The recent fighting in the Shaba province of Zaire, formerly Katanga, has lit up unresolved differences of opinion within the American government about its African policy, and, more generally, about American readiness or reluctance to intervene with troops abroad. The "government", for these purposes, includes congress, as well as a divided administration. Indeed, the running debate of the week got started when President Carter complained in a meeting with leading members of congress about congressional restraints on the president's ability to take military actions abroad. About the same time units of the 82nd airborne division stationed at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, a "quick-reaction" force, were put on alert. These soldiers, as it turned out, were not needed, after all, to help rescue American civilians in the fighting zone. It is far from clear that they were ever really meant to be dispatched in the first place. But the alert was the first signal of a more assertive line being taken in the administration, from the White House at least.

On Friday, May 19th, the White House announced that 18 American transport planes would help in the airlift of French and Belgian troops to the area. Neither American weapons nor combat troops were involved. The White House, all the same, called this a "military" mission.

By this stage it was plain to even the dimmest observer that the White House was trying to make a point. The day before Mr Fidel Castro had sent an unusual, personal message to the president, denying Cuban involvement in the attack from Angola on Shaba province. The administration insisted that Cubans had trained the former Katangan rebels in the invasion force which was armed with Cuban-supplied Russian weapons. The stiffer American response was the sort for which Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser, has sought for some time. Though he himself was out of the country, on a trip in China discomfiting the Russians, his immediate staff was plainly delighted at the turn of events.

On Sunday, May 21st, Mr Andrew Young, the American ambassador to the United Nations, and hitherto a reliable spokesman for the United States's policy in Africa, said on television that he doubted whether congressional restraints on the president were unduly onerous. He returned to his theme, supported inside the state department, that the

administration might have a tendency to exaggerate the strategic importance of Cuban troops in Africa.

Next day, to add to the mounting sense of confusion, Mr Young said he did share the president's concern with congressional restraints, but felt there was enough support for Americans to do openly in Africa whatever was needed. Meanwhile the state department had released an eight-page list of congressional restraints on military action abroad. Chief among those of which Mr Carter complained were the amendment to the foreign aid bill obliging the president to inform congress of covert operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Clark amendment to the 1976 Arms Export Control Act prohibiting any sort of military help, open or covert, for operations in Angola.

The events of the week have convinced the author of that amendment, Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, that the United States is seeking to becoming involved again in Angola. It is believed that the director of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turner, and Mr Brzezinski's deputy, Mr David Aaron, proposed to him a way round his amendment for getting arms to opponents of the Angolan government through third countries. Their idea was to tie down Cuban troops who are helping the regime of Mr Agostinho Neto. Mr Clark was not impressed, apparently, and thought the scheme broke the spirit of the law.

This is only the latest episode in the unfolding of the Carter administration's African policy. It is unlikely to be the last. It shows that Mr Carter is leaning towards Mr Brzezinski's advice that the

United States must stand up, somehow, to the Cuban presence in Africa. But it also reveals that the long debate over African policy as a whole is unresolved. Mr Young and the state department, who have had the upper hand so far, have come under test with their view that steady pressure for majority rule in southern Africa is the United States' most urgent task. That was broadly the message of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia whose visit to Washington coincided with the Shaba fighting. Mr Vance's public role has so far not been very definite, one way or the other, and could be influential. There is almost no evidence of public support for American military adventures abroad. Those in search of it could do worse than look to Iowa where Mr Clark is running, with no evident difficulty so far, for re-election to the senate.

Congressional opinion about foreign entanglements has, since Vietnam, been hostile. As for any shift, the first signs might come from a new committee called for on Monday by the house speaker, Mr Tip O'Neill, to look into congressional restrictions on foreign actions. The senate's influential majority leader, Senator Robert Byrd, does not think congress has tied the president's hands in ways that need changing.

insure their sovereignty and independence."

He expressed support for the Soviet Union's latest disarmament proposals and was applauded by both the Soviet bloc and the majority of smaller third-world countries, which, like Cuba, regard themselves as politically nonaligned.

totally disrupted the copper mining industry in that key Zairean province at least temporarily and driven the foreign technicians to flight, Simonet replied.

"It's very difficult to assess. I have contradictory reports. I've been trying to check them but when you try to dig into what people say then you realize how fragile some of the evidence is."

time being."

The Carter administration, and especially presidential national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, has been sounding increasingly alarmed about the "destabilizing" Soviet-Cuban danger across Africa.

Simonet, however, expressing his views in very precise language in an

able to stand on its own. This is the essential purpose, he said, of the proposed economic-centered conference scheduled in Brussels June 13-14 to attempt to salvage the Zairian economy from looming disaster with the help of Western nations and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

In order to create any prospect for

adequate technical skills.

It was learned from other diplomatic sources that spokesmen for the major Western nations were dissembling on Tuesday when senior officials described next Monday's emergency meeting on Zaire as primarily an economics-centered conference.

Authoritative western sources said the meeting to be held in Paris next Monday by representatives of the United States, Belgium, France, Britain and West Germany is actually centered on military-political problems. The reasons for describing it last Tuesday as "a preliminary meeting" for long-planned economic talks was primarily for American purposes, informed sources said, to relieve the Carter administration of the political pressures upon it if it was overtly committed to exploration of a new African defense mechanism.

The western foreign ministers' preoccupation with Africa has been taking place on the edges of the NATO summit conference in Washington during the last two days. The suggestion that it was better for public consumption to put the emphasis in the Paris meeting on economics was first reported to have been made by French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud, whose nation is a principal advocate, along with Belgium, of the need for a pan-African security force. Guiringaud's suggestion was reported to have been swiftly embraced by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and fellow ministers.

At a State Department press conference Tuesday night, Vance shifted the public emphasis on the Paris meeting from defense to economics, while other ministers did the same in briefing other reporters.

Simonet in yesterday's interview duly complied. But numerous other sources said there is no question in private about the central objective in the Paris meeting, which is to be followed by other Western discussions on a potential pan-African defense force.

Unlike Vance, however, Simonet yesterday openly acknowledged the need for the allies to provide backing for an African defense force in the form of what he called "logistics support" from the West. Another source said, "We really mean logistics—but in the broadest sense of that term."

Simonet said that "at least for Belgium" his nation is talking about "solely a logistic force."

It was learned yesterday that presidential national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski addressed the NATO council in its closed session on Tuesday—an unusual, if not unprecedented appearance by a White House adviser in such a forum. The primary reason for Brzezinski's appearance before the summit meeting, sources said, and the subject of his initial commentary was a report on Brzezinski's recent trip to China.

Brzezinski, however, also took the floor later, sources said, to stress the danger of the use of Soviet-supported Cuban troops across Africa. Brzezinski, the sources said, expanded on Carter's theme that Cuba cannot be considered a nonaligned nation because it is "a surrogate" for Soviet military penetration of Africa.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A2THE BALTIMORE SUN
1 June 1978

Turner to depict Cuba's Zaire role

By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—With the international controversy over Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa growing increasingly intense, Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence, yesterday scheduled testimony on Capitol Hill for next week.

Admiral Turner will appear at closed-door sessions of both the Senate and House foreign affairs committees to outline the evidence on which President Carter bases his current hard-line statements.

Mr. Carter's assertions that the Cubans, supported by the Russians, trained and supplied the Katangans who invaded the Shaba province of Zaire two weeks ago, have been denied in Havana and have provoked angry Kremlin reaction, plunging detente to a recent low.

The State Department yesterday reaffirmed that the administration had "good and sufficient" evidence of the Cubans' active role, and a CIA spokesman said Admiral Turner would present the evidence he has already delivered to the President and other policy-makers when he appears before the congressional committees.

But at the same time, the administration's assertions of Cuban responsibility came under new attack from the third world at the United Nations in New York, and its general approach to African affairs was treated here to an unexpectedly patronizing assessment by Prime Minister James Callaghan of Britain.

Mr. Callaghan, in town for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit conference, was unusually blunt in pinpointing U.S. shortcomings in an area of the world where the post-colonial British consider they have much more experience.

He said he feared that "a lot of Christopher Columbuses are setting out from the United States to discover Africa for the first time."

British sources said Mr. Callaghan's outspokenness reflected his genuine anxiety over ancient tribal conflicts in Africa being conceived here as latter day East-West trials of strength.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON STAR
28 MAY 1978

WHITE HOUSE TALKS MAKE LITTLE PROGRESS ON SALT

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

U.S. and Soviet officials disagreed sharply yesterday over the Soviet and Cuban role in Africa during lengthy discussions that failed to make much progress on strategic arms limitations.

President Carter and senior foreign policy and defense aides spent four hours talking to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at the White House — double the scheduled time. Gromyko later lunched with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance at the State Department.

After the apparently tense and tough White House meeting, Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, leaked the results of his recent visit to China.

Brzezinski's timing in making public the similarity of U.S. and Chinese interests in opposing the Soviet Union seemed intended to bring pressure on Moscow to be more flexible in its African policy and in negotiations for a new strategic arms limitations treaty, SALT II. In the past the Kremlin has reacted angrily to such pressure.

MOST OF THE time in yesterday's talks was spent on SALT. But complex blend of technical and political issues, plus briefer talk

about a nuclear weapons test ban and human rights in the Soviet Union, was overshadowed in public comments by controversy on Africa.

The controversy focused on possible Cuban involvement in the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by Katangan rebels two weeks ago.

On the broader question of superpower relations in Africa, Gromyko told reporters he did not think there would be a confrontation.

"We have no intention of grabbing either the whole of Africa or its parts," he said. "We don't need it."

Gromyko emerged from the White House and said that he and Carter had held a "useful and essential" discussion on Africa. "We do have our differences" on what is happening there, he said.

"I think notably that the information that the president has at his disposal is not correct. This is our assessment of it," the foreign minister said. He did not elaborate.

GROMYKO'S REMARK followed administration statements that the Soviet Union and Cuba have been stirring up trouble in Africa and endangering detente. Carter has repeatedly warned publicly, and he repeated privately to Gromyko, that Soviet activities are making it difficult to win American support for new arms control agreements with Moscow.

Cuban President Fidel Castro has denied that his country had any direct or indirect involvement in the Shaba invasion. But Carter said Thursday that Cuba shares "a burden and a responsibility" for the invasion. Its forces "played a key role in training and equipping" the attackers, Carter said, and Cuba knew of their plans but "obviously did nothing to restrain them."

The administration's evidence for this has not been disclosed. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has called CIA Director Stansfield Turner to testify this week on it.

Gromyko seemed to be deliberately entering this dispute, although he did not specifically refer to it.

CONTINUED

CARTER'S PRESS SECRETARY, Jody Powell, later told reporters that "the president wishes to make it completely clear that there is no doubt in his mind about the accuracy of the information that he has received, and which he has conveyed publicly to the American people and privately to the foreign minister."

Powell said their discussion on Africa had included the Cuban role in Shaba but went beyond just that part of the continent.

When Vance and Gromyko emerged from the State Department after lunch, the secretary of state volunteered a comment on the subject to waiting reporters.

"I feel I must take exception," Vance said, "to a statement that was made following the meeting with the president this morning where it was indicated that the president did not have accurate information with respect to the situation in Africa."

"That is not the fact. The president is fully and accurately informed. I want to make this very clear," Vance declared.

Gromyko then volunteered that "there is information and information. Sometimes conclusions are drawn from incorrect and inexact information, and that is bad."

"Please don't involve me in any more politics," Gromyko added as he turned to leave.

AFTER HE HAD LEFT, Vance was asked if this dispute referred just to the Cuban role in the Shaba invasion. "There are a number of different matters on which we have differing views in respect to Africa," he replied.

The White House meeting included Vance, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, and the chief arms control negotiator, Paul C. Warnke. Gromyko was accompanied by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, and the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Malcolm Toon, also attended.

Gromyko told reporters after the meeting that "there has been some headway on some parts of some of the questions" still blocking conclusion of SALT II.

Looking at a tree on the south lawn, the foreign minister said the remaining questions are like the tree. "They branch out into separate branches of questions and subquestions. . . . If a certain question can be cut down into five or 10 subheadings, if we reach agreement on some of these headings it

doesn't mean we've reached agreement on the whole question."

Later at the State Department, Gromyko said some SALT issues "do indeed require a lot of time" to resolve. He had "made certain proposals and suggestions" during yesterday's meetings, he added.

VANCE SAID LATER that some of these were substantive proposals, but another participant in the talks described them as not being major new departures from the previous negotiating track.

Asked if he was satisfied with the way the day's talks on SALT had gone, Vance replied, "I can't say that we made much progress today, but we'll have to keep at it and see whether, as we continue to talk, we can find some common ground."

Vance and Gromyko scheduled another meeting on SALT in New York Wednesday. Gromyko is attending the U.N. General Assembly's special session on disarmament.

Powell said Carter had "very direct and frank" discussions with Gromyko on human rights, mentioning "present cases and others." This was a reference to the recent sentencing of Yuri F. Orlov to 12 years' imprisonment and exile and the pending trials of other Russians who monitored Soviet observance of Helsinki Agreement commitments.

CARTER SAID Thursday that "there is no doubt that if the Soviets continue to abuse human rights, to punish people who are monitoring the Soviets' compliance with the Helsinki Agreement, which they signed of their own free will, and unless they show some constraints on their own involvement in Africa and on their sending Cuban troops to be involved in Africa, it will make it much more difficult to conclude a SALT agreement and to have it ratified once it is written."

This message was repeated to Gromyko, Powell indicated.

Powell said the possibility of a meeting between Carter and the Soviet Communist Party's general secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, was mentioned "only in passing." Neither dates nor specific plans were discussed.

The press secretary recalled that the administration has been willing to have a summit meeting at any time, but the Soviets want one only when a SALT treaty has been agreed on.

When Gromyko was asked about prospects for a summit this summer, he said he "would not like to go into that question right now."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1, 11

LOS ANGELES TIMES
25 May 1978

High U.S. Officials Discuss Arms Aid to Angola Rebels

BY JOHN H. AVERILL

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—High Administration officials have discussed the possibility of resuming U.S. arms shipments to anti-Communist guerrillas in Angola, the White House said Wednesday.

Press Secretary Jody Powell said that President Carter has not yet made a decision on the matter.

Powell said that CIA Director Stansfield Turner and David Aaron, President Carter's deputy assistant for national security affairs, had discussed possible U.S. action in Angola with Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), author of the 1975 law banning any direct or indirect U.S. military involvement there.

Neither Turner nor Aaron, meeting separately with Clark, attempted to promote any specific plan, Powell

said. Clark, at a press conference of his own, said Senate rules prohibited him from discussing matters told him in confidence by the Executive Branch.

However, a source familiar with the meetings told The Times that Turner in talking to Clark said the Administration would like to provide assistance to forces, led by Jonas Savimbi, that are opposing Angola's Marxist government.

The purpose of the aid, the source said, would be to occupy the estimated 20,000 Cuban troops stationed in Angola, preventing them from undertaking new adventures in Africa, particularly the possibility that they might enter the Rhodesian conflict.

By helping Savimbi, the source said, the Administration thinks it could "make it less attractive for the Cubans to involve themselves elsewhere."

The proposed U.S. aid to Savimbi would be channeled through a third country, probably France, the source said.

However, for any aid to Savimbi to be legal, repeal of the Clark amendment would be required, and Press Secretary Powell said the President had made no decision with regard to the provision.

Clark told his press conference that he would strongly oppose repeal but that he did not know what Congress would do if the President asked that the amendment be eliminated.

In an interview Tuesday, Clark had said that Carter's repeated criticisms of legislative restrictions on foreign policy had convinced him that the President had decided "to reinvolve the United States in the Angolan Civil war."

This was disputed Wednesday by Powell, who rejected suggestions "that the President has made some sort of decision to plunge us into the Angolan civil war."

"I can assure you that . . . it's not the case," Powell said.

Powell said Carter had no knowledge of the visits to Clark by Turner and Aaron. In fact, the press secretary called it, "a reasonably routine thing" for an Administration official with a problem to confer with "a senator who is well known as an expert in this area and in addition had a particular interest in a particular matter."

Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Clark is a member, released a study challenging the impression generated by some Administration officials in the past week that the President's foreign policy flexibility is sharply limited by a host of congressional restrictions.

"Applicable statutory restrictions on military involvement have presented no obstacle to the achievement of publicly announced United States objectives in Africa," the study said.

It noted that the only African countries where U.S. military involvement is expressly barred by law are Angola and Ethiopia. There are, however, restrictions on economic assistance to some African nations, notably Angola, Mozambique and Uganda.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A1-12**

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 May 1978

Carter, Gromyko Disagree Sharply On Africa Policy

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko sharply disagreed over African policy yesterday, but the Russian diplomat expressed hope that the discord would not derail completion of a new nuclear arms limitation pact.

A public clash — more severe than strategists on either side anticipated — developed after Gromyko emerged from four hours of discussion at the White House, sounding relatively optimistic about the grinding strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

When reporters turned the questioning to African issues, however, Gromyko said:

"... Of course we do have differences, and I think ... that the information which the president has at his disposal is not correct—that is our assessment ..."

"We have no intention of grabbing either the whole of Africa or its parts. We don't need it."

White House press secretary Jody Powell firmly countered, after consultation, that "the president wishes to make it completely clear that there is no doubt in his mind about the accuracy of the information which he has received and which he has conveyed

publicly to the American people and privately to the foreign minister."

Powell was referring to Carter's statements in his Chicago press conference on Thursday that Marxist Angola "must bear a heavy responsibility for the deadly attack" into Zaire's copper-mining Shaba Province, and the responsibility is "shared by Cuba." The Carter administration has charged that Cuba trained the invaders, who were armed with Soviet weapons. Carter added on Thursday that unless the Kremlin leaders "show some constraints" in Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa, that could "make it much more difficult to conclude a SALT agreement ..."

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, with Gromyko at his side at the conclusion of talks at the State Department yesterday, said somberly:

"I feel I must take exception to the statement that was made [by Gromyko] following the meeting with the president this morning, where it was indicated that the president did not have accurate information with respect to the situation in Africa.

"That is not the fact. The president is full and accurately informed, and I want to make this very clear."

Gromyko, asked at the same time if the United States and the Soviet Union are on a confrontation course over Africa, replied:

"I would not think that that should happen. Both sides should [an American said the Russian word Gromyko employed was more precisely translatable as "must"] conduct themselves in a responsible way in that area of politics as well.

"I would add to that, that there is information—and information. And sometimes conclusions are drawn from incorrect and inexact information. And that is bad."

Closing the exchange, Gromyko added, with a strained chuckle to reporters, "And please don't involve me in any more politics," as he waved off the press, saying genially in English, "Goodbye, ladies and gentlemen."

Vance announced that another meeting with Gromyko will be held in New York Wednesday "to carry on discussions." There had been no earlier hints of such a meeting.

This sudden scheduling has all the diplomatic earmarks of a damage-repair meeting to try to soften the sting of yesterday's encounter. It will require Vance to break into the schedule of a major summit conference for heads of government of the 15-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which opens here Tuesday.

Vance said the Wednesday meeting "would be more on the political side than on the technical side" of the nuclear arms control talks.

While Gromyko did his utmost to sound upbeat about the nuclear portions of yesterday's talks, saying they helped to "narrow down the differences" and produced "some headway on some parts of some of the questions," the attitude on the American side was generally gloomy.

Gromyko said the Soviet Union initiated "certain proposals and suggestions" to try to break the impasse on unresolved points in the four-year-old negotiations, and "we—the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership in general—are certainly in favor of an agreement."

"We certainly stand for peace in general, and for peaceful relations with the United States ...," Gromyko stressed.

Vance, however, bluntly said to reporters immediately after his farewell to Gromyko that "I can't say that we made much progress today, but we have to keep at it ..."

Asked if the latest Soviet suggestions can overcome the remaining barriers for concluding a new limitation on intercontinental missiles and bombers, Vance said Gromyko "did make some new proposals" and "some of them were substantive ..."

But Vance hardly sounded optimistic. He said, "We've got to take a look and see what these suggestions are that are on the table."

Powell said he would concur in Gromyko's comment that the talks on nuclear issues showed "some narrowing of differences in some areas." But he declined to encourage any optimism about the long-projected summit conference in Washington this summer between Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev and Carter to sign a nuclear pact.

He reiterated that "we are willing to sit down at any point," while "the Soviet Union has maintained that they are not willing to sit down until some sort of an agreement is reached."

Disappointment clearly registered at the White House after the talks, which began there at 8 a.m. and continued to 12:15 p.m. with a brief interruption for Carter to chat with Rose Kennedy, mother of the late president John F. Kennedy, and to introduce

CONTINUED

Powell told reporters "the discussions were full and very frank"—a diplomatic euphemism to signify blunt, or tough talks; he repeatedly employed the symbolism "frank" or "very frank."

The discussion, he said, "covered a number of important issues, including SALT, comprehensive test ban [meaning a ban on all nuclear testing, which would seal off the underground testing permitted by the Soviet Union and the United States since their above-ground testing ban in 1963], Africa and human rights."

Powell pointedly said that "the discussion on human rights was very direct and frank" and mentioned "existing cases . . ."

Carter on Thursday said that continuing Soviet "abuse" of human rights and punishment of citizens "monitoring" Soviet compliance with human rights pledges can rebound, along with Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Africa, against the sensitive nuclear negotiations.

The recent Soviet conviction of dissident Yuri Orlov, and pending prosecutions of Alexander Ginzburg and Anatoly Scharansky, are weighing heavily on the Carter administration.

For months the administration and the Soviet Union have engaged in what amounts to a semantic, diplomatic charade about whether this means these issues are "linked" to a new nuclear treaty. The charade was continued yesterday, although at the same time it became almost totally transparent.

Gromyko, speaking of SALT and Africa, told reporters on the White House lawn that "I think the secretary of state would agree if I say that neither side is linking these two issues."

"That is correct," Vance said.

At the end of Powell's press briefing, however, he added a more realistic statement "just so there is not any misapprehension or misunderstanding about the question of my response on [similarly disclaiming] linkage."

Powell said:

"As you know, we have consistently maintained that there is no reason to link those [subjects] directly in terms of refusing to reach agreements that are in the interest of this country in one area because of differences in another.

"However, we have also said that these differences in other areas can have, and do have, an impact on the attitude of the American people toward the bilateral [American-Soviet] relationship and its tone . . . And that point was also made in these discussions. So although the answer to the question [on linkage] is accurate as we have said, I would not want to mislead you that the other impact of these differences was ignored."

National Security Affairs Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who participated

in yesterday's talks, is one of the strongest advocates of what could be more accurately described as officially unacknowledged linkage. Some administration sources said the Carter-Gromyko meeting was timed to enable Brzezinski to attend it after his recent trip to China.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who had been regarded to be almost as wary of the hazards of linkage as Vance is known to be, also participated in the White House meeting, which Carter left without making any comment to the press.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-13

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 May 1978

Citing Contradictions, Senators Ask For Evidence of Cuban Role in Zaire

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the director of the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday for the evidence that prompted President Carter's charges of Cuban involvement in the rebel invasion of Zaire.

The committee's request to Adm. Stansfield Turner came against a background of confusion and skepticism about the accusations made by Carter on Thursday.

At a Chicago press conference, the president asserted that Cuba had helped to train and equip the Angola-based rebels who invaded Zaire's Shaba province.

Administration officials have said Carter's charges were based on new intelligence received by the White House on Wednesday. However, during the past few days, different administration sources have given conflicting versions of the Cuban role in the Zaire invasion.

The State Department's official position, which it publicly reiterated yesterday, is that Cuba helped train the rebels. However, it is known that some factions within the department contend that this assertion is grounded in inadequate and unreliable intelligence.

On Wednesday night, a senior department official, in a background briefing for reporters who accompanied Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance to New York, said he was not aware of any recent training provided the rebels by Cuba.

In response to questions yesterday about whether that contradicted the president's charges, a department spokesman, Tom Reston, said the official had not seen the new information in the possession of the White House when he spoke to reporters Wednesday night.

Reston said this fresh intelligence backed up the department's earlier

public assertion that the rebels were given Cuban training and Soviet weapons. Asked when the training took place, Reston said, "The time frame was directly leading up to the invasion."

However, some department officials are known to still have doubts about the reliability of the administration's evidence. Some reportedly have said privately they believe Carter made his public charges as part of a White House campaign to win a loosening of congressional restraints on actions the executive branch can take to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa.

The confusion that these contradictions have caused became evident yesterday when Vance testified at a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) said afterward that he called attention to official Cuban government denials of involvement in Zaire and asked Vance about the Carter charges.

Vance referred to "new evidence," McGovern said. But in response to a motion asking for a written report on this evidence, according to McGovern and other committee sources, Vance broke in to say that the new intelligence had originated with the CIA and added: "I'd prefer that you get the information from Adm. Turner."

The committee then agreed unanimously to call Turner to testify after the Senate returns from the coming week's recess. In announcing the action, committee Chairman John Sparkman (D-Ala.) denied that it re-

flected doubts among committee members about Carter's charges.

McGovern said: "I don't want to say I'm skeptical of what the president is saying. But, I recognize a contradiction when I see one, and I think it should be cleared up."

McGovern, who met with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez at the United Nations last week, said the Cuban had assured him "in the strongest possible terms" that his country had "absolutely no involvement" with the Zaire invasion.

"He told me," McGovern added, "it's as Shakespeare said, 'Much ado about nothing.'"

The senator said he and Rodriguez also had discussed Cuba's military role in other parts of Africa. According to McGovern, Rodriguez said Cuba, which aided Ethiopia in its recent conflict with Somalia, would not take part militarily in Ethiopian actions against rebels in Eritrea province "unless other foreign powers intervene."

McGovern said Rodriguez took a different line in regard to Rhodesia, where rebels operating from neighboring countries are fighting the transitional government moving Rhodesia toward black majority rule.

Rodriguez said if Anglo-American mediation efforts produce a solution to the "front-line" African states supporting the guerrillas, Cuba will accept that result. Otherwise, he added, Cuba "reserves the right to help its friends" among the guerrilla forces.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 23

THE BOSTON GLOBE
26 May 1978

POLITICAL CIRCUIT

By ROBERT HEALY

A difficult role for US in Africa

The Carter Administration is beginning to make noises like Henry Kissinger on its African policy. But the talk appears to be just that — talk of the cold war nature without any clear substance.

On the one hand the President told congressional leaders last week that restrictions on emergency U.S. assistance to friendly foreign countries hampered the Administration's efforts to aid nations, such as Zaire. Later, to a group of editors, the President said he favored a lot of those constraints placed on him by the Congress.

It was revealed on Wednesday in the Washington Post that CIA director Stansfield Turner earlier this month met with Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) about possible covert U.S. military aid to rebels in Angola through a third country. The rebels are fighting the troops of Angola's leftist central government.

Clark is the author of an amendment in 1975 which restricts the President's use of covert operations in Angola without the express consent of Congress.

White House Press Secretary Jody Powell said Wednesday that the President had no knowledge Turner was meeting with Clark.

Finally, there was the TV appearance on Sunday of UN Ambassador Andrew Young on "Face the Nation" where he said that congressional constraints have not hindered the Carter Administration's efforts to provide limited aid to Zaire and other countries fighting Communist-backed troops in Africa.

It's no wonder columnist Robert Shrum referred to the Carter Administration as the Ted Mack hour.

In 1975, when Kissinger was urging then President Gerald Ford to fight the imposition of the Clark amendment restricting the President's right to engage in covert operations and for a temporary commitment of aid to the group the United States supported in Angola, everyone knew clearly where Kissinger stood. And Kissinger himself was angry at the President for not making what he considered a more effective fight on Capitol Hill for the Secretary's position.

Finally, by the end of last week, a Pentagon spokesman said there were "less than 100 Americans" on the ground at three airports in Zaire coordinating landings of American planes there. Earlier, Jody Powell had talked in terms of a dozen or less people at one airport in Zaire.

What is involved here is a major issue in American foreign policy. For some time now the President's foreign policy adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has been talking freely with members of the Senate about the need to counter Soviet influence in Africa. Specifically, American estimates put some 15,000 to 17,000 Cuban troops in Ethiopia where they are, or could become involved in the 16-year-old secessionist guerrilla war in the province of Eritrea, which borders the Red Sea, across from Saudi Arabia.

Further, the rebels who invaded Zaire from Angola to challenge the Western-supported Zaire government are believed by U.S. intelligence experts to have been trained by Soviet-supported Cuban troops.

Brzezinski, a cold warrior much like Kissinger, would like to counter this Soviet influence. Just how far he would go is not clear as the actions of the Administration have shown during the last week.

President Carter, during the campaign, was critical of the secret commitments of Kissinger and he promised there would be none.

Further, it is the broad position of Ambassador Young that any kind of military involvement, either by the Soviets or the US, is a losing proposition.

But one gets that uneasy feeling that the Administration isn't sure what it is doing in Africa.

SENATORS ASK PROOF THAT CUBA HAD ROLE IN INVASION OF ZAIRE

By **BERNARD GWERTZMAN**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 26—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the Administration today to produce evidence to back up President Carter's contention yesterday that Cuba had played a behind-the-scenes role in the recent invasion of Zaire by rebel forces based in Angola.

In a closed-door hearing with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, the committee agreed to a request by Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, for a full airing of the President's charges.

Mr. Vance was asked about Mr. Carter's statement that Cuba had trained and equipped the invaders, knew about the invasion and did nothing to prevent it. The Secretary reportedly said the committee should address its inquiries to the Central Intelligence Agency, the source of the information.

Administration Accuses Cuba

As a result, the committee decided to hear testimony from Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, after the Memorial Day recess.

For the last week, the Carter Administration has been accusing Cuba of playing a substantial role in the invasion, even though President Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials have emphatically denied any direct or indirect involvement.

Senator McGovern, who just returned from the opening of the United Nations special session on disarmament, said that Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez of Cuba had told him in New York yesterday that there was no Cuban involvement. Earlier, Mr. McGovern had been told the same thing by Cuba's senior diplomat in Washington, Ramón Sánchez Parodi.

Mr. McGovern said he was raising the issue because it was crucial for the committee to know Cuba's role in Africa and to find out whether Cuban officials or the Administration was telling the truth. He said it was important because several public figures, including former President Gerald R. Ford, were urging that the talks on strategic arms be suspended because

of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Africa.

Other members of the committee were concerned that the President was seeking more freedom of action in foreign affairs and was using the Cuban issue to argue for changes in the law.

The question of Cuban involvement in the Zaire fighting has been hotly disputed within the Administration. Some officials contend that it is impossible to prove that the Cubans did anything more than train some Katangans some time ago, in connection with their aid to Angolan forces, and give them Soviet arms.

But the Administration, in part to justify American participation in the French and Belgian airlift to Zaire, has suggested a direct Cuban role. Mr. Carter, in a news conference in Chicago, said the Angolan Government bore "heavy responsibility" for the attack launched from its territory "and it's a burden and a responsibility shared by Cuba."

McGovern's Reaction

"We believe that Cuba had known of the Katangan plan to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border," he said. "We also know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked."

Mr. McGovern, when asked by reporters about Mr. Carter's comments, said: "I don't want to say I am skeptical of what the President is saying. I recognize a contradiction when I see it."

Mr. Vance, who is having critical talks with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms, was before the committee to brief them on the negotiations and said nothing to reporters about the controversy over the Cubans.

Administration Denials

In New York on Wednesday night, reporters covering Mr. Vance's trip were told that he had no specific information linking the Cubans to events in Zaire. But a State Department spokesman, Tom Reston, said today that fresh information had been received Wednesday that confirmed the Administration's contention earlier that the Cubans had recently trained and equipped the Katangans.

A highly placed official said, however, that the information available was open to different interpretations and that there

was no evidence that the Cubans had instigated the attack.

The demand by the Foreign Relations Committee for evidence of Mr. Carter's allegations provoked denials that the Administration had manufactured the concern. Although some officials remained unconvinced, others with more complete access to intelligence information insisted that the cumulative impact of the data was "overwhelming" in indicating that the Cubans had strongly abetted the Katangan operation.

"The stack of papers is three inches high," one source said, contending that if a newspaper had even one or two of the reports, "you'd run with it." The Administration, in keeping with its practice of protecting intelligence sources, refused to divulge how its information was received.

A C.I.A. spokesman said there was "very hard, recent evidence that the Cubans have been both training and equipping the Katangese."

Another official said there was no specific new evidence but that an intensive C.I.A. review of previous intelligence reports showed the Cubans had trained the Katangans, that the Russians had equipped them and that the Angolans had given them sanctuary.

"One has to assume that they all knew that the Katangans' only goal in life was to go across the border and shoot up Shaba Province from where they all had originated," the official said.

In his news conference, Mr. Carter also complained about Congressionally imposed "limitations on his power. The issue came up during Mr. Vance's appearance, and the Secretary reportedly suggested that the Administration needed a contingency fund for military assistance to friendly countries in emergencies.

Outlook for Change

Congress in recent years has provided funds for an economic contingency fund but has insisted upon specific advance authorization for military help.

A staff study by the Foreign Relations Committee found that economic aid was barred for only two countries in Africa, Angola and Mozambique. Some other countries can receive aid if the President declares it to be in the United States' national interest. Mr. Vance would like all prohibitions by country removed so that if a country such as Angola changes policy, it can be rewarded quickly by the President without waiting for new legislation.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 48-53

NEWSWEEK

5 June 1978

The Fallout In Zaire

In a convoy of stolen cars and trucks, the Katangan rebels pulled out of Zaire last week, crossed through neighboring Zambia and returned to their sanctuaries in Marxist Angola. Back in Kolwezi, the shattered Zairian mining town, French Foreign Legionnaires and Belgian paratroopers wound up their rescue mission and began to withdraw. But Jimmy Carter was still on the offensive. "The government of Angola must bear a heavy responsibility for the deadly attack which was launched from its territory, and it's a burden and a responsibility shared by Cuba," Carter declared at a press conference in Chicago. "We believe that Cuba had known of the Katangan plan to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border. We also know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked."

Some Administration officials still questioned the extent of Cuban involvement in the Zaire invasion. But in Kolwezi last week, NEWSWEEK's Arnaud de la Grange interviewed two Katangan prisoners who said that Cuban advisers had accompanied them into Zaire's Shaba Province (page 53). Carter insisted

that he needed a freer hand to "compete peacefully" with the Cubans and their Soviet sponsors and ordered a study of Congressional restrictions on military and economic aid to African nations. Another study under way at the State Department and National Security Council foreshadowed new forms of U.S. pressure on Cuba.

Alarm over the Cuban thrust was not confined to the U.S. Last week, in response to Cuban activities in Africa, Canada discontinued its program of aid to Havana, which has totaled nearly \$15 million since 1972. In Paris, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing held a summit conference of twenty African leaders—including Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko—to organize a pan-African peace-keeping force for Zaire. Giscard then met with Carter in Washington and pressed for more U.S. help in Africa.

HORROR AND HOSTAGES

In Zaire, the retreating Katangan invaders left behind a trail of death and devastation. Casualty figures were far from complete, but an estimated 1,000 Africans had died, and almost 100 whites

had been massacred. And when the rebels withdrew, they took as many as 60 European hostages with them. No one knew when Kolwezi's vital copper mines would be back in production, and there was strong doubt that Zaire's inept army could protect the region. But the French-inspired African peace-keeping force was slowly taking shape; a vanguard of Moroccan troops had already arrived.

On the Zambian side of the border, Bill Campbell, a free-lance photographer on assignment for NEWSWEEK, watched loot-laden Katangans race toward Angola. "Near the town of Ikелenge we came upon four Katangan rebels," Campbell reported. "The leader wore a brown pin-stripe jacket, and around his neck hung a radio-cassette player loaded with a Ray Conniff tape. 'Do you have hostages with you?' asked a reporter. 'Many men, women and children,' replied the leader. 'They are behind us and will be traveling to Angola.' Thousands of Zambians turned out to cheer the Katangans. Said one villager: 'They are good fighters and have much magic.'"

In Kolwezi, fear and death still stalked the city. Black townspeople began to return to their homes, but few whites were left. The French commander, Col. Yves Gras, complained they had been driven away by "a psychosis of fear." But at least some of the fears were justified. "I had to take refuge in the Kolwezi airport one night because Zairian troops had gone on a drunken rampage in town," NEWSWEEK's James Pringle reported from Kolwezi. "At dawn the next morning, the Zairian troops guarding the airport opened up with a fifteen-minute barrage of gunfire against attackers who existed only in their imagination. A French officer had to hit them on their helmets with the butt of his rifle to get them to stop firing—which they had been doing with their eyes squeezed shut. 'Kolwezi is finished,' the officer told me. 'Two days after we leave, all hell will break loose.'"

MOSTLY JAWBONING

In an effort to hold Zaire together, Giscard presented Carter with some specific proposals at a dinner meeting late last week. The French President wanted the U.S. to support the pan-African peace-keeping force and to contribute to two economic-development funds, one for Zaire itself and another, totaling \$1 billion, for Africa as a whole. The Administration's response was noncommittal in detail, but Carter promised some form of "concerted action" with the French.

So far, U.S. policy on the Soviet threat in Africa was mostly a matter of jawboning. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Washington last week for further talks on a second-stage strategic arms limitation treaty, and Carter said at his news conference that he did not want to abort that process by "linking" SALT to Africa. Instead, he issued another warning that the Soviet thrust in Africa "will make it much more difficult to conclude a SALT agreement and to have it ratified once it is written."

Despite Carter's verdict on Cuba's role, U.S. officials still disagreed on the extent of Havana's responsibility for the Zaire invasion. Some State Department officials insisted there was no evidence of recent contact between the Cubans and the Katangans. And at a United Nations conference on disarmament last week, Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez told Sen. George McGovern: "I give you my word, on my honor, that our forces had nothing to do with the Katanga operation." In blaming Cuba, the Administration seemed to be relying in part on French intelligence reports which came, NEWSWEEK learned, from agents of UNITA, the anti-Marxist guerrilla movement in Angola.

Hard-liners in Washington, including national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, wanted the U.S. to act vigorously against the Cubans. Nearly a month ago, the director of the CIA, Stansfield Turner, is said to have shown Sen. Dick Clark of Iowa a detailed plan for providing covert aid to UNITA's campaign against Angola. Elements in the Administration, led by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young, favor what Young calls "a steady, quiet approach" involving economic aid to African nations that might be weaned away from the Soviet-Cuban bloc.

CONTINUED

PRESSURE ON HAVANA

Carter rejected any use of UNITA to stir up trouble for Cuba in Angola. But he seemed on the verge of putting more pressure on Havana through economic actions. Vance, for one, believes that cutting off the flow of American tourists to Cuba could be a first step. And although the U.S. already has an embargo on trade with Cuba, its allies could exert still more pressure. "We didn't exactly discourage the Canadians from cutting aid to Havana," said an Administration aide. Beyond that, the study being prepared by the State Department and NSC suggests that other allies could be asked to reduce their trade with Cuba, halt aid programs and limit technology transfers. "The way to get at the Cubans is through the Europeans," said a high State Department official. Such policy decisions were still to be made, but it was clear that Jimmy Carter has had enough of Cuba's armed challenge in Africa.

—ANGUS DEMING with JAMES PRINGLE in Kolwezi. SCOTT SULLIVAN in Washington and bureau reports

Hill Panel Asks Proof Of Cuba Role in Zaire

Associated Press

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided yesterday to demand CIA evidence that would back up President Carter's claim of Cuban involvement in the recent invasion of Zaire by Katangan rebels.

The committee requested such proof from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance during a closed-door meeting on the U.S.-Soviet arms limitation talks. But Vance told the senators it was the CIA, not the State Department, which had the evidence.

Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., who disclosed the committee action to reporters, quoted Vance as having told the panel he "would prefer that we'd interrogate them (the CIA)."

He said the senators agreed to call on CIA Director Stansfield Turner for an explanation. He did not say whether an actual vote was taken, but there was "no question that the entire committee supported the request."

Cuban officials, including President Fidel Castro, deny that Cuban forces in Angola had any role in the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by Katangan rebels operating from Angola.

Dozens of Europeans and many African residents of Shaba were killed, injured or left homeless before the invasion was quelled by French and Belgian paratroopers.

McGovern told reporters he personally had been assured twice by the Cubans — first by the chief of their diplomatic-interest section here and again on Thursday by Cuban Vice President (Carlos Rafael) Rodriguez at the United Nations — that there was no Cuban involvement in the Zaire episode.

In addition, McGovern recalled that Castro last week called in the senior U.S. diplomat in Havana, Lyle Lane, to deny Cuban involvement in Zaire.

Carter said Thursday that the United States knows that "the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked."

Asked whether he personally believed the Cubans rather than Carter, McGovern replied: "I'm not passing judgment. But I know a contradiction when I see one. I think it's time for the committee to have a clear answer."

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-2**

NEW YORK TIMES
1 JUNE 1978

Congress Is Accused of Laxity on C.I.A.'s Covert Activity

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Some members of Congress and Washington officials are openly expressing concern about what they say are weaknesses in the Congressional control and monitoring of the Central Intelligence Agency's covert activities overseas.

They cite as evidence the willingness of the Senate and House intelligence committees to approve clandestine operations in such sensitive regions as the Middle East and Africa without serious questioning.

At least three such operations involving the shipment of communications equipment to Egypt and the Sudan and an anti-Cuban propaganda program in the Horn of Africa, were approved by the committees last fall, according to well-placed sources.

Some legislators were known to have had subsequent misgivings about at least one operation, but no objections were voiced at the time, the same sources said.

There is no legislation barring the C.I.A. from engaging in covert activities abroad, but the quick endorsement by the Senate and House intelligence committees last year of the three covert operations disconcerted some members of Congress who had already raised questions about the various command-and-control mechanisms set up in the wake of the C.I.A. domestic spying scandals, The Times's sources said.

The C.I.A.'s operations were approved, as they must be before being submitted to Congress, by President Carter and the Special Coordinating Committee, his new Cabinet-level group that reviews and assesses all clandestine activity. The coordinating committee is headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser.

'To Cover the Waterfront'

Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee acknowledged in recent interviews that the process of gaining the right to complete oversight over the C.I.A.'s activities was a slow one and not yet been completed. But they insisted, as one senior aide said, that "in every area of intelligence activity, the committee will be able to cover the waterfront from top to bottom."

The broad question of Congressional control over the C.I.A.'s covert activities has been raised repeatedly since the spying scandal. One immediate solution was to expand to eight the number of Congressional committees entitled to briefings on such activities. In practice, however, an inquiry by The Times showed that while the full membership of the Senate and House intelligence committees was briefed, only a few members of the other six committees were informed of the covert operations and usually after the fact.

Because of the past controversy over the agency's involvement in Chile and elsewhere, some members of Congress and Administration officials are known to believe, the security for such operation is all the more fragile and, thus, the activities riskier.



For example, the existence of the clandestine operations in the Middle East and Africa was disclosed as President Carter and key Administration aides are becoming involved in an increasingly public debate over Congressional restrictions and prohibitions on foreign involvements.

New U.S. Role in Angolan War Seen

Senator Dick Clark, Democrat of Iowa, told reporters last week that he believed the Carter Administration was considering a re-entry into the Angolan civil war by clandestinely supplying arms, through the French, to a pro-Western faction there. And the President was quoted as having made clear to some senators that he would support a repeal of legislation barring the United States from aiding a pro-Western faction in Angola.

The covert operations, all approved sometime last fall, included the delivery of clandestine radio and other communications equipment to President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt and to President Gaafar al-Nimeiry of the Sudan.

In addition, the C.I.A. organized an anti-Cuban propaganda operation during intensified fighting between Ethiopia and insurgents in Eritrea.

As explained by Administration officials, the equipment provided to Mr. Sadat last year was part of a continuing C.I.A. project to supply him with a personal communications system for safety.

The Administration officials said that Mr. Sadat had requested the equipment

so he could communicate with his personal aides without others—presumably in the Egyptian military—being able to eavesdrop.

The equipment was said to have cost less than \$500,000 and perhaps as little as \$350,000. It was described as part of a five-year or six-year multimillion-dollar communications program, now in its final stage.

Similar equipment was reportedly provided earlier to leaders of the Israeli Government.

Administration officials explained that Mr. Sadat considered the C.I.A. equipment as "very personal" and it was at his direct request that it was provided secretly.

CONTINUED

One well-placed official expressed dismay during an interview over the fact that the Senate and House intelligence committees, which investigated the C.I.A. scandals in 1975, had now routinely approved the covert operations. "The pendulum is swinging back," he said.

A Loophole Was Found

Complicating the overall question of how effectively the Senate and House intelligence committees have been in monitoring covert C.I.A. activities is a procedural dispute that is now under study by the National Security Council.

According to a number of Administration officials and members of Congress, a basic monitoring tool for Congress is the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which states that no covert C.I.A. operation can be carried out unless the President makes "a finding" that the operation is important to national security. The proposed activity then is submitted to the House and Senate intelligence committees for approval before being carried out.

What some members of Congress are known to consider as a loophole was quickly found. In January 1975, less than a month after the amendment was approved by Congress, President Gerald R. Ford issued a series of secret "world-

wide findings" that determined in advance that any C.I.A. clandestine operation dealing with narcotics, terrorism or counterintelligence was prima facie important to national security.

President Carter endorsed that interpretation shortly after taking office last year, well-placed sources said.

In other words, the sources said, the C.I.A. did not need formal approval to begin overseas operations in those three categories of clandestine activity.

Some members of Congress, interviewed in recent weeks complained that the worldwide findings were "vague" and "open-ended."

end insert a pu 21graf "Complicating... insert b cia sub for grafs 27-30 strtg "Anytime..."

One legislator noted, for example, that under the current interpretation the C.I.A. theoretically could mount a propa-

ganda operation—without advance clearance from Congress—in connection with a narcotics investigation.

Another legislative official conceded that the worldwide findings were vague, but contended, nonetheless, that the Senate and House intelligence committees could overcome that deficiency.

The official added that the basic issue confronting the committees was one of "follow-up." The fact that the White House and C.I.A. had agreed on a worldwide finding, the legislator added, should not deter the committees from fulfilling their obligation—to continuously investigate the C.I.A. overseas to insure that no improper activities were taking place.

As of today, a number of sources said, the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has the largest staff for such work in Congress, has only one investigator assigned to that area.

Because of some complaints, the sources said, the National Security Council is now trying to rewrite the worldwide findings into a more specific "omnibus" finding. It would specifically cite the kinds of terrorism, narcotics or counterintelligence activities that would be directly considered important to national security and, thus, would not need Congressional approval. The new finding is expected to be proposed imminently, sources said.

Another potential Hughes-Ryan loophole cited by some members of Congress dealt with language in the legislation that specifically exempts C.I.A. "activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence" from Congressional oversight.

"That's the real escape clause," one official said. "They don't have to report on their assets doing intelligence collection."

Two members of Congress noted during interviews that John Stockwell, the former C.I.A. task force leader in Angola, revealed in his recently published book that C.I.A. agents and operatives were serving on the ground inside Angola as advisers during the 1975 civil war there—in direct contradiction to what Congress secretly was being told by the C.I.A.

Those Americans inside Angola, the officials said, were depicted during secret briefings as merely conducting "intelligence collection"—an activity outside of the purview of the Hughes-Ryan amendment.

"Take a C.I.A. asset in the field," one legislator explained. "He may be giving you counterintelligence information, gathering positive intelligence and also may be doing propaganda."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-21

THE WASHINGTON POST
29 May 1978

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The CIA: Rejecting a Plea to Help Moro

Rigid clamps placed on secret U.S. intelligence operations by a fearful Congress forced the Central Intelligence Agency to reject a top-priority request for help from Italy in that nation's agony during the abduction and murder of Aldo Moro by left-wing terrorists.

The request was delivered to the CIA by CESIS, a secret liaison arm of Italy's intelligence service. It asked assistance from the CIA in dealing with the menace of the Red Brigades, Christian Democratic leader Moro's kidnappers and later murderers.

In an earlier era, such a request to be helped by what used to be the Western world's most effective intelligence organization would have been instantly and routinely met. Not so today. Burdened with restrictions imposed by Congress and targeted as enemy No. 1 by some of its own former operatives, the CIA was finally compelled to say no to CESIS.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner and his legal advisers wrestled with the request for two weeks before rejecting it. Theoretically, they might have ruled the other way, without running afoul of the law.

Their fear, however, went deeper than the cold print of the law. They feared, probably rightly, that even if CIA's clandestine help to Italy in a moment of extreme agony had been ruled technically legal, the chance of discovery by unfriendly congressional sleuths could have fanned it into another political exposé. That this was neither subverting a legally elected government nor intruding in another country's election made no difference.

The law is clear. Signed Dec. 30, 1974, it prohibits all undercover "operations in foreign countries," other than routine intelligence gathering, "unless and until the president finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States." Each clandestine operation must be reported to literally dozens of congressmen: members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations committees, as well as the two intelligence committees.

Despite softening of the anti-CIA mood in Congress, fear of political attack that might damage President Carter, Adm. Turner and the CIA itself dictated extreme caution in replying to Rome.

An affirmative reply, had it come, would have required days or even a

week more in a situation where speed was imperative if Moro was to be saved. The 1974 law, written by former senator Harold Hughes (D-Iowa) and Rep. Leo Ryan (D-Calif.), requires a full-fledged meeting of the National Security Council and a specific presidential directive to the CIA before any clandestine operation can be started. Then comes notification of the four congressional committees.

The only exception is a "generic" presidential finding that permits clandestine CIA help in dealing with "international" terrorism. The president made that finding months ago. But CIA lawyers, agonizing over Italy's request for help, could not absolutely prove that the Moro-Red Brigades case involved "international" terrorism.

"Sure," one administration official told us, "we know that the Red Brigades are armed with communist-bloc guns, but that isn't easy to prove. Sure, we are pretty certain they get training in Eastern Europe, but we don't have absolute proof." Lacking proof of internationalization, the witch-hunt atmosphere that has dominated Capitol Hill's handling of the CIA the past few years called for extreme caution.

With great reluctance, Turner said no to his Italian counterparts. Instead of gaining access to the CIA's expertise, the Italian government accepted overt assistance from a single State Department psychiatrist, who went to Rome and performed creditably in advising the Italian government on psychological aspects of the case.

These tragic overtones of CIA impotence in a matter of extreme urgency to Italy go far beyond Italy alone. In the past, U.S. intelligence would have been on the scene helping to unlock the secrets of the Red Brigades; it would also have been the beneficiary of in-

valuable, on-the-spot information about the Red Brigades and about methods of Italian intelligence.

Exposure to such details is the heart and soul of the intelligence game, permitting the U.S. agents to compile a record that some day could be essential in uncovering future terrorist operations—perhaps in the United States itself. But the CIA's hands were tied in a case demanding speed, courage and political support. The result: a costly defeat in the war to preserve democratic institutions.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE-A-1

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
2 JUNE 1978

Soviets Bug U.S. Embassy In Moscow

Associated Press

Electronic devices of "an intelligence gathering nature" were discovered in a chimney of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow last week, administration officials said last night.

One official, who asked not to be named, said the espionage equipment represented a "fairly serious penetration of our embassy."

He said the electronic gear was apparently regularly maintained by Soviet technicians, who entered the embassy by crawling through a tunnel and then climbing up the chimney.

The official said the electronic equipment, which included a large antenna, was being analyzed. He added that a "damage assessment" of possible information obtained by the Soviets was under way.

U.S. officials in Moscow said a Soviet agent was discovered before a bank of electronic equipment monitoring information from the device when wiring from it was traced through the tunnel to a nearby apartment building. When discovered, the man fled, officials said.

THE CHIMNEY is adjacent to the embassy's south wing, which houses junior employees and does not have a high security rating, but U.S. diplo-

mats were concerned that the bugging equipment could have been monitoring the neighboring central wing. That section houses the highly sensitive offices of Ambassador Malcolm Toon.

Thomas Reston, the State Department's associate spokesman, said earlier that the devices were found May 25 and that a protest has been lodged with the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

Reston, however, declined to give details about the devices or how they were found.

The electronic gear was discovered during one of the routine security searches conducted regularly because of the history of Soviet espionage activity involving the embassy, one official said.

AFTER FINDING the equipment, American embassy officials followed a cable down the chimney and through a tunnel that led to Soviet property, he said.

"There was regular physical penetration of the embassy by Soviets without the knowledge of the United States," he said. "They would come through the tunnel and up the chimney."

U.S. officials have built a barrier in the tunnel near the embassy's property line to "keep the Russians out," he said.

Although the exact nature of the equipment was unknown, the official said it apparently was not limited to eavesdropping devices.

"WE'RE STILL trying to figure this puzzle out," the official said. "We're doing a technical assessment of the problem right now. But it might take some time to determine precisely how it (the equipment) works."

He added that the equipment might be linked to the mystery of why the Russians have frequently beamed low-level microwaves at the embassy.

Authorities have been concerned that excessive microwave radiation could result in health problems for U.S. personnel serving in the embassy.

Some officials have also speculated that the microwave bombardment could be connected with intelligence gathering activities, possibly supplying power to spy equipment concealed in the embassy.

In a similar case, the State Department disclosed on May 19, 1964, that at least 40 microphones were found hidden in the walls of the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

The microphones, discovered by a wrecking crew after U.S. suspicions had been aroused by several clues, were found on the embassy's 8th, 9th and 10th floors and lower apartments.

An administration official said yesterday that the chimney runs through the embassy and added that the antenna was located in the upper part of the building although he was uncertain where the rest of the equipment was discovered.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1,3

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 June 1978

Secret Bugging Shaft Found in U.S. Mission in Moscow

By Dan Fisher
Los Angeles Times

MOSCOW—A secret shaft containing sophisticated listening and transmitting devices was discovered in the south wing of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow last week by workers doing some remodeling, it was learned here.

[State Department spokesman Tom Reston confirmed last night that "electronic devices of an intelligence-gathering nature" were discovered in the embassy May 25 and said that an official protest has been lodged with the Soviet Foreign Ministry.]

The shaft is connected to a previously unknown underground tunnel beneath the wing which leads in the direction of neighboring Soviet apartment and office buildings, according to reliable embassy sources.

When an embassy security employee crawled into the tunnel to investigate it, he reportedly encountered a Russian who scrambled swiftly toward the opposite end. It had been speculated that the intruder was in the process of removing wires and other electronic gear from the tunnel.

Discovery of the secret shaft and tunnel comes at a time when U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union is under its most fundamental review in several years. The continuing military buildup within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe coupled with Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa have caused a noticeable negative shift in American attitudes toward the Kremlin.

The discovery also comes during a critical stage in negotiations toward a new strategic arms limitations treaty (SALT). Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance concluded the latest round of SALT talks in New York on Wednesday.

This newest evidence of Soviet eavesdropping here follows the revelation early in 1976 that the Soviets were beaming microwaves at the embassy in an apparent effort to listen in on conversations. There was also Soviet speculation at the time that the radiation beams were intended to disrupt U.S. equipment on the embassy roof that was designed to pick up radio transmissions.

It is believed that radiation is still aimed at the embassy's top floors, although at low levels.

It could not be learned yesterday whether the gear discovered in the secret shaft might be connected with the microwaves. The principal piece of equipment retrieved from the shaft reportedly was a dish-shaped instrument believed to be a transmitter-receiver.

The south wing where the vertical shaft was discovered is composed mostly of apartments for embassy secretaries and other staff personnel. No apartment there is assigned to high-ranking embassy officers.

The offices of the mission's science section are on the first floor of the wing. They were moved there after a fire last summer that gutted most of the floors in the key central section of the building and severely damaged two more.

The top floor of the south wing also contains the headquarters for diplomats assigned to oversee construction of a new U.S. Embassy for which preparations are under way.

The secret shaft extends from the basement all the way to the seventh and highest floor of the wing, it is understood.

Whether the electronic instruments in the shaft could have compromised security in the embassy's central wing depends on how sophisticated they are, one source suggested. With the proper equipment, this source said, it may even be possible to duplicate a letter or memo based on the sounds that the different typewriter keys make as they strike the paper.

According to one report, workmen have now blocked off the tunnel and removed the listening devices from the shaft. While it was open, however, the tunnel apparently gave the Soviets secret access at least to the embassy's south wing.

It is apparently unknown how long the tunnel and secret shaft have existed. The building that houses the embassy was originally an apartment house. Soon after completion, it was converted by a Soviet military construction battalion and turned over to the Americans in 1952.

In 1961 more than 40 "bugs" with pin-sized microphone heads were found to have been imbedded in the walls behind the upright fins of hot-water radiators in the building.

The location guaranteed that they would not be sealed by any of the five coats of paint put on by U.S. security officials, since they were in a place virtually impossible for the painters to reach.

In the mid-1950s, the Great Seal of the United States that hung on the wall behind the ambassador's desk was found to have been fitted with a microphone and miniature radio transmitter.

ARTICLE APPEARED

NEW YORK TIMES

2 JUNE 1978

ON PAGE 48

U.S. Embassy in Soviet Finds 'Bugs'

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 1—United States officials have again discovered electronic intelligence devices in the American Embassy in Moscow, Administration aides said today.

The officials declined to provide details of the discovery, but a State Department official said that on May 23 "electronic listening devices of an intelligence gathering nature" were discovered in the embassy. The officials would not say how many of the so-called "bugs" had been found.

The United States has delivered a formal protest to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, officials said.

The discovery occurred on the day that Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance met in New York with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to discuss Soviet-American relations.

Officials are irritated by the episode and it is said to have reinforced tendencies in the White House to take a firmer line in dealings with Moscow.

Electronic monitoring devices have been found in the American Embassy before, on one occasion in large numbers.

Also, a "bug" was found in the nose of a wooden image of the American eagle that had been presented to the embassy by Russians.

The most recent incident of monitoring at the embassy involved radiation beams directed at the building, apparently for picking up conversations and also for jamming American listening devices.

Mr. Vance met with Mr. Gromyko in New York yesterday, but it is not clear whether the issue was raised in their five-hour session.

A Time of Growing Tension

The disclosure comes at a time of growing tension between Washington and Moscow, and some officials have linked the Soviet action to other issues, including Moscow's policies in Africa and its treatment of domestic dissidents.

According to a White House official, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, had the incident in mind when he strongly criticized Moscow in a televised interview on Sunday.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-1**

BALTIMORE SUN
2 JUNE 1978

U.S. finds Soviet bugs at embassy

Penetration called 'fairly serious' at legation in Moscow

From Wire Services

Washington—United States officials have discovered electronic listening devices in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, administration aides said yesterday.

Officials said the devices were not microphones and that specialists have not yet been able to determine their exact function. However, it is thought that they were related to the large amount of microwave radiation that has been detected in the vicinity of the embassy since 1976.

Thomas Reston, the State Department's associate spokesman, said the devices were found May 25 and that a protest has been lodged with the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

Mr. Reston, however, declined to give details about the devices or how they were found.

While the State Department officially declined to provide details of the discovery, one official told the *New York Times* "electronic listening devices of an intelligence-gathering nature" were discovered.

Another State Department official, who asked not to be named, told the Associated Press that espionage equipment represented a "fairly serious penetration of our embassy."

He said the electronic gear was apparently regularly maintained by Soviet technicians who entered the embassy by crawling through a tunnel and then climbing up a chimney.

The official said the electronic equipment, which included an antenna, was being analyzed. He added that a "damage assessment" of possible information obtained by the Russians was under way.

The electronic gear was discovered during one of the routine security searches conducted regularly because of the history of Soviet espionage activity involving the embassy, one official said.

After finding the equipment, U.S. Embassy officials followed a cable down the chimney and through a tunnel that led to Soviet property, he said.

"There was regular physical penetration of the embassy by Soviets without the

knowledge of the United States," the official said. "They would come through the tunnel and up the chimney."

A barrier was built in the tunnel near the embassy's property line to "keep the Russians out," he said.

Although the exact nature of the equipment was unknown, the official said it apparently was not limited to eavesdropping devices.

"We're still trying to figure this puzzle out," the official said. "We're doing a technical assessment of the problem right now. But it might take some time to determine precisely how it works."

He added that the equipment might be linked to the mystery of why the Russians have frequently beamed low-level microwaves at the embassy.

Authorities have been concerned that excessive microwave radiation could result in health problems for U.S. personnel serving in the embassy.

Some officials have also speculated that the microwave bombardment could be connected with intelligence-gathering activities, possibly supplying power to spy equipment concealed in the embassy.

The discovery of the devices is said to have irritated U.S. officials and to have reinforced tendencies in the White House to take a firmer line in dealings with Moscow.

The disclosure comes at a time of

growing tension between Washington and Moscow, and some officials have linked the Soviet action to other issues, including Moscow's policies in Africa and its treatment of domestic dissidents. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, was referring to this incident in mind when he delivered a strong blast at Moscow in a televised interview Sunday, a White House official said.

Another official said the discovery "surprised a number of Soviet specialists" in the State Department and weakened the arguments of aides there who had attempted to restrain the new coolness in White House presentations on relations with the Soviet Union.

The American Embassy is run under tight security conditions and is always guarded by U.S. marines. Officials carry out routine sweeps for listening devices.

However, in a fire on August 26, 1977, it was penetrated by Soviet firefighters who are said to have had access to large portions of the old building.

But embassy officials refused to allow the firefighters to enter the communications center, preferring to let the equipment and secret documents in that section be destroyed.

The State Department disclosed on May 19, 1964, that at least 40 microphones were found hidden in the walls of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

The microphones, discovered by a wrecking crew after U.S. suspicions had been aroused by several clues, were found on the embassy's 8th, 9th and 10th floors and lower apartments.

The U.S. ambassador's office was on the 9th floor and the offices of the military attaches were on the 10th floor.

An administration official said yesterday that the chimney runs through the embassy and added that the antenna was located in the upper part of the building although he was uncertain where the rest of the equipment was discovered.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

28 May 1978

CIA Memo Confirms U.S. Offer to Fund '71 Viet Candidate

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has confirmed in court documents something government officials have long denied: that Ellsworth Bunker, when he was ambassador to South Vietnam, offered to finance the campaign of an opposition candidate in the Vietnamese presidential election in 1971.

The revelation—based on tape recordings—is contained in a CIA memo quoted from during a pretrial deposition in the civil suit against former CIA officer Frank Snepp.

Snepp wrote that Bunker offered Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh \$3 million as a bribe to keep him in the race as token opposition to incumbent Nguyen Van Thieu "for appearances' sake." Minh withdrew from the campaign, however.

The White House "flatly denied" earlier reports of the transaction and Bunker also has been quoted as denying the reports.

But in the deposition of CIA officer Norman Jones, a Justice Department attorney read from a CIA document: "Blank listened to the tapes, blank, in which Ambassador Bunker offered to finance, blank, race for the presidency. Blank noted that the amount of \$3 million was not mentioned in the conversation, although the basic report by Snepp is true." (Blanks are the CIA's deletions.)

Bunker, now ambassador-at-large at the State Department, and CIA officials declined comment yesterday on the agency's confirmation of the financial offer to Minh or the taping of the conversation, which took place in Minh's home.

Snepp, who is being sued because he refused to submit his book for review by the agency, said in a phone interview yesterday that "\$3 million" probably wasn't mentioned the conversation because "the pitch was made in piasters [Vietnamese currency], not dollars."

Snepp also said he was not surprised to learn the meeting between Bunker and Minh had been taped. "There could have been a bug in his home, or Bunker or his aide might have been carrying a recorder in a briefcase. They tried that once with Ky [Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky] but it didn't work."

It has been disclosed that the United States "bugged" Thieu's presidential palace during the war.

Minh, a retired general who stayed in Vietnam when Thieu's regime was defeated by the North Vietnamese in the spring of 1975, was urged to run against Thieu in the 1971 election, sources said at the time, because the United States wanted to ensure a genuine contest.

Bunker allegedly made the offer of aid to Minh after returning from a trip to Washington in August, 1971.

Snepp said he first heard rumors of the \$3 million offer during an early tour as a CIA officer in Saigon. His book, "Decent Interval," is highly critical of the American withdrawal from Vietnam.

Snepp Charge of Attempted Bribe In Vietnam Is Backed by U.S. File

By ANTHONY MARRO

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 26—Frank W. Snepp 3d was essentially correct in his assertion that the United States tried to bribe Gen. Duong Van Minh to run for President of South Vietnam in 1971, according to a document made public today in connection with the Government's breach of contract suit against Mr. Snepp.

Mr. Snepp, who is being sued for allegedly having violated the secrecy oaths that he signed upon joining and leaving the Central Intelligence Agency, had made the charge in his book, "Decent Interval," which detailed the last days of the Vietnam War.

In the book, he said that after other opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu had withdrawn from the race, Ellsworth Bunker, then the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, "decided to bribe the moderate opposition figure, Gen. Duong Van 'Big' Minh, to stay on the slate for the sake of appearances."

Mr. Snepp went on to say that Mr. Minh eventually refused, after concluding that "the \$3 million offered him for his campaign was less compelling than the prospect of assured defeat."

The materials concerning Mr. Minh, who is now in prison in Vietnam, were described by a United States Government attorney during a deposition taken in the case, and apparently came from a C.I.A. review of a recording made of the meeting between Mr. Minh and Mr. Bunker.

Names Left Blank

Although the names of the participants were left blank, the material clearly refers to the allegation by Mr. Snepp about the attempt to persuade Mr. Minh to remain in the campaign. Reading from a C.I.A. document, Elizabeth Gere Whitaker, a Justice Department lawyer in the case, said that it contained the following information:

"For instance, (blank) listened to the tapes (blank) in which Ambassador Bunk-

er offered to finance (blank) race for the presidency. (Blank) noted that the amount of \$3 million was not mentioned in that conversation, although the basic report by Snepp is true."

Reported \$3 Million Offer

Last Nov. 20, in a segment of the CBS television network's "60 Minutes" program, Mr. Snepp said that Mr. Bunker had offered Mr. Minh \$3 million "if he would run as a straw horse candidate." At the end of that broadcast, Mike Wallace, who had interviewed Mr. Snepp, noted, "Ambassador Bunker denies having offered General Duong Van Minh \$3 million to run for the presidency against General Thieu."

Asked about the matter again today Mr. Bunker, who is now an ambassador-at-large, said through an aide that he would have "no comment on a matter which is pending before the court."

Mr. Snepp, who served two separate tours of duty in Vietnam in his eight years in the C.I.A., left the agency in 1976 and then spent 18 months writing his book, which is highly critical of the United States Government's handling of the evacuation of Saigon, which is now known as Ho Chi Minh City.

The Justice Department filed a civil suit against him last February, charging that he had violated his secrecy oath by not submitting the manuscript for prepublication review. Although it is not accusing him of disclosing any classified information that the C.I.A. itself had not previously made public, it is asking the court to restrain him from speaking publicly about the agency for the rest of his life, and to award the Government damages that would include any profits from the book.

Last week, Federal District Judge Oren R. Lewis refused a motion by Mr. Snepp's attorneys, Mark H. Lynch of the American Civil Liberties Union and John C. Sims, to dismiss the suit, and it is now scheduled for trial on June 20.

CIA Reveals Vietnam Bribe Offer

By Richard Dudman
St. Louis Post-Dispatch

After more than six years of official denials, the CIA has verified that Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker offered money to a South Vietnamese politician to try to persuade him to remain in the Saigon presidential race.

A CIA memorandum, made public yesterday apparently through inadvertence, confirms the "basic report" of the incident by Frank Snepp in his controversial book, "Decent Interval."

Snepp reported that Bunker tried to "bribe" the moderate opposition figure, Gen. Duong Van "Big" Minh, to stay in the presidential race, so that war critics could not say that President Nguyen Van Thieu had won re-election without a fight. Snepp put the amount of money

offered at \$3 million and said Minh turned it down.

BUNKER DENIED Snepp's report last November when the book was published. The U.S. embassy in Saigon likewise had denied Minh's statement in 1971 that he had rejected an offer by Bunker of an undisclosed amount of money to remain a candidate.

The CIA memorandum that became public yesterday disclosed, however, that Bunker's meeting with Gen. Minh was tape recorded.

The matter came up at a recent deposition proceeding in the government's civil suit against Snepp, a former CIA analyst in Vietnam, over his evasion of CIA censorship in publication of his book.

A government attorney, Elizabeth Whitaker, was resisting efforts by Snepp's lawyers to obtain all or most

of the lengthy memo, a CIA appraisal of various allegations in the Snepp book.

ATTEMPTING TO SHOW that most of the memo was irrelevant to the lawsuit, she said, "I'll read you one of the sentences."

Then she read into the hearing record the following passage, with some words blacked out, including Gen. Minh's name:

"For instance (deleted) listened to the tapes (deleted) in which Ambassador Bunker offered to finance (deleted) race for the presidency. (Deleted) noted that the amount of \$3 million was not mentioned in that conversation, although the basic report by Snepp is true."

The excerpt from the memo appeared in a transcript of the deposition that was filed in U.S. District Court in Alexandria.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

244-3540

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Question Of The Day STATION WRC Radio
Live News-98

DATE May 25, 1978 7:19 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Full Text

BILL STABLER: The "Question of the Day" on the WRC Direct-Line was: "Did recent CIA investigations and disclosures damage security?"

Here's a sampling of some of our listeners comments.

WOMAN: The badgering and persecution of the CIA by axe-grinding politicians and others of similar strife has certainly damaged our national security. I'm thoroughly disgusted with this endless ringing about our freedoms and the open society. Unless we have a strong CIA to help us to protect both, we may end up having neither one.

MAN: Certainly the congressional investigations of CIA has damaged our national security.

WOMAN: I think our security has been badly damaged by the attacks on the CIA.

WOMAN: Continuous hounding of the CIA's mistakes by the press and the so-called liberals has certainly hurt the security of our country. One would think the CIA has done nothing right in this world of subversion. How can we maintain our security without intelligence?

WOMAN: I think we have been overdoing it on the CIA and the FBI and making it difficult for our security. However, there may be some checks and balances that could be put into effect, but we are overdoing it right now.

MAN: Recent CIA disclosures did not damage the national se-

OFFICES IN: NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES

Material supplied by Radio TV Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.

-2-

curity. They merely exposed the fact that we have no national security. In this wide opened society where liberty is mistaken for license and the threats to promote treason, it's done with a mistaken interpretation of the First Amendment.

MAN: The long investigation and disclosures of the CIA have definitely hurt the security of the United States.

STABLER: In all, 85 percent of our callers said "yes," recent CIA investigations and disclosures did damage national security while 15 percent disagreed.

Listen each morning for the "Confrontation" between Tom Braden and Pat Buchanan on the "Question of the Day," then it's your turn.

WRC Washington is the station that listens to you.

30 May 1978

CIA Effectiveness Decreases

Former Members 'Dishonor' Agency

ANDREW
TULLY

WASHINGTON — I hate to give the creep any publicity, but how can anybody in my trade ignore the adolescent whimperings of John Stockwell, who quit the CIA so he could tell all in a book?

First, one must note that Stockwell didn't desert until our spy shop was in trouble. He joined the CIA in 1964 and bade it graceless farewell in 1976 when everybody and his uncle was trying to get rich — or headlines — by exposing what they perceived as the agency's naughtiness.

BY THAT TIME, of course, it was also socially and politically chic to kick the CIA in the teeth, and never mind that you'd sworn an oath of secrecy on what — in Stockwell's case — is euphemistically described as his "honor."

Stockwell's book tells a lot of stories about CIA's covert activities, notably its paramilitary involvement in the Angolan war. He may even be telling the truth. But that's not the point. The CIA had taken him at his word that he would not reveal any agency secrets. Let the buyer beware. I'd expect change from a thin dime if I bought that guy's "word."

OBVIOUSLY, Stockwell knew he was dabbling in the illicit. He wrote the book in secrecy because he knew the agency would try to stop him from doing so if it found him out. He claims in the media that he is now a "liberal," converted by the fact that "at least 12 journalists knew about my book while I was writing it and

not one of them exposed me . . . If that's true, the only possible comment is "Some journalists!"

Now we have Stockwell claiming that he'll feel "uncomfortable" if his book makes him a lot of money. "I think it would be an inappropriate thing," he says.

THIS WOULD seem to suggest that Stockwell would reject any self-promotion of his work. Not him. He wants it both ways. He wants to be seen as a "moral hero," but also wants that big dough. He not only shoots off his mouth to every reporter he can corner, he succeeded in getting himself interviewed on CBS' "60 Minutes," which is not a secret operation.

"All my friends agreed that '60 Minutes' would be the best way to present (read promote) the book," says the "moral hero." I'm surprised the guy didn't bring along some of the call girls he accuses the CIA of foisting on foreign officials. Topless, of course.

FORTUNATELY for fragile truth, the "60 Minutes" episode also presented Bill Colby, the most recent former CIA director. And Colby calmly and neatly dissected Stockwell's moral posture. Stockwell has said he felt freed from his oath of secrecy because the CIA didn't "act the way" he was told it would when he joined up in 1964.

"Well, that's a great rationalization," said Colby quietly. "Because I'm sure . . . that he knew roughly what kind of organization he

was joining. And if he says suddenly it doesn't turn out to be the Boy Scouts, I think he was asking a little much." In any case, of course, Stockwell had not been released from his "word of honor."

COLBY PROPERLY put Stockwell in his place among the draft dodgers and violent demonstrators of the 60s. "I believe you can't run an army if every lieutenant decides which order to follow," said Colby. "You can't run an intelligence service if every junior officer decides which secret to keep."

Indeed, thanks to the money-hungry John Stockwells, the CIA can't run the kind of intelligence agency it should. Foreign spy shops, notably the British and French, have reduced the amount of information they're willing to give the CIA. As a British operative put it: Damned if I'll trust my neck to the tender care of a chap like Stockwell."

11 MAY 1978

Middle Course For CIA

The new focus of the Central Intelligence Agency will be precisely what the name implies, according to Director Stansfield Turner, suggesting a determined effort to win back global respect and public confidence.

The agency will reduce its "political action," the director said, referring to the interference in the governments of other nations that has brought criticism upon the CIA.

But Turner has pledged to stop short of "emasculating" the CIA's capabilities by placing an absolute ban on such intrigue. National security in the future may still demand that the CIA not only report on events abroad but influence them as well.

As emphasized by the director, however, and reaffirmed by President Carter in his recent news conference, such activity must be authorized by the President himself and the proper

committees of Congress must be advised.

Turner, who has been given expanded power and authority over all intelligence operations, recognizes the temptations that challenge his department. He also has demonstrated the toughness in personnel handling that indicates temptation will be resisted.

"This organization," he said, "must be under control at all times."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 44

NEW YORKER
June 1978



STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-6

THE WASHINGTON POST
31 May 1978

Two Russians Are Indicted In Espionage

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two Soviet employees at the United Nations were charged formally with espionage yesterday for their alleged part in a scheme that had its beginnings on a Caribbean cruise.

According to a federal grand jury indictment filed in Newark, N.J., an unidentified U.S. Navy officer who is the key government witness in the case took a one-week trip from New York to Bermuda last summer aboard the MS Kazakhstan, a Soviet-owned ship.

It was on that trip that the alleged Soviet spies apparently first made contact with the American officer and set up the elaborate plot whereby they would trade him cash—\$20,000, according to the indictment—for anti-submarine-warfare secrets.

The two Soviets, Valdik A. Enger, 39, an assistant to the under secretary general at the United Nations, and Rudolf P. Chernyayev, 43, a personnel officer at the U.N. Secretariat, were arrested May 20 in a Woodbridge, N.J., shopping center when they allegedly retrieved film of defense documents the Navy officer dropped off in an orange juice carton.

They have been held in lieu of \$2 million bond.

A third Soviet citizen, Vladimir P. Zinyakin, 39, also was picked up at the scene, but was released because he is an attache at the Soviet mission at the United Nations and has diplomatic immunity.

He was named as unindicted coconspirator in the federal charges, and has left the country.

Yesterday's indictment adds little to what has been made public in the detailed complaint that was the basis for arrests in the case. It specifically did not explain what the Navy officer was doing on the Soviet cruise ship in the first place.

Robert J. Del Tufo, the U.S. attorney in Newark, said yesterday he could not comment beyond the specifics of the indictment.

The indictment mentions only one Navy document that was turned over to the Soviets: a 1971 "confidential" report on a Navy antisubmarine helicopter called LAMPS.

The information being passed by the Navy officer—who cooperated from the beginning with the FBI—has been cleared by intelligence officials so important secrets would not be given to the Soviets, authorities have said.

The Navy officer and his contacts would communicate by calls to pre-arranged public phone booths and notes in containers disguised as discarded trash. In one instance, according to the indictment, one of the Soviet officials hid \$5,000 cash in a car radiator hose for the Navy officer.

If convicted the two men could receive sentences of up to life in prison.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)

2 JUNE 1978

South Africa Razing Towers That Caused Nuclear-Test Alarm

By Henry S. Bradsber
Washington Star Staff Writer

South Africa has begun dismantling the structures in the Kalahari Desert that caused international apprehensions last summer of a nuclear weapons test.

The South African government still has not signed the international agreement banning non-nuclear nations from acquiring nuclear weapons, as the United States and other Western nations have been urging it to do.

But negotiations on international nuclear safeguards are still under way with the Carter administration. It has held up the shipment of nuclear fuels to South Africa pending acceptance by that country of controls that would insure the fuels were not used for weapons.

Because of the delicacy of the negotiations, the administration refuses to discuss them openly. An official of the South African Embassy indicated yesterday that the negotiations are not being very actively pursued at present.

A key U.S. official called the dismantling of the desert structures a hopeful sign that South Africa might be moving toward greater cooperation with the West on nuclear matters. "It's a powerful step in the right direction that we're seeing," he commented.

CIA PHOTO interpreters have been regularly scanning satellite reconnaissance pictures of the desert site since the Soviet Union raised the alarm last August that South Africa was preparing for a nuclear test.

Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev sent a personal message to President Carter on Aug. 6. It said the test was being secretly prepared in the Kalahari Desert.

Satellite photos then showed a tower of the kind that would be used for mounting an above-ground nuclear device, support buildings and an apparent command post.

The United States, France and other countries joined in urging South Africa not to "go nuclear." In answer, South Africa insisted that it had no intention of detonating a nu-

clear device. It has continued since then to contend heatedly that it was being falsely accused — but the purpose of the desert structures was never explained.

Within recent weeks, South Africa has begun to take down the tower and raze some of the support structures. But it still has not explained to the outside world what is going on.

CARTER SAID ON Aug. 23 that South Africa had told Western nations "that the Kalahari test site which has been in question is not designed for use to test nuclear explosives." While Western experts were convinced last August that they were, some uncertainty later developed in the West about just what had been going on in the Kalahari.

Carter also said that "we will, of course, continue to monitor the situation there very closely." It was that monitoring that detected the dismantling of the structures.

"We'll also renew our efforts," Carter said, "to encourage South Africa to place all their nuclear power production capabilities under international safeguards and inspections and encourage them along with other nations to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty."

There has been "some improvement" in prospects for getting safeguards and inspections, according to informed sources. But South Africa still has not accepted the controls of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which inspects nuclear facilities of non-weapons states.

DESPITE THE improvement, however, it is unclear whether South Africa will eventually agree to the controls. And it still appears doubtful to some officials here that it will sign the nonproliferation treaty.

That treaty, which went into effect in 1970, seeks to limit the number of countries with nuclear weapons to those which then had them: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. Since then only one nation, India, has exploded a nuclear device.

A number of countries besides South Africa have refused to sign. They include India, Israel, Pakistan

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
2 June 1978

Mag: KGB Killed Hammaraskjold

Former United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammaraskjold, who was killed in a plane crash in the Congo in 1961, was murdered by Soviet KGB spies, Penthouse magazine reports in its August issue.

The magazine quotes CIA sources as saying that the Russians killed Hammaraskjold because of his opposition to their scheme to install a "troika" or three-man tribunal to head the United Nations.

A secret report prepared by the CIA for President Kennedy in 1962 stated that there was evidence that the explosive device aboard Hammaraskjold's plane was "of standard KGB incendiary design," the magazine says. It reports that Kennedy kept the report secret so as not to endanger the 1963 nuclear test ban agreement with the Russians. The troika proposal was turned down after Kennedy made an emotional appeal for the UN to honor Hammaraskjold's memory by rejecting the Russian scheme.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A10**

THE BALTIMORE SUN
1 June 1978

Helms regrets not ending CIA-Mafia tie

New York (Reuter)—Richard M. Helms, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said in a television interview broadcast last night that he was wrong in letting the CIA stay involved with the Mafia in plotting against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Helms, in the interview with David Frost, also denied that the CIA's now well-publicized assassination plots against the Cuban leader ever got out of the laboratory planning stage.

In the interview, televised by NBC, Mr. Helms also said he had never tried to blackmail then-President Richard M. Nixon into making him ambassador to Iran and that his successor at the CIA, William E. Colby, and former President Gerald R. Ford weakened the agency.

The interview provided Mr. Helms's first public answers to allegations of agency misdeeds during his years as head of the CIA.

On Cuba, he said that the so-called assassination attempts against Mr. Castro, including sending him lethal seashells, were "pipe dreams . . . the things never left the laboratory."

"Nothing was ever done about them," Mr. Helms added.

But Mr. Helms went on to say that one of his biggest regrets was that he did not stop the CIA's involvement with the Mafia in working against Mr. Castro, even though he denied there was any evidence to show any assassination attempt was made.

He was referring to a plot supposedly hatched in the 1960's in which gangland figure John Roselli was alleged to have been involved in a plan to use poisoned pellets to murder Mr. Castro.

Of the involvement with the Mafia, Mr. Helms said, "When I found out about it, I should have corked it off and stopped it right then and there, and I am genuinely sorry that I didn't. . . . It was a mistake. It was a case of poor judgment."

"On the other hand, let's not exaggerate what was involved there. There never was the slightest evidence produced, that I know of, that any poisoned pellets ever even got to Havana."

"We have the word of a gangster that they did, but we have no record, no evidence, no nothing, and I don't believe it," he said.

Mr. Helms said that all he ever authorized was an attempt by Roselli to see if any Mafia contacts still were working in Havana. "I shouldn't have authorized even that," he said.

Questioned further by Mr. Frost as to whether the CIA or any American agency should consider assassination as a political tool, he said: "Assassination is not a way for the American government. It is not a way for the CIA."

"I was never in favor of it. Murder will out. It will always, eventually, leak around in some fashion that it was done."

Mr. Helms vehemently denied reports that he blackmailed President Nixon into appointing him ambassador to Iran.

"I was never one of those presidential appointees that thought he had an entitlement to a job. . . . I never, by word, deed, action or innuendo, threatened President Nixon with anything, ever."

The former CIA director blamed former President Ford and Mr. Colby, who has since retired from the CIA, for weakening the agency by allowing too much material about its covert work to be made public.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A -2

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
1 June 1978

Names/Faces

Helms Confides With Frost

Former CIA Director Richard Helms says his successor, William Colby, and former President Gerald Ford weakened the agency by opening up secret documents to the public and Congress. He says he warned former FBI acting Director L. Patrick Gray at the time of the Watergate break-in that the burglars may have some connection with (John) Ehrlichman." He says the CIA's decision to enlist the Mafia in a plot to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro (poisoned pellets in his food) is one of the greatest regrets of my life." All of this was on a taped television interview with David Frost on NBC. When Frost suggested Helms "blackmailed" Richard Nixon into naming him ambassador to Iran, Helms said the whole theory is laughable."



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 22ATLAS WORLD PRESS REVIEW
MARCH 1978

ATLAS DIALOGUE

THE CIA AND THE PRESS

Foreign reaction to disclosures of media manipulation

RUY BARBOSA

PATRICK BROGAN

CREIGHTON BURNS

The following exclusive "Atlas Dialogue" was conducted by the Editor in Washington, D.C., with Ruy Barbosa, correspondent for the independent "O Estado de São Paulo" of Brazil; Patrick Brogan, chief Washington correspondent for the independent "Times" of London; and Creighton Burns, Washington correspondent for the independent "Age" of Melbourne, Australia.

How have your countries reacted to revelations of attempted CIA manipulations of the foreign press?

BARBOSA: In Brazil there was quite an uproar. A whole New York *Times* series on the subject was reprinted, and many editorials repeated what we have always heard—that the CIA runs our country, that we are at the mercy of the U.S. intelligence, all of which I personally think is an exaggeration.

CIA intervention worries a lot of Latin American publishers, editors, and reporters. The recent allegations that the CIA has successfully infiltrated the Inter-American Press Association is causing concern. The Association has a fine record and has helped to free many newsmen jailed by totalitarian governments. Many good people are active in it and they do not want to be part of a government operation. These people are journalists.

BURNS: In Australia we have just been through a minor imbroglio over allegations, denied in Canberra and Washington, that the CIA was involved in activities beyond its charter in

Australia in the Sixties. Australians have pretty much accepted that CIA activity isn't restricted to enemy or unfriendly countries, that it also operates in the territory of allies, particularly those like Australia that have American military establishments. So the recent revelations about the CIA and the press have been received with philosophical resignation.

I wrote a story for my paper about a former Australian journalist who resigned as Editor of *Business International* because its management acknowledged, after a New York *Times* report, that it had indeed provided cover for CIA agents during the 1960s. But on the whole the *Times* series was not given much prominence in Australia.

BROGAN: The public outcry in Britain hasn't been terribly noisy, but newspapers do think the CIA should stop trying to hire Reuters correspondents. This has been said in leaders—editorials—but in a rather convoluted way, because to say the CIA should stop employing or giving retainers to British foreign correspondents would imply that this does indeed happen. This would be an admission no paper is going to make.

Has your country's press been victimized by stories planted by the CIA?

BARBOSA: I can't speak for other publications, but *O Estado* is very careful not to accept any stories that may have links with foreign officials. The USIS-USIA operation is quite large in

CONTINUED

South America, and it hands out exclusive stories by prominent byliners. We won't touch even this material.

BURNS: The consensus in Australia is that whatever influence the CIA might have on news stories generated there is through Australian intelligence organizations—particularly the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) and the Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIS). A number of reporters and columnists admit to getting preferential briefings in some cases from Australian security sources. There's a general feeling that in exchange for information they get briefed in a way that nobody else gets briefed. So they write stories that nobody else writes, because they have access to sources of which they're sometimes not that critical.

I have seen no allegations that the CIA has, in fact, directly influenced stories about the U.S. in Australia. There has been more concern about unverified allegations of CIA contributions to an Australian political party and interference in trade unions.

BROGAN: The most blatant example of CIA involvement with the British press was when the CIA set up an agency in London called Forum World Features, which some very right-wing journalists were brought in to run. These writers claimed to be absolutely astonished to discover that financing came from the CIA. They wrote newsfeatures and commissioned people to write newsfeatures—all of which were rather favorable to the U.S. and to anti-Communism. But it wasn't obvious propaganda. For a few years they successfully placed articles and pictures in a lot of newspapers, including *The Times*. It was a rather loosely veiled front. The thing folded before its cover was blown. I think everybody knew by then, and that is why the CIA withdrew.

This is the type of thing Congressional committees are concerned about because American editors will see an article published in *The Times* and say, "This is very good," and then they'll carry it. So with one move you could have the CIA

was a CIA front, the student organizations and *Encounter* had to survive without its financial assistance. The magazine did continue, apparently independent of CIA money, but the taint remained.

Would your newspaper knowingly employ intelligence agents?

BROGAN: I assume it wouldn't. There was an allegation in the Washington *Post* a couple of years ago that one major English newspaper employed a number of spies as correspondents, and we carried a very indignant attack, saying that the *Post* was endangering the lives of honest British correspondents who might



Atlas World Press Review

"We suffer from a paranoia about it..."


—Ruy Barbosa

be mistaken for spies and be mugged as a result.

The most sensational case in Britain, of course, was that of Kim Philby, whom the British intelligence service, in a move never really satisfactorily explained, sent to the Middle East as a correspondent for *The Observer*. Did *The Observer* know he was a spy? Did it know that he was a double agent working for the British and the Russians simultaneously—and that everybody knew this? We don't know.

Very recently David Holden, Chief Foreign Correspondent for the *Sunday Times*, was murdered in Cairo. His paper, which is related to ours by ownership and is otherwise independent, made a curious assertion that he may have been murdered by an intelligence agency. It didn't go any farther, and it left hanging the question of whether it referred to a Western, Eastern, or Middle Eastern intelligence agency. Generally speaking, spies only murder one another. So perhaps the hint is there. Holden was a very good journalist and an honest man. I don't think it likely that he worked for the British Secret Service. But I don't know. The whole spy business is so convoluted and complicated that you can never be sure of much.

BARBOSA: My newspaper would not employ intelligence agents, but I believe some Brazilian newspapers would. The CIA hasn't been an enormous problem in Brazil. Our big problem with respect to the CIA is that we suffer from a paranoia about it that is very common throughout Latin America.



Atlas World Press Review

"I don't want spies on my turf..."

—Patrick Brogan

producing material for both the foreign and American markets. I think if the CIA is going to be in the business of propaganda it should stay in America and leave the British alone.

BURNS: A documented case of direct intervention in Australian publishing was a quarterly magazine called *Quadrant*. According to Congressional testimony in the late Sixties—which has yet to be denied—it was partially financed by the CIA. Similar publications with CIA financing also existed in Indochina and the Philippines and, I think, Malaysia. But my understanding is that this stopped some years ago.

BROGAN: Another famous instance came out about ten or fifteen years ago: A foundation called the Congress on Cultural Freedom dispensed largesse to various organizations, including *Encounter*, an excellent, rather right-wing magazine, and various student groups in England. When it became known the Congress

BURNS: It is my belief that for the past ten years and more, under its present management and editorial leadership, *The Age* would certainly not have employed either an Australian intelligence agent or a foreign one. I couldn't be absolutely certain that there haven't been times in the past—the confrontation with Indonesia, for instance—when it would have sympathetically considered propositions to provide cover for Australian intelligence organizations. But now there is no comparable emotional setting. And the whole atmosphere has changed as a result of revelations about the CIA's activities and a shakeup in Australian intelligence organizations.


When the Labor Party came to power, wide circulation was

CONTINUED

given to allegations that ASIO had extended its charter to investigating and even bugging leading members of the party when it was in opposition. The present Government has carried out actions which would imply there were reasons for tightening its control over the organization. The feeling that the ASIO was involved in domestic politics reached a peak, of course, during the Vietnam War, when it was alleged to be gathering dossiers on people engaged in absolutely legitimate protest activities.

Has there been any change in attitudes recently about intelligence activities?

BROGAN: Probably less in Britain than in the U.S. The British have a less exalted view of their Secret Service than the Americans do of the CIA, and therefore haven't been disillusioned. There's a very funny debate in Britain at the moment, however. There is a British fiction that gentlemen do



not open one another's letters and that we do not have a spying organization. Everybody knows this is not true. But because there is this fiction, and in theory the name of the head of Secret Service is not publicly known, the Government is not allowing Secret Service papers from the 1920s to be published.

Do Americans seem to be too exercised over matters like this?

BROGAN: I see things two ways. As a reporter, I am as exercised as anyone—I don't want spies on my turf. But the American feeling that an intelligence agency should never tell a lie or that foreign policy can be openly arrived at does seem extremely naïve. The CIA obviously got enormously inflated in size, in budget, in self-importance. We learned that its new director, Adm. Turner, has sacked 800 secret operatives, who are said to represent 20 or 30 per cent of the spy personnel. This is a grotesque number—these are not secretaries but people who sneak around with manila envelopes stuffed with money. A couple of dozen, I should think, would be quite enough.

The CIA's record isn't public knowledge so we can't tell what its great successes were. But the people who know about it and write about it cautiously all tend to say that the CIA's great achievements are in analysis. They get very bright people who sit down and look at evidence, of which they have a great variety, and then come up with the answer.

Given its need for information, then, is it realistic to expect the CIA to change its mode of operation?

BROGAN: The journalist's credo is: What I find out, I put into print. All my best secrets have appeared in *The Times*. The CIA doesn't even have to buy me a drink to find out. They can just subscribe to the paper.

To some extent in Paris and to a great extent in places like

Buenos Aires and Cairo, and so on, all the reporters hang out in the same place, and if you're a CIA agent you go to the bar and listen, or introduce yourself. I don't think you'd get very much that won't be in the newspapers the next day, but you don't have to pay reporters retainers to get them to talk. They're indiscreet by definition.

How have recent revelations affected the credibility of the American press abroad?

BURNS: I think the influence of the CIA on the press has probably been exaggerated. In Australia the important thing is the feeling that the U.S. press has come out of Watergate fairly well. It is much more self-critical than the Australian press. American newspapers run self-critical articles; they run columnists who criticize their policies; they criticize one another. The American press is much more open than the Australian press, to the same degree that America is a more open society than Australia. I don't think this recent flap has done the American press serious harm.

BARBOSA: The American press has a great influence in Latin America. Most major publications carry stories from the *Los Angeles Times* as well as from the *New York Times* and other papers. If I were back home editing a section of my paper right now I would be doubly careful about using information coming from American publications.

What alleged excesses of the CIA worry you most?

BURNS: The thing that probably concerns most Australians is evidence of involvement in domestic American politics. If you assume it isn't a perfect world and the CIA is an intelligence organization, then it is ludicrous to be shocked or surprised that CIA agents act as spies in other people's countries. That's what they're paid for. (It's when they act as spies in their own country that you start asking questions about the consequences on domestic politics.) This is particularly true of countries with an alliance relationship with the U.S. How closely Australia would want to be allied with the U.S. would depend, in the last resort, on the functioning of the American political system.

BARBOSA: For me the whole matter of espionage, of snooping, is immoral. But so is man. So, in consequence, are the nations that man builds. There is no way that the U.S. could have achieved



Vadillo/El Sol de Mexico

CONTINUED

the position it has achieved in the world without a very effective intelligence apparatus. I'm not saying that I condone everything that the CIA does. I would resent it if they tried to hire me or print a story through me.

BROGAN: You can't have it both ways: Either you do nothing abroad at all, you just observe foreign governments; or you admit that, yes, we can attempt to liquidate Idi Amin and put poison in Lumumba's toothpaste and things like that. One would think it wasn't necessary to get involved in Chile: Gen. Pinochet was quite capable of taking over the Government and shooting everybody. I would guess that, on balance, since World War II the CIA through covert operations has neither greatly added to nor subtracted from the success of the U.S. in the world. The gathering of information is obviously necessary.

Are present efforts to improve the CIA's accountability succeeding?

BROGAN: If it's a question of gathering information by technical means or by spies, then you don't need to oversee anything, really. You can leave the technicians to get on with it and judge by its results. If you're going to have covert operations, however, the fewer people who know about it the better. If it is necessary before any sort of covert operation to inform half a dozen Congressmen then this in effect means you're not going to have covert operations. If I were going to risk my life to make Fidel Castro's beard fall off I would not tell anyone in Congress.

If anyone in Congress knew, I would stay at home. I would not trust their discretion.

BURNS: No matter how good a supervisory system is set up, you're left with a substantial investment and a substantial amount of faith, not only in the Chief Executive and people immediately associated with intelligence, but in the director of the CIA. It would seem you need at the top a man who will be concerned not only with actually running the organization, but with keeping a check on it. I wonder whether a more effective way of controlling CIA activity might not be, for example, to appoint somebody from outside the organization and outside politics, somebody with long and well-publicized experience, say, in the law—a judge whose training would have given him some experience in saying, "Look, given the defined tasks of this organization in its charter, this is legitimate, this is not legitimate, this is gray." If you bring in the organization's activists at the top then professional enthusiasm is always going to drive them toward "excesses."

Do you have any advice for Americans on this?

BROGAN: The CIA is in the midst of an immense reorganization and we won't be able to judge its effects until it has been concluded. But if you want a piece of candid advice, it's not worry. The CIA isn't that important. There are more serious things in this world at the moment. For example, I'm much more worried about the activities of the Federal Reserve Board. ■

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

DES MOINES REGISTER
5 May 1978

Iranian students protest speech by Colby at USA

By RUSSELL REIN
Register Staff Reporter

About 50 Iranian students carrying neatly-lettered signs and chanting slogans Thursday night protested the appearance of former Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby on the University of South Alabama campus.

The protest was organized by the Iranian Students Association, a newly-organized campus group. ISA spokesman Amir Azad said the protest was to focus attention on the involvement of the CIA and the U.S. government in Iranian activities.

Colby spoke in the University Center as part of a series of addresses by public figures on the campus. Most of the students involved in the protest indicated that Colby should not have been permitted to speak at USA.

Doug Taylor, a member of an organization known as "Equality and Economic Justice" and an ISA sympathizer, said, "Colby and others like him do not deserve that kind of platform."

When asked about the former CIA director's rights of free speech, Taylor said Colby could not be considered in "abstract terms" and had no moral right to speak on campus than "other criminals, mass murderers and subversives."

Azad said the protest and others like it sponsored throughout America ISA chapters was to inform "the American people of the involvement of their government in the regime of the Shah of Iran." Azad said American support of the Shah has resulted in assassination, incarceration of "at least 100,000" political prisoners, and other alleged violations of human rights.

"This is the kind of thing Americans are supporting," Azad said. He mentioned President Carter's stand on human rights as running counter to the American position in supporting the current Iranian government.

"We don't understand how the American government, which is the focus of democracy, can support that kind of government," Azad said.

According to Dr. David Curry, the ISA's faculty adviser, and a member of the USA sociology department faculty, the organization has had difficulty with obtaining recognition by the university administration. He said a protest of Colby's appearance earlier Thursday was halted because one of many participating students "happened not to be registered during the current quarter."

"The administration has even imposed extraordinary requirements for recognition, such as the support of 13 registered students in contrast to standard procedure which requires only five students to form a recognized organization," Curry said.

The students said they intend continued efforts to expose "the Shah and his regime for what it truly is, even though we must someday return to our country and face their oppression," Azad said.

The protesters caused no disruptions of normal University Center activity.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8

THE WASHINGTON POST
3 June 1978

Moscow Embassy Bugging Assessed by U.S. Officials

By Robert Parry
Associated Press

U.S. officials, after discovering sophisticated electronic spy equipment in a chimney of the Moscow embassy, are assessing the damage it did to American security and puzzling over how the gadgetry works.

One official called the Soviets' use of the espionage equipment a "serious penetration of our embassy," but said the electronic gear would have to be analyzed before deciding if it had caused a major security breach.

The official, who asked not to be named, said the equipment was apparently maintained by Soviet technicians who sneaked into the embassy by crawling through a tunnel, which originated in a nearby apartment building, and then climbed up the chimney.

In Moscow, an embassy source said the cable leading from the device was traced to a room in the nearby building where a Soviet agent was discovered before a bank of equipment, monitoring signals from the bug. He fled when U.S. officials entered, said the source, who asked not to be named.

The discovery of the device also raised questions about the equipment's possible link to other mysteries involving the Moscow embassy—such as why the Soviets have beamed microwaves at the building for years worrying U.S. officials about possible health hazards.

State Department spokesman Hodding Carter yesterday said the device was discovered May 23 and that "a stiff protest" was delivered through the U.S. embassy in Moscow Wednesday.

"This is a serious matter of concern to us," Carter said. He said the Soviets have not replied to the protest.

Carter said the "penetration system" could not have been used for microwave radiation against the embassy and its personnel. The level of radiation from "exterior sources" remains at about two microwatts, he said.

The chimney is adjacent to the embassy's South Wing, which houses junior employees and does not have a high security rating, but U.S. diplomats were concerned that the bugging

equipment could have been monitoring the neighboring Central Wing. That section houses the highly sensitive offices of Ambassador Malcolm Toon.

Since the discovery of the bug, embassy officials had reinforced their Marine guard on the building's roof and at a point along the tunnel, said the embassy source. A cat-and-mouse game involving the tunnel began with U.S. officials removing a brick from its wall at night only to find it replaced the following morning, the source said.

However, another official said the electronic gear—including a large antenna—was discovered during a routine security search. "There was regular physical penetration of the embassy by Soviets without the knowledge of the United States," the official said.


Although the exact nature of the equipment was unknown, the official said it apparently was not limited to eavesdropping devices. "We're doing a technical assessment of the problem right now. But it might take some time to determine precisely how it [the equipment] works," the official said.

One source said the equipment might never have been found if special American crews had not been flown to Moscow to repair damage to the embassy caused by a fire on Aug. 26, 1977. "They suggested a thorough sweep of the embassy and we're glad they did," the source said.

The discovery has also raised new questions about what Soviet firefighters might have done when they entered restricted parts of the building to fight the blaze. But an official in Washington said a link between the fire and the spy equipment was remote.

The official said a connection between the equipment and the low-level microwaves that the Soviets have beamed at the embassy was more likely.

Some officials have speculated that the microwave bombardment could be connected with intelligence gathering activities, possibly supplying power to spy equipment concealed in the embassy.



Associated Press

Arrow shows U.S. embassy chimney where electronic spy equipment was found.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 6

THE NEW YORK TIMES
3 June 1978

U.S. Imposes Information Blackout On Bugging of Embassy in Moscow

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 2—Many questions remained unanswered here today about the discovery of electronic intelligence devices in the American Embassy last Sunday—all American diplomats were ordered to keep quiet about the incident.

Asked about the secrecy which was imposed following the disclosure in Washington yesterday that the devices had been found, a high embassy official said: "All I can tell you is that we're not trying to protect the Soviets."

"Maybe," he added with a smile, "it's because we also have an interest in finding out what the Soviets are up to in their embassy in Washington."

The continued mysteries here included what the Russians might have overheard or peered into, how long they had an espionage tunnel from an adjoining apartment building into a chimney at the embassy and what kind of electronic devices they had planted there.

A Surprise Encounter

Despite the official silence, many unofficial accounts circulated today. One was that the tunnel had been discovered by a United States Navy Seabee, or construction worker, who surprised a Russian crawling in from the apartment building. The Russian fled, the account said, and the Americans then sealed off the passageway.

Another version was that before the tunnel was sealed off, American security officers clambered through and surprised a Russian seated in front of an electronic monitoring console full of bugging equipment.

Still another report, which could not be verified, said that at least one dish-shaped radio antenna had been found in the chimney.

The chimney rises at the rear of the part of the three-section embassy building containing apartments for secretaries and staff personnel, a science office and

a planning center for a new embassy building.

The concealed antenna was apparently not related to high levels of microwave radiation detected in the embassy in 1976. That was continuing at lower levels today, one official said, possibly because of monitoring devices situated outside the embassy.

Ambassador Malcolm Toon is in Washington, and his deputy, Jack F. Matlock Jr., issued instructions to embassy employees not to divulge anything to reporters about the incident.

It is not known what measures are being taken to improve embassy security or to assess the effects of the chimney eavesdropping. The embassy is understood to have made a formal protest to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

It is not clear how long the tunnel had gone undetected. The embassy, originally built to be an apartment building for Russians of high position, is on Chalkovsky Street, part of a boulevard circling central Moscow. The building was turned over to the United States early in the 1950's with the purpose of getting the Americans away from their original embassy overlooking the Kremlin.

State Department security experts and the marines who guard the building make regular checks for monitoring devices.

American correspondents inspecting the apartment building beside the south wing of the embassy today found a repairman busily connecting and rewiring what appeared to be a communications box built into the embassy's rear wall.

Soviet policemen quickly arrived to stare at the reporters and they left. When an embassy officer was asked about the box, he said he had never seen it and later relayed word that a security expert had been sent out to find out what it was.

Navy Seabee Followed Wire Straight to Startled Russian

By Barton Reppert
Associated Press

MOSCOW — A U.S. Navy Seabee's sudden confrontation with a Russian manning a secret room packed with surveillance gear climaxed the latest round in the American Embassy's long war against Soviet electronic snooping, sources reported yesterday.

The surprise meeting in the basement of a nearby building — prompting the startled Russian to flee in surprise — came after American security officers discovered an array of Soviet bugging equipment hidden in an air shaft in the embassy's south wing.

American investigators traced the wires from the intelligence-gathering devices down the vertical shaft to a tunnel leading into an apartment building adjacent to the embassy, the sources said.

Finally, one of the Navy men assigned to the embassy to handle construction in classified areas was sent into the tunnel, and had a face-to-face showdown with the Soviet eavesdropping specialist monitoring operation of the bugs.

Embassy personnel later bricked up the tunnel to prevent further intrusions.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS in Moscow and Washington were reported examining the sophisticated surveillance devices and trying to assess the degree to which the embassy's security had been breached.

In Washington, State Department spokesman Thomas Reston said the United States had lodged a formal protest with the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

There was no immediate comment on the incident by the Soviet government or news agencies.

An official in Washington, who asked not to be named, said there was regular physical penetration of the embassy by Soviets without the knowledge of the United States.

"We're still trying to figure this puzzle out," he said. "We're doing a technical assessment of the problem right now. But it might take some time to determine precisely how it works."

He said the equipment might be linked to the mysterious Soviet microwave bombardment of the embassy.

SINCE THE EARLY 1960s, the Soviets have been aiming microwave beams at the embassy's upper floors, which contain the offices of ranking diplomats and a variety of electronic intelligence-gathering equipment.

The peak strength of the radiation has been focused in the vicinity of the ambassador's office on the ninth floor, located about 80 feet from the shaft where the bugging gear was discovered.

Earlier speculation about the purpose of the microwaves has included possible use of the beams to energize Russian bugging devices or to try to foil U.S. electronic eavesdropping efforts.

The sources here said the latest bug-hunting episode began late last week when security men running a routine check spotted a suspicious wire behind a radiator in one of the apartments on the fourth or fifth floor of the embassy's south wing.

The telltale wire led into the ventilation shaft where the bugging devices were secreted. Near the top of the shaft, the sources said, investigators found a dish-shaped antenna connected to the surveillance gear.

THE INVESTIGATORS followed the shaft down to an underground tunnel. The tunnel passes under a room where Soviet employees who clean the embassy are allowed to change clothes and then into the basement of the adjoining apartment building.

It appeared the bugging devices inside the shaft had been maintained regularly by Russians coming in via the tunnel, the sources said.

There have been several previous efforts in the history of the present American Embassy to ferret out Soviet bugs. The embassy was originally built as an apartment building and turned over to the United States in 1952.

In 1960, a microphone was found beneath the beak of the eagle on a U.S. seal on an embassy official's office wall. Later, U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge displayed the carved-out and wired seal during a U.N. debate on the U-2 spy plane incident.

In May 1964, the State Department disclosed that tearing apart of walls within the embassy had disclosed at least 40 hidden microphones planted on the eighth, ninth and tenth floors.

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1,11

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 June 1978

Amid Protests, House Votes \$--- For Intelligence

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Brushing aside protests that most members had no idea what they were doing, the House overwhelmingly approved a \$ (deleted) authorization bill yesterday for the nation's intelligence community.

The vote was 323 to 43. Five other members voted "present," apparently following the example of Rep. John F. Seiberling (D-Ohio), who complained that the bill authorizes a "blank amount so I intend to vote blank."

The House Intelligence Committee insisted on secrecy for the multibillion-dollar spending measure on the grounds that disclosure of even the total would generate pressure for more details.

The bill, however, is believed to authorize more than \$10 billion in direct and indirect intelligence expenditures for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the rest of the intelligence community, including segments of the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Intelligence Committee Chairman Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.) described the measure as an important, although imperfect, first step. He pointed out that the House has never before adopted a separate authorization bill for intelligence and has always hidden the money in other appropriations.

The 13-member committee had prepared an 83-page "Classified Annex" for House colleagues who wanted to know some details of the bill, including the overall total. But Rep. James P. (Jim) Johnson (R-Colo.), one of the few House members to read the confidential annex, said it was virtually useless.

"The Classified Annex tells us absolutely nothing about what the intelligence community is doing," he protested.

Johnson, a former member of the Intelligence panel who emerged yesterday as the most forceful opponent of the authorization bill, said he feared that Congress was "returning to the days when an elite few members exercised oversight over the intelligence community" and kept too many secrets to themselves.

He said the committee's classified report, for example, was crammed with impenetrable acronyms that made the proposed expenditures virtually meaningless. Meanwhile, he said, lawmakers keep coming across supposedly classified information and "leaks to columnists" in the newspapers almost every day of the week.

"We don't even trust elected officials with even the bare outlines," Johnson said, adding that he resented the notion that appointed officials in the executive branch were somehow safer repositories of government secrets.

Rep. Bill D. Burlison (D-Mo.), chairman of the Intelligence subcommittee assigned to the bill, said that it had made "very substantial cuts" in the administration's requests. "We have not served as a rubber stamp," he assured the House.

In facetious tones, Rep. John L. Burton (D-Calif.) wondered how in the world he could offer an amendment to restore the money the administration wanted when even the cuts were classified.

Boland indicated his committee would try to make more information available to the House next year, but observed that "there are some people who will never be satisfied" with any amount of secrecy.

Rep. J. Kenneth Robinson (Va.), a ranking Republican on the committee, agreed that the panel should try to avoid "excessive use of acronyms" in future reports. But he also pointed out that only eight House members were curious enough about the "Classified Annex" to visit the committee offices and glance at it during the three legislative days it was available.

Over the prolonged protests of some House liberals, the Intelligence Committee also won authority in the bill to require reports next year on "excludable aliens" admitted to this country against the recommendations of the FBI. Boland said the State Department has been prevailing on the attorney general to overrule the FBI repeatedly in such matters.

He said that the committee wants the reports to determine how much of a "problem of counterintelligence" this has created for the FBI.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-7

Jack Anderson

Toppling Inflation

The Central Intelligence Agency has sent the White House an economic report that contains ominous news for all Americans. For the first time, the United States has overtaken the six leading industrial nations on the CIA's inflation charts.

This has brought an urgent warning from President Carter's chief economic adviser, Charles Schultze. "Additional federal action is essential," he told the Cabinet behind closed doors, "to avoid a recession."

The CIA has recorded the trend in weekly charts, comparing the economic indicators for Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany and the United States. In November 1975, the U.S. inflation rate started to gain on the cost of living in the other industrial nations. President Gerald Ford began passing out "Whip Inflation Now" buttons and threatening to invoke wage and price controls.

Now Carter is trying to tighten the federal pursestrings as an example to the nation. He has named Robert Strauss as his special anti-inflation fighter. It is Strauss's heroic mission to persuade corporations, unions and families to tighten up.

A rueful Strauss was obliged to acknowledge the other day that "the score is: Inflation 100 percent, Strauss zero." This has caused quiet despair in the backrooms of the White House, where Carter has questioned "whether the country has the will to combat inflation."

Without voluntary restraints, the

president won't be able to keep the lid on the economy. His economists have found no government elixir that will ensure prosperity, without inflation. Schultze has reported to the Cabinet: "No substantially different approach has emerged that could satisfy the goals of holding down the deficit while also stimulating the economy, creating new jobs and containing inflation."

It will take sacrifices by everyone, the president has told associates, to prevent the economy from going into a stall. But he made it emphatic that the sacrifices should begin with the government.

The best way for the government to fight inflation, he stressed, is to cut back spending. "It is sound political, as well as substantive, strategy to oppose excessive spending bills," he said.

According to the confidential minutes, he emphasized "the need to hold the line against increases in the budget" and announced his determination "to take a firm stance against any additions proposed by the Congress."

The confidential Cabinet minutes indicate that the Carter crowd didn't begin to wake up to the economic danger until last November. Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps kept warning that the gross national product, the measure of how well the nation is doing economically, would be disappointing. She called for regular meetings with the president's chief economic counselor.

By the end of the month, Schultze

had met with Kreps, Labor Secretary Ray Marshall, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal and White House domestic adviser Stuart Eizenstat. In December, Schultze began attending regular Cabinet meetings.

It was Marshall who suggested on Dec. 5 that the federal government should set an example for the private sector. Otherwise, he warned, "there will be escalating demands for wage and price controls or for a tighter monetary policy, both of which proposals are fraught with severe practical and political difficulties."

The president, quickly agreeing, asked each Cabinet member to reassess the spending habits of his or her agency and seek ways to hold down inflation. He urged the Cabinet "not to let constituency groups dominate an agency's handling of issues that have inflationary impact."

Schultze volunteered that his economic experts would review 15 to 20 key government regulations each year to determine how government activities and the regulatory process could be used to combat inflation. "Who," demanded Blumenthal, "would make the tough decisions when the regulatory analyses revealed large inflationary effects?" Schultze said he would call upon government officials to produce alternatives that would cost less.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

EXCESSIVE SECRECY ASSAILED IN BRITAIN

Some Journalists Are Objecting
to Government's Traditional
Restrictions on Information

By ROY REED

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, June 3—Someone caused a small sensation on the beach at Whitley Bay in April by writing the name H. A. Johnstone in the sand in letters 10 feet tall.

It was against the law. The Official Secrets Act prohibits the revelation of anything the British Government deems vital to national security. The name of H. A. Johnstone, until then known to most of the public as Colonel B, had been so deemed.

Though the crime was washed away by the next high tide, a national furor over Colonel B and restrictions on information, far from disappearing with the shifting sands, has increased. The Government, one of the most secretive in the West, is under unusually strong attack for its closed-door policies, with defenders of civil liberties demanding that it open itself to public scrutiny.

When Colonel Johnstone, an intelligence officer who monitors radio and electronics communications, was a witness in a court hearing last year, he told the judge that his name should be kept secret. The judge agreed to let him write it on a slip of paper and refer to himself simply as Colonel B.

Identity Traced and Named Printed

Later three small militant magazines easily traced the colonel's identity and printed his name. There followed an underground campaign to make him famous. Stickers saying "Colonel B. is H. A. Johnstone" appeared on subway stairs and building walls.

The sand writer at Whitley Bay was at a meeting of the National Union of Journalists, many of whose members consider the restriction on the colonel's name an abuse of press freedom. Four members of the House of Commons joined the campaign and uttered the name in the House. The Commons had just begun allowing debate to be broadcast, so it went out on the BBC. All the major newspapers printed it in the next day, then reverted to "Colonel B."

The three magazines, one of them published by the Union of Journalists, were found guilty of contempt of court last month and ordered to pay fines ranging from \$360 to \$900 after the judge said they had been "flouting the court." However, the BBC and the major newspapers were not charged.

A publication called The New Law Journal commented that the three editors who had started the campaign had been misguided in naming Colonel B but that their cause was worthy. "For a country where the right to freedom of speech has become a source of considerable pride, it is a sorry state of affairs," the journal said.

Information Is Throttled

The farce-bound case has focused new attention on an old anomaly that troubles many Britons. For a democratic society, Britain permits an unusually small flow of information from the governors to the governed. Pointing to the more open systems in the United States and Sweden as models, civil libertarians, including a few members of Parliament from the major parties and a segment of a generally acquiescent press, have increased their agitation for more freedom of information.

The preference for secrecy goes back to the days when ordinary folk left public business to their "betters." Many civil servants and elected officials still believe it proper and even necessary to conceal as much of their work as possible.

The Official Secrets Act, the 67-year-old legal basis for most of the restrictions, is under attack. Rushed through during a pre-World War I spy scare, the act makes it a crime to print any official secret, with the definition of secret left to the Government. The Labor Party promised several years ago to repeal or reform it, and a new version is being drafted; reporters who have seen bits of it say that it will be no improvement.

Press and broadcasting organizations are hamstrung by a variety of other factors. Parliament and the judiciary make free use of their powers of contempt to punish those who publish "unauthorized" information, a category so vaguely defined that it comes close to meaning anything an official does not want printed. A few weeks ago two newspapers were severely reprimanded by the House of Commons—and might have been punished further if members had wished—for printing articles about a report on race relations from a Commons committee before the committee had given it to full House.

Ignored by Editors at Their Peril

Every British editor keeps on his desk a book of so-called D Notices, a list of guides on national security information that a committee of government, military, press and broadcasting leaders says should not be published. Editors may ignore the notices, and sometimes do, but they can be prosecuted if a court finds that they have damaged the national security, and the act of disregarding the notices can add to the severity of the punishment. As a consequence, most editors follow them carefully.

The House of Lords forbade The Sunday Times to print an article it had prepared in 1972 on how the drug thalidomide, which caused hundreds of birth defects, had been promoted as a tranquilizer for pregnant women. The Lords ruled that publication would be contempt of court because of pending litigation between the parents and the British producer of the drug, Distillers Company (Biochemicals) Ltd. After exhausting all appeals at home, the paper took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, where argument was heard in April.

Prodded by a member of Parliament, 20 Government departments have produced comprehensive lists of subjects—ranging from military secrets to farm marketing information—that they will not discuss publicly, not even in reply to questions from legislators.

Not just editors and reporters are affected by governmental secrecy. A few weeks ago the Manpower Services Commission asked for information on employment trends from the Treasury, which refused, saying it was confidential. The commission spent nearly \$500,000 on outside research to get the same information.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
5 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10

Control of foreign intelligence

We suggested, not long ago, that in its quest for ways to prevent future abuse of the "foreign intelligence" surveillance function, Congress is in the grip of a fixed idea. The fixed idea is that judges and warrants are the right answer.

That notion completely controlled the Senate deliberations, which ended in near-unanimous passage of a bill replacing traditional presidential discretion with a warrant-issuing procedure by specially designated federal judges. It has also controlled House deliberations, for the most part.

It is our hope, however, that the House will take a deeper look. Basic issues, not only of national security itself but of constitutional checks and balances, are involved. The House Select Committee on Intelligence has now examined its own Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (H.R. 7308), contenting itself with the conventional wisdom that judges are the answer.

But there is a chance, albeit a shaky one, that the House Judiciary Committee might also get into the act. The Senate's bill has been referred to it.

The Judiciary Committee may not exercise jurisdiction, since it has already examined the bill formally before; and even if it does so, it may not examine alternatives to judicial control of foreign-intelligence wiretapping. Yet, as we understand the situation, some senior members of the Judiciary Committee are making the case to Chairman Peter Rodino that it should do both things.

The main issue here is easily stated. It is readily agreed — and the view has Supreme Court sanction now — that any electronic surveillance for domestic intelligence (surveillance likely to involve American citizens and suspected criminal acts almost exclusively) should be undertaken only with court-issued warrants.

The question is whether that rule should also properly apply to foreign-intelligence surveillance. The conventional view on Capitol Hill is that it should. But several knowledgeable students of the issue — including former Solicitor General Robert Bork, Rep. Robert McClory of Illinois and former Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman¹ — have made a persuasive case that the rule need not and should not apply.

Their argument, complex as it is, can briefly be summarized: Judicial control of foreign-intelligence surveillance, especially if it adheres to a "criminal standard," might give us the worst of both worlds. On the one hand it would severely limit the intelligence-gathering capacity of the president when suspected criminal acts were *not* at issue: that is, when information rather than evidence for possible indictments is

sought. On the other hand, it would involve federal judges in a matter as to which their knowledge, experience and perspective — and traditional constitutional role — are incomplete or irrelevant. "The task of the judiciary under this legislation," as Mr. Silberman told the House Intelligence Committee last winter, "seems much closer to rendering the traditionally prohibited advisory opinion than to the constitutionally sound adjudication of cases and controversies."

And this is not to mention the entirely arguable proposition that the discretionary control of foreign-intelligence gathering is within the implied constitutional powers of the Commander-in-Chief, hence not subject to abridgment by Congress.

What then, one might ask, of past and future abuses of the surveillance power? Have they not been serious, and might they not be serious again? Certainly.

But no system for monitoring this executive function, whether by judges or otherwise, is likely to be fool-proof. The American electorate unavoidably confides vast discretion to any president, including discretion over the nuclear arsenal, relying on his basic character and integrity as a safety device. And if a bomb, why not a wiretap? For that matter, a president faced with a legal technicality that precludes some form of secret intelligence-gathering that seems to him essential to national security will probably prefer the lesser evil of winking at the legal technicality: and should.

But the public is not without protection. Two powerful new deterrents have entered the picture. Both houses of Congress have established permanent intelligence committees, whose duty and mandate it is to check abuses and excesses. Additionally, we have learned in recent years the power of exposure as a check on mischievous abuse of the executive power. It is, as Mr. Silberman says, "the single most important deterrent to executive branch malfeasance." Would a few designated judges, acting in areas they are given but dimly and partially to understand, improve on that deterrent?

The issue seems to us of sufficient gravity to prompt the House to pause from any headlong plunge into judicial control and weigh the alternatives anew — weigh them with both the integrity of the judiciary and the larger aims of foreign intelligence in mind. Perhaps such a consideration, for which the House Judiciary Committee is best equipped, would not result in a turning away from the conventional wisdom. But at least deeper, and largely unexplored, issues will have been fully aired for the first time.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1,6

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
8 June 1978

Carter Speech Fails to End Conflict on Africa Policy

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Within the next few weeks, the Carter administration is scheduled to complete a study of what it might do about Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa.

Once President Carter has considered its conclusions and chosen among the alternatives offered, the administration might speak with a clearer, more unified voice on ways of reacting to the Soviet challenge.

But there was little in Carter's speech at Annapolis yesterday to unify the discordant chorus of official comments that has been heard recently.

Nor was there much to quiet the growing concern in the country about increasing Soviet military strength. Carter seemed to show some concern of his own by using a higher estimate of Kremlin military spending than the official figure of the U.S. intelligence community.

THE OFFICIAL ESTIMATE used by the CIA is that the Soviet Union spends between 11 and 13 percent of its gross national product on its armed forces. But Carter told the new ensigns at the U.S. Naval Academy who will face those forces that the Kremlin is spending "almost 15 percent" on armaments.

Carter said that "the Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice."

The official Soviet press agency, Tass, commented that this was "strange, to say the least." It is up to Carter to choose, Tass said, but "apparently in the leadership circles of Washington" there is vacillation.

The Kremlin has chosen "the road of peaceful coexistence, of strengthening detente, and it promotes these goals consistently and unswervingly," Tass declared. It accused Carter of talking about African intervention and the Soviet military buildup "to justify pretensions by the United States and NATO to a role of global policeman."

FROM CARTER'S OWN National Security Council staff have come sounds of alarm about Soviet activities in Africa. From his Pentagon

officials have come public worries about the Soviet military buildup.

While the president decided to make his speech at Annapolis the occasion for reassuring the nation on both subjects, he did not directly deal with the alarm or the worry.

The U.S. Africa policy has been loosely based on a presidential directive that arose from last year's study of the worldwide Soviet-American relationship, known as PRM-10.

It recommended that the United States work to resolve troubles in Africa that produced instability and created temptations for the Soviet-Cuban combination to exploit it. The intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts to find a way toward peaceful transitions from white to black rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South-West Africa (Namibia) fit this recommendation.

LAST YEAR'S STUDY also suggested U.S. support for regional African efforts to solve conflicts, trying thereby to keep outsiders out. It also

suggested a greater reliance on European nations that have old colonial and continuing economic ties with African nations, instead of having this country try to do everything itself.

Administration officials point out that this policy has generally been followed. But it has not prevented the recent public debate on trying to do something more about the Soviets and Cubans in Africa — a debate that has had the effect of heightening public concern.

Carter called for "all other powers (to) join us in emphasizing works of peace rather than weapons of war in their assistance to Africa." But he also noted that "the Soviet Union apparently sees military power and military assistance as the best means of expanding their influence abroad."

That comment incidentally suggested that Carter has little hope of getting the Soviets to agree on limiting transfers of conventional arms to developing countries. The administration urged the Kremlin to enter negotiations on such limits, but, with two rounds of talks so far, some senior officials feel confirmed in their skepticism about meaningful results.

CARTER ALSO CALLED at Annapolis for the Soviets to "join us in seeking a peaceful and speedy transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia."

So far Moscow has not been involved in Western diplomatic efforts in these areas. South Africa, which now controls Namibia, and the Soviet Union have no diplomatic contact. Some diplomatic observers doubted that the Soviets could be usefully brought into the efforts.

The leader of one of the guerrilla forces fighting the Rhodesian government, Joshua M. Nkomo, was quoted Tuesday as confirming that Cubans are training his troops in Zambia. In addition to the estimated 75 Cuban soldiers there, Cuba runs a larger operation in Angola for training Nkomo's men in special courses, according to African sources.

Cubans in Angola also support the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) that is fighting the South Africans along the Namibian border.

CARTER'S "ALMOST 15 percent" estimate of Soviet military spending sounded like one that has been used at the Pentagon. Some military intelligence officers have argued for years that the CIA's estimates are too low.

The CIA estimate was between 6 and 7 percent until 1976. Then, after long skirmishing with the Pentagon over the figure, it raised its estimate to 11 to 13 percent. The United States is now devoting 5.6 percent of GNP to defense.

Since 1976 Soviet military spending is believed to have grown faster than the growth of the overall economy, so that the percentage would have to creep up. But, despite some studies that suggest it should now be in a range of 13 to 14 percent, and some Pentagon contention that an even higher figure is now required, the CIA has officially stuck to 11 to 13 percent.

CARTER WAS AWARE of that range, officials said. They were unable to say why he used the higher figure or whether Defense Secretary Harold Brown, one of his advisers on the speech, had recommended it.

CONTINUED

The speech repeated a theme that the administration has used before to try to offset what it considers alarmist views of Soviet military strength.

Carter said that, "although the Soviet Union has more missile launchers, greater (missile-warhead) throw-weight and more air defense, the United States has more warheads, generally greater accuracy, more heavy bombers, a more balanced nuclear force, better missile submarines and superior anti-submarine warfare capability."

Without challenging that present situation, critics outside the administration point with alarm to the changing relationship. The United States used to be ahead in virtually all those measurements, they say, but now it has lost some advantages and many of those Carter still cites are fast wasting away as the Soviet military buildup continues.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1,16

THE WASHINGTON POST
6 June 1978

Turner Gives Hill Evidence Of Cuba Role

Photos, Reports Said To Back U.S. Charge Of Zaire Involvement

By John M. Goshko
and Mary Russell
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Carter administration yesterday showed Congress some of the evidence—satellite photographs and reports from diplomats and prisoners—on which President Carter based his charge that Cuba assisted the rebel invasion of Zaire last month.

Reliable sources said the evidence, presented by Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner to a closed session of the House Intelligence Committee, consisted mostly of information collected from rebel prisoners, diplomats and persons in countries surrounding Zaire.

In addition, the sources said, Turner displayed various satellite photos that he said showed rebel encampments near the Zaire border and a Cuban ship being unloaded in Angola, the neighboring Marxist country from which the rebels launched their attack on Zaire's Shaba Province.

Although the evidence was described by the sources as largely circumstantial, committee Chairman Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.) said, "I'm satisfied, and the committee itself is satisfied, that the president's statement was correct."

His words added the committee's backing to the support given Carter last week by the top leadership of Congress: Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) and Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) and Minority Leader John J. Rhodes (R-Ariz.).

After a meeting with Carter and Turner at the White House on Friday, all four said they believed the president's charges that Cuba helped train and equip the invading force.

However, it was not immediately clear whether this growing congressional support will end the questions

and doubts that have been expressed about whether the administration has sufficient evidence to prove its charges against the Cuban government of President Fidel Castro.

These doubts have come from some members of Congress, most notably Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), and from some officials of the administration itself. The officials, who have asked not to be identified, have said the evidence appears too circumstantial and too susceptible to differing interpretations to be conclusive.

Turner, speaking to reporters after his two-hour session with the committee yesterday, tried to address that point, saying:

"To sum up, we have made a very careful and objective evaluation of this evidence. In intelligence, nothing can be black and white. But from the preponderance of the evidence and the variety of sources over a period of time, we can only come to the conclusion that we did."

Almost certain to add to the controversy was the revelation by administration sources yesterday that none of the evidence will be declassified and made public—at least not under present White House plans.

The sources said public disclosure had been considered but was rejected out of fear it would reveal the CIA's sources and methods of collecting information.

As a result, they added, current plans call only for the evidence to be given to the Intelligence and Foreign Relations committees of Congress on a restricted, nonpublic basis. That decision, one source said, seems certain to be adhered to even "if it means a credibility gap."

Despite a statement yesterday by House Speaker O'Neill that the administration had evidence of Cubans in Zaire, the administration has said only that Cuba helped to train and equip the rebels in Angola and that Havana knew of the plans for the invasion and did nothing to stop it.

Turner underscored that point anew yesterday. "This government made no statement that Cubans were in Zaire or they were not. The evidence is not clear one way or the other," he said.

Among those who have seen or been briefed on some of the evidence, the biggest argument involves the reliability of the sources from whom the CIA obtained its information.

Persons present at yesterday's committee briefing said Turner referred to sources only in such general terms as "an African diplomat" or a "man believed to have been one of the rebel invaders who was wounded and interviewed while a hospital prisoner."

A source who has seen one of the intelligence reports in question noted, though, that it contained a CIA notation that the African diplomat who provided the information had never been used before and was therefore of unknown reliability.

One committee member said the most detailed identification given by Turner yesterday involved a Belgian national who was taken prisoner by the invaders and transported to a rear area, apparently in Angola, for execution.

However, the committee member said, the man spoke Spanish and used that language to plead successfully with persons in command over his captors for his release.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-1

THE WASHINGTON STAR
8 June 1978

TV TONIGHT

Commentary

Carl Rowan (WTOP-TV): "... Mr. Carter will have to decide whether proving his charges (about Communist involvement in Zaire) is important enough to compromise an intelligence breakthrough. A more difficult situation could be that a high-level Cuban official is a U.S. intelligence agent who has revealed what Cuba, Russia and East Germany have been doing ... It is beyond asking that the U.S. betray a source in Havana ..."

A House Leader Says He Accepts Data on Cubans

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 5—Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, presented evidence to the House Intelligence Committee today that appeared to have satisfied its chairman that President Carter was justified in asserting that Cuba had trained and equipped Katangan rebels, and knew in advance of their attack on Zaire from Angola last month. The charge has repeatedly been denied by Cuban leaders.

Representative Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts, the committee chairman, told reporters after a two-hour closed-door briefing: "I'm satisfied, and the committee itself is satisfied, that the President's statement was correct."

The Administration has not yet made public its purported data, but instead has begun a campaign of briefing key members and committees of Congress on its contents. Mr. Boland said that Admiral Turner had presented evidence from "prisoners, diplomats and persons surrounding Zaire itself."

'We Have Sufficient Evidence'

Meanwhile, representatives of the United States, France, Britain, West Germany and Belgium argued late into the night in Paris over the best way to stabilize Zaire without becoming involved in African rivalries or generating a new East-West confrontation. [Page A7] And King Hassan II of Morocco, who sent peace-keeping troops to Zaire last night, vowed to "intervene in Zaire again and even a third and a fourth time" to help protect it from further attacks by insurgents based in Angola. [Page A8]

Admiral Turner, speaking to reporters, was cautious in describing the evidence. "It is my considered opinion," he said, "that we have sufficient evidence to draw the conclusion that there must have been Cuban involvement in the training and equipping of these insurgent forces which attacked the Government of Zaire last May 13."

"We made a careful, objective evaluation of this—no intelligence conclusion is ever absolutely black and absolutely white," Admiral Turner said. "But when you have a preponderance of evidence as we do in this case from a variety of sources over a period of time, one can only come to the kind of conclusion that we did."

President Fidel Castro and other Cuban

leaders have denied any recent involvement with the rebels, who had fled to Angola from Shaba Province, formerly called Katanga.

Whether Cubans played an active role in aiding the Katangans is important, because much of the Administration's African policy in recent weeks has been based on the assumption that the Cubans and Russians were causing trouble for Zaire.

Mr. Carter said at a news conference in Chicago on May 25 that Angola had to bear a heavy responsibility for the "deadly attack" on Shaba, "and it is a burden and a responsibility shared by Cuba."

"We believe," the President said at that time, "that Cuba has known of the Katangan plans to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border. We also know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked."

McGovern Tells Cuban Version

Senator George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, who has publicly drawn attention to the discrepancy between Mr. Carter's and Mr. Castro's statements, said today that he had been told by the Cubans that their involvement with the Katangans ended two years ago.

Mr. McGovern said the Cubans asserted that they had trained and equipped the Katangans only to help them fight on the side of the winning forces in the Angolan civil war, led by President Agostinho Neto. According to Mr. McGovern, the Cubans said that since then they had had nothing to do with the Katangese. But Mr. Boland said the information provided to the committee showed that the Cubans' training had taken place as recently as the past year.

Mr. McGovern, who has not yet been briefed on the Administration's data, said that if he was convinced the Cubans were lying, he would regard it as a "personal insult."

Some Administration officials are not satisfied with the quality of the intelligence. They have said privately that the reliability of many of the informants was dubious, and that much of the data was "circumstantial."

'Proof Is There,' O'Neill Says

An Administration official said that it had been decided to brief the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last on the ground that that group would be the most critical. The first briefing was at the White House last Friday and involved Congressional leaders such as the House Speaker, Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., Democrat of Massachusetts, who commented today: "I would say that the proof is there that Cubans participated in Zaire." He also said he understood that the Central Intelligence Agency had photographs of Cubans with Katangans.

But the Administration has never asserted that Cubans actually crossed over into Zaire from Angola, and Admiral Turner, when asked about Mr. O'Neill's comment, said: "This Government made no such statement that Cubans were in Zaire or they were not. The evidence is not that clear one way or the other."

President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire has charged that Cubans were responsible for the attack.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

8 June 1978

Many doubt Carter's claims that Cuba trains Katangese

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

The Carter administration's claims of Cuban involvement in the training of Katangese rebels for their invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province are being met with considerable skepticism within some intelligence circles in Washington and elsewhere.

In fact, some elements in the intelligence community simply do not accept the claims and say there is no solid evidence of such Cuban involvement.

These views, which sharply contradict President Carter's statements and those of White House aides, come from a variety of sources including Washington intelligence officials, Belgian and Israeli intelligence personnel, and both military and diplomatic people in Washington. The views also fly in the face of the publicly advanced statements of Central Intelligence Agency director Stansfield Turner and Defense Secretary Harold Brown.

'Circumstantial' evidence

The evidence presented by both Admiral Turner and Secretary Brown to support the claims of Cuban involvement is viewed as "circumstantial" by many of those who have seen it.

Some of the sources speculate that the CIA has been under considerable pressure from the White House to come up with corroborating support for the administration's claims.

As far as Washington's diplomatic community is concerned, some people close to the issue say they see absolutely no evidence of Cuban involvement in the Zairian situation.

That, of course, is the line being taken by Cuban President Fidel Castro — a line that was

adamantly put forward May 30 by Cuba's Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, in a speech to the United Nations.

According to Sen. George McGovern (D) of South Dakota, the Cubans told him they had had nothing to do with the Katangese recently. They said they had trained Katangese only to fight in the Angolan civil war about two years ago.

A meeting with Lane

Dr. Castro went so far as to call in Lyle F. Lane, the head of the United States "interest section" in the Swiss Embassy in Havana, to deny the Carter administration claims.

Cubanologists point out that this was the first time that Dr. Castro had taken the unusual step of meeting officially with Mr. Lane, a step that amounts to tacit acceptance of the interest section as a form of limited diplomatic relations.

Neither Washington nor Havana has done that before, and the view among Cuban specialists is that Dr. Castro obviously felt the issue was important enough to break with precedent.

According to some sources in Washington, the White House is basing its claim in part on intercepted Cuban radio broadcasts. But a source in the intelligence community said those broadcasts are not clear and could easily be read two different ways.

A call for evidence

Some intelligence community members wonder, however, if the White House claims are simply a reference to the fact that some Katanga tribesmen have been in Cuba in the past 10 years or so and that they, like hundreds and perhaps thousands of other Africans, have had schooling on the island.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-18

THE WASHINGTON POST
5 June 1978

Issue of Castro's Honesty Divides Aides to Carter

By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Foreign Service

Cuba's repeated denials of U. S. charges of involvement in the rebel invasion of Zaire have divided administration officials between those who believe Cuban President Fidel Castro is lying, and those who believe President Carter has been misled.

Even those in the administration who have seen portions of intelligence files that reportedly document the charges are at odds over whether they conclusively point to Cuban complicity.

While strongly defending Carter's personal integrity, several high-level administration officials who find the evidence inconclusive have said they suspect the Central Intelligence Agency is not above manufacturing evidence to support the claims that have now caused strong international repercussions.

Despite a personal denial by Castro, Carter has said Cubans trained Katangan rebels involved in the May 11-12 raid on Shaba (formerly Katanga) Province. In a verbal battle that has substantially escalated over the past week, Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez accused Carter's closest aides, specifically national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, of feeding the president inaccurate information.

State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III subsequently accused Rodriguez of launching a "personal attack" on President Carter.

Beyond the immediate issue of the Zaire invasion, there is deep disagreement on the value of a Cuban denial among U. S. officials who have followed Cuba's growing African presence over the past three years.

A senior White House official who strongly defends the current administration charges said he is happy to test the credibility of President Carter on the Cuban role in Shaba against the credibility of Castro.

This official said the Cubans have a long record of lying about their activities in Africa, particularly in Angola and Ethiopia. They have lied about whether Cuban troops were present, about what they were doing and about their plans, he said.

It is precisely this belief, which they admit governs current U. S. policy, that infuriates and perplexes other administration officials.

"To say that Castro has misled us all along is just not true," said another administration official with long involvement in the Cuba question.

"There are those who are convinced of it," he said, but "the Cubans have never misled us on Angola or Ethiopia."

What does appear to be beyond dispute is that, since then-Cabinet minister Che Guevara traveled to Africa in 1963, Cuba has made no secret of its commitment—as Castro told Cuba's First Communist Party Congress 10 years later—to "shed blood . . . in other countries threatened by imperialist aggression" in Africa.

Since Cuba first sent troops to Angola in late 1975, however, what has perhaps angered first the Ford and later the Carter administrations as much as the actual combat presence has been Castro's refusal to keep the United States apprised of what he was doing, and his lack of acknowledgement of and response to U. S. concern and threats.

At the same time, the United States has at times appeared to have misread those few signals Castro has sent.

In September, 1975, Castro and the president of the Congo (Brazzaville) issued a joint communique offering support to the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), one of three groups hoping to lead independent Angola.

In early November, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made headlines when he told the House International Relations Committee that Cuba was aiding the MPLA.

While U. S. estimates of Cuban troop presence in Angola rose to 6,000 within two months, Cuba repeatedly stated it was proud of its support and made no denials.

In April, 1976, after Cuban support had effectively placed the MPLA in power, Castro told Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme that he planned to begin withdrawal from Angola.

"They did start a drawdown that ran through the summer of 1976," said an administration official opposed to the current pressure on Cuba. "It was hard to tell how substantial it was since our intelligence was set up to count troops moving in, not out, of Angola."

The withdrawal apparently started to slow in the fall of 1976. In March, 1977, when the first Katangan invasion of Zaire drew Moroccan troops to the area, this official said, the Angolan government asked for and received more Cuban troops.

In May, 1977, Castro told television journalist Barbara Walters that he had halted the withdrawal announced nearly a year before. It was not until last November that Carter angrily reacted to the halt, calling it a danger to further normalization of relations with Cuba.

Those officials who believe Castro deceived the United States note his broken commitment to withdraw from Angola. They believe his failure to announce a renewed troop buildup the midst of normalization talks constituted deception.

Those who trust the Cuban leader's honesty say troops were at least temporarily withdrawn, but there was never a Cuban commitment not to return. Similarly, they say that during normalization negotiations the Cubans were "brutally frank" in their refusal to discuss Africa under any circumstances.

In Ethiopia, where a Cuban presence was first reported in mid-1977, the situation is more confused.

According to the White House official, Castro denied that Cuban troops were fighting in Ethiopia until he felt the time was right to announce the "victories" of his forces.

According to one official, who feels Castro has played it straight; however, "no commitments were ever made to us" by the Cubans.

Most of the charges, and denials of early Cuban involvement in Ethiopia came from the African participants in the conflict. In August, 1977, when the United States maintained there were only about 50 Cuban advisers in Ethiopia, Somalia charged that 5,000 foreign troops, presumably Cubans, were on their way to the Horn of Africa.

During that same period, Castro acknowledged the Cuban medical personnel and technicians were in Ethiopia, although he did not differentiate between medical and other "techni-

"At that time," said an administration official, U.S. intelligence reports indicated that medical technicians were all there were. Up until September, there were very few Cubans in Ethiopia, he said.

When Cuban combat troops began pouring into Ethiopia a short time later, however, the United States felt it had been deceived. With normalization talks proceeding, the Carter administration, by the end of last year, was put in the uncomfortable position of criticizing Cuba on one hand for Africa, and appearing to appease Castro by talking about friendly bilateral relations on the other.

Castro did not help matters by his few public statements on the issue. On Dec. 7, he noted that Cuba's activity in Africa had "nothing to do with Carter . . . nothing to do with the United States. We can neither discuss nor negotiate our relations with Africa."

So far, he has not. Although Cuba appears to have accomplished its goal—helping the Ethiopians throw out invading Somalis—there has been no reported Cuban troop withdrawal from either Ethiopia or Angola.

U.S. officials opposed to current harsh administration censure of Cuba say they do not expect withdrawal in the near future, and certainly do not expect Castro to discuss the matter with the United States.

The consistent refusal to talk about Africa, those officials say, is what makes Castro's unprecedented direct denial of involvement in the recent Zaire raid all the more believable.

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
5 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8

Brown, Young Report Data Linking Cuba, Zaire

Associated Press

Two high-ranking government officials say they have seen evidence that convinces them Cuba was involved in the rebel invasion of Zaire.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown, appearing yesterday on the CBS television interview program "Face the Nation," said the evidence of Cuban involvement "consists of reports, statements, some of them eyewitness reports . . . some of it comes from prisoners who were held temporarily by the invaders. Some of it comes through diplomatic channels."

United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young said in an interview with U.S. News and World Report magazine that, initially, he had doubts about Cuban involvement in Zaire but now believes the reports are true.

BROWN ALSO SAID East Germans "have been mentioned in this once or twice, and they may be involved. I would say that that's less certain."

Brown said "I did see some" evidence of East German involvement, but "there is less clear evidence, I would say, of actually carrying out the tactical training."

Of possible Cuban troop movements in Zaire itself, Brown said, "I would say there is no convincing evidence that Cubans actually accompanied the invading forces into Zaire, but there is evidence that they accompanied them very close to the border."

"There is nothing like a Cuban cigar butt picked up, for example, in Zaire. That's why I think one has to say that this is a pattern of evidence that to me is quite convincing, and I would say that any of you . . . no matter how conservative and cautious, would not hesitate, seeing this evidence, to print as fact that the Cubans and the Angolans were involved in the way that I've said."

YOUNG SAID, "I did seriously question the charges (of Cuban involvement) at first . . . but additional intelligence that I've seen convinces me there is truth to the allegation."

Young said his initial doubt stemmed from the difficulty in gathering intelligence information from Angola, where Cuban troops are based.

As for the presence of Russians and Cubans in Africa, Young commented: "I've said that we ought to have a rational, analytical response . . . and not respond emotionally. I'm afraid that we have been responding emotionally, and I would hope that we would stop and think very carefully about it."

"I think we ought to have concern, but when concern is translated into panic by others, I don't think it serves the U.S. interest. And that's what I'm afraid of: panic," Young said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 June 1978

Africa Turnabout

Concern Over Soviets, Cubans Transforms U.S. Policy

By Robert G. Kaiser and Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Carter administration, which took office committed to reducing the Cold War focus of U.S. policy in Africa, has reversed its rhetoric and substantially revised its operations there in recent months.

As U.S. Air Force planes prepare to land African troops in Zaire's ravaged Shaba Province this weekend and lift out French legionnaires, the Washington policy establishment, as well as the world outside, is watching diligently for signs of how much further the change will go.

In the past several weeks, the emerging Carter policy of emphasizing and counteracting Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa has set off intense controversy involving high politics, personal animosities and, at a basic level, differences of view about international priorities, East-West relations and the U.S. role in far-off military conflicts.

Starting with the dramatic airlift of Cuban troops and Soviet supplies to Ethiopia late last year, communist operations in Africa have been a growing preoccupation of major elements of the Carter administration. Until recently the U.S. reaction was primarily diplomatic and verbal. But a National Security Council study of the Soviet-Cuban problem scheduled to be completed in the first draft a week from now, recent soundings with Congress and the dispatch of Air Force transports to Zaire raise the prospect that the administration may decide to take stronger action.

The administration contains high-ranking officials who say they are deeply troubled by President Carter's apparent new willingness to involve America more deeply in African conflicts. These unhappy officials tend to ascribe much of the change in U.S. behavior to the efforts of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security affairs adviser, who has expressed concern about Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa virtually since Carter's inauguration.

Just in the last few days administration officials have been arguing—sometimes emotionally—about how big a commitment the United States should make to a multinational African military force being organized to help Zaire defend Shaba Province from Katangese guerrillas.

In view of the increasingly poisonous nature of the Soviet-American dialogue, decisions by Moscow or Washington or both to raise the ante could bring about more dangerous confrontations in Africa. This possibility concerns many U.S. policymakers who are deeply worried less about what has happened than about what the trends imply and what may happen.

While campaigning for the presidency, Carter criticized the Ford administration for "fueling the East-West arms race in Africa," and said the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola was "regrettable," but it "need not constitute a threat to United States interests."

Once elected, Carter installed Andrew Young as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations with special responsibility for Africa, the first black to have a strong influence on U.S. foreign policy. Young quickly established a new tone and direction to American policy in Africa, one applauded by black leaders on the continent.

Last July 1, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance gave a major address setting down the new administration's basic policy for Africa. In contrast to the late-blooming Kissinger activism in the Ford administration, Vance emphasized the importance of "affirmative policies" and declared that "a negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile."

The essence of the 1977 policy was to deemphasize the East-West confrontation in Africa, stress U.S. support for African nationalism and economic development, and bring much stronger U.S. pressures to bear against white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa.

When Katangese forces based in Angola invaded Zaire's Shaba Province in March-April 1977 (an episode now known as Shaba I), the United States officially maintained it had "no hard information" to confirm President Mobutu Sese Seko's charges that Soviets and Cubans were involved. The United States rejected Mobutu's request for weapons and sent only "nonlethal aid." A White House spokesman said, "We do not see the [Shaba] situation as an East-West con-

Referring to this episode in his July 1 policy speech, Vance declared that "when such crises as the recent invasion of Zaire arise, we see no advantage in unilateral responses and emphasizing their East-West implications." As President Carter recently said, it is best to fight fire with water."

Testimony by Vance in closed session to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's African subcommittee three weeks ago provides vivid documentation of the policy evolution. While support for African nationalism, economic development and majority rule are still part of the program, about half of Vance's May 12 presentation concentrated on the Soviet-Cuban challenge on the continent and the U.S. "strenuous effort" to counter it. Specifically, Vance outlined:

- New U.S. military aid or new authority for military aid to Sudan, Chad, Kenya and Zaire. (Since then, the administration has, in addition, taken steps toward the supply of "defensive" arms to Somalia.)

- Public and private representations to the Soviets and Cubans that "we view their willingness to exacerbate armed conflict in Africa as a matter of serious concern."

- U.S. warnings to the Soviets that their activities in Africa pose "dangers . . . for our overall relations." (Brzezinski had publicly been more explicit in warning that events in Africa could jeopardize a strategic arms limitation agreement.)

The secretary did not mention two other elements in the new policy that have emerged more clearly since that last testimony—consideration of indirect reinvolved in Angola's ongoing civil war, and direct logistical support first for French and Belgian and now African military forces in the troubled Shaba Province.

Sitting in a White House office Friday afternoon, one of the chief architects of the shift in emphasis declared simply: "Events imposed it." In his perspective, the communist side, rather than the United States, has injected the Cold War into Africa and it is necessary for the United States to respond. "By not meeting the Cuban-Soviet challenge soon enough, it would be more difficult to meet it later. And in domestic terms we could be charged with trying to ignore it,"

An important White House aide just below the top policymaking level amplified, "You really have a different situation from last summer. There has been a doubling of Cuban combat forces, mostly in Ethiopia, and more than \$1 billion in Soviet military equipment pumped in. There is a more expansive Soviet and Cuban presence."

A senior State Department official said that after the experience in Ethiopia, the United States had to assume that—in the absence of countermeasures—the communist forces will be prepared to move on to the explosive black-white conflicts of southern Africa. That would mean Soviet-backed Cubans in Rhodesia in the near future, a prospect so ominous to the administration that its top priority now is to avoid it.

On the other hand, a skeptical congressional source deeply involved in African matters maintained that Brzezinski and those anxious to emphasize anticommunism are not looking at Africa but "looking at the Soviet-Cuban problem." During the Ethiopian-Somalia war over the Ogaden region, according to this source, Brzezinski was heard to say, "The problem isn't the war, the problem is the Soviet and Cuban presence." But Brzezinski seems never to have considered, the source continued, that the war was what made the Soviet-Cuban presence possible.

A State Department official who closely monitors Africa policy attributed the shift in emphasis to a combination of Brzezinski's inherent anti-communist and global concerns and U.S. sensitivity, bordering on irrationality, about the activities of Cuba. It is not yet clear how far the president has come in his thinking, said the official. "We won't know if we're back into the 1950s until hard decisions are made on a variety of things," he said.

The Soviet Union and Cuba have long been involved in the affairs of Africa, but the meshing of Cuban combat troops and Soviet logistics and arms—thousands of miles from the national territory of either state—is an unexpected development of major importance. This combination first appeared in Angola late in 1975, and the Ford administration's efforts to counteract it were halted in early 1976 by act of Congress.

When the Carter administration came to office, about 22,000 Cuban troops or advisers were reported in Africa, 17,000 of them in Angola. For Carter and most of his new team, the Soviet-Cuban force in Angola was considered a mismanaged affair of the Ford administration and essentially a problem of the past. Since then, the Soviet-Cuban force in Africa has roughly doubled to about 43,000 troops.

The Soviet-Cuban airlift into Ethiopia, which began Nov. 28, posed the challenge in sudden, sharp and extremely difficult fashion for the Carter administration.

The United States faced the agonizing problem that the Soviet-Cuban force had been invited by a legitimate African government, Ethiopia, to do battle against invading troops from neighboring Somalia. When Brzezinski and others considered military aid to Somalia, perhaps through third countries, to counterbalance the communist help, the State Department pointed out that such action would be denounced throughout Africa.

A Brzezinski plan to send a U.S. naval task force as a show of force to deter the Russians was reportedly opposed by Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. "If our bluff had been called, would we have been prepared to use the fleet? We had to make a rigorous assessment of how important is that area to us as a nation," said an official involved in the discussions.

In the end, the Carter administration limited itself to publicizing the Soviet-Cuban intervention, obtaining statements from the Soviets and Ethiopians that they would not cross the Somali border, and pressing other African nations to speak out against any extension of Soviet-Cuban force outside Ethiopian territory. "If you are deprived of dirty tricks or military responses, those are the sorts of things you do," explained a policymaker.

This sense of relative helplessness produced frustrations. By this spring administration officials began to discuss the now well-publicized allegation that Congress had unduly tied the president's hands in Africa. This concern led to a decision to explore some new alternatives within the administration and on Capitol Hill.

In late April Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence, went to Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) to discuss a plan to secretly sell weapons to France for transshipment to Angola for guerrillas fighting for the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). This aid could not be provided legally under an amendment originally introduced by Clark.

Turner said the administration would want to consult with a number of members of Congress before doing anything about the plan. More than consultations was required, Clark replied — the plan Turner was talking about would violate the law. Yes, Turner later agreed, the Central Intelligence Agency's lawyers had reached the same conclusion.

The rationale Turner offered Clark was that aid to UNITA rebels fighting the Angolan central government, heavily supported by Cubans, might tie the Cubans down there, making it difficult for them to consider moving into the Rhodesian civil war. A stronger UNITA also could inflict more damage on the Cubans in Angola. Raising the price for the communists in Angola is something Brzezinski "just kept toying with" in recent months, said an informed official.

But aid for the UNITA fight against the Angolan central government led by Agostinho Neto also could disrupt a basic element in the African policy laid down earlier in the Carter administration by Young, Vance and their colleagues—the attempt to establish majority rule in Namibia, formerly Southwest Africa. That policy was to support the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which, in turn, was dependent on Neto in Angola. U.S. support for Neto's UNITA enemies could lead to a collapse of the negotiations with SWAPO.

The plan Turner described has not moved forward. After press accounts in late May—three weeks after the fact—described what had happened, Carter said he had no desire to repeal the Clark amendment or to become involved in Angola.

But by that time the new Katangese invasion of Shaba had given the United States a clear opportunity to help France and Belgium to repel the invaders and protect Zaire's territorial integrity. U.S. officials agreed speedily and, reportedly, enthusiastically to use American aircraft to transport French and Belgian forces.

It was an appealing opportunity to help a legitimate government defend against Soviet-Cuban incursions—if the communists actually were involved. And the Carter administration aggressively looked for and said it found evidence of Cuban involvement in the new Katangan invasion.

Cuba and the Soviet Union both charged that Carter was wrong, but the administration stuck by its position and claimed that Cuba had repeatedly lied about its involvements in Africa in the past. Administration officials who read the three-inch-thick pile of intelligence documents that were the basis of the charge of Cuban involvement disagreed about their persuasiveness. Some said they proved the involvement; others said they were ambiguous. The administration has declined to make the information public.

The French-Belgian intervention in Shaba had essentially succeeded in driving the rebels out of the province and resecuring the territory, but the administration recognized that this was a temporary accomplishment. A spirited debate began inside the administration over what to do next.

On May 28 Carter met with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France over dinner at the White House. They agreed that France and the United States would cooperate to help African nations protect themselves and each other against "destabilizing external forces," as the French foreign minister later put it.

Soon afterward, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, the NATO commander, began discussions with French officials about renewed U.S. airlift support to bring the French Foreign Legion out of Shaba and to replace it with a force of other African troops.

CONTINUED

Brzezinski, just back from his controversial trip to Peking, was reportedly excited at the prospect of this sort of Franco-American cooperation, something not seen since Charles de Gaulle began to distance France from the United States in the 1960s.

But other administration officials argued that the rush to join the French in some new African endeavor was insufficiently thought out. Secretary of State Vance learned on Thursday afternoon last week that the airlift operation arranged primarily by Haig in Europe was literally about to begin without the United States and France having agreed on numerous basic issues. At Vance's insistence, sources said, the airlift was postponed until this weekend. A message was sent to France seeking information on the unresolved issues.

Had the operation gone ahead on Thursday, according to a spokesman for Giscard in Paris, the new African force would have included troops from the landlocked Central African Empire, one of Africa's more improbable countries, ruled with an iron hand by a man who crowned himself emperor last year in a ceremony of ermine and Mercedes Benz limousines that cost millions of dollars. One U.S. official said the administration had been saved a major embarrassment by delaying the airlift.

Informed sources said Young, at the

United Nations, was deeply upset by the course of events, but he held his peace in public. Senior officials in several government agencies expressed dismay at the administration's apparent eagerness to back a hastily assembled force of African soldiers without knowing how this enterprise might end.

The problem, several officials said privately, was that U.S. intelligence saw a real possibility that the Katangese rebels may return to Shaba in a matter of weeks. "They're regrouping," one official said, and have already mounted several new forays into towns in southern Shaba.

If the Katangese attack again and the new African force has difficulty coping with the attack, the United States could face painful choices.

The administration has advised congressional leaders that it has not agreed to any new commitments to the African force apart from the decision to help transport it to Zaire. But congressional leaders have also been told that the United States will con-

sider offering equipment and arms to the Africans.

Several officials who express skepticism about the administration's new course—and about the eagerness they attribute to Brzezinski in supporting it—said privately they saw little merit in making a great show of strength in Zaire on behalf of one of Africa's least effective and most corrupt governments.

Officials on the other side of the dispute say Brzezinski is only being sensible in his conclusion that the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and Carter's political stature both may depend on the United States mounting an effective riposte to the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa.

These sources also claim to see signs that the tougher U.S. rhetoric and action may be working. For example, they claim that Cuban forces are not involved on behalf of the Ethiopian government in its fight against rebels in the province of Eritrea, despite earlier signs that the Cubans might enter that struggle.

Staff researcher Jane Freundel contributed to this article.

Hill Leaders Back Carter On Cuban Role in Zaire

By Vernon L. Guldry Jr.

Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter yesterday won the support of congressional leaders of both parties for his assertions that Cuban forces trained and equipped with Soviet weapons the Katangan rebels who invaded southern Zaire last month.

Cuba has denied any involvement and, joined by other nations, has called on the United States to back its claim.

Carter, backed by CIA director Stansfield Turner, briefed congressional leaders yesterday who emerged from the 45-minute session with ringing endorsements of the U.S. position. The administration is resisting any attempt to make its information public.

In another development concerning major-power influence in Africa, the Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua, reportedly flew to Zaire yesterday, immediately after conferring with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance in New York.

"I'M CONVINCED beyond a shadow of a doubt that the president is correct; that there has been Cuban support and Russian involvement," said Senate GOP Leader Howard Baker.

House Republican Leader John Rhodes said Carter and Turner did not offer any documentary evidence. "There really wasn't any exhibit A or B or C, but Adm. Turner did brief us on the reasons they feel there was Cuban involvement in the training and equipping of the Katangese," he said.

Rhodes noted that there were about 20,000 Cubans in neighboring Angola. The Cuban bases are located

in areas where the Katangan rebels are harbored. "Being a lawyer," he said, "I'd say the prime facie case has been proved."

House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill said Carter offered 35 instances of information that supported the U.S. assertion. "I think his sources were reliable and credible," O'Neill said.

He was asked if that meant to him that the Cubans were lying. "As far as I'm concerned, that has to be the answer," O'Neill said.

Senate Democratic Leader Robert Byrd also endorsed the accuracy of Carter's information through a spokesman from his office.

THE WHITE HOUSE, meanwhile, acknowledged that U.S. Air Force jet transports will be used to evacuate French foreign legionnaires the United States helped to deliver to Zaire, where they parachuted in to rescue 3,000 Europeans trapped and threatened by Katangan rebels who massacred groups of whites and blacks while they held the Shaba province town of Kolwezi.

The transports also would be used to ferry into Zaire a pan-African peace-keeping force being put together by France from among French-speaking former African colonies.

The trip of the Chinese foreign minister to Zaire and his meeting with Vance at a time when the United States is searching for ways to counter Soviet-Cuban influence in Africa was taken as indicating China may now be ready to lend its influence to countering the Soviets there as well.

Nothing of the Vance-Huang meeting was disclosed. A U.S. spokesman said only that their talks were "useful and constructive."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-9

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 June 1978

E. Germany Denies Role in Training Invaders of Zaire

Associated Press

East Germany yesterday denied U.S. allegations that it may have helped train the Katangan rebels who invaded Zaire's Shaba Province.

"It is not true and it will not be true," Oskar Fischer, the East German foreign minister, said after a meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance.

"He asked me whether it was true and my reply was the same I have just given you," Fischer told reporters after the State Department session. He was in Washington to deliver a speech later in the day to the National Press Club.

The East German minister described relations with the United States as "normal but capable of being developed."

In a nationally televised interview May 28, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, said the Katangan invasion of Shaba "could not have taken place without the invading parties having been armed and trained by the Cubans and indeed perhaps also the East Germans."

Fischer disputed the allegation.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A26THE NEW YORK TIMES
9 June 1978

C.I.A. Overseers

To the Editor:

I would like to comment on an article published in The Times of June 1 headed "Congress is Accused of Laxity on C.I.A.'s Cover Activity."

I think it is important to make plain that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reviews in detail every covert-action activity, and each activity is voted upon by every member of the committee after deliberation and discussion. This is done when each case arises as well as on a yearly basis and as part of the annual authorization for intelligence activities.

In the view of the committee, President Carter has honored his commitment in Executive Order 12036 which directs the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all agencies involved in intelligence activities to keep the intelligence committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives "fully and currently informed concerning intelligence activities including any significant anticipated activities...."

The Presidential directive of Jan. 28, 1978, also instructed the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies to provide "any information or document" in the possession, custody or control of the agency or Government department to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, provided it is within the committees' jurisdiction. There is also a requirement to report "in timely fashion" any illegal or improper activities and any corrective action that may have been taken or is planned.

As chairman of the committee charged with oversight over all intelligence activities, I can report that the President's instructions are being carried out by the intelligence community under Adm. Stansfield Turner. There are still some procedural problems that remain to be worked out, but there is no disagreement about the right of access by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to any information on intelligence matters.

BIRCH BAYH

United States Senator from Indiana

Washington, June 5, 1978

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-10**NEW YORK TIMES
7 JUNE 1978

Carter Won't Give Data on Cubans To Foreign Relations Committee

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6—The Carter Administration has refused to turn over to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the documentary evidence to substantiate its charges that Cuba trained and equipped Katangan rebels for their recent invasion of Zaire from Angola, Administration officials said today.

Rather than provide the raw material to the Foreign Relations Committee, the Administration decided to give it only to the Senate Intelligence Committee. The same pattern is being followed on the House side, officials said.

Since the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was the only committee to raise questions about the Administration's assertions that Cuba had played a major role in the Zaire invasion, the decision to deny it the raw material may provoke a sharp dispute, when Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, testifies before the committee on Friday to back up the Administration's assertions about Cuba.

According to members of the Foreign Relations Committee, their Chairman, John J. Sparkman of Alabama authorized the staff to assemble as much information as possible about the charges that Cuba was involved in preparing the Katangans for the Zaire action—charges that Cuba has consistently denied.

Two Requests Made

Last week and again this morning, committee staff members asked the Central Intelligence Agency for the intelligence documentation so that the staff could prepare material for the senators to have before Admiral Turner testifies.

Since members of Congress are usually occupied with a number of complex matters, they are usually prepare for a hearing by having staff members summarize available data and suggest pertinent questions.

But the C.I.A.'s Congressional liaison officials told the Foreign Relations Committee that the White House had decided to restrict the data to the intelligence committees. The official reason was that the Administration wanted only those committees to handle the classified material. By implication, the C.I.A. was expressing concern about possible unauthorized disclosures.

The Senators' Options

But several of the members and staff of the Foreign Relations Committee were equally concerned that the Administration was not providing them with the information they needed to question Admiral Turner because of political considerations. In the interim, the committee has formally asked the Senate Intelligence Committee for a full report on the information it has on the raw material.

At the moment, the committee staff intends to provide as much data as it can in advance to the committee members, pointing out that the staff was unable to see the actual intelligence materi-

al. If the members of the committee are unsatisfied with Admiral Turner's briefing on Friday, they can demand fuller information, staff members said.

The Foreign Relations Committee has been highly critical in the past of what

it regarded as excessive American involvement in Zaire. Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa, has been concerned about what he perceived as exaggerated concern in the Administration over the activity by Cubans in Africa.

Admiral Turner has been selectively briefing key members of Congress and has elicited statements that President Carter was justified in charging Cuba with training and equipping the Katangan rebels.

He is telling members of Congress, such as Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., the Speaker, that the Government has reports from African diplomats, from captured Katangan rebels and from "agents" of other governments that amount to a "preponderance of evidence" that Cuba was involved.

Sources Are Questioned

The Administration has also reportedly said that it has satellite photographs that show Cuban camps in the vicinity of the Katangan camps in northern Angola.

But some members of Congress who asked not to be identified said today that the source of evidence supplied by Admiral Turner was open to question.

At the instigation of Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, the committee called for an inquiry into the discrepancy between Mr. Carter's comments and the denials of President Fidel Castro.

Yesterday, Representative Edward P. Boland of Massachusetts, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said he and his committee were "satisfied" that Mr. Carter's assertions about the Cuban involvement were "correct." He and some members of his committee had received a two-hour briefing from Admiral Turner. His committee also was given documentation.

The issue of whether the Foreign Relations Committee should have access to the intelligence material is controversial. Some members of the committee and its staff argue that without access to such documentation, it is difficult to assess independently testimony given by Administration witnesses. But the Administration contention is that the intelligence committees were created to guard against unauthorized disclosure of information and to provide a sophisticated panel to assess intelligence activities.

Angolan Talks of Cubans

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., June 6 (AP)—Angola's Foreign Minister, Paulo Jorge, said today that he "can't even guess" when the Cubans will leave his country "because their work has just begun."

"The Cubans are in my country for the simple reason that we have two bad neighbors—Zaire and South Africa—and Cuba will send as many people as we need and they will stay until the work is finished, but I can't even guess when that will be," Mr. Jorge said in an interview.

9 June 1978

House Unit Divided On Cuba and Zaire

By John M. Goshko
and Richard L. Lyous

Washington Post Staff Writers

The Carter administration, continuing its campaign to convince Congress that Cuba assisted the rebel invasion of Zaire last month, drew sharply mixed reactions yesterday from the House International Relations Committee.

Following a closed meeting with Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner, committee members said they were still divided about whether the administration has sufficient evidence to prove President Carter's charge that Cuba helped train and equip the invasion force.

Essentially, it was a case of those who have tended to support the president saying they were convinced, while those who have expressed doubts said they had heard nothing to change their minds.

Several members complained that they had been hindered in making up their minds by the administration's refusal to show any of its evidence to the committee. Instead, they added, yesterday's presentation was limited to Turner's describing the intelligence on which Carter based his charges.

Some of the evidence — satellite photos and reports from African diplomats, captured rebels and agents of other governments — has been made available to the House and Senate intelligence committees.

But, in a move that administration sources privately say is intended to guard against leaks, the CIA has balked at providing this documentation to the House International Relations Committee or to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which are to meet with Turner today.

As a result, the reactions of those who heard Turner yesterday turned on their individual willingness to accept what he said at face value.

Committee Chairman Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.), normally a staunch administration loyalist, said, "I'm convinced the president's assessment was accurate, and I support the president. There's no doubt about the credibility of the evidence."

However, Rep. Don L. Bonker (D-Wash.), a committee member who has

specialized in African affairs, said: "I wasn't persuaded they have evidence that would stand up in a court of law. They haven't proved complicity."

Bonker said there was little doubt that the Cubans, in the past, have helped train Zaire rebels in Angola, the neighboring Marxist country from which the invasion was launched. But he added:

"There's a very fine line here. I don't see any evidence directly linking the Cubans to involvement in or direction of this specific operation."

Similarly mixed judgments and expressions of confusion came from other committee members who asked not to be identified. What was probably the dominant opinion was expressed by Rep. Helen S. Meyner (D-N.J.). She said she supported the president, but added: "I knew as much before this meeting as I do now."

While the arguments about the evidence continued, the first stirrings of congressional reaction began to be heard about Carter's Wednesday U.S. Naval Academy speech in which he challenged the Soviet Union to "choose either confrontation or cooperation."

At a breakfast meeting with reporters, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who next year is expected to become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, criticized what he called "the Cold War 'The Russians are coming' tone" of the president's rhetoric.

Church said it was unrealistic for the United States, "which by nature of its position seeks to exert as much influence as it can in the world," to tell the Soviet Union that it cannot do the same.

The real issue in Zaire, Church argued, is the West's interest in keeping that country's copper mines open.

A similar caution came from Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), who originated the request that the administration show Congress its evidence about Cuban involvement in Zaire.

"We don't need so much confrontation," McGovern said of Carter's speech. "I don't see any purpose in ginning the American people into a kind of antiSoviet hysteria. I don't think that was his intention, but I think he needs to cool the rhetoric...."

NEW YORK TIMES
8 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 38

Letters

Of Covert C.I.A. Actions and the Congress

To the Editor:

The article by Seymour Hersh on June 1 regarding Congressional oversight of the C.I.A.'s covert action program is misleading. "Evidence" is cited that both the Senate and House intelligence committees have approved covert actions "without serious questioning."

I cannot speak for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, but I can assure your readers that in the 10 months since the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has been in existence, it has gone into the C.I.A.'s covert action program in great detail. The committee has received a number of briefings from the Director of Central Intelligence on this subject, during which the committee members thoroughly examined the C.I.A.'s covert action program. In addition, the Subcommittee on Oversight, chaired by Representative Les Aspin, has held five hearings delving into every aspect of covert action.

Moreover, as part of the annual budget authorization process, the Subcommittee on Program and Budget Authorization, chaired by Representative Bill Burlison, examined the risk and policy implications versus cost of

each of the C.I.A.'s covert action programs.

Your readers should also be aware that in accordance with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, passed in 1974, no funds appropriated by Congress may be expended by or on behalf of the C.I.A. for covert operations unless the "President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of Congress..." The Administration has agreed that the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence are among the appropriate committees to receive such reports. You will note that, contrary to the article's assertion, the law does not require the approval of Congress or of any of the "appropriate" committees before covert actions are carried out.

Let me explain how the process works. Once the President has made a finding in accordance with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, our committee is so informed. The Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Turner, has been meticulous in informing the committee of such findings, usually within hours after the President's

decision. The committee then sets a time, normally within a day or so, for Admiral Turner to brief the full committee on the covert operation.

Members have demanded great detail on each such activity. In addition, the committee has requested that Admiral Turner report back to the President any disagreement with any covert operation on the part of even one member of this committee.

Finally, let me point out that funds for operations of the C.I.A. must be authorized by this committee. In the future, as we receive the required reports from the Administration, not only can we make known to the President any dissatisfaction we may have with a particular covert operation but a majority of the committee can vote not to authorize such operations.

Far from being a rubber stamp, as suggested in the article, our committee is exercising close and continuing scrutiny over the covert actions of the C.I.A. If our ongoing investigation into the covert actions approval process confirms any loopholes, I am confident that the committee will recommend remedial legislation to the House of Representatives.

In sum, I believe the Hersh article presented a distorted picture of current realities. Congressional oversight of the C.I.A.'s covert activities, far from being lax, is vibrant, thorough and continuous.

(Rep.) EDWARD P. BOLAND
Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence
Washington, June 1, 1978

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
14 JUNE 1978

U.S. agent who defected in '60 to Russ reported set to return

LENINGRAD (UPI)—Bernon F. Mitchell, a cryptographer at the super-secret United States National Security Agency who defected to Moscow 18 years ago, evidently wants to come home, according to informed sources.

Mitchell, 49, and a colleague, William I. Martin, 47, were employed as junior mathematicians in the NSA's cryptography department at Ft. Meade, Md., when they defected to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1960.

After turning up in Moscow on Sept. 8, 1960, they told reporters they had defected "for moral and political reasons," saying they were disenchanted with U.S. intelligence methods.

Their defection caused an uproar in U.S. defense circles because it was believed they carried with them informa-

tion concerning the inner workings of the agency.

NSA, the most secret American intelligence agency, is concerned mainly with breaking foreign codes and protecting American codes. It also intercepts foreign communications with sophisticated monitoring equipment.

A U.S. CONSULATE official in Leningrad confirmed that Mitchell, of Eureka, Cal., has contacted American officials regarding the possibility of returning to the United States.

"Mitchell has visited the consulate two times this year to talk to a consular official," said the American diplomat. "The talks were mostly exploratory."


Informed sources said Mitchell visited the American consulate in Leningrad

three times this year to ask about legal questions regarding possible prosecution for espionage if he returned to the United States.

They said that during the first two visits there were substantial discussions; but on the third visit, Mitchell, who had to wait a few minutes until the consular official was free, suddenly got up and left.

THE SOURCES said the fact that Mitchell got past the Soviet militia guard outside the consulate indicated the visits were carried out with the knowledge of Soviet authorities.

Mitchell lives in Leningrad and teaches at Leningrad University. Martin, of Ellensburg, Wash., also lives and works in Leningrad.



Bernon Mitchell in 1968

Source said Martin, upon hearing that Mitchell wanted to leave the Soviet Union, "got very angry and has been trying to talk him out of it."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 June 1978



Martin, left, and Mitchell shown after their defection in 1960.

U.S. Defector Eyes Return Home

LENINGRAD (UPI) — Bernon F. Mitchell, a cryptographer at the super-secret U.S. National Security Agency who defected to Moscow 18 years ago, evidently wants to come home, informed sources report.

Mitchell, 49, and a colleague, William H. Martin, 47, were employed as junior mathematicians in the NSA's cryptography department at Fort Meade, Md., when they defected in 1960.

After turning up in Moscow, they said, they had defected "for moral and political reasons," and that they were disenchanted with U.S. intelligence methods.

Their defection caused an uproar in U.S. defense circles because it was believed that they had information about NSA's inner workings.

NSA is concerned mainly with breaking foreign codes and protecting American codes. It also intercepts foreign communications.

A U.S. Consulate official in Leningrad said that Mitchell, of Eureka, Calif., had contacted American officials to explore the

possibility of returning to the United States.

Informed sources said Mitchell visited the American Consulate in Leningrad three times this year to ask about legal questions regarding possible prosecution for espionage if he returned.

They said during the first two visits there were substantial discussions, but that on the third visit, Mitchell, who had to wait a few minutes until the consular official was free, suddenly got up and left without meeting the diplomat.

The sources said the fact that Mitchell got past the Soviet guard outside the consulate indicated Soviet authorities knew about the visits.

Mitchell lives in Leningrad and teaches at Leningrad University. Martin, of Ellensburg, Wash., also lives and works in Leningrad.

They said Martin, upon hearing that Mitchell might leave the Soviet Union, "got very angry and has been trying to talk him out of it."

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-22

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 June 1978

Spying by the Rules

THE PROCESS OF Soviet-American relations comes down to a continuing quest to draw rules to keep competition within bounds. The pursuit of rules is acknowledged in regard to strategic arms. It is tacit in regard to espionage. Both sides long ago decided to spy—but within limits. Though they surely know or suspect who most of each other's agents are, they grant them entry and let them operate—while keeping an eye on them. The two governments shy from doing physical harm to each other's agents. Political things being equal, each hesitates to embarrass the other's intelligence service by exposure.

In recent months, of course, political things have not been equal. That's why the air has been unusually full of spy charges. By the Russian version, which some American officials privately accept, the United States bent the rules last month by arresting, publicizing and holding for trial on high bail—rather than quietly expelling—two accused Russian spies. The Kremlin quietly warned that "two can play at this game." When, soon, further publicity was given to discovery of a Soviet-operated electronic listening post in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, the Russians publicly protested this "artificial aggravation" of East-West relations.

In quick sequence they disclosed that they had quietly ousted an accused American spy last July, and they pulled an American businessman out of his car on a Moscow street on a reported smuggling charge. Apparently he was arrested to be exchanged for the arrested Russians; regardless, we do not think his company, International Harvester, should do normal business with the Russians until he is free.

If the United States were prepared to forego spying there, it would be in a position to crack down hard on Soviet spying here. But espionage conducted inside Russia remains an attractive and presumably useful supplement to intelligence operations carried on outside. Experience should have shown what sort of operations—we refer to intelligence collection—have a value worth the stress and risk of conducting. If that means the Soviets will continue to enjoy enhanced opportunities to collect intelligence here, then it is the task of U.S. counterintelligence to limit the damage. There is no particular benefit, we feel, in breaking the tacit rules by which these activities go on. The rules not only regulate intelligence operations. They also prevent intelligence activities from souring the climate in which rules on more important matters are pursued.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 16APHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
15 JUNE 1978

Arrest jars executives in Moscow

Associated Press

MOSCOW — Stunned by the arrest of an Alabama salesman, American businessmen working here said after a meeting yesterday at the U. S. Embassy that they were worried about where the Soviets might strike next.

More than 40 industry representatives gathered at the luncheon with high-ranking members of the embassy to discuss what had happened to Francis J. Crawford, the Moscow representative for International Harvester, who was dragged from his car by police Monday night. The police took him away, leaving behind his fiancée, who sought in vain to see him in prison yesterday.

Crawford, 38, of Mobile, Ala., was charged with smuggling and held in Lefortovo prison. U. S. Embassy legal experts said they believed he would be accused of smuggling currency, an offense punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Western observers here expect the Soviets to try to trade him for two Soviet U.N. employees who are on trial as spies in New Jersey.

Crawford was arrested only hours after the Soviet newspaper Izvestia had reported that a CIA agent formerly attached to the U. S. Embassy here was expelled last July for spying. Izvestia said the agent, Martha D. Peterson, had provided poison to an accomplice who used it to kill "an innocent person who stood in his way."

The Soviets had threatened to expose U. S. espionage activities in retaliation for the accusations against Valdik Enger and Rudolph Chernayev, who are being tried in Newark, N. J., on charge of conspiring to pass U. S. Navy secrets to Moscow, and because of recent U. S. charges that the Soviets had bugged the American Embassy in Moscow.

The luncheon yesterday, one of a series of monthly gatherings organized for businessmen by the U. S. Commercial Office here, reportedly was devoted almost exclusively to Crawford's arrest.

One businessman said that those at the meeting, virtually all the American executives here, agreed to formally ask their corporate headquarters what action, if any, should be taken as a result of Crawford's arrest.

The business source said some participants suggested telling the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry "something to the effect that if you want good relations, you can't have businessmen yanked out of their cars."

Embassy sources said that Crawford's fiancée, Virginia O'Brish, 32, who is from Philadelphia, was barred from seeing him yesterday but did not argue with officials. It was hoped that the couple could meet later this week.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
15 JUNE 1978

Soviet Is Said to Have Warned U.S. Of Retaliation in Arrest of Russians

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 14—Authoritative sources said today that Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko warned Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance two weeks ago that the Soviet Union would soon retaliate against Americans in Moscow unless the United States released two Soviet employees of the United Nations being held on espionage charges.

According to an authoritative account of the Vance-Gromyko meeting, which was in New York on May 31, Mr. Gromyko raised strong objections to what he

and other Russians charged was a violation of an unofficial understanding in recent years that alleged espionage activity committed by each against the other would not be subjected to excessive publicity.

Mr. Gromyko said, according to the account made available today, that the United States, in keeping with recent practice, should allow the Soviet citizens to leave the United States, or at the minimum be freed on reasonable bail pending trial.

Otherwise, he reportedly cautioned, "two can play the same game." As a result, American officials had been waiting for the retaliation to occur, and it apparently began on Monday in Moscow in two episodes and may not be over yet.

The first incident the disclosure by Izvestia, the Government newspaper, of the detention nearly a year ago of Martha Peterson, a vice consul of the American Embassy, on espionage charges.

Mrs. Peterson, who was said by officials here to be an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, was permitted to leave the Soviet Union without publicity.

In the article, Izvestia said that Ambas-

sador Malcolm Toon had asked for secrecy about the incident and that the Soviet Union had "found it possible to keep the incident from public knowledge."

But the article said that, instead of following this practice, the United States recently "sanctioned the scandal over 'Soviet espionage.'" This was similar to the line of argument used by Mr. Gromyko.

Officials said that despite Mr. Gromyko's warning nothing was done to alert Americans in Moscow because it was not known precisely what the Russians might do.

The second development was the arrest on Monday night by the Soviet police of F. Jay Crawford, a service representative of International Harvester, a farm and construction equipment company with a long and active trade relationship with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Crawford was arrested while he was in his car with his fiancée and stopped at a traffic light. He was pulled from the car and taken by the police directly to prison, reportedly on currency violation charges.

The arrest of Mr. Crawford was regarded by officials here as directly related to the continued detention of the two Soviet employees of the United Nations. The harsh manner in which he was seized was also seen here as a signal to Washington that the Soviet Union was ready to respond in a tough manner.

Officials here said that they had no idea why Mr. Crawford had been singled out.

There was an assumption by State Department officials that the ruling Politburo of the Communist Party had given the Soviet security police, the K.G.B., authority to arrest Americans not having diplomatic immunity as direct retaliation for the arrest of their citizens.

Link to U.S. Arrests Is Seen

One official said that he doubted that either the Soviet Foreign Ministry or the Foreign Trade Ministry had a choice as to which American would be arrested.

"If they had, I'm sure they wouldn't have picked International Harvester, one of the strongest voices for Soviet-American trade in this country," the official said.

Some officials said that they expected that the Soviet Union might arrest one or more additional Americans. They also said they expected further revelations soon about other American espionage incidents in the past to counter the publicity given not only to the arrest of the two Russians but also to the discovery late last month of elaborate Soviet listening devices in the American Embassy.

The two Soviet employees under detention are Rudolf P. Chernyayev and Valdik A. Enger, who were arrested on May 20 in a shopping center in Woodbridge, N.J.

As employees of the United Nations Secretariat, neither Mr. Chernyayev nor Mr. Enger is entitled to diplomatic immunity. A companion who was seized with them, Vladimir P. Zinyakin, was allowed to return to the Soviet Union because he was attached to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and as such had diplomatic immunity.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-20

THE WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1978

Gromyko Said to Warn U.S. on Russians' Arrest

Associated Press

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko told Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance late last month that his government was incensed by the highly publicized arrest of two Russian nationals on spy charges and might retaliate against Americans, a U.S. official disclosed last night.

"Two can play at this game," Gromyko was reported to have warned Vance in New York during discussions which dealt primarily with efforts to conclude a treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons, said one official who asked not to be identified.

The Russian nationals who were employed at the United Nations Secretariat were arrested in New Jersey on May 20 and charged with espionage.

The Soviets—Valdik Aleksand-

rovich Enger and Rudolf Petrovich Chernyayev—pleaded innocent to the charges and were ordered held in lieu of \$2 million bail each.

Gromyko was reported to be especially upset by the unusually high bail set for the two Russians. He pointedly advised Vance that the Soviet Union was capable of retaliating against Americans in Moscow, said one official.

The apparent Soviet retaliation surfaced Monday when Izvestia, the Soviet government newspaper, claimed that Martha D. Peterson, a CIA agent posing as a U.S. embassy official, was expelled last July after she allegedly was caught planting espionage devices.

On Monday night, U.S. businessman Francis J. Crawford, the Moscow representative for International Harvester, was arrested on smuggling charges.

"It's clear the Soviets telegraphed their punch," a U.S. official said, referring to Gromyko's warning and the following arrest.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A -20

THE WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1978

Spies Under Glass, in Washington and Moscow

In a Dramatic Departure From the Past, Espionage Cases Get Wide Publicity

By Fred Barbash

Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department acknowledged yesterday that the Soviet Union and the United States have secretly handled a "great many" espionage cases of the sort that are now being publicized by both sides.

The acknowledgement bolstered what government sources have said privately for the past week: that the "unwritten rules" of spying, which dictated mutual discretion, are breaking down.

The change in approach has accompanied a deterioration in Soviet-American relations over the past year. Government experts said they expect further splashes of publicity about espionage cases in the coming weeks.

The latest of these came Monday, when the Soviets revealed that nearly a year ago they detained and then expelled Martha D. Peterson, a CIA agent posing as a diplomat in Moscow, after they caught her allegedly planting espionage devices on a bridge crossing the Moscow River.

The U.S. ambassador in Moscow reportedly asked the Soviets at the time to avoid publicity about the incident, which they did until this week.

Sources have speculated that the Soviets broke their silence because the United States made public two Soviet spying incidents, including the arrest last month of two Soviet U.N. employees who had allegedly paid \$20,000 for secret American antisubmarine-warfare documents.

That arrest, said one knowledgeable source, probably would not have occurred two years ago, when Soviet-American relations were more calm.

"It clearly changed the rules of the game," the source said, and going ahead with it "was clearly a major and serious decision made at the highest levels."

State Department spokesman Tom Reston declined to comment on whether there has been a conscious change of policy in handling such cases. Responding to a question about the Martha Peterson case, however, he said that "over the years, many of these cases have not become public." Later he added that "a great many of them just do not crop up."

Government statistics show a significant increase in U.S. prosecutions of espionage activity over the past three years. Ten defendants have been prosecuted since June 1975, according to the Justice Department, more than during the all of the previous 10 years.

In recent months, the government has moved publicly against the two U.N. employees, a third Soviet diplomat stationed at the United Nations and an alleged Washington-based spying ring designed to funnel information to Vietnam.

Recent newspaper stories revealed the existence of a secret Soviet-operated electronic listening post in the south wing of U.S. embassy in Moscow.

All this activity is in sharp contrast to the way things were generally done during the 1960s and much of the 1970s. With a minimum of publicity, if any, the Soviets and Americans would cite "circumstances" or "inappropriate behavior" on the part of the other side and declare the offender persona non grata.

A lively debate within the administration preceded President Carter's decision to approve prosecution of the most recent case of alleged Soviet espionage—the arrests of the U.N. employees—according to sources.

State Department and CIA officials argued against arresting the two Soviet officials because they feared retaliation by the Soviet Union.

But Attorney General Griffin B. Bell took the position that the case should be tried because it was a clear violation of law by Soviets not covered by diplomatic immunity. Justice Department sources said.

Though Carter finally sided with Bell, Justice officials said they did not view the decision as a major shift in U.S. policy toward Soviet espionage cases. "It's all being handled on a case-by-case basis," one Justice official said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-20

THE WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1978

Soviet Harassment a Yardstick for Ties

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW — In the past two years, as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have gradually deteriorated from the heyday of detente six years ago, incidents of harassment and intimidation of American diplomats, businessmen and journalists here have increased in number and severity.

There is no doubt in the minds of seasoned observers that the incidents constitute a rough barometer of Kremlin feelings toward Washington. In the past two days, two incidents have underscored this notion.

On Monday, the Soviets accused a former U.S. diplomat here having been involved in a CIA plot, allegedly involving a murder, to "stop detente" by espionage. The following day, it was revealed that Soviet police had dragged an American businessman from his car in downtown Moscow and had detained him on a reported smuggling charge.

Both acts are virtually unprecedented. Never before have the Soviets directly accused the CIA of killing a Soviet citizen as part of a spy plot. While businessmen have occasionally been searched at customs points, no one here could remember an incident of such crude intimidation as the seizing of F. Jay Crawford.

There are more than two dozen American companies with representatives here and the arrest of Crawford sent shock waves through this group. Many of them gathered at the embassy commercial office yesterday for a briefing by U.S. officials.

"They're upset and some are scared," said one businessman.

To a degree, the two incidents must be seen as separate examples of the tensions between the two superpowers. Relations between the Garter administration and the Kremlin are in a period of extreme difficulty as the two governments attempt to find a successful way to address each other's concerns and conclude a number of important agreements involving both nuclear weapons and conventional forces.

The case of the diplomat, Martha D. Peterson, whose connection with the CIA has been confirmed, is seen by many sources here as a straight Soviet retaliation against the revelation two weeks ago by the U.S. Embassy that it had found Soviet eavesdropping equipment on Embassy grounds.

Both governments in the past have sought to blunt each other's allegations of espionage activity with revelations of their own. But the seriousness of the charge in the Peterson case hints at a new intensity in the Kremlin's approach.

Similarly, the incident involving Crawford a representative of International Harvester, a company with tens of millions of dollars in contracts here and run by an outspoken advocate of closer U.S.-Soviet trade ties, evokes ghosts of the cold war Stalin era.

Not long ago, such incidents would have been unthinkable. That was in the days when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and President Nixon had found responsive notes of trust and understanding that shaped and softened Soviet-American relations from the 1972 summit through the first months of the Ford administration.

In the spring of 1976, with President Ford beginning to find political troubles with detente following Soviet involvement in Angola, harassment began anew for Americans living here. Several U.S. diplomats were jostled and spat upon and warned that "worse could happen" if demonstrations against the Soviet Union in the United States by the Jewish Defense League did not cease. When the league ceased its protests against Soviet treatment of Jews, the harassment also stopped.

As events have unfolded since, however, the atmosphere here for American correspondents and diplomats especially has been marked by renewed pressure. The principal cause has been Kremlin alarm at the increased contacts between the small, scattered groups of human rights activists here and the reporters. This alarm turned to fury when President Carter made human rights a major issue of his new administration and publicly supported the dissidents.

The KGB secret police neutralized the embassy's specialist in human rights activities by heavy-handed surveillance. The state-controlled press began denouncing several American correspondents working here at the time: George Krinsky of Associated Press, Alfred W. Friendly Jr. of Newsweek, Christopher Wren of The New York Times, Peter Osnos of The Washington Post and Robert Toth of The Los Angeles Times.

Krinsky, Friendly and Wren were accused of working for the Central Intelligence Agency, the first time in memory that journalists had been directly accused of working for the CIA. Krinsky was expelled on alleged currency irregularities and Toth was later seized and questioned, allegedly for possessing confidential state documents.

The press campaign against these five has continued, although none works here any longer. Krinsky, Wren and Friendly recently were labeled as CIA agents in a half-hour television show that was a clear warning to viewers to avoid contacts with American correspondents. The campaign against the reporters has been combined with moves against the dissidents, including arrests, intimidation and involuntary emigration.

In the year since Toth was seized, the KGB has repeatedly stopped journalists from taking photos of news events and on several occasions has seized film. CBS correspondent Bernard Redmont has been interfered with three times. Another correspondent was detained for almost five hours by Soviet border guards as he drove back from Poland and many of his notes and research files were seized and not returned.

A Soviet newspaper recently denounced another reporter and other similar incidents have occurred to create an atmosphere of frustration within the small community of reporters.

The recent spate of harassments is in part caused by the unfolding of events: a major trial of dissident leader Yuri Orlov, which triggered many incidents; a series of demonstrations by dissidents and Jews seeking exit visas.

The Soviet reaction to these events leaves little doubt in the minds of many about how the Kremlin currently feels about some of the foreigners it finds residing in its midst.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
15 JUNE 1978

Spying Is Back With New Vigor

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 14—Suddenly this spring it was all back in the headlines: secret agents, double agents, mail drops, code books and invisible writing. There has been more public attention to international espionage in the last six months than at any time in a decade. A cold war espionage apparatus that many Americans thought had been relegated to the spy novel and the movies again seems to be in place and flourishing. What is not clear is: Why this spring?

One possible reason for the latest flurry is the Soviet contention, expressed to Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko two weeks ago, that the United States had violated an informal understanding of recent years by its highly publicized arrest of two Soviet employees of the United Nations and the refusal to lower the extraordinarily high \$2 million bail on each. At that time, Mr. Gromyko threatened Soviet retaliation against American agents.

According to senior diplomatic sources,

intelligence officers and present and former counter-espionage experts, several violated unwritten diplomatic protocol by giving widespread publicity to the arrest. Other factors may have contributed to the developments.

At the highest level, they maintain, are deteriorating diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. They say this means that decisions for arrest, expulsion or exposure of spies in both countries may be made for diplomatic reasons as well as on the facts of the particular case.

Another factor, one source said, is that the United States concluded last fall that Soviet espionage activity here had "gotten out of hand" in the sense that Soviet intelligence officers were undertaking injudicious operations that were virtually a "provocation."

On Dec. 23, the United States expelled a Soviet diplomat in what one top intelligence officer called a clear-cut case of espionage. However, the United States abided by a tacit diplomatic agreement with the Soviet Union that restrains publication of information when one or the other's spies get caught "with their hands in."

II Expelled From Canada

Several weeks later the Soviet Union, in retaliation, expelled an American diplomat who United States officials said was not involved in intelligence work. The United States, several key sources said, felt "this threw the whole thing out of balance" and in late January it

expelled a consular officer here in a further act of retaliation.

In the next two months several cases, which intelligence officers contend are unrelated, kept the public eye on espionage. The United States arrested, tried and convicted two men of giving national security secrets to Vietnam and expelled its chief delegate to the United Nations.

The Canadian Government, whose counter-espionage activities are closely coordinated with those in the United States, ordered 11 Soviet diplomats and other personnel home after an undercover man identified them as part of a conspiracy to get secret information about operations of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

In April, Arkady N. Shevchenko, a Soviet citizen employed at the United Nations Secretariat, quit his high-ranking post, and elected to stay in the United States. Intelligence sources said he had told them he could give the United States information on the activities of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, in the United States.

Last month, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested two Soviet employees of the United Nations and charged them with stealing secrets about United States submarine defenses. The State Department ordered the Soviet Union to recall a third man who was released because he had diplomatic immunity.

One key source said the arrest was a deliberate effort to send the Soviet Union the message that its espionage activities in the United States had to be curtailed. This source and several others said that the vast increase in Soviet citizens on official duty here and a treaty arrangement allowing Soviet ships to call at 40 American ports had sharply increased Soviet espionage efforts.


This week the Soviet newspaper Izvestia published details about what it said was a Central Intelligence Agency operation in Moscow last July. Also this week the Soviet police, in what may be a further card in the same diplomatic game, detained an American employee of the International Harvester Company.

Beneath the diplomatic level, several other currents are at work, according to interviews. Both the United States and Canada have stepped up their counter-espionage activities, and the United States particularly has enlarged the number of agents working on Soviet bloc intrusions.

Soviet agents, on the other hand, seem more bold, less restrained by the dangers of exposure. In one instance, Soviet officials made a direct contact with a senior United States Government official, one source said. In the naval secrets case, one former intelligence officer said, the Soviet operatives seemed to move far more quickly than they did in the past and were less concerned that they might be dealing with a provocateur working for the F.B.I.

Moreover, several sources said, Moscow seems to be playing to American public opinion by publicizing spy stories it deems to be harmful to the C.I.A.'s interests. The Izvestia article was the second time in a year that a Soviet publication had talked in detail about espionage and counter-espionage.

BALTIMORE EVENING SUN
14 JUNE 1978



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
14 JUNE 1978

American is arrested in Moscow

By Nikki Finke
Associated Press

MOSCOW — An Alabama businessman working here was arrested by Soviet authorities after being dragged from his car at a traffic signal and driven away by Soviet police, the U. S. Embassy reported yesterday. It is believed that a violation of Soviet currency laws may be involved.

The embassy sent a formal letter to the Soviet Foreign Ministry protesting the behavior of the officers who arrested Francis J. Crawford, 38, a Moscow representative of International Harvester, an agricultural equipment firm. And U. S. State Department spokesman Thomas Reston said in Washington that the matter had been raised with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador.

Crawford's arrest came less than 24 hours after the Soviet newspaper Izvestia reported that Martha D. Peterson, a former U. S. Embassy staff member, had actually been expelled for espionage when she left the country last summer.

A well-informed Soviet source said he did not believe that there was any connection between Crawford's case and that of two Soviets who are being

tried in New Jersey for alleged espionage.

But Western diplomatic sources said there was. "The Soviets have a tradition, when their hand is caught in the cookie jar, of trying to possibly get something in return," a Western diplomatic source said.

The source said that he thought Crawford might be "an innocent victim" of deteriorating U. S.-Soviet relations.

Legal experts at the embassy said, however, that they believed currency violations were involved in Crawford's arrest. He was charged under Article 78 of the Soviet criminal code, which carries a 3- to 10-year prison term.

The article refers to smuggling or the illegal transfer of goods or other valuables across the Soviet border. A

Soviet source said that in currency matters "there is no leniency."

Consular officials reported that they had met late yesterday with Crawford, but declined to divulge his condition or to comment on the charges against him, citing U.S. and Soviet privacy laws. It was not disclosed where he was being held, but informed sources said officials met with him at Lefortovo Prison.

Crawford's fiancée, Virginia Olbrish, 32, was with him when he was arrested. She is a secretary in the U.S. Embassy's commercial section and immediately notified her office, officials said.

The two planned to be married this summer, according to a friend. Crawford, who is from Mobile, has been working in Moscow for two years.

An International Harvester spokesman in Chicago, Harry W. Conner, said that Crawford had a good record and was unlikely to have been involved in currency wrongdoing.

Miss Olbrish refused to talk with reporters.

Sources said that the two had been on their way to a diplomatic party Monday night when uniformed militiamen stopped their car at a traffic signal on a downtown street.

Police pulled Crawford out and drove him away, the sources said. They tried to detain Miss Olbrish, but she claimed diplomatic immunity and went to the embassy, the sources said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
14 JUNE 1978

Russ seize U.S. exec on smuggling charges

By Jim Gallagher

Moscow correspondent

Chicago Tribune Press Service

MOSCOW—The Moscow representative of the Chicago-based International Harvester Co. was dragged from his car by Soviet police Monday night and charged with violating an anti-smuggling statute, an American Embassy spokesman said Tuesday.

The charge carries a prison term of from 3 to 10 years.

F. Jay Crawford, 33, of Mobile, Ala., who has been in Moscow for about two years, was apprehended after his car was signaled to stop at a red light near the Kiev railroad terminal not far from the center of the city.

Crawford's fiancée, Virginia Oldbrish, 32, of Philadelphia, an employee in the American embassy's commercial section, was with him at the time but was not taken into custody.

A CONSULAR officer from the embassy met with Crawford Tuesday, and a ranking diplomat in the embassy's political section delivered a written note of protest to the Soviet Foreign ministry.


The foreign ministry said Crawford was being detained under Article 78 of the criminal code of the Russian republic, which deals with the illegal transfer of goods and other valuables across the Soviet border.

However, Soviet sources told American reporters here that they understood the relevant statute to be Article 88, which deals with illegal currency transactions and carries a lesser penalty.

CRAWFORD was described by associates here as a colorful character with a deep Southern accent who always dressed in cowboy boots. He has lived at the Intourist Hotel.

International Harvester does considerable business with the Soviets.

There has been speculation among Westerners here that Crawford's arrest might be in retaliation for the recent arrest in New Jersey of two Soviet United Nations employees on



Francis Jay Crawford

spying charges.

THE ARREST COMES at a time when relations between the two superpowers are rapidly souring. The United States recently accused the Soviets of having installed listening devices in the American Embassy here. The Soviets have accused elements in the United States of creating a "spy fever" in an effort to weaken detente and delay the signing of a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

The Soviet newspaper Izvestia said on Monday that a former U. S. Embassy vice consul had been expelled last July after being exposed as an undercover agent for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The diplomat, Martha Peterson, 33, was said by Izvestia to have delivered poison to a spy here, who later used it to poison a Soviet citizen who represented a threat to his personal safety.

"They want to intimidate us," said Izvestia of those persons behind the anti-Soviet campaign in the United States. "But we are not the ones to be intimidated."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-6NEW YORK TIMES
14 JUNE 1978

SOVIET POLICE SEIZE A U.S. BUSINESSMAN

International Harvester Office Chief Dragged From Car and Is Held on a Charge of Smuggling

By DAVID K. SHIFLER

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 13—An American businessman representing International Harvester was pulled out of his automobile last night by Moscow policemen and taken into custody on a charge of smuggling, the American Embassy disclosed today.

F. Jay Crawford, a 34-year-old Alabamian, was seized while on a drive with his fiancée, Virginia Olbrish. When he stopped at a traffic light, according to



United Press International

F. Jay Crawford

the embassy account, police officers "forcibly removed him from the vehicle" while others restrained Miss Olbrish, who works in the embassy's commercial office.

Miss Olbrish was allowed to proceed after Mr. Crawford had been taken away, an embassy spokesman said.

Without commenting on the charges, the embassy sent a written protest to the Foreign Ministry about the police behavior.

The incident, particularly the method of arrest, was viewed by diplomats as part of an intensification of official pressure against Americans residents, one result of worsening Soviet-American relations.

10 Years in Prison and 5 in Exile

The charge against Mr. Crawford carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and 5 years of exile in a remote area, usually Siberia.

Yesterday, the Government newspaper Izvestia published a long article by Yulian Semyonov, a popular writer of spy thrillers, about an American diplomat, Martha Peterson, said to have been caught in the act last July of planting a cache of espionage equipment, miniature cameras and ampules of poison for pickup by a Russian working for the Central Intelligence Agency. The article hinted, and some well-placed Russians have supported the hint, that there would be further "revelations" of American espionage.

In recent weeks, President Carter and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, have focused sharp accusations at Moscow over Soviet and Cuban military involvement in Africa, a continuing Soviet arms buildup, Soviet violations of human rights and other aspects of Soviet behavior.

More Latitude for Soviet Police

Such an increase in tension usually gives greater latitude to the police in the Soviet Union and Americans in Moscow often become targets.

Many foreigners have long suspected that Soviet police authorities are behind the activity of some of the young men outside tourist hotels offering black-market deals of rubles for dollars or exorbitant amounts in rubles for Western clothes and records. The assumption of foreigners who live here is that some of the offers, and perhaps most, are intended to entrap Westerners and give the police evidence to use against them if desired.

It is not clear why the Russians would want to make a case against Mr. Crawford. He directs International Harvester's off-

and the farm machinery company does important business with the Soviet Union.

The company has sold large quantities of agricultural equipment to the Russians at a time when some American concerns have become doubtful about the potential of the Soviet market, in the midst of political strains with the West. It would seem illogical, some observers commented, for the Russians to scare off businessmen by police maneuvers.

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 June 1978

U.S. Businessman in Moscow Seized on Smuggling Charge

By Kevin Kliese

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—An American businessman was dragged out of his car by Soviet police here Monday night and arrested on charges of smuggling, U.S. Embassy officials said yesterday.

F. Jay Crawford, 38, Moscow representative of International Harvester Co., was arrested as he and his fiancée, an employee of the U.S. Embassy, were driving through downtown Moscow to a cocktail party at a friend's apartment.

U.S. sources said Soviet policemen suddenly appeared when Crawford stopped his car at a traffic light. The policemen reportedly yanked open the door of the car and dragged Crawford out. The sources said his screaming fiancée, Virginia Olbrish, 32, grabbed

the car keys and invoked diplomatic immunity when the policemen also tried to drag her from the car.

Although the incident took place around 7 p.m. Monday, the Soviet Foreign Ministry refused to respond to U.S. Embassy queries about Crawford's whereabouts and condition until late yesterday.

The ministry permitted U.S. Consul Clifford Gross to visit Crawford at Moscow's Lefortovo Prison late yesterday. Soviet officials said the American is held not only on smuggling charges but also possible currency violations. Under the Soviet criminal code these charges carry prison terms of three to 10 years.

The U.S. Embassy protested the Foreign Ministry's conduct. It was reliably reported that Crawford, who has been here since August 1976, denied all the allegations against him.

International Harvester is one of the top companies in annual trade figures doing business with the Soviets. Its chairman, Brooks McCormick, is a director of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, which seeks to promote more trade between the two countries. McCormick has been an ardent supporter of increased commerce between the two superpowers.

[McCormick yesterday requested that "the U.S. government take immediate steps to secure (Crawford's) release." The message was relayed by Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) to Vice President Mondale.]

The arrest is the latest in a series of incidents of increasing seriousness in-

volving official Soviet government actions against Americans.

Several informed Western diplomatic sources speculated last night that Crawford's arrest is the beginning of a Soviet effort to arrange a swap for two Soviet U.N. employees now held in the United States on conspiracy charges for allegedly plotting to transmit U.S. Navy secrets to Moscow.

Several sources also suggested that the Soviets may have deliberately chosen a man without diplomatic immunity since the two arrested Soviet U.N. officials do not enjoy diplomatic status.

The incident comes against a backdrop of deteriorating relations between Washington and Moscow as the Carter administration reviews its approach to dealing with the Soviet leadership.

Just Monday, the Soviet government newspaper Izvestia accused a former woman employee of the U.S.

Embassy, Martha D. Peterson, of being an accomplice in a CIA plot to "stop detente" that allegedly involved the slaying of a Soviet citizen and obtaining presumably secret information to be passed to the West.

In recent weeks the two countries have exchanged increasingly sharp criticisms of each other's policies and the strategic arms limitations negotiations, cornerstone of Soviet-American relations, apparently have stalled anew in complex disagreements.

According to the account from U.S. sources, the latest incident took place near the Kievsky railroad station, when Crawford and Olbrish pulled up in their Volvo station wagon to a stoplight. They reportedly waited for a lengthy time for the light to turn green, when suddenly Soviet police appeared and seized Crawford, a rangy, moustachioed Alabaman. Olbrish, a secretary-archivist at the embassy, was left behind after the police scuffled with Crawford and took him away.

She flagged a passing car and was taken to the U.S. Embassy several blocks away where she reported the incident. She was reported to be still upset yesterday.

Western diplomatic sources here viewed the incident as "without doubt, the most serious of its kind in many years." Some recalled the 1963 Soviet seizure of an American Russian studies professor, Frederick Barghoorn, for a similar precedent. Barghoorn was released after strenuous protests by President Kennedy.

"When their hand is caught in the cookie jar, the Russians can react this way," said one source, speaking of the possibility that the Crawford case is a preliminary to a swap. "But remember, there are two Soviets in jail and so far, only one American." It was a comment made several times by other sources last night.

The smuggling allegation involves Article 78 of the criminal code dealing with smuggling and contraband brought in over Soviet borders. The possible currency allegation involves Article 88 of the same code.

International Harvester has had substantial business with the Soviets in the past, selling them an estimated 1,200 major earth-moving and construction machines including spare parts. The company's sales here since 1974 exceed \$300 million.

Crawford, said by friends here to be an expert troubleshooter on mechanical problems of such machines, was brought in two years ago to help run the spare parts contracts.

Soviets traditionally are wary of allowing foreigners to move widely within the country and Crawford was reportedly allowed only infrequent contact with Soviet mechanics who were actually servicing the machines.

In the past several years, International Harvester and many other U.S. firms that opened offices here in the early 1970s in anticipation of major sales to the Soviets have been disappointed. Soviet harvest shortfalls have forced the Soviets to use hard cur-

rency to buy feed grains, with a resultant cutback in Western equipment purchases. International Harvester had recently recalled its resident director here and Crawford was serving as temporary head of the office when he was seized.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2

THE BALTIMORE SUN
14 June 1978

American accused of Soviet currency violation

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Soviet Union has charged an American businessman with violating currency laws, the latest in a series of episodes an American diplomat termed "symptomatic of deterioration" in superpower relations.

Francis J. Crawford, 37, of Mobile, Ala., was taken "forcibly" from his car in Moscow at 7 P.M. Monday, a State Department spokesman said. The United States protested "the behavior of arresting authorities" even before U.S. consular officers gained access to Mr. Crawford yesterday.

Mr. Crawford was described as the junior representative of International Harvester Company in Moscow. His arrest occurred shortly after Soviet officials reported the expulsion last July of an American woman diplomat, Martha D. Peterson, for espionage that included complicity in murder.

American diplomats judged that the announcement concerning Mrs. Peterson, 32, then a third secretary, was retaliation for American publicity regarding recent bugging of the U.S. Embassy. Soviet officials had warned publicly, in fact, that they would adopt a tit-for-tat policy in exposing spy cases.

But there was immediate speculation here that Soviet authorities had something more complex in mind with the arrest of Mr. Crawford. Lacking diplomatic immunity, he could be seen as a political counterpart to two Soviet citizens now awaiting trial in New Jersey for buying U.S. military secrets.

The two Soviet citizens, Valdik A. Enger, 39, and Rudolf P. Chernyayev, 43, have been held in lieu of \$2 million bond for plotting to obtain secrets regarding antisubmarine warfare. Both employees of the United Nations, they were arrested last month at a Woodbridge, N.J., shopping center.

As U.N. employees, they lack diplomatic immunity. They were seized with a third Soviet citizen, Vladimir P. Zinyakin, 39, a diplomat who since has left the United States.

American officials suspect that the Soviet government may be attempting to influence the New Jersey case by demonstrating, through the arrest of Mr. Crawford, the vulnerability of non-diplomats.

Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, voiced his displeasure over "the matter in New Jersey" directly to Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State, one diplomat reported. Mr. Gromyko, who reportedly felt the United States was violating unwritten rules of espionage, was said to have warned about possible retaliation.

"Of course he could have been referring to the Peterson case," the diplomat remarked. "But the Crawford case seems more directly applicable because of the absence of diplomatic immunity."

Neither side was linking publicly the public chain of arrests and spying reports to worsening U.S.-Soviet relations generally. "Nobody wants to admit," one official said, "that individuals are being used as pawns. But it's impossible to separate small and large events entirely; because some of these things never would have seen the light of day in a better atmosphere."

Alarmed over Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa, President Carter has become increasingly critical of the Soviet Union. Both governments, however, apparently have attempted to hold arms control negotiations apart from their other differences.

U.S. officials refused to discuss details of intelligence operations yesterday. They specifically refused to comment on the case of Mrs. Peterson beyond saying that she had been expelled last July after Soviet authorities accused her of "engaging in inappropriate activities."

In fact, *Izvestia*, the Soviet government newspaper, reported that she had been caught hiding espionage materials, including a camera and ampules of poison. Her activities, for the Central Intelligence

Agency, the newspaper said, had contributed to the death of one unidentified person.

American officials privately treated Mrs. Peterson's employment by the CIA as a fact. She had been reassigned in Washington, spokesmen said, but is "currently on leave."

Mr. Crawford is accused of violating Article 78 of the Soviet criminal code, a State Department spokesman reported, related to "illegal currency dealings."

The spokesman, Tom Reston, said Mr. Crawford's car was stopped by Soviet police on a Moscow street Monday night. He was "forcibly taken away," Mr. Reston added, leaving behind his companion, Miss Virginia Olbrish, a U.S. Embassy secretary.

She immediately notified the embassy of the episode, Mr. Reston said, and U.S. diplomats began seeking an official explanation. George W. Vest, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, "raised the matter," the spokesman reported, in a conversation late Monday with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington.

A spokesman for International Harvester Company said Mr. Crawford has been in Moscow about two years. The law he is accused of violating provides a penalty of 3 to 10 years in prison plus confiscation of property and internal exile.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1, 15

THE WASHINGTON POST
13 June 1978

Soviets Allege American's Role In Spy Killing

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—The Soviet government yesterday accused an American posing as a diplomat in Moscow of involvement in the murder of an innocent Soviet citizen who stood in the way of an espionage ring run here by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The charge was leveled at Martha D. Peterson, a former vice consul in the U.S. Embassy here, who was described as a CIA agent who transmitted the poison used in the killing. The alleged victim or the spy who carried out the execution were not identified.

[Sources in Washington confirmed that Peterson, 33, was employed by the CIA. The State Department, confirming she was expelled, issued a statement saying "it was alleged that she engaged in inappropriate activities." It added that she is on leave.]

The accusation in the government newspaper Izvestia alleged that Soviet counterintelligence agents uncovered the plot last year when they intercepted Peterson as she was about to transfer espionage gear, including two poison capsules, concealed inside a fake rock to her unidentified contact. Among allegedly captured items were photographic equipment and money.

"It was found out during the investigation that the poison transmitted to the spy earlier had been

used to kill an innocent Soviet citizen who stood in the way of the spy's criminal activities," Izvestia said.

While U.S. Embassy sources refused to comment on the allegations, they said that Peterson worked in the embassy from autumn 1975 to July 1977 and that following her departure she was declared persona non grata by the Soviet government. Officials refused to provide any additional details except to say that she had been "detained briefly" by Soviet police before her departure.

The extraordinary accusations published on the front page of Izvestia appear to be a response to recent American disclosures that Soviet eavesdropping gear had been discovered secreted within the U.S. Embassy chancery here. They also seem to be linked to the arrest in New Jersey of two Soviet citizens accused of espionage.

Izvestia clearly indicated that its revelations came after the "American

side" violated an unwritten understanding under which the two sides refrained from publicizing each other's espionage actions.

[Sources in Washington said it was true that the current charges back and forth between Moscow and Washington represent a departure from past practices in which espionage operatives using diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic cover were expelled quickly and without publicity.]

Izvestia's harsh language underscores the growing distrust now permeating relations between the two capitals as the Carter administration scrutinizes its basic attitudes toward Moscow and sounds repeated notes of warning to the Soviets both about the terms of a new strategic arms limitation agreement and Soviet military involvement in Africa.

Over the years, both governments have accused each other of harboring spies among their diplomats and many diplomats have been expelled on espionage grounds.

A trial is now under way in Newark, N.J., involving the two Soviets accused of conspiring to pass U.S. Navy secrets to Moscow.

Izvestia's accusations of CIA poisoning are virtually without precedent. It tied the allegation to an attack on CIA Director Stansfield Turner's congressional testimony saying the CIA no longer condones or supports political assassinations.

"How to tally Turner's public statement with the practical work of his agency?" Izvestia asked.

The long article, mixing sarcasm and contumely with purported facts, leaves many major questions unanswered in a confusing pastiche. It was written by Yulian Semenov, this country's most famous spy novelist and author of a recently widely hailed television series about how Soviet agents prevented the United States from making a separate peace with Hitler during World War II.

The article said Peterson was involved in an effort to obtain information and falsify it "to stop detente."

It said she was seized last July 15 after elaborate efforts by her to evade surveillance and deposit the espionage rock in an arch of a well-traveled bridge over the Moscow River so it could be retrieved by the anonymous spy.

It said that when she was apprehended "she started shouting, 'I am a foreigner.' Obviously the vice consul was shouting so loudly to warn the spy who was coming to the appointment place about the danger."

The newspaper published two photos, one showing what it described as the contents of the hollow rock and the other of Peterson and U.S. Consul Clifford Gross sitting at a table with items from the rock spread before them.

Semenov wrote that on the night of July 15, Peterson drove herself to the center of Moscow, changed from a white dress to black trousers "in a poorly lit place" and took a bus, trolley, subway and taxi before she "finally hurried to the bridge" spanning the Moscow River at Lenin Hills "and put an ordinary-looking stone in a loophole in the arch. It was there that the vice consul was detained."

The rock was opened in the presence of Peterson and Consul Gross. It "proved to be a cache, containing cameras, gold [a] large sum of Russian money and a phrase book, microphone and instructions." The two poison capsules "and special instructions on how it should be used also were found."

The following day, Ambassador Malcolm Toon was summoned to the Foreign Ministry, and handed a protest note, said Izvestia, alleging that U.S. "special services were pursuing subversive pictures on Soviet territory, using the diplomatic cover of the embassy, and using such means as poisons."

After the meeting, said the paper, "the ambassador said the U.S. would be grateful if what happened would not be made public. The ambassador assured that he would do everything he could so that this kind of incident should not be repeated. Considering

CONTINUED

the man representing the U.S. government could not be irresponsible about what he was saying, the Soviet side did not make the affair public.

"But now it has become clear that the U.S. has not taken any steps to stop that kind of activity. The scandal concerning 'Soviet spying' has been authorized."

Izvestia also named Robert Fulton, Jay K. Gruner and Serge Karpovich as "implicated in the espionage." Sources here said Fulton was a political officer from July 1975 to July 1977 and routinely reassigned to Washington. The other two made a brief visit here in November 1975.

Peterson, whose husband was killed over Laos five years ago while serving as a Navy pilot, has been assigned to Washington. Officials said she is currently on leave.

While linking Peterson to the alleged death of a Soviet citizen, Izvestia did not identify her accomplice but left the impression that he was a Soviet citizen who provided information to the CIA.

CONTINUED



Photograph published by Soviet newspaper shows accused agent Martha Peterson with U.S. consul Clifford Gross and alleged espionage equipment. TASS via Associated Press

Soviet, Retaliating, Publicizes Case Against Woman Linked to C.I.A.

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 12—The Government newspaper Izvestia said today that an American woman assigned to the United States Embassy here had been arrested last July as she planted a cache of spy equipment, including ampuls of a lethal poison, on a bridge over the Moscow River.

The packet, containing miniature cameras, gold, Soviet currency and written instructions, was hidden inside a hollowed-out stone for pickup later by a Soviet citizen working for the Central Intelligence Agency, the paper said.

Izvestia accused the American, Martha D. Peterson, of complicity in the poisoning and murder of an unidentified Soviet citizen. It said she was an agent of the C.I.A., but had been allowed to leave the Soviet Union because she had diplomatic immunity. An embassy spokesman said that Miss Peterson, who arrived in the fall of 1975, had worked for the embassy's economic section and then as a vice consul, before being expelled, but he declined further comment.

Izvestia said the publicity, in the form of an article with a picture of Miss Peterson in interrogation, behind a table covered with alleged spy paraphernalia, had been authorized because of "the new round of anti-Soviet hysteria" in the United States, specifically in response to

the arrest in Woodbridge, N.J. of two Soviet employees of the United Nations caught in the act of picking up Navy documents on antisubmarine warfare. The two did not have diplomatic immunity, and are in custody on \$2 million awaiting trial. A third Russian, a diplomat, was expelled from the United States.

Izvestia identified several other American officials as C.I.A. agents, including Robert M. Fulton, who worked in the political section from July 1975 to July 1977, according to the embassy spokesman, and Jay K. Gruner and Serge Karpovich, who had been in Moscow on temporary duty in November 1975, the spokesman reported.

In 1976, an American woman named Martha Schneider identified Mr. Karpovich as one of the officials who persuaded her to rent an apartment in Salzburg, Austria, for the C.I.A.

Incident Is Described in Detail

According to the Izvestia account, Miss Peterson drove toward the center of Moscow on a warm evening last July 15, parked her car in a dimly lighted area, changed from her white dress into a black jumper and slacks, locked her car and got into a city bus. After two stops she transferred to a street car, then went down into the subway, and only after that took a taxi, the paper said.

"What then?" Izvestia continued. "The vice consul left the taxi on the river em-

bankment, walked along an alley near a tennis court, waited until no one was around who could somehow be alerted to her, and hurried to the bridge."

There, the paper said, she put her cache into a chunk in the stone of the bridge. She was caught in the act and seized. "I'm a foreigner!" she exclaimed. "What are you doing? I'm a foreigner."

The American consul, Clifford H. Gross, was summoned to the interrogation, Izvestia said. He is shown in the published photograph seated next to the young woman.

A subsequent Soviet protest listed the cache, contained in a milk carton, as including "spy instructions, a miniature camera, various valuable articles, a large

sum of Soviet currency, two ampuls of deadly poison and special instructions for its use."

Izvestia said that Miss Peterson had refused to say for whom the poison was destined, and that similar poison had been passed on by her previously to an unidentified Soviet agent.

U.S. Embassy Used as a Cover

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 12—Administration officials had no formal comment today on the Izvestia report, but they said privately that Miss Peterson, 33 years old, was a C.I.A. employee who had used the United States Embassy in Moscow as a cover.

Soviets go public with U.S. spy tales

By Seth Mydans
Associated Press

MOSCOW — The Soviet Union, carrying out a threat to publicize details of U. S. spy activities, accused the CIA yesterday of an elaborate undercover operation here involving caches of gold, secret dropoffs of instructions and an American woman spy purveying poison.

The government newspaper Izvestia said U. S. Embassy Third Secretary Martha D. Peterson, who left Moscow last July, was in fact expelled for espionage and that Ambassador Malcolm Toon had requested at the time that the matter be kept quiet.

The newspaper charged that poison supplied to a spy by Miss Peterson

was used to kill an "innocent" who stood in the way of the CIA.

Neither the embassy nor the State Department in Washington had any comment yesterday. But informed sources in Washington said Miss Peterson was a CIA employee who had been working in a cover job in the embassy's consular section.

Izvestia leveled the charges in response to U. S. accusations that the Soviets are spying on the American Embassy in Moscow and to an espionage trial now under way in New Jersey that involves two Soviet officials of the United Nations.

Now that the United States is trying to build up a "scandal" over alleged Soviet spying, the time

had come to respond, it said.

The Izvestia article appeared just over a week after the United States reported the discovery in its Moscow Embassy of secret Soviet electronic equipment believed to be listening devices.

A ranking Western diplomatic source here said yesterday that the equipment was of a kind never before seen by security specialists and that it needed further analysis.

In response to these allegations of eavesdropping on the embassy, the Soviets had warned they might reveal documentary proof of U. S. espionage here.

Izvestia described in detail the case of Miss Peterson and said it was just one of a network of cases "uncovered by the Soviet counter-intelligence service."

On the evening of July 15, it said, Miss Peterson parked her car in a poorly lit place, changed her dress and took a series of buses to a bridge over the Moscow River, where she put "an ordinary-looking stone" into an archway.

She was detained there, the "stone" was opened, and it "proved to be a cache containing cameras, gold, money and instructions, as well as ampules with a poison," Izvestia said.

13 JUNE 1978

Soviet Tells Spy Tale Of U.S. Lady & Poison

Moscow (AP)—The Soviet Union, carrying out a threat to divulge details of alleged U.S. spy activities, accused the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday of elaborate undercover operation here involving caches of gold, secret dropoffs of instructions and an American female agent purveying poison.

The government newspaper Izvestia made the charges in response to U.S. accusations that the Soviets were spying on the American Embassy in Moscow and to an espionage trial now under way in New Jersey.

"Time to Respond"

Izvestia said that details of the U.S. activities had been kept quiet at Washington's request, but that the United States was now trying to build up a "scandal" over alleged Soviet spying, and the time had come to respond.

Izvestia said that Martha D. Peterson, an embassy employee who left the Soviet Union last July, was in fact, expelled for espionage, and that U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon had requested at the time that the matter be kept quiet.

The newspaper charged that poison supplied to a spy by Peterson was used to kill an "innocent" who stood in the way of the CIA.

Neither the embassy nor the State Department in Washington had any comment yesterday. But informed sources in Washington, who asked not

to be identified, said that Peterson was a CIA employee who had been working in a cover job in the embassy's consular section.

The Izvestia article appeared just over a week after the United States reported the discovery in its Moscow embassy of secret Soviet electronic

equipment believed to be listening devices.

In response to allegations of eavesdropping on the embassy, the Soviets had warned they might offer documentary proof of U.S. espionage here.

On the evening of July 15, it said, Peterson parked her car in a poorly lit area, changed her dress and took a series of buses to a bridge over the Moscow River, where she put "an ordinary-looking stone" in an archway.

She was detained there, the stone was opened, and it proved to be a

cache containing cameras, gold, money and instructions, as well as ampules with a poison," Izvestia said.

The Soviet counterintelligence service established beyond a doubt that the poisons taken from the cache had been sent to Moscow by the Central Intelligence Agency not for the first time," the newspaper said.

Izvestia described the Newark, N.J., espionage trial of two Soviet United Nations employees — Valdik Enger, 39, and Rudolf Chernyayev, 43 — as theatrical buffoonery." The two pleaded innocent last Tuesday to charges they conspired to pass U.S. Navy national defense secrets to Moscow.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
13 JUNE 1978

Soviets Name 3 'Accomplices' In U.S. Espionage

MOSCOW (AP) — The Soviet government newspaper Izvestia says at least three other persons are implicated in the espionage for which Martha D. Peterson, a Vietnam war widow who was third secretary of the U.S. Embassy here, was expelled last July.

The United States has made no reply so far to yesterday's Soviet charge of spying and complicity in murder against Peterson, identified as a CIA agent who for two years was on the embassy staff.

Izvestia said Peterson was expelled in July for espionage and that she supplied poison to an accomplice who used it to kill "an innocent person who stood in his way." The accomplice was not identified, although presumably he was a local Russian.

"ALSO IMPLICATED in this espionage," Izvestia said, was Robert Fulton, the first secretary of the embassy's political section from mid-1975 to mid-1977, and two visitors from Washington in 1975, S. Karpovich and J. Gruener.

Neither the embassy nor the State Department had any comment, but Western sources in Moscow said Peterson was not declared persona non grata until after her departure. Sources in Washington who asked not to be identified said she was a CIA employee who had been working in a cover job in the embassy's consular section.

Izvestia said the charges against Peterson had been kept quiet at the request of the United States. It said they were being made public now because the U.S. government on June 1 made public its charge that the Soviet government bugged the U.S. Embassy and because of the espionage trial in New Jersey of two Soviet employees of the United Nations.

The government paper gave this account of Peterson's arrest:

On the evening of July 15, she



MARTHA PETERSON
Identified as CIA agent

parked her car in a poorly lit place in Moscow, changed her dress and took a series of buses to a bridge over the Moscow River, where she put "an ordinary-looking stone" into an archway.

SHE WAS DETAINED there, the "stone" was opened, and it "proved to be a cache containing cameras, gold, money and instructions, as well as ampules with a poison."

"The Soviet counter-intelligence service established beyond a doubt that the poisons taken from the cache had been sent to Moscow by the Central Intelligence Agency and not for the first time."

"It was discovered . . . that the poison that was given to the spy earlier was used by him against an innocent person who stood in his way."

Izvestia said Peterson's case was one of a network "uncovered by the Soviet counter-intelligence service."

The paper termed the Newark espionage trial of Valdik Enger and Rudolf Chernayev "theatrical buffoonery . . . directed by the CIA and FBI . . . to justify in the eyes of their superior the failures that took place in Moscow."

The two U.N. employees pleaded innocent a week ago to charges that they conspired to pass U.S. Navy secrets to Moscow.

13 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-2

Soviet alleges CIA spies ran operation in Moscow

Moscow (AP)—The Soviet Union, carrying out a threat to divulge details of American spy activities, accused the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday of an elaborate undercover operation here involving caches of gold, secret drop-offs of instructions and an American woman spy purveying poison.

The government newspaper *Izvestia* leveled the charges in response to United States accusations that the Russians are spying on the American Embassy in Moscow and to an espionage trial now under way in New Jersey.

It said that the details of the U.S. activities had been kept quiet at Washington's request, but that the United States was now trying to build up a "scandal" over alleged Soviet spying and the time had come to respond.

Izvestia said that Martha D. Peterson, third secretary of the U.S. Embassy, who left the Soviet Union last July, was in fact expelled for espionage and that American Ambassador Malcolm Toon had requested at the time that the matter be kept quiet.

The newspaper charged that poison supplied to a spy by Miss Peterson was used to kill an "innocent" who stood in the way of the CIA.

Neither the embassy nor the State Department in Washington had any comment yesterday. But informed sources in Washington who asked not to be identified said that Miss Peterson was a CIA employee who had been working in a cover job in the embassy's consular section.

The *Izvestia* article appeared just over a week after the United States reported the discovery in its Moscow embassy of secret Soviet electronic equipment believed to be listening devices.

Yesterday, a ranking Western diplomatic source here said that the equipment was of a kind never before seen by security specialists and that it needed further analysis.

In response to these allegations of eavesdropping on the embassy, the Rus-

sians had warned they might reveal documentary proof of U.S. espionage here.

Izvestia described in detail the case of Miss Peterson and said that it was just one of a network of cases "uncovered by the Soviet counter-intelligence service."

On the evening of July 15, it said, Miss Peterson parked her car in a poorly lit place, changed her dress and took a series of buses to a bridge over the Moscow River, where she put "an ordinary-looking stone" into an archway.

She was detained there, the "stone" was opened, and it "proved to be a cache containing cameras, gold, money and instructions, as well as ampules with a poison," *Izvestia* said.

"The Soviet counter-intelligence service established beyond a doubt that the poisons taken from the cache had been sent to Moscow by the Central Intelligence Agency, not for the first time," it said.

"It was discovered in the process of investigation that the poison that was given to the spy earlier was used by him against an innocent person who stood in his way," *Izvestia* said. By "the spy," *Izvestia* apparently was referring to the intended recipient of Miss Peterson's material.

After Miss Peterson was seized, *Izvestia* said, Ambassador Toon was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and told she must leave the country, the paper said. Western sources said, however, that Miss Peterson was declared "persona non grata" only after her departure last summer.

The *Izvestia* account, headlined "Who Needs It?," included two photographs, one showing a table covered with alleged evidence of espionage, the other showing Miss Peterson sitting at a table with U.S. Consul Clifford Gross.

"Also implicated in this espionage," *Izvestia* said, were Robert Fulton, first secretary in the embassy political section from mid-1975 to mid-1977, and two men who visited briefly in 1975 from Washington, S. Karpovich and J. Gruener.

Izvestia described the Newark (N.J.) espionage trial of Valdik Enger, 39, and Rudolf Chernyayev, 43, two Soviet employees of the United Nations, as "theatrical buffoonery." The two pleaded innocent last Tuesday to charges of conspiring to pass U.S. Navy national defense secrets to Moscow.

"One can see with the naked eye that this show, directed by the CIA and FBI, was only staged to justify in the eyes of their superiors the [U.S. espionage] failures that took place in Moscow," *Izvestia* said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2CHICAGO TRIBUNE
13 June 1978

Yank spy was involved in death plot: Soviets

MOSCOW [AP]—The Soviet Union accused a former American employee of the U.S. Embassy Monday of engaging in espionage before she left Moscow last summer. The Soviets charged, among other things, that she transmitted poison used to kill an "innocent" who was an obstacle to CIA operations.

The government newspaper Izvestia said the woman, Martha Peterson, took part in an elaborate espionage plot involving the planting of cameras, gold, money, instructions, and poison.

In Washington, informed sources who asked not to be identified said Miss Peterson was a CIA employee who had been working in a cover job in the embassy's consular section. A State Department spokesman declined immediate comment, and the embassy here maintained official silence.

THE SOVIET newspaper also charged that a trial of alleged Soviet spies currently under way in New Jersey is "the-

atrical buffoonery" designed to divert attention from U.S. espionage failures.

Izvestia said Miss Peterson was declared "persona non grata" and was sent out of the Soviet Union by the embassy after she was apprehended last July 15 as she left a cache of espionage material at a secret niche on a bridge over the Moscow River.

The Izvestia story was the first report that espionage charges were involved in Miss Peterson's departure.

Izvestia said U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon was called in to the Foreign Ministry after she was caught, and he was told she was no longer welcome to remain in the country.

AT A FEDERAL court trial in Newark, N.J., two Soviets employed at the United Nations, Valdik Enger, 39, and Rudolf Chernyayv, 43, pleaded not guilty last Tuesday to charges they conspired to pass U.S. Navy national defense secrets to Moscow.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-1**

WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
13 JUNE 1978

SOVIETS ARREST U.S. BUSINESSMAN

By Seth Mydans
Associated Press

MOSCOW — The Soviet government arrested an American businessman here a few hours after it charged an American woman formerly attached to the U. S. Embassy with espionage and murder-by-poison.

Embassy legal experts, formally notified today of last night's arrest, said they believe Francis Jay Crawford of Mobile, Ala., was detained on charges of alleged currency violations.

An embassy spokesman said the Russians will allow a meeting between Crawford, 38, who is a representative of International Harvester, and a U.S. official. The meeting was set later in the day.

The Soviets informed the embassy that Crawford, who has lived here about two years, was being held under article 78 of the Russian criminal

code, referring to smuggling or illegal transfer of valuables across the Soviet border. Conviction could carry a 3- to 10-year prison term.

A WESTERN diplomatic source in Moscow who asked not to be named said it is possible the Soviets might want to trade Crawford for two Soviet United Nations employees on trial in New Jersey.

The spokesman said embassy officials spent last night and early today trying to locate Crawford, then presented a formal written protest over Soviet behavior in the case.

Crawford was arrested with his fiancée, Virginia Olbrish, 32, who works in the U.S. Embassy's commercial section. She alerted U.S. officials, saying authorities stopped their car at a traffic signal and pulled them from the vehicle.

A well-informed Soviet source said he believed it would be stretching a point to connect Crawford's arrest with the report earlier yesterday in Izvestia, the government newspaper, of espionage by a former secretary in the U.S. Embassy.

Martha D. Peterson, a Vietnam war widow, the embassy's third secretary, was expelled last July for espionage, Izvestia reported, adding she allegedly supplied poison to an accomplice who used it to kill "an innocent person who stood in his way."

THE ACCOMPLICE was not identified, although presumably he was a local Russian. But Izvestia said "also implicated in this espionage" was Robert Fulton, the first secretary of the embassy's political section from mid-1975 to mid-1977, and two visitors from Washington in 1975, S. Karpovich and J. Gruener.

Neither the embassy nor the State Department had any comment, but Western sources in Moscow said

Peterson was not declared persona non grata until after her departure. Sources in Washington who asked not to be identified said she was a CIA employee who had been working in a cover job in the embassy's consular section.

Izvestia said the charges against Peterson had been kept quiet at the request of the United States. It said they were being made public now because the U.S. government on June 1 made public its charge that the Soviet government bugged the U.S. Embassy and because of the espionage trial in New Jersey of two Soviet employees of the United Nations.

THE GOVERNMENT paper gave this account of Peterson's arrest:

On the evening of last July 15, she parked her car in a poorly lit place in Moscow, changed her dress and took a series of buses to a bridge over the Moscow River, where she put "an ordinary-looking stone" into an archway.

She was detained there, the "stone" was opened, and it "proved to be a cache containing cameras, gold, money and instructions, as well as ampules with a poison."

"The Soviet counter-intelligence service established beyond a doubt that the poisons taken from the cache had been sent to Moscow by the Central Intelligence Agency and not for the first time."

"It was discovered . . . that the poison that was given to the spy earlier was used by him against an innocent person who stood in his way."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-10

THE WASHINGTON POST
10 June 1978

U.S. Publicly Charges Soviets Spied on Mission

By Dusko Doder

Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States publicly accused the Soviet Union yesterday of "crude intrusion" into the compound of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and setting up a "secret listening post" equipped with electronic spy devices within the U.S. chancery building.

State Department spokesman John Trattner said the listening post was discovered in the chimney of the chancery building and was linked to an underground tunnel "extending considerable distance through the embassy property."

The underground tunnel was connected to a "neighboring Soviet apartment building" and "Soviet personnel had been observed to enter and occupy the tunnel from the end connecting to the Soviet apartment building," Trattner said.

Trattner said U.S. security personnel discovered electrical cables to be "energized," adding, "There can be absolutely no doubt that this listening post had been actively operated by the Soviet side."

The U.S. charges were contained in a summary of an earlier American protest Trattner offered after dismissing as "absurd" Soviet public charges that U.S. Embassy personnel had penetrated into the neighboring Russian apartment building.

The Soviet charges were contained in a note Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin delivered to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance yesterday afternoon. The contents of the Soviet note had been released Thursday by the official Tass news agency.

The Soviets charged that the United States is using its Moscow embassy for espionage activities and that the embassy staff had penetrated the neighboring Soviet apartment building, destroyed its heating facility and damaged a "protective system" designed by the Soviets to counter U.S. intelligence operations.

U.S. officials said the Soviets, in an earlier note, had claimed that the chimney shaft was not within the U.S. Embassy compound. "This," officials said, "was too far-fetched to answer in writing" and the note was rejected as "totally erroneous."

Yesterday's charges suggested that U.S. security officials have known for some time about the existence of the underground tunnel. "We watched before we blew the whistle," one source said.

But it has yet to be determined how long the underground tunnel and the eavesdropping installation in the south wing of the embassy building have been in existence.

The embassy building was originally a Soviet apartment building constructed after the end of World War II. It was converted by Soviet Army engineers in 1951 and the U.S. Embassy was established there in 1952.

State Department officials said the disclosure of details about the embassy bugging incident had been prompted by Tass charges Thursday about alleged U.S. espionage activities in Moscow.

Trattner said that it was expected here that the incident would not have any lasting effects on Soviet-American relations. "We don't intend that it will," he added.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-10NEW YORK TIMES
16 JUNE 1978

White House Cites C.I.A. Material

a Cuban Role in Zaire Invasion

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 15—The Administration has added a new dimension to its efforts to substantiate President Carter's assertions that Cuba was deeply involved in training the Katangan rebels who invaded Zaire last month from bases in Angola.

Faced with repeated denials by Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader, that Havana was involved in any way and expressions of skepticism by some members of Congress about Mr. Carter's evidence, the White House has been concerned that Mr. Carter's credibility was being challenged, officials acknowledged today.

Until now, the Administration had refused to make public any documentation of the charges against Cuba. But yesterday, Jody Powell, the President's spokesman, authorized disclosure to reporters, on a private basis, of declassified memorandum by Herbert E. Hetu, the Central Intelligence Agency's head of public information, summarizing the Administration's position. The document is dated June 2.

A C.I.A. spokesman said today that Mr. Hetu had not actually drafted the material but had only conveyed it in memorandum form to the White House, at its request.

He said the White House had wanted "a sanitized" statement about the intelligence information and it was the White House's decision on what to do with the document.

'Wide Variety of Sources'

The memorandum flatly asserts that "evidence from a wide variety of sources over the past two years refutes Castro's denials of any direct or indirect involvement."

But the document lacks details on the sources of the C.I.A.'s information. It has been the reluctance of the Administration to divulge these sources in detail that has produced the most criticism on Capitol Hill.

One Democratic member of the House, who requested anonymity, said today that on the basis of a briefing from the C.I.A. and Mr. Castro's denials, "I think an impartial jury would acquit Castro for lack of evidence."

The Katangans, members of the Lunda tribe, which predominates in northeast Angola and southern Zaire, crossed into Shaba Province in southern Zaire from Angola, via Zambia, on May 13 and overran the town of Kolwezi, which they left a few days later.

In March 1977, the Katangans also crossed into Zaire and were driven out two months later.

In the first days after the latest Katangan invasion, the Zaire Government charged that the Cubans were behind it, but the Administration said repeatedly it could not confirm that until May 19, when Tom Reston, a State Department spokesman, said new information had become available showing "recent" Cuban training of the rebels.

Castro Admits Cuban Training Role

It had been known that Katangans had received Cuban training in 1975, something admitted by Mr. Castro, but the Cuban leader in a meeting with the chief American diplomat in Havana on May 17 specifically denied any recent involvement.

Since Mr. Reston's statement, enlarged upon by Mr. Carter on May 25 and again yesterday, the Administration has been engaged in trying to prove its case.

The C.I.A. memorandum said that there was "no independent information" to confirm press reports that Cubans had accompanied the Katangans into Zaire. But the evidence, it said, does "contradict" Mr. Castro's other disclaimers.

Among the assertions in the memo are the following:

¶As early as the summer of 1976, Soviet and Cuban advisers requested President Agostinho Neto of Angola "to support incursions by Katangans into Zaire." No source was listed for the information.

¶In mid-1976, Cuban and East German officials provided military training to the Katangans at Saurimo Air Base in Lunda Province. No source was given.

¶The invasion of Zaire in March 1977 was supported by Cuban troops in Lunda Province who were with the Katangan troops before and at the time of the invasion. No source was given.

¶After the first invasion, military training for the Katangans continued in northeast Angola "with the active support of Cuban instructors." Over the summer, the guerrillas had established training bases in at least five Angolan towns: Cazombo, Nova Chaves, Chicapa, Saurimo, and Camissombo. No source was given.

¶In August 1977, 5,000 Katangan recruits and 1,500 veterans of the first Shaba invasion were reported to be under the control of Cuban and East German instructors and in addition "Cuban and Angolan troops transported large quantities of weapons from Luanda to a camp near Cazombo for the use of Katangans around this time."

¶In early 1978, the Katangan leader, Nathaniel M'Bumbo, announced his intention to invade Zaire and said that Cubans

were providing arms and training. It was reported elsewhere that this was done in a letter to the Zambian Government.

¶At the same time, Cubans were reportedly organizing the movement of a large number of Katangan troops from northeast Angola toward the Zambian border, and the Cubans accompanied the force as advisers. No source was given for the information.

3 Major Conclusions Listed

The memorandum listed three major conclusions:

"1. The Cuban presence in Angola is pervasive. Little of importance is done without their involvement.

"2. Katangan insurgents have been trained and armed by the Cubans and possibly by the East Germans for several years. This assistance has had the active support of the Angolan government. The Soviets have been indirectly involved in this activity.

"3. The May 1978 invasion of Shaba province, as well as the March 1977 attack took place with the cooperation of the Angolan government and the Cubans."

Several senators, when advised of the C.I.A. memorandum, said that it was a close summary of what they had been told in a briefing by Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence. But they said that despite rather extensive questioning, he did not provide the sourcing information they had requested.

Traditionally, the intelligence community has been extremely reluctant to provide details about the sources of information.

The members of Congress were told that the material had come from Katangan prisoners and African and European diplomats, but they were not told much more than that, senators said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1,17

THE WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1978

Carter Decries Castro Failure to Stop Attack

U.S. Releases Summary of Its Evidence

By John M. Goshko
and Edward Walsh

Washington Post Staff Writers

In a reaction to continued questioning of President Carter's charges of Cuban complicity in the invasion of Zaire, the White House yesterday made available a summary of the evidence on which the president based his accusations.

This intelligence summary draws a picture of Cuban troops in Angola training the Katangese rebels and later accompanying them to the launching point for their invasion on the Angola-Zaire border. The rebels invaded Zaire's Shaba Province last month.

However, while the summary contains a number of specific assertions about Cuban involvement in the invasion, it does not contain any backup documentation. A senior White House official, who described the summary as a "sanitized" selection of information from intelligence reports, said the backup material could not be made public without revealing intelligence sources.

As a result, the White House summary seemed unlikely to resolve what has been the central issue in the controversy about Carter's charges—whether the administration's evidence comes from sources that are sufficiently reliable and conclusive to prove Cuban involvement.

The White House official insisted that the information in the summary was reliable. He described it as coming from a variety of sources—European, African, and what he called "U.S. intelligence assets."

The administration, the source added, has a lot of additional information that was not included in the summary because it was regarded as less reliable by U.S. intelligence analysts.

For example, he said, none of the material in the summary came from Zairian sources.

However, several members of Congress and some State Department sources, who have seen at least part of the backup data, have continued to insist that it appears too circumstantial and too dependent on sources of questionable reliability to establish the administration's case convincingly.

During recent days, these sources have given piecemeal accounts of the evidence that has been made available on a selective basis to Congress. They have described it as consisting, in large measure, of data collected by the CIA from African diplomats, captured Katangese rebels and agents of European governments.

But, the sources have noted, much of it is clearly identified in CIA reports as information received at second or third hand or from persons of unproven reliability. Some of the specific data has been described by these sources as a report of a conversation with a Soviet diplomat, in a third country or accounts of persons who appeared to be speaking Spanish working with the rebels.

The sources concede that the evidence does point to some kind of Cuban involvement with the rebels—at least in the past—and provided an adequate intelligence basis for Carter's policy decision to assist the airlift of French and Belgian paratroopers to Zaire.

Instead, these sources say, they question whether the evidence was strong enough to justify the administration's attempts to influence world opinion by making public accusations against another government.

President Fidel Castro has denied the U.S. charges vehemently, and some State Department officials are known to fear privately that Washington doesn't have the ammunition to win its escalating war of rhetoric with Havana, particularly where the attitudes of Third World countries are involved.

The main points of the White House summary allege that Cuba may have

equipped and reorganized the Katangese forces in Angola as early as 1975, provided planning and training for an invasion of Shaba by 2,000 Katangese in March 1977, and, following the failure of that foray, continued to aid the rebels until shortly before their latest invasion attempt last month.

The summary charges that Cuban and Soviet advisers asked Angola's Marxist government in 1976 to permit raids into Zaire and that Cuban and East German personnel trained the rebels at Saurimo air base in Angola's Lunda Province.

Following the 1977 invasion, the summary says, Cuban instructors provided training for the rebels at five bases in northeastern Angola—Cazombo, Nova Chaves, Chicapo, Seremo and Kamisfomo.

By early this year, the summary continues, the Katangese leader, Nathaniel M'Bumba, was declaring his intention to topple the Zaire government and asserting he had the support of the Angola regime. NBC News reported last night that this claim was made in a letter asking permission from neighboring Zambia to cross its territory in order to enter Shaba Province.

Throughout this period, the summary says, Cubans were involved in organizing the logistics of the rebels' movement toward the Zambian border and accompanied them to the point where they left Angola to enter Zaire through a small strip of Zambian territory. The summary added that the United States has no proof that Cubans went with the rebels into Zaire.

In the upper righthand corner of the White House summary, there appear the initials H.E.H., which stand for Herbert E. Hetu, the public information director at the Central Intelligence Agency who supervised production of the document. The summary, dated June 2, was the last of several draft summaries written to back up Carter's allegations against the Cubans in Africa.

14 JUNE 1978

CASTRO TELLS OF BID TO STOP ZAIRE RAID

In Talk With Congressmen, He Says
Angola Could Not Control Rebels
—White House Repeats Charge

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 13. — President Fidel Castro told two visiting Congressmen during a nine-hour meeting that ended this morning that Cuba had been aware of "rumors" of a planned attack by Katangan rebels against Zaire from Angola and had persuaded President Agostinho Neto of Angola to issue instructions last February to try to prevent the raid.

The Congressmen, Representatives Stephen J. Solarz, Democrat of Brooklyn, and Anthony C. Beilenson, Democrat of California, flew back to Washington after the meeting. They said at a news conference this afternoon that Mr. Castro had told them the efforts to head off the attack failed in May because Angolan forces were unable to control the Katangans based in the northern part of Angola and because Mr. Neto was ill in the Soviet Union at the time and unable to exercise authority.

Mr. Castro invited the Congressmen to Havana to repeat to them his strong denials of President Carter's charges that Cuba was involved in training and equipping the Katangans for the attack.

The White House late today again repeated Mr. Castro's denials. In a special briefing, a White House official said it was "inconceivable" that if Cuba had made a serious effort to stop the invasion, it could have continued. He said that no one would accept such a "ridiculous" assertion by the United States if the roles of the two countries were reversed.

The Congressmen, who are members of the House International Relations Committee, were briefed by Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, Thursday about the purported evidence substantiating the Administration's accusations.

Two Now Express Doubts

As a result of the C.I.A. briefings and the long talk with Mr. Castro—during two of the nine hours three reporters were present—Mr. Solarz and Mr. Beilenson both said that they now had doubts about Mr. Carter's case. Mr. Solarz said that the Administration's evidence was "circumstantial and hearsay in character."

They were the most recent members of Congress to be briefed privately by Admiral Turner to express skepticism about the evidence. Mr. Solarz said he and Mr. Beilenson hoped to meet with Mr. Carter and secure more details. He said that members of Congress needed to know more exactly the sources for the Administration's conclusions.

An additional problem for the Administration has been the charge by Mr. Castro that the United States abruptly changed signals and accused Cuba of involvement in the invasion after first saying there was no indication of such a role.

The White House official, in response to Mr. Castro's comments to the Congressmen, acknowledged that the Cuban leader had told the chief American diplomat in Havana, Lyle F. Lane, on May 17 that Cuba had tried to stop the attack, but the Administration official said this had been only a passing reference in the discussion.

On May 19, Mr. Lane was instructed by the State Department to express appreciation for Mr. Castro's comments but to warn that if Cuba had played a role it would be a matter of "gravest concern."

"I'd say that President Castro makes a very compelling case that there was no Cuban involvement in the Zaire invasion," Mr. Solarz said.

According to Mr. Solarz, and Mr. Beilenson, Mr. Castro told them that last February Cubans in Angola picked up "rumors" that the Katangans, whose Lunda tribe is the largest single group in the northern border area, were contemplating another attack into southern Zaire, from where many of them had come, sometime in April.

Mr. Castro said, according to the Congressmen, that Cuban officials in Angola met with Angolan officials to discuss the situation. They decided, the Cuban leader said, that an attack on Zaire would be against Angola's interests for two reasons.

The first was that such an attack would create new tensions on the Angolan-Zaire border when Angola, whose forces are engaged in a major guerrilla war in the southern part of the country, needed a tranquil border on the north.

The second reason was that the Cubans and Angolans were deeply concerned that the invasion would provide a pretext for Western intervention in Zaire, raising the possibility of additional Western support for the forces opposed to President Neto in Angola.

Mr. Castro also told them, Mr. Solarz said, that the main problem facing Africa involved the nationalist struggles in Rhodesia, South Africa and South-West Africa and that a conflict in Zaire would divert attention from those struggles.

Ties Severed, Castro Says

Mr. Solarz said that Mr. Castro was vehement in asserting that Cuba had decided in 1976 to sever ties with the Katangans and had refused them all training and even medical support in the last two years. Admiral Turner has asserted that the United States has information of recent training of the Katangans by Cubans.

Mr. Castro also reportedly told the Congressmen that Mr. Neto had decided that Angolan authorities would be more energetic in the future in preventing provocative actions by the Katangans because the Angolans want to resolve their differences with Zaire.

On another African matter, Mr. Solarz reported that Mr. Castro had said Cuba wanted a political settlement between Ethiopia and Eritrea based on "the principles of Marxism-Leninism." He said that the Cuban leader also had insisted that there were no Cuban troops in Eritrea and that Cuba was in agreement with radical Arab countries in favoring a political solution.

Mr. Castro said, according to Mr. Solarz, that Cuba would keep its forces in Angola because he did not believe a political solution was possible while the present factions were in contention, and that Cubans would remain in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia because Somalia had not abandoned its claims on the region.

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 June 1978

Castro Takes His Case to U.S. Public

By Karen DeYoung

Washington Post Foreign Service

HAVANA—His tone was at times forceful, at times subdued. The language was eloquent, frequently impassioned. Fidel Castro had been challenged by the White House. For weeks, he had heard his denials of Cuban involvement in the Shaba invasion contradicted by U.S. officials.

Now he was taking his case straight to the American people.

First to two congressmen and then to American reporters, Castro sought to counter, charge for, charge the assertions that his troops in Angola had aided the Katangan rebels who invaded Zaire.

"Brutal," Castro said of the American charges.

For 2½ hours, in a late-night interview Monday in his spacious office at Havana's Palace of the Revolution, Castro made his case. He sat and he paced. He puffed his cigar and the words tumbled forth:

"We may be private about some things," he said. "We may be discreet. But we never have lied. We never made use of lies as an instrument of politics."

It was not the Cubans who were lying, Castro declared, but rather it is President Carter, who has been "confused and deceived" by his advisers.

American-Cuban relations have had many stormy moments, but the recent trend had been toward better times. Now, Castro said, he had been personally hurt and insulted at precisely the moment when the United States seemed prepared to make "just and constructive" moves toward Cuba.

Castro said he had asked himself many times in recent weeks, "How am I going to tell a lie to [Secretary of State Cyrus] Vance, when he has had a constructive, respectful attitude to the problems between Cuba and the United States?"

"How would I lie to [U.N. Ambassa-

dor] Andrew Young, who has been respectful and kind to us? How would I lie to [Sen.] George McGovern, who has been interested in improvement of relations with Cuba?"

"But in addition," Castro asked, "how would I lie to Mr. Carter?"

The answer Castro said he was that he had not.

"Everything will be known sooner or later," he went on. "History will prove some day that we were telling the truth and that the charges against us were really false."

While the course of U.S.-Soviet relations has led Moscow to personally attack Carter, Castro stopped well short of that. He described the administration's "so-called hard policy, the policy of threats, the policy of pressure" as a "serious, tremendous mistake."

That policy, Castro said, "already has a name and a last name. It is [national security advisor Zbigniew] Brzezinski's policy."

The lie told against Cuba, he said, "is not a half lie. It is an absolute, total complete lie. It is not a small lie, it's a big lie. It is not a negligible lie, it is an important lie."

The lie, which he said was "manufactured in Brzezinski's office" was intended to "provide a pretext of justifying the U.S. intervention and the intervention of the NATO powers" on behalf of the government of Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko. It was, he said, "to manipulate U.S. public opinion and to pressure the U.S. Congress" to "lift restrictions established on subversive activities by the CIA."

The bulk of Castro case was to present in detail a series of events which he described as "inexplicable" occurring in the week following the May 11-12 raid on Zaire by Angola-based Katangan rebels.

Within three days after the raid, he said, the U.S. government sent him a private message, through the Cuban interests section in Washington, and twice said publicly it had no proof of Zairian charges of Cuban involvement.

Because of that positive U.S. gesture, Castro said, he was "inspired to make a reciprocal gesture . . . to do something I have never done before."

Castro invited U.S. interests section chief Lyle Lane to a private meeting in which he said he made six points.

Castro said he told Lane, "there were no Cubans—not one Cuban soldier—involved in Shaba; that we

CONTINUED

have no direct or indirect participation in the Shaba problem; that we have not trained the Katangans; that we have not supplied weapons; that we tried not to have any contact with the Katangans; and that we were opposed to that kind of operation."

"I had this meeting with Mr. Lane," Castro said, "as a gesture that I wanted to make toward the U.S. government."

Castro said he told Lane that he had heard "rumors" last month of a planned Katangan invasion—"rumors, not accurate or precise information since we have no intelligence operations among them, so it was only rumors."

"Later," he said, "I went through my papers and found that it had been in February." Motioning to an aide who handed him a large file, he said, "I have everything here complete on Cuba's position. I would say that in this case, this Shaba case, I have everything."

"We were concerned about [a possible invasion] because we knew this could become an instrument of provocation against Angola, a pretext for intervention afterwards as has happened once before. This time, it would be worse."

"It was then that we sent a message to [Angolan President Agostinho] Neto. We explained all the difficulties the new action of the Katangans implied. It was important to prevent that action from occurring, at any expense."

Neto, Castro said, "was fully in agreement with us, and we even knew he instructed his people to speak to the Katangans to adopt the measures necessary to prevent an invasion from taking place again."

A combination of factors led to the inability to stop the raid, Castro said. The large and little-patrolled area in northeast Angola where the Katangues live, a reluctance on Neto's part to deal with the matter in a military rather than a diplomatic way, and an illness that kept the Angolan president out of the country.

"The fact is that the Katangans, acting on their own, went ahead with their invasion once again."

Carter administration sources have said that Castro's protests that Cuba and Angola tried to stop the raid were weak and unbelievable.

Castro said, however, that from a Cuban point of view the raid was one of the worst things that could have happened to harm the cause in Africa closest to Cuba's heart—what he termed the struggle against racism in southern Africa.

The timing of the raid was particularly bad,

Castro said, because the Zaire invasion drew world attention away from a recent South African attack on a Namibian guerrilla camp in southern Angola in which hundreds were reported killed.

"When I talked to Lane," Castro said, "I explained what had happened. I did not speak on behalf of the Angolans, but I knew the Angolans agreed with us. I told him I could not speak on behalf of the Soviets, but the Soviets fully agreed with our point of view."

It was impossible, Castro said, to have explained all positions more clearly. "I'll tell you again," Castro said, "that the United States government sent a message expressing its satisfaction with the contents of my talk with Mr. Lane."

The meeting with Lane, Castro said, was on a "confidential, top-secret" basis. "It was not a matter of having my picture taken or publishing it," he said.

Yet, Castro said, again on the same day he received the U.S. message and the public U.S. charges, the facts that the meeting had taken place, and part of its contents, were leaked in the United States to the press.

"It was a matter of minutes," Castro said. "All of these things happened in minutes."

President Disputes Castro's Account

By Don Oberdorfer
and Edward Walsh

Washington Post Staff Writers

The White House took sharp issue yesterday with Cuban President Fidel Castro's latest account of his dealings with Carter administration officials on Cuba's role in the rebel invasion of Zaire last month.

White House press secretary Jody Powell told reporters that "we are willing to place the records of veracity [of President Carter and Castro] side by side and let the American people decide for themselves."

Powell made his statement and senior White House officials gave additional details of U.S. diplomatic contacts with Castro in the wake of interviews granted by the Cuban leader on Monday to two U.S. congressmen and three American reporters.

The lawmakers, Reps. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) and Anthony C. Beilenson (D-Calif.), said in a news conference shortly after returning from Havana that nine hours of conversations with Castro had raised doubts in their minds about the U.S. version of Cuban involvement in the attack on Shaba Province.

Both men are members of the House International Relations Committee, where they heard Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner present a secret version of the Carter administration's case last week. They called the U.S. evidence "not conclusive," "circumstantial" and "hearsay," but declined to say

whether they believed Castro rather than Carter and his aides.

Solarz said Castro made "a very compelling case" that there was no Cuban involvement with Lunda tribesmen, also known as Katangans, who attacked several towns in Shaba Province early last month. He said that even if Carter proves to be mistaken, this may be due to "a faulty interpretation of circumstantial evidence" rather than conscious misrepresentations.

The lawmakers said they are making a report to their committee and are asking to see Carter.

Castro's interviews with the congressmen, U.S. reporters and information provided by White House and State Department officials yesterday suggests this sequence of events:

May 11-12—Katangese forces based in Angola staged attacks on Kolwezi and the surrounding area of Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba Province, their homeland.

May 16—The State Department, responding to questions, said through spokesman Hodding Carter: "We have no independent confirmation that Cubans are involved in the present action, but I have stressed that our information is sketchy. We have no hard information on recent raining of Katangans by Cubans."

May 17—Castro summoned Lyle F. Lane, senior U.S. diplomat in Havana, and denied any direct or indirect Cuban involvement in the Shaba attack. Castro told Lane he had heard rumors of an attack more than a month before and tried unsuccessfully to stop it through the Angolan government.

May 19—Lane delivered an oral response from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance to Cuban Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Rene Anillo for transmission to Castro. According to Castro's version, Vance said that he and Carter had taken note of the Cuban's assurances that Cuba was not involved, and asked that Cuba make a public statement of noninvolvement.

Castro told the lawmakers that his message from the U.S. government was that the assurances were "appreciated." Rep. Solarz said Castro suggested that the message he received was an implicit admission that Cubans were not involved in the Shaba attack.

According to a senior White House official yesterday, "at no point did Lane state or imply that we accepted these assurances or claims at face value." The White House official said Lane had told the Cubans that the United States trusted the assurances were true because if they were not it would be a matter "of the gravest concern" to the U.S. government. The White House official said Cuban officials were asked to "express their concern publicly" about the attack.

The New York Times of May 19 carried a story from its Washington bureau reporting that Castro had called in Lane two days before and denied direct or indirect Cuban involvement in the Shaba invasion.

At the White House on the morning of May 19, a meeting was convened under the chairmanship of David Aaron, deputy presidential assistant for national security, including representatives of the State and Defense departments and the CIA, primarily to discuss the U.S. airlift to Shaba and what should be said about it.

The CIA representative at the meeting, according to participants, said his agency has evidence that Cubans have been "recently" training the Katangans who attacked Shaba. The same day the White House instructed the State Department to make a statement to this effect through the press spokesman.

Spokesman Tom Reston, at the State Department noon briefing, volunteered that "new information is that it is now our understanding that the insurgents in Shaba Province have been trained recently by Cubans in Angola and that they are employing Soviet weapons." This was the first U.S. charge that Cuba was directly involved.

Later the same day a top State Department official, at a briefing for reporters, disclaimed any knowledge of "recent" training by Cubans.

According to the White House, it is "very possible" that the intelligence on which the May 19 public statements were made was not available to Vance when the message to Castro was drafted.

May 20—Cuba's Foreign Ministry issued a public statement saying: "The Cuban government categorically reiterates that there do not exist, now, nor have there ever existed, ties of military cooperation between Cuba and these forces; that Cuba has not furnished any military equipment to them; that Cuba has not trained them or had any part in their actions and that there are no Cuban troops or technicians in Zaire."

May 25—Carter, in a press conference statement which had been drafted by a committee of White House and State Department officials meeting the night before and earlier that day, told a press conference in Chicago that Cuba shares "a burden and a responsibility" for the attack. "We believe that Cuba had known of the Katangan plan to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border. We also know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked."

CONTINUED

In briefing for congressional committees last week, CIA Director Turner did not disclose that Castro had told the United States on May 17 that he had attempted to head off the invasion. This became widely known last weekend.

Yesterday Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli (D-Ky.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said his group "might not have" endorsed the Carter administration's claim that Cuba bore responsibility for the invasion if Castro's statement had been available at the time of the briefing. Mazzoli accused the administration of dealing "cavalierly" with the committee and called for additional information to be made available.

Committee Chairman Edward Boland (D-Mass.) said "nobody thought to ask" Turner if Castro had claimed to have made efforts to head off the invasion. Boland said he intends to ask the CIA chief to return to his committee to explain the sequence of events involving Castro.

White House Asserts It Can Chart Cuba's Role in Shaba Invasion

By Vernon A. Guldry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

Citing reliable intelligence sources, the Carter administration maintains it can chart specific Cuban involvement with Katangan rebels up to their jumping-off point for last month's invasion of Zaire.

These assertions provided the most detailed glimpse yet of what might be behind the war of charge and countercharge that erupted when the United States accused Cuba of involvement and President Fidel Castro personally and vehemently denied it.

The "sanitized" intelligence details now coming to light are apparently of the same nature as those made available to a number of members of Congress, and which have left some of them still unpersuaded.

White House officials said last night that intelligence sources — who they stipulated were not Zairean sources — trace Cuban involvement with the Katangans from 1975 until last month when the Katangans stepped over the border of Angola which provides them sanctuary and headed for Kolwezi in Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province.

CASTRO HAS acknowledged that Cuban forces helped the Katangans up to two years ago, but, he insisted to Strobe Talbott of Time-Life News Service in Havana this week, Cuba has since then refused repeated Katangan requests for cooperation.

"We felt that after the (1976 civil) war, Angola needed peace in order to reconstruct the country, and it needed to improve relations with its neighbors. We knew that the Katangans could create a future point of conflict with Zaire," Castro said in the interview.

The Cuban leader said that since 1976 "we have had neither military nor civilian personnel with the Katangans — not even physicians. And we avoided all contact precisely because we did not want to get committed to the Katangan policy."

Such assertions by Castro and others involved in the issue have left the White House angry and frustrated, with one official claiming in exasperation that the administration was being subjected to the "big lie" technique.

A White House official who last night declined to be identified outlined Cuban — and Soviet — involvement with the Katangans which he said included a joint Cuban-Soviet re-

quest in the summer of 1976 for the Angolan government to support Katangan incursions into Zaire.

Both Cubans and East Germans were involved with Katangans in Angola by mid-1976. The first invasion of Zaire in March 1977 by a force of 2,000 Katangans was planned and prepared in "close coordination" with both Cubans and with Angola's armed force, the official maintained. Stockpiles from Angola sources and from Cubans were used to arm that invasion.

Following last year's incursion, Cuban military training of Katangans continued in at least five locations in Angola, the official went on.

The official said U.S. intelligence has information that planning for the invasion began as early as June 1977 and that both Cubans and East Germans were involved with a force of 5,500 Katangans in Angola in August 1977.

EARLY THIS YEAR, specifics of Katangan planning began to emerge. U.S. sources reported that Katangan leader Nathaniel M'Bumba was declaring his goal of "liberating" Zaire.

Reinforcing the White House standpoint, M'Bumba was claiming support of the Angolan government and arms and training from Cubans who now number perhaps 20,000 in Angola, the White House official said.

NBC News reported last night that this claim was made in a letter asking permission from the government of Zambia to cross its territory in order to strike at Zaire's Shaba province.

U.S. intelligence sources track the Cubans with the Katangans until at least the point when they left their Angolan sanctuary to cross a peninsula-like parcel of Zambian territory before entering Zaire, the official said.

President Carter's credibility has become an issue in the controversy which was first spawned by U.S. accusations of Cuban involvement in training and equipping the Katangans prior to the May 13 invasion.

The information now being added to the public record on the U.S. side still suffers from the same defect that has caused congressional skepticism, namely that the assertions are unsupported by any evidence the administration is willing to supply because of the fear of compromising its sources.

Administration spokesmen point out, however, that even the skeptics admit there is a need for secrecy to protect intelligence sources and methods.

The information does partially answer the charge that even the administration's accusations against Cuba lack specificity.

Castro has most recently made his denials to two members of the House, Stephen J. Solarz, D-N.Y. and Anthony C. Beilenson, D-Calif.

The two men held a press conference yesterday at which they said they weren't sure who was telling the truth after hearing both the U.S. intelligence briefing and Castro's denials.

"I believe the evidence on which the administration is relying is circumstantial and hearsay, so one must decide whether to believe it or not," Solarz said.

A QUESTION OF credibility arose yesterday that didn't involve information from intelligence sources. Rather, it was a question of what the United States and Cuba said to each other via diplomatic channels.

Castro claimed in Havana that the initial U.S. response to the Shaba invasion was to absolve the Cubans of responsibility. Talbott reported that Castro claimed to have received a private message May 15. The Cuban president will say only that the message came from "someone in a sufficient capacity to speak" for the U.S. government and that its tone was "constructive and positive." That message led him, he says, to make "a gesture of reciprocity on a confidential basis."

CONTINUED

The White House has categorically denied that private U.S. communications to Cuba gave any signal of acceptance of Cuban claims.

A senior White House official knowledgeable on the subject said he knew nothing about a May 15 communication, but this official did have quite a bit to say about what Castro termed a "gesture of reciprocity" and its aftermath.

That gesture consisted of Castro's inviting Lyle Lane, the ranking U.S. diplomat in Havana, to an audience May 17. Castro claimed Cuban non-involvement and at one point said Cuba got wind of invasion plans and asked the Angolan government to intercede to stop it.

On May 19, Lane informed Rene Anillo, Cuban first vice minister of foreign affairs, of the U.S. response to Castro's May 17 comments. Lane did so on instructions from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

The senior White House official says the United States noted the Cuban denials of involvement and said "we trusted they were accurate because if they were not, we would consider it a matter of the gravest concern."

On that same date, other things were happening in Washington. At a morning meeting at the White House, the CIA, sources say, offered new information on Cuban involvement.

Later in the day, that prompted both the White House and the State Department to make public statements that were the first, sharp U.S. criticism of Cuban involvement.

The White House officials said that Vance, who instructed Lane on what to tell the Cubans that day, may not have had the benefit of this last-minute intelligence because he had been away from Washington.

In any event, the White House insists that nothing that was told the Cubans officially should have signified acceptance of their claim of non-involvement.

"The President, Brzezinski, Lake, exactly the same way, interpret United States interests in the same way. And that is the most important part of African policy because it impacts on our relations with all the rest of Africa."

Other officials said the southern African policy thus far has had the backing of the Defense Department and the Central Intel

nce Agency and "positive inputs" from Mr. Brzezinski's National Security Council staff.

Yet, some officials fear the southern African policy could be wrecked if White House concern about the Soviet and Cuban adventures provoked greater emphasis on East-West rivalry and increased United States involvement in such activities as the French and Belgian military operations in Zaire.

These officials were dismayed last week when President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania summoned the diplomatic corps to denounce Western involvement in Zaire and to criticize President Carter for listening to "hysterical voices" and pushing Africa into the East-West conflict.

Mr. Nyerere was the first African leader invited for a state visit by President Carter. He has been cultivated assiduously by Mr. Carter and Mr. Young as the most influential of the five so-called "front-line" presidents, the leaders of black-ruled African countries that support black nationalist guerrillas in Rhodesia. His support is believed to be essential if the American initiatives in Rhodesia and South-West Africa are to succeed.

Letter to Nyerere

Administration officials said Mr. Carter had sent a letter to Mr. Nyerere last week, explaining the strictly limited nature of the American airlift in Zaire. But the letter failed to reach Dar es Salaam before Mr. Nyerere's public statement and his departure for a meeting of the "front-line" presidents in Angola.

In a telephone interview, Mr. Young said he believed Mr. Nyerere was mostly concerned with France's intervention in Zaire. "He's not responding to our limited, restrained policy but to emotional rhetoric and the treatment of the Zaire action by the news media," he said.

Mr. Young and his colleagues feared, however, that the meeting in Angola might focus almost entirely on events in Zaire. They were relieved when the five front-line presidents were able to persuade the South-West African People's Organization, the main insurgent group in the territory, to resume negotiations with the United States, Britain, Canada, France and West Germany on their independence plan.

For a solution in South-West Africa, the cooperation of President Agostinho Neto of Angola is also considered essential, since the South-West African People's Organization is waging its guerrilla struggle from Angolan bases.

Relations With Angola

The State Department's African team would like to establish diplomatic relations with Mr. Neto's Government, which insists that it will remain nonaligned despite its Marxist ideology and the large-scale Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola.

But strong opposition from Congress and elsewhere make formal recognition of Mr. Neto impossible for the Carter Administration at present, particularly after the President's charge of Angolan

complicity in the invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province by Katangan exiles based in Angola.

Mr. Neto was also angered by the Administration's talk about repealing the Clark Amendment, by which Congress in 1976 cut off covert military aid to two pro-Western Angolan factions that were fighting Mr. Neto's regime.

Mr. Moose, then a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

staff, worked closely with Senator Dick Clark, Democrat of Iowa, in obtaining Senate passage of the amendment and is known to oppose its repeal vigorously.

Mr. Carter now says he will not seek repeal of the Clark Amendment, but even the suggestion by Administration officials that it constituted a burdensome restriction on the President's capacity to act was interpreted by Africans as presaging renewed American intervention in Angola.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 22

THE BOSTON GLOBE
13 June 1978

Intelligence on Africa

In the debate on the playing fields of Congress over the Carter Administration's assertion that Cuba bore responsibility for the rebel invasion of Zaire last month, the score is now even. That much is clear. What is not so clear, however, is the object of the game — its true value in aiding the United States in setting its African policy.

The contest was inaugurated May 25 when President Carter, speaking in Chicago, asserted that Angola, the staging ground for the rebel raid, had a role in the invasion and that Cuba, which has a substantial military presence in Angola, "shared" that responsibility. Fidel Castro denied the assertion and his denial drew the interest of members of Congress. To support the Administration charge, CIA Director Stansfield Turner appeared before two congressional committees to outline the intelligence information on which it was based.

Early last week, Rep. Edward Boland of Springfield, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said that on the basis of the Turner testimony his committee was "satisfied" that the President's charge of Cuban responsibility for the Katangan invasion was correct. Late last week, however, Sen. John Sparkman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which he chairs, said Turner had failed to produce conclusive evidence of Cuban responsibility.

Then over the weekend it was revealed that shortly after the invasion Castro had told US officials

he had attempted to head off the invasion. Taken at face value, the Castro assertion would seem to contradict the thrust of Carter's remarks. On the other hand the Castro statement is a clear admission that at least he had advance word of the invasion. Some senators suggested the most significant aspect of the Castro communication was that it had not been revealed to Congress.

In its way the debate over the CIA intelligence is an interesting exercise. CIA Director Turner's admonition that such intelligence rarely takes on the irrefutable quality of courtroom evidence deserves a place in any ensuing debate.

Yet there are substantial dangers to the whole affair. By focusing on the degree of reliability of CIA information on Cuban involvement in Zaire — a focus which raises the larger questions of the Cuban and Russian roles elsewhere in Africa — there is a very real danger that US African policy will come to be drawn solely in East-West terms. This would be a sharp and regrettable departure from the earlier Administration inclination to leave African problems to the Africans, with the United States playing a subordinate role where it could — in Rhodesia and South Africa — for instance.

If the Administration chooses to view the formulation of its African policy primarily from an East-West perspective, it runs the risk of needlessly endangering crucial big power agreements, such as a new SALT treaty, and of inflating the United States' true interests in and influence over events in Africa.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

244-3540

FOR

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM

NBC Nightly News

STATION

WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE

June 13, 1978 6:30 PM

CITY

Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT

Cuban Role in Shaba Invasion

JOHN CHANCELLOR: Fidel Castro told two American congressmen yesterday that he will allow about sixteen hundred people to leave Cuba for the United States. They hold dual Cuban-American citizenship, and they'll be allowed to leave with their dependents.

And Castro told his visitors, including some reporters, that he had absolutely nothing to do with the Katangan natives' recent invasion of their old homeland in southern Zaire. He says -- Castro does -- that he tried and failed to get the government of Angola to stop that invasion.

Richard Valeriani has been following these events. Dick, what have you got to report?

RICHARD VALERIANI: John, this morning, and then again late this afternoon, White House officials made clear that they just don't believe Castro. They say that there is no evidence to show that he tried to stop the invasion, and they insist that the Cubans were involved.

CHANCELLOR: How is the White House documenting its charge that the Cubans were involved?

VALERIANI: The principal piece of evidence, which has not been made public up to now, is a letter written by the leader of the invading force, General Mbumba (?), to Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, asking for permission for the rebel forces to cross Zambian territory on their way from Angola to Zaire. And in that letter, he refers to Cuban support, and he says the Cubans have been helpful.

OFFICES IN: NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES

Material supplied by Radio TV Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.

-2-

CHANCELLOR: Dick, the White House has been making this case that the Cubans were involved with great intensity around town down there. Are they making their case, or are there still some people who don't believe it?

VALERIANI: John, there's still a lot of skepticism, especially on Capitol Hill. People up there think the evidence is flimsy. And actually within this building itself, within the State Department, there're also a lot of people who say the evidence simply is not overwhelming.

CHANCELLOR: Thank you very much. Richard Valeriani at the State Department.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1,11

THE WASHINGTON POST
13 June 1978

Castro Again Denies U.S. Charges Of Cuban Complicity in Zaire Raid

By Karen DeYoung

Washington Post Foreign Service

HAVANA — Cuban President Fidel Castro last night emphatically denied U.S. charges of Cuban complicity in last month's rebel raid in Zaire's Shaba province and described U.S.-Cuban relations as at their lowest point since the beginning of the Carter administration.

Castro suggested the American charges were falsely formulated to justify planning U.S. and NATO involvement in the creation of a "neocolonialist interventionist pan-African force."

It was also likely, Castro said, that the accusations against Cuba were an attempt to "manipulate U.S. public opinion" and to "suppress congressional restrictions" against U.S. military activities abroad and the "subversive activities of the CIA."

Castro's comments, his first public statement on the events of the past several weeks, came in a lengthy interview in which he outlined the progression of events between the May 11 and 12 raid and subsequent U.S. charges of Cuban involvement.

The interview followed five hours of private conversations with representatives Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) and Anthony C. Beilenson (D-Calif.) members of the House International Relations Committee, invited here by Castro.

The Cuban leader revealed that on May 19, two days after a previously reported meeting with U.S. Interests Section chief Lyle F. Lane in which he sent personal assurances to Carter that there was no Cuban involvement in the Shaba raid, he received a reply from the U.S. government.

In a message relayed through the interests section from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Vance said both he and Carter had taken note of and appreciated Cuba's assurances. Castro characterized the message, a copy of which he showed reporters, as "kind and friendly."

That message arrived on the same day that a State Department spokesman first publicly accused Cuba of direct complicity in the raid.

Castro called the U.S. accusation, and a subsequent direct charge by President Carter citing Cuban "train-

ing an decimpping of Katangese" forces for the raid "brutal and gross."

The charge of Cuban involvement, Castro said, is "not a half-lie, it is an absolute, total, complete lie . . . an important lie."

Castro said he would be willing to meet with President Carter and that he had "no objection . . . or prejudice if the United States government would consider it useful" to clear up the situation.

Castro said he believed the charges were "the responsibility of the United States government as a whole. I don't want to accuse President Carter."

Castro said the lies have been manufactured in [national security adviser Zbigniew] Brzezinski's office. I think President Carter has been confused and deceived."

"I have no doubt that there are people within the U.S. government interested in manufacturing their own Tonkin Gulf incident to justify intervention in Africa," Castro said.

The Cuban leader said that he had explained to Lane at length about his efforts to stop the raid by the Katangese rebels.

"The Katangese participated in the final stage of the liberation of Angola," he said. "There was cooperation with us on some fronts . . . Since early 1976 we have tried to avoid relations with the Katangese [because] we felt that after the war Angola needed peace to reconstruct itself; it needed to improve its relations with its neighbors."

He said that the Cubans always thought that the Katangese could be a source of conflict that would impede these goals.

Castro said that the Katangese at many times requested assistance and cooperation with Cuba but that such assistance had always been refused. Castro said he felt both Angola and Cuba had "no moral or legal problems with helping the Katangese in their fight against the government of Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko but that both countries made a policy decision not to enter into relations with the Katangese nor cooperate with them."

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)

13 JUNE 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

Castro Blames Brzezinski for 'Lies'

By Strobe Talbott
Time-Life News Service

HAVANA — Fidel Castro has for the first time publicly denied charges by the Carter administration that Cuba was involved in the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by Angolan-based Katangan secessionists last month.

The Cuban president said that the U.S. charges are based on lies manufactured in the office of presidential national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski as part of a campaign to justify what Castro calls a "neocolonialist" West European military intervention in Zaire and to persuade Congress to lift legislative restrictions on CIA covert operations in Africa.

Castro insisted that Cuban forces in Angola have neither trained nor armed the Katangan exiles in northern Angola since early 1976, when they broke off all contacts with the Katangans. He denounced as "absolute, complete total lies" the Carter administration's claims to have evidence of "recent" Cuban aid to the Katangans.

CASTRO'S VEHEMENT denials came in a five-hour meeting with two visiting U.S. congressmen, followed

by a lengthy interview with three American reporters that continued into the early hours of this morning.

According to the congressmen, Stephen Solarz, D-N.Y., and Anthony Beilenson, D-Calif., Castro offered to meet personally with Carter in order to tell his side of the story about the Shaba incident.

"However," Solarz said after the meeting, "President Castro is realistic that such a meeting is not likely to take place anytime soon."

Castro took pains not to blame Carter personally for what he called the American "lie" about Shaba. "I think Carter has been confused and deceived," said Castro. "Carter is a decent and honorable man and I don't want to preclude the possibility that he has been misled."

The Cuban president made clear he considered Brzezinski primarily to blame for the recent toughening of American policy toward Cuba. He said Brzezinski was "deeply involved" with "circles within the U.S. who have an interest in manufacturing a new Tonkin Gulf incident in order to justify their intervention in Africa."

The reported Tonkin Gulf attack on two U.S. Navy destroyers in 1964 was used by President Lyndon Johnson to gain congressional authorization for full American participation in the Vietnam War.

CASTRO REPEATEDLY distinguished Brzezinski from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who he said had demonstrated a "constructive attitude toward the main problems of Africa."

In his meeting with the Americans last night and early today, Castro amplified publicly on the explanation of the Cuban position in Angola that he had given privately May 17 to the chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Lyle Lane, after the Shaba invasion.

The Cuban forces in Angola, he said, "have deliberately followed a policy of non-collaboration with the Katangans, preventing contact as much as possible, and refusing many requests for contact" for the past two years. But earlier this year, the Cubans heard what Castro characterized as "rumors" that the Katangans were planning an invasion of Zaire.

Castro said he sent a message to Angolan President Agostinho Neto, urging him to intervene with the Katangans. Castro said Agostinho Neto was "fully against" the invasion and "instructed his people to take measures to prevent the invasion." But, Castro continued, the Angolan president was ill and out of his country, getting medical treatment, and failed to head off the invasion.

Castro claimed that his private assurances to Lane were sympathetically received by the U.S. State Department. As evidence, he showed reporters the Spanish-language text of a May 18 State Department response to the assurances he had given Lane. "It was a positive response," said Castro, "and it expressed satisfaction with the talk I had with Lyle Lane."

CASTRO SUGGESTED repeatedly that a sympathetic State Department was undercut and overruled by Brzezinski, who he said was determined to "fabricate anything he could think of" in order to blame Cuba for the Shaba invasion.

Castro concluded his discussion with the Americans by saying "it is my firmest promise that my feelings of respect and admiration for the American people will not change, whatever may be the actions of their rulers."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
12 JUNE 1978

U.S. disputed on

Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The Carter Administration did not disclose a statement in which Fidel Castro said he tried to head off the recent rebel attack in Zaire because it did not believe that Castro was telling the truth, Senate sources said.

The sources said the Cuban leader informed the United States four days after the Katangan rebels invaded Zaire's Shaba province that he had prior knowledge of the May 13 attack and tried to head it off.

The sequence of events appears to support President Carter's claim that Cuba was aware of the invasion plans, but it casts doubt on Carter's

allegations that the Cubans did nothing to prevent the attack.

Deputy White House Press Secretary Rex Granum declined yesterday to comment on the matter. Mary Ann Bader, a State Department spokesman, said, "It is not our practice to comment on diplomatic exchanges."

Castro made his comments on May 17 to Lyle F. Lane, the top U.S. diplomat in Havana, who relayed them to the State Department in a secret cable, sources said Saturday night.

The sources, who asked not to be named, said that CIA Director Stansfield Turner confirmed the contents of the cable after Sen. George S. McGovern (D, S. D.) read a copy of it to

Castro statement

a closed meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Friday.

The sources quoted Turner as saying that the cable had not been disclosed publicly because Carter Administration officials did not believe Castro was telling the truth.

President Carter charged on May 25 that Cuba and Angola shared responsibility for the attack, saying at a news conference:

"We believe that Cuba had known of the Katangan plan to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border."

Castro claimed that after learning early in April of the impending invasion, he tried to persuade the Angolan government of President Agostino Neto to stop it, the sources said. But Castro was unsuccessful, they said,

partly because Neto was ill and was staying in the Soviet Union.

On May 13, the rebel Katangans captured the copper-mining city of Kolwezi and killed hundreds of black and white civilians. The rebels eventually were dislodged from Kolwezi and driven back into Angola by a combined force of French, Belgian and Zairean troops who received U. S. logistical support.

Sen. Dick Clark (D., Iowa), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa, referred to the cable in a telephone interview Saturday night.

"The thing that I find disturbing is that the President didn't bring it out and let the Congress and public decide (on Castro's truthfulness)," Clark said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-6WASHINGTON STAR
11 JUNE 1978

Castro Attempt to Stop Shaba Invasion Reported

By David Binder
New York Times News Service

President Fidel Castro informed the United States on May 17 that he learned early in April of plans by insurgents to invade Shaba province in Zaïre and tried unsuccessfully to stop the invasion, Senate sources reported yesterday. The attack started over the weekend of May 13 and 14.

The statement attributed to Castro raised new questions about President Carter's assertion eight days later on May 25 that Cuba "obviously did nothing" to hold back the invasion by 2,000 or more insurgents operating from Angola. Cuba is believed to have 18,000 to 20,000 troops in Angola.

Sen. Dick Clark, D-Iowa, chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on African affairs, said in a telephone interview that while he did not regard the disclosure of new information about Castro's position as "all that central," he felt that "it would have been useful in the discussion of the Cuban role if the president had made this clear."

THERE HAS BEEN controversy between several senators and Carter over the connection between Cuban forces in Angola and the Katangan insurgents since the invasion of Shaba province began. Carter has insisted that Cuban officers armed, trained and prepared the Katangans for their raid on the mining center of Kolwezi, in which hundreds were killed.

Clark said that Sen. George S. McGovern, D-S.D., Friday read a secret State Department cable to the Foreign Relations Committee, giving Castro's description of the evolution of the rebel attacks and his purported efforts to stop them.

The cable was sent to Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance by Lyle F. Lane, who heads the United States' interest section in Havana, following a meeting on May 17 with Castro.

According to Senate sources the cable quoted Castro as saying that he had learned early in April that the insurgent force was contemplating a raid on Shaba province, their tribal homeland, from which they had either been driven or had voluntarily left more than three years ago.

THE LANE CABLE described Castro as saying he was "disturbed" by the reports and had immediately approached the Angolan government head, President Agostino Neto, to urge him to call off the invasion, arguing that it would only harm Angola.

The cable added that Castro said one reason his intercession failed might have been the fact that Neto was ill and staying in the Soviet Union at the time.

The Katangan insurgents are based in camps along the Zaïre frontier, hundreds of miles from Luanda, the Angolan capital.

Several senators who attended the closed committee hearing Friday expressed skepticism about Castro's veracity, but added that they were disturbed by the fact that Carter had not bothered to inform them of the Lane cable.

The point is that the administration never told us about it," said one senator, who asked not to be named.

Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., the Senate majority leader, in a briefing for newsmen yesterday, said that regardless of the new disclosure, the Cubans are acting as the cat's paw of the Soviets in Africa and are in control in Angola, the troops which invaded Zaïre did come from Angola, and the Cubans have trained Katangans and supplied them with equipment." Byrd added: "Who knew what and where is somewhat peripheral."

A **WHITE HOUSE** spokesman said there would be no comment yesterday on the new disclosure about the Cuban role in the Shaba province incursion. Nor was it clear whether McGovern or Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, would press the White House for an explanation of Carter's handling of Castro's statement about trying to halt the invaders.

The administration's first declaration on the subject, on May 18, noted that Castro had denied there was Cuban involvement in the invasion, directly or indirectly. On May 25 Carter declared in Chicago: "The government of Angola must bear a responsibility for the deadly attack, which was launched from its territory, and it's a burden of responsibility shared by Cuba."

He went on: "We believe that Cuba had known of the Katangan plan to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border. We also know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked."

ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, director of Central Intelligence, last week briefed four Senate and House committees on the information and reports assembled by the Central Intelligence Agency which prompted Carter to make his assessment of the Cuban role.

Carter's Case on Cuba Not Proved, Foreign Relations Chairman Says

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 9 — Chairman John J. Sparkman and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said today that the Carter Administration had failed to produce conclusive evidence to support its charges that Cuba was deeply involved in the training and equipping of rebels who invaded Zaire from Angola last month.

After a three-hour briefing from Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, Senator Sparkman of Alabama said the evidence was "circumstantial and the weight of it substantial but by no means conclusive." Senators George McGovern of South Dakota, Dick Clark of Iowa and Frank Church of Idaho, all Democrats, also registered varying degrees of skepticism about the evidence and all said the intelligence was inconclusive.

Mr. Sparkman said that as a result of the inconclusive nature of the evidence, the committee would "pursue this matter" further with the Central Intelligence Agency and with the Senate Intelligence Committee. He said that in addition, the committee had instructed its staff "to undertake an in-depth review of United States policy toward Africa and related areas."

The result was a setback for the Administration's effort to back up President Carter's charge on May 25 that Cuba shared "responsibility" for the Katangan attack.

The only member of the committee who voiced satisfaction with the presentation was Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, who told reporters that the President's charges were "by no means without substance."

Javits Finds 'Substance' in Charge

"I am convinced that there is substance to the President's charges," Senator Javits said.

He also said that he favored "American supply and support for an all-African force" proposed by the French to bolster other regimes in Africa besides Zaire—a proposal not accepted by the United States.

Admiral Turner spent much of this week on Capitol Hill briefing leaders and committees about the intelligence information. Until today, the reaction had been generally supportive.

Yesterday, for instance, Representative Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin, Chairman of the House International Relations

Committee, said after a similar briefing: "I was impressed favorably." And Representative Edward P. Boland of Massachusetts, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said Monday that he was "satisfied" that Mr. Carter was correct in blaming the Cubans.

But liberals on the Foreign Relations Committee, asserting that they were concerned about what they regarded as overreaction by the Administration to Cuban and Soviet activity in Africa, were reluctant to endorse Admiral Turner's conclusions.

The Administration apparently irritated some members of the Foreign Relations Committee by briefing others on Capitol Hill first and by refusing to give the committee documentary evidence. All material was turned over to the Senate Intelligence Committee instead.

McGovern Sees Documents

Senator Sparkman said he had not seen the documents, but Senator McGovern said he had gone to the Senate Intelligence Committee and had read all available material. He said that as a result of seeing that evidence and hearing Admiral Turner, it was apparent that "they do not have overwhelming hard evidence of a major Cuban operation, either in the training or equipping of Katangan rebels and the Cubans stoutly deny they prepared them for this incursion."

Asked whether the sources for the Central Intelligence Agency's case were reliable, Mr. McGovern said "I regard the sources as doubtful."

"I'm not rejecting them or accepting them," he said. "I think they're the kind of sources that if a group of people was asked to look at you'd get a divided jury."

Senators McGovern and Clark said they saw no hard information to justify the Administration's allegations. Rather, the information was said to consist of many reports of conversations with prisoners, Africans and other sources. Mr. Clark said the committee had received no photographs or tapes.

Cuba Denied Involvement

Cuba has denied any involvement with the Katangans in the last two years, and Representative Stephen J. Solarz, Democrat of Brooklyn, a member of the International Relations Committee, said he was flying to Cuba at President Fidel Castro's invitation to discuss overall Cuban policy in Africa with him.

Admiral Turner, when told of Senator McGovern's statement, said, "Intelligence is not court-procedure evidence."

"Intelligence is the job of bringing little pieces of evidence, clues from disparate sources, together to piece into one picture," he said. "It's an entirely different operation from going to court and having to have evidence that is irrefutable in a court of law."

"We have many, many pieces of evidence here," the admiral said, adding that

"the cumulative effect is persuasive."

"I say that the Cubans had to bear responsibility for the invasion, taking place," he said. "I would say that the Cubans are such a pervasive colonial presence in Angola that it is unlikely that anything of this nature could take place in that country today, which is so dominated by the Cubans," without Cuban backing.

Carter's Charges

Cuba is estimated to have about 20,000 troops in Angola supporting the Government of President Agostinho Neto.

Mr. Carter said on May 25 in Chicago that Angola had to bear a heavy responsibility for the Katangan attack. "It is a heavy responsibility that Cuba, he said,

"We know that Cuba has known the Katangan plans to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them crossing the border," Mr. Carter said. "We also know that the Cubans have

played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked."

The next day, Mr. McGovern, who had been told the opposite by Cuban officials, called for an inquiry to resolve the discrepancies.

One member of Congress said that the CIA had told him that Katangan prisoners said they were trained by the Cubans. But when he asked who questioned the Katangans, he said he was told it was done by Zairian forces. The Congressman said, "This was hardly a reliable source."

In part because of the alleged Cuban involvement in Zaire, the Administration has alerted French and Belgian forces to Shaba Province to repel the invaders from the French-speaking African forces to Zaire.

The Pentagon announced that the United States Air Force had been ordered to send up to 25 aircraft missions beyond the 30 originally approved for the current operation.

INCOMPLETE AS RECEIVED.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3

WASHINGTON STAR
10 JUNE 1978

Senate Report Doubts Cuban-Katangese Link

By Vernon A. Guldry Jr.

Washington Star Staff Writer

A preliminary report to the Senate Intelligence Committee says there is no "hard, concrete evidence" of Cuban involvement in the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by Katangese rebels, according to persons familiar with the issue.

The classified report is the latest development in the question of Cuban involvement, which has become an issue of some controversy. Much of that controversy has centered on the weight that should be given to administration conclusions of Cuban involvement based on its intelligence regarding the Katangese.

President Carter has said the Cubans trained and equipped the invaders. The Cuban government has denied any involvement, direct or indirect.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday received one of a number of briefings given by CIA Director Stansfield Turner on the issue.

Members of the panel emerged from the briefing with mixed reactions. Chairman John Sparkman, D-Ala., said the evidence "is circumstantial and its weight is substantial, but by no means conclusive."

SEN. DICK CLARK, D-Iowa, said yesterday Turner said the foreign relations panel received the same briefing that the intelligence panel had received.

Clark, who is chairman of the foreign relations panel's Africa subcommittee, said his reaction to the briefing is that the Carter administration's evidence of Cuban involvement "suggests that the president's statements may be credible, but the evidence doesn't support more than that."

Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, said he had not reached a final judgement since he had not seen the administration's supporting documentation.

Sen. Jacob Javits, R-N.Y., said he is convinced that there is "substance to the president's charges."

Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., said his conclusion was that "while

there is enough circumstantial evidence to bring an indictment, they would never get a conviction."

THE KATANGESE rebels invaded Zaire from neighboring Angola where Cuba has a very large presence, including some 20,000 troops. After the invasion, Cuban President Fidel Castro took the highly unusual step of calling in the highest ranking U.S. diplomat in Havana and personally denying involvement.

Cuba and the United States do not fully recognize each other in diplomatic terms so have exchanged "interest sections" rather than ambassadors.

Carter's assertion of Cuban involvement has also brought him criticism from one of Africa's most respected statesmen, Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania.

"There is no evidence of Cuban or Soviet involvement in this. . . . The Cubans have persistently and convincingly repudiated such allegations," Nyerere said this week.

As for the Senate intelligence panel, its chairman, Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind., has said publicly that there is "credible information from credible sources" to support Carter's charge. In a recent exchange with reporters, he declined to answer questions about the nature of the evidence.

THE FOREIGN relations panel members were unanimous yesterday in agreeing to a complete study of the administration's policy toward Africa, including the issue of Cuban involvement in the invasion.

Clark said yesterday the administration has not presented Congress with a clear picture of what its intentions are in Africa.

"The administration's Africa policy is very much in flux," he said. "I think they're very uncertain themselves."

The question, Clark said, was whether Carter would continue his earlier policy of identifying with black majority populations in nations such as South Africa or whether Africa would be seen as it has seemed more recently, a "cold war battleground" for East-West confrontation.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1, 12

THE WASHINGTON POST
10 June 1978

Tried to Halt Zaire Raid, Castro Says He Reportedly Told U.S. Aide of Bid At May Meeting

By John M. Goshko
and Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writers

Cuban President Fidel Castro told the United States in mid-May that he knew of the invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province a month or more in advance and that he tried unsuccessfully to stop it, informed sources said last night.

The first half of Castro's statements on May 17 to the chief U.S. diplomat in Havana, Lyle F. Lane, seems to buttress the Carter administration's claim that Cuba had advance knowledge of the cross-border attack.

But the second half of the Castro statement—which has not been officially disclosed—contradicts President Carter's May 23 declaration that Cuba "obviously did nothing" to restrain the invaders.

The U.S. diplomat's report on his conversation with Castro was made available to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday. Sources familiar with the diplomat's report said Castro told Lane that he tried to persuade the Angolan government of President Agostino Neto to restrain the attack by Katangese rebels across Angola's border into Shaba Province.

Castro reportedly said he may have failed because Neto was ill and out of the country part of the time before the attack by Angola-based Katangans on May 11-12.

There was no immediate explanation for the administration's failure to disclose Castro's claim that he sought to head off the invasion. CBS, which reported the story on its evening news last night, quoted a State Department source as saying the claim was withheld because the department did not believe Castro but did not want to call him a liar.

The fact of Castro's meeting with the U.S. diplomat was disclosed by administration officials on May 18, the day after it occurred. The officials said then that Castro had said Cuba was not taking part, directly or indirectly, in the Shaba invasion. No further details were given.

Carter's May 23 declaration, which was drafted by a committee of White House and State Department officials, stated: "The government of Angola must bear a responsibility for the deadly attack, which was launched from its territory, and it's a burden and a responsibility shared by Cuba."

"We believe that Cuba had known of the Katangan plan to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border. We also know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked."

The Carter administration's accusations that Cuba played a role in the attack have been rejected by Cuba and questioned by some administration officials and members of Congress.

Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner, in a series of classified briefings this week for four Senate and House committees, sought to prove the case that Cuban help was a factor in the invasion.

Turner's two-hour closed session presentation yesterday to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—like similar briefings to other Hill units—drew sharply mixed reactions from lawmakers who heard it and failed to resolve the controversy over Cuban aid to the forces that invaded Shaba.

Those who have tended to support Carter said Turner had convinced them that the president's charges were correct. But those who have questioned the accuracy of the evidence said they still have heard nothing to put their doubts to rest.

Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), who originated the committee's request for the administration's evidence, summed up the situation by saying:

"There's a definite parallel with what happened during the Vietnam war. Different people look at the same data and draw different conclusions from it."

McGovern, who has been the most vocal of the doubters, added that he was still unconvinced after hearing Turner and examining the evidence. He said: "While they may have enough circumstantial evidence to bring in a rather shaky indictment against the Cubans, they would never get a conviction based on the evidence they have."

Even committee Chairman John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.), a staunch administration loyalist on most issues, reacted cautiously. He said, "The weight of the evidence is circumstantial, and that weight is substantial but by no means conclusive."

Similar caution was expressed by such key committee members as Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who is in line to become committee chairman next year, and Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), who heads the subcommittee on Africa. Both said they wanted to take closer and harder looks at the evidence before making up their minds.

Of those senators willing to comment on Turner's presentation, the strongest support for the administration came from Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.). "The president has not conjured up some incident to discredit the Cubans," Javits said, but he added that he was unwilling to characterize the degree and depth of Cuban involvement in the Zaire situation.

Although the reactions yesterday were the most skeptical and reserved that Turner has encountered in his forays up to Capitol Hill this week, the administration has been encountering questions about its charges ever since Carter first made them in a Chicago press conference on May 23.

The president said specifically that the rebels who invaded Zaire's Shaba Province from the neighboring Marxist state of Angola were trained and equipped by the Cubans. He also charged that Cuba knew of the invasion plan and did nothing to stop it.

Castro's government had denied these charges. It has admitted helping train Angola-based rebel foes of Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko in the past, but has insisted it played no role in last month's invasion.

The ensuing argument about whether Castro or Carter is correct has centered on two points: Whether the intelligence on which the administration based its charges comes from reliable sources and whether it establishes a recent connection between the Cubans and the rebels.

Those who have seen the evidence say part of it involves satellite photos that allegedly show Cuban camps located near rebel camps in northern Angola and a Cuban ship unloading supplies at an Angolan port.

But, as has become clear during the past week, the overwhelming mass of the administration's evidence consists of reports collected by the CIA from African diplomats, from captured rebels and from agents of other governments.

Continued

The CIA, which refuses to identify its sources, insists that its intelligence adds up to a "preponderance of evidence" about Cuban involvement.

However, many sources, including some administration officials who ask not to be identified, say that much of this intelligence was obtained second or third hand or comes from sources of doubtful reliability. As a result, the sources contend, the evidence is too circumstantial and too susceptible to differing interpretations to be conclusive.

On the second point—whether Cuba can be tied to last month's invasion—Turner told reporters yesterday that the evidence proves Cuba trained and equipped the rebels "over several years" including the period between a rebel attack on Zaire in March 1977 and last month's operation.

However, that charge also is disputed by many who have seen or been briefed on the evidence. McGovern, for example, said yesterday he had no doubt that Cuba has helped the rebels in the past, but added he had seen "no hard evidence" to connect Cuba with the latest invasion.

When reporters questioned Turner on these points, he replied that "intelligence is not court procedure evidence. The job of intelligence is collecting many little pieces and clues and fitting them into one picture. We have many, many pieces of evidence in this situation. The cumulative effect is persuasive."

In fact, Turner insisted, the evidence is so strong that he did not see how "reasonable men" could look at it and not be convinced that "Cuba has to bear responsibility."

So far, the evidence has been made available only to Congress on a highly restricted basis to guard against unauthorized disclosure, and administration sources say they do not intend to make any of it public.

In that, the administration even won the backing of McGovern, who said he didn't believe the information could be classified without revealing the CIA's sources and methods of collecting information.

Administration sources concede this exposes them to possible charges of a "credibility gap." However, they add, the White House has decided to take that risk and hope either that a majority of Congress and public opinion will accept the administration's word or that the controversy simply will blow over and be forgotten in a short time.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE Parade 23

THE WASHINGTON POST
11 June 1978



PARADE'S SPECIAL

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

by LLOYD SHEARER © 1978

BECAUSE OF VOLUME OF MAIL RECEIVED, PARADE REGRETS IT CANNOT ANSWER QUERIES ABOUT THIS COLUMN.

OIL ESTIMATES

From whom does million barrels of oil per day come 1985. and gas fields in Siberia.

President Carter get his energy information? How can he be sure there is or will be a shortage of world energy supplies?

In a TV appearance in April, Carter revealed that his energy estimates came at least in part from the Central Intelligence Agency, whose experts predicted that the No. 1 oil producer, the Soviet Union, would be increasing as many as 3.5

The Soviets claim the CIA forecast of their oil production capacity is incorrect. Nikolai Inozemtsev, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow, flatly declares: "We are going to export oil in the mid-'80's, and we are going to export in rather substantial quantities." The Russians insist that they have large untapped oil

How accurate are the CIA estimates on which President Carter is formulating his domestic energy policy? At the moment there is an oil glut in the world. How long will it continue? And how much of a chance is Carter taking in following the energy estimate and analysis prepared by the CIA?

A number of independent and governmental specialists think he is taking a considerable one.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
8 June 1978

editorials

The Blank Check

The House has voted, by 323 to 43, to approve budgets for all U.S. foreign intelligence agencies, although most House members did not know what they were voting for, how much money was involved, or how it would be used. This overwhelming example of studied ignorance raises a question. What did Congress, or at least the House, learn from years of investigation of intelligence abuses?

Repeated congressional investigations after the Vietnam war showed that the intelligence agencies had gone far beyond the mere gathering of intelligence. They had considered foreign assassinations, managed foreign interventions, started foreign wars and conducted their own foreign policy. They were able to get away with this conduct because of Washington's intense belief that secrecy was in the national interest.

To the contrary, though, the congressional investigators found that secrecy often was opposed to the national interest, and that the way to overcome it was through direct congressional oversight. If Congress didn't watch the espionage apparatus, who would? So Congress established new oversight committees and the Senate began to consider reforms of the intelligence system. And the key to reform was oversight: after all, Congress could hardly know whether intelligence was operating as expected if legislators did not check on the results.

Now, as some House members frankly say, the House has given the intelligence system a blank check. Few members even studied the budget information given them for a three-day review, and those who did found the information confusing and useless. It is as though the long inquiries and public outrage concerning intelligence abuses never happened. If that is to be the House response, then the public must rely on the Senate to uphold Congress' responsibility for both the budget and conduct of U.S. intelligence agencies.

HARTFORD COURANT
25 May 1978

The CIA Goes Local?

The future role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency is still a national issue and has not yet been clearly defined by the president and Congress. Nonetheless, there is an effort, sponsored by federal funds, to train local police in the kind of tactics that brought so much discredit on the FBI, CIA and other federal intelligence agencies.

The training at the Western Regional Organized Crime Training Institute in Sacramento is run by the California Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Intelligence Branch, with some funding from the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. So far, the school has taught such things as electronic eavesdropping and domestic spying to more than 4,000 police officers from 30 states, including Connecticut, and from several foreign countries.

Students are instructed to investigate and infiltrate noncriminal groups like anti-nuclear protest organizations, as well as criminal groups. They are instructed in operating under legitimate fronts such as book stores, law offices, assemblies and even parades, and are taught how to plant a variety of eavesdropping devices and take long-range photos, including the use of infrared cameras at night.

Some of the instructors are former government intelligence agents, including those who investigated political and college groups in this country in years past.

The school appears to have set a goal of duplicating the FBI and CIA

operations on the local level. As one officer of the school put it, "The fact that the feds have been burned on their intelligence work means it (then) spilled over to the local level. When the CIA types got into trouble, they couldn't help us anymore, so we took to training ourselves."

And another official said a "major fringe benefit of the school is the creation of a de facto national police intelligence force unlike any other seen in the nation."

New charters for the FBI and the CIA are being considered in the aftermath of revelations of abuse by these and other intelligence agencies. It is disturbing to learn that while the debate over abuses continues at the national level, local police are apparently being trained to use discredited tactics by former members of the FBI and the CIA.

The Sacramento school should be investigated by Congress. Legislators and the public they serve need to know all about the kind of training being given local police to increase proficiency in domestic spying.

The last thing the country needs is a national intelligence police force using such illegal and immoral tactics as opening mail, breaking and entering, wiretapping without court orders, forging documents, infiltrating business and political organizations and fomenting unrest, as happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s when some radicals were encouraged by undercover agents to take to the streets and, in some cases, instructed in the use of incendiary devices.

LITTLE ROCK DEMOCRAT

23 May 1978

Turn them loose

FBI Director William Webster said the other day that "we're about out of the internal security business." A day or so later, former CIA director Richard Helms told a Senate Committee that a proposed new congressional charter for the agency would cripple it.

The FBI is responsible for internal security and the CIA for our security abroad. What's happening? Are things so bad? Well, everybody who hasn't been asleep for the past several years knows that Congress has hauled the FBI and CIA over the coals and rifled, tumbled, tossed and pilloried them to the point that many must wonder whether these agencies are being purified of their (confessed) sins or destroyed.

The FBI, for instance, isn't being hit only by Congress. Its top boss, Atty. Gen. Griffin Bell, has ordered trial of some of its former high administrators and punishment for hundreds of agents. Bell says that the grumbles about his trying to "run" the FBI underline a fact that he wants acknowledged—that he IS the boss. He is—at second hand—which is where most attorney generals prefer to be found.

The CIA has been in an uproar for over two years, beginning with the Senate Church Committee's investigation of its excesses (most of them acknowledged) and ending most recently with the suspended imprisonment and fining of its former chief Richard Helms—who is asking the Senate Intelligence Committee not to use the new charter to drown the CIA in paperwork and leaks.

That shouldn't even need saying. But as Sen. Barry Goldwater remarked in response, a sizable segment of both Congress and the press doesn't want any intelligence at all. It was left, however, to Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan to tell it like it is: "We indict more intelligence officers than Russian spies," Moynihan says. While the Russians spy on us, the government fires away at the FBI and CIA.

That's as good a summary as any of what's been happening for too long.

VALLEY MORNING STAR
HARLINGEN, TEXAS
15 May 1978



ANDREW TULLY

Time To Take Action On Ticklish Situation

WASHINGTON — Let us toy briefly with fantasy. Suppose it were possible for the United States government to hire the former boss of Moscow's spy shop as an adviser on the Soviet political scene.

The job would involve frequent communications between Washington and its new consultant. Employer would summon employee to the U.S. for face-to-face consultation. From time to time, an emissary would be dispatched to shoot the breeze with the former espionage chieftain on his home turf. That's the routine.

Just so. Now I would call for the dismantlement of the CIA if its agents failed to take advantage of such a juicy situation. I would expect CIA spooks to seek every opportunity to brainwash our government's new hired hand with a view to obtaining pages of hot stuff on how the Soviet KGB operated, what it knew about our own secret mischief-making, and how it acquired said intelligence.

I assume that as a Russian patriot the lobbyist would resist such Machiavellian importunings. But so-called truth drugs can be administered without the subject's knowledge. The guy has to eat and drink.

My fantasy is prompted by the news that William Colby, former director of the CIA, is going to work for a Tokyo public

relations firm to "monitor" the Washington political scene for a bunch of Japanese businessmen. In his new job, Colby will be registered with the Justice Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Well now. My admiration for Bill Colby knows practically no bounds. His integrity is unquestioned. He behaved with grace before Congressional investigators of the agency and even managed to protect some important CIA secrets from the blabbermouths on Capitol Hill. I would trust Colby with my wife, and, if I had one, even my mistress.

But Colby is also human. And Japanese intelligence, while no more is engaged in the chore of digging up national secrets wherever they can be found — from friendly as well as inimical governments. We spy even on the British and French, and vice versa.

Only a fool would suggest that a Bill Colby in his normal state of mind would leak any secrets to his new employer. He didn't leak any even to his most aggressive Congressional inquisitors. To me, he was the most dedicated leader ever of the CIA.

But — there are those truth drugs. And Colby has to eat and drink too. The Japanese government would be derelict in its duty if it failed to employ some

pharmaceutical means to penetrate Colby's memory.

Colby, of course, is setting no precedent. His predecessor, Richard Helms, worked for a group of Iranian businessmen after leaving the CIA and the post as Ambassador to Iran. That was risky, too, and one can only hope that Iranian spooks didn't learn anything interesting from that relationship.

However, it's time to do something about a ticklish situation. Bill Colby is not a rich man, and he draws only a relatively modest pension. He still has children to educate. In short, he has to work for a living.

What is required, then, is action by Congress so that Bill Colby, an honorable man, need not go to work for any foreign government. That can be done only by bestowing on all former CIA directors a more substantial measure of financial security. As men whose heads are crammed with vital secrets, they should be protected against overtures from the foreign marketplace.

A lifetime job as a well-paid consultant to the CIA? Bill Colby's experience and expertise would be valuable to the agency he once headed. Or perhaps ex-CIA bosses could be insulated by, say, a \$100,000-a-year, tax-free pension. After all, they know too much to be set adrift.

SAVANNAH PRESS

15 May 1978

Exposing the CIA

The crusade of anti-intelligence continues. On top of all its other troubles in recent years, the CIA has suffered a rash of disgruntled former agents who have publicly denounced the agency. With the prodding of promotion and fees, these malcontents have shown all and told all about their dastardly deeds in the CIA.

The latest of these revelations is a book entitled "In Search of Enemies" by ex-CIA officer John Stockwell. In this expose, illustrated with classified information that Mr. Stockwell had no right to release, we learn that the CIA supplied aid and equipment to anti-Communist forces in Angola.

THIS BY HIS telling was an unpardonable sin. Why so we don't understand. Despite his assertion to the contrary, the pro-communist factions at the time were undoubtedly getting similar help from the outside which later grew into a massive Soviet-Cuban intervention. In contrast, Mr. Stockwell admits that our aid was generally ineffective. Even so, he incredibly implies that it was sufficient provocation for the Soviet-Cuban move.

This scenario fits nicely into the trendy and twisted "revisionist theory" that blames the United States and not the Soviet Union for starting and perpetuating the Cold War. The liberal literati who hold these views will no doubt have plaudits and stars for Stockwell.

They for sure will ignore the fact that he violated his solemn vow not to reveal CIA secrets. We hope the Justice Department will not.

IF HELD accountable for his violation, Mr. Stockwell will claim that the oath did not bind him because then he did not know about some of the rough and tough tactics that the CIA used. What, may we ask, did he expect — a Boy Scout outing? Intelligence work, like war, is sometimes a dirty business, but it is a necessary business against the sort of foes that we have today.

While men like Mr. Stockwell have their fits of peevish moralism, they pay no thought to the immorality of letting down their country, their oaths and their former comrades.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 47

THE WASHINGTON STAR (Green Line)
12 June 1978

Turner Reveals Agency Efforts

Foreign Students Recruited At U.S. Colleges by CIA

NEW HAVEN, Conn. (UPI) — CIA Director Stansfield Turner says his agency is recruiting foreign students attending U.S. colleges, but "very few" of the 120,000 foreign students in the United States are under contract to the agency.

Turner told a panel discussion Saturday night at the national convention of the American Association of University Professors that recruiting is conducted both openly and secretly on more than 150 college campuses across the country.

He said he was making his first public remarks on the subject to improve relations between the CIA and colleges, but he would not disclose what the students were recruited to do.

"I'm sorry to have to tell you there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communications and free association," Turner said.

He said, "The CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in

our country. . . . very few of the 120,000 of these students.

"Let me assure you all such contracts are without coercion, entirely free and entirely a matter of choice," Turner added.

He likened the campus recruiting to that done by business.

"We recruit today openly on about 150 different campuses just like businesses or other government agencies," he said.

Most of Turner's remarks were made in response to questions from CIA critic and panel member Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies.

Halperin said he thought it wrong the CIA doesn't always tell potential recruits they are candidates before approaching them with a contract.

"Every one of you every year, I suspect," Turner said to the attending delegates, "gets a number of letters asking who is a good graduate student, or who would be a good professor to be head of a department at another university."

THE WASHINGTON POST
12 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-20

CIA Defends Recruiting Of Foreigners on Campus

NEW HAVEN, Conn. (AP)—Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner said Saturday that the CIA recruits foreigners studying or teaching in the United States, but with no more secrecy than private business recruiting.

Turner told a meeting of the American Association of University Professors that the CIA seeks information sources "openly" on about 150 U.S. campuses.

Responding to a question by CIA critic Morton Halperin, who appeared on the same panel, Turner said the intelligence agency recruits "a few out of the 120,000" foreigners studying or teaching in this country.

"It is no more secretive than any of the other recruiting that we do," he added.

He told the audience of several hundred AAUP members that it was his first public statement about CIA recruitment of foreigners on U.S. campuses.

Questioned by Halperin about inquiries made without the knowledge of potential sources, Turner said the CIA recruiting process is no different from that of private businesses and universities. Recruiters often look for

the best possible employees before approaching them directly, he said.

The CIA needs more assistance from the academic community in gathering information about "closed" foreign governments, he added. He criticized those who assume faculty members will be "tarnished if they associate with the CIA."

In response to questions about how faculty members working for the CIA should conduct themselves, Turner said he has been working for more than a year with a faculty leader from a "leading university . . . writing a specific code of ethics."

After the meeting he declined to identify the person.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-21

THE WASHINGTON POST
12 June 1978

Academics Still Secretly Inform CIA

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA continues to maintain an "invaluable" network of academic informants on college and university faculties upon which it "depends daily...for information, guidance and insight," CIA officials have acknowledged in court records here.

The disclosure of the continued CIA use of unidentified academicians follows by two years a suggestion by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that all such contacts be open instead of covert.

In affidavits filed in a Freedom of Information Act suit here, CIA officials said it is generally up to the professor to decide whether to disclose his voluntary CIA cooperation to his employer.

Several sources familiar with intelligence gathering said, however, that it would be highly unlikely for most CIA informants to disclose to superiors their cooperation with the agency.

Occasionally, CIA officials said, relationships are kept secret by the academicians "at our request."

More often, the CIA officials added, "they are discreet at the scholar's request because of his concern that he will be badgered by those who feel he should not" cooperate.

In the court case, brought by a California man seeking records concerning the agency's relationship with the University of California, the CIA says the scholars are considered "sources of intelligence" and therefore secret under federal laws.

As justification for withholding the names of University of California personnel who might be involved with the agency, the CIA filed two affidavits that give a public accounting of the current use of academicians.

John F. Blake, deputy director for administration, said in his affidavit that all the relationships with academicians are for "foreign intelligence purposes."

Most of the contacts are with professors who "have traveled abroad" or who are experts in various fields of study, he said. However, one element of the agency maintains confidential contacts with college personnel "for assistance in the recruitment of foreign intelligence sources," he added.

He called cooperation with academicians "vital to the intelligence collection mission of the CIA."

Regular contacts with them "enable us to keep abreast of professional developments, including new insights, interpretations, and methodologies," Blake continued.

Public disclosure of the contacts might result in "active and abrasive campaigns to discover and expose the individuals concerned on at least some" campuses, he said.

Blake said cooperating academicians in many cases "place their reputations, credibility, livelihood and in some cases even their lives on the line in providing information."

The CIA's personnel director, F.W.M. Janney, said in an affidavit that the campus contacts are necessary to properly protect national security. He said in many fields it is "absolutely essential that the agency have available to it the single greatest source of expertise: the American academic community."

CIA analysts at its National Foreign Assessment Center consult regularly with the academicians on an "informal and personal basis, often by telephone," with the understanding that the contacts will be confidential, Janney said.

Janney said, without specifying, that scholars whose CIA contacts have become public were subjected to harassment and ridicule by students and other faculty members.

"There is also evidence that such scholars, despite recognized standing in their fields of expertise, have been subjected to professional disabilities, including denial of tenure and dismissed from their positions as a result of acknowledging such informal contacts with the CIA," Janney said.

The Senate Select Intelligence Committee said in an April 1976 report that many of the CIA's contacts with academicians are not dangerous but that the "operational use" of academicians raised serious questions about preserving the integrity of academic institutions.

According to the committee, several hundred American academics, "in addition to providing leads, and, on occasion, making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad. Beyond these, an additional few score are used in an unwitting manner for minor activities."

In suggesting that all contacts with academics be open, the senators said: "... If the CIA is to serve the intelligence needs of the nation, it must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce. But this advice and expertise can and should be openly sought—and openly given."

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)

22 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2*'Always Say What I Think'***Snepp Broke Contract
With CIA, Judge Says**

By Brian Murchison

Special to The Washington Star

"I always say what I think," declared U.S. District Judge Oren R. Lewis during the trial of Frank W. Snepp III in federal district court in Alexandria.

And Lewis lived up to his words yesterday when he all but found Snepp guilty of breaching an agreement with the CIA not to divulge information obtained while in the agency's employment.

Since joining the district court bench in 1960, the 75-year-old judge has become noted for taking over cross-examinations, rephrasing questions to witnesses and making no secret of what he thinks about a defendant or the merits of a case before handing down a decision.

When Lewis "retired" from the district bench and became a senior judge in 1973, he said he would never stop hearing cases. "I was born to work, I enjoy working, and the only way I'll leave here is horizontally," he said. "I'll be just as mean and cantankerous as ever."

LEWIS' BLUNT approach was in full view yesterday at the close of the case against Snepp, a former CIA agent whose book, "Decent Interval," was published without prior approval by CIA officials. The book was a stinging account of the CIA's handling of the evacuation from Saigon in 1975.

Lewis characterized himself as a "poor district judge" who has had to "run schools and penitentiaries, and now I'm going to have to run the CIA." He said it was time "to determine once and for all" the restrictions the government can legally place on intelligence officers.

After closing arguments the judge indicated that, while he would not rule on the case immediately, he would discuss his views at length for the benefit of newspapers which earlier had "distorted" his conduct of the trial.

Lewis said "the evidence in the case was undisputed" — that Snepp had committed "a willful, deliberate and surreptitious breach of contract and of the highest public interest."

The real issue in the case, according to Lewis, is whether CIA employees can be "the sole judges of what they divulge." He said that "if the CIA is deprived of controlling its employees, it might as well go out of business."

Defending his evidentiary rulings, Lewis said, "I went five steps further than I had to go to give the defendant every opportunity to state everything he wanted to state." Defense attorneys earlier had argued that there were issues of fact that should go to a jury, but Lewis said that the case only presented issues of law and that no jury was necessary.

The judge indicated the only aspect of his decision left to be determined was the government's remedy.

"That's what disturbs me, what the remedy might be," said the judge. "It might be to relieve him of all his ill-gotten gains."

Snepp has said he has made about \$60,000 from book sales and the sale of paperback rights so far.

THE GOVERNMENT is asking that Snepp be enjoined from divulging further information about the CIA and to have his earnings from "Decent Interval" go to the government.

The judge also said Snepp's manner of writing and publishing his book "buttresses this conclusion."

"He did it surreptitiously, behind people's back, in a public park," the judge said, citing Snepp's testimony that he had met with Random House agents only in parks and restaurants when discussing the contract to write the book.

According to Lewis, Snepp published his book only for financial gain. "He did it for money. There's no question that he did it for money. He had an agent, and he didn't want anybody to know about it."

Snepp had no patriotic motives, said Lewis. "He never said he was doing this a la the Pentagon Papers, to save the United States."

Outside the courthouse, Snepp said Lewis' comment about financial motives "is the most absurd statement I've heard. I wrote about the CIA so

Snepp also said that "it was absolutely wrong to say I did it secretly. I informed officials on the CIA about my book prior to leaving the agency."

According to Snepp, he met with publishing agents in obscure spots because "I didn't want the agency to interfere with publication." He said he feared the CIA might "intrude illegally to stop publication."

He stressed that he had exposed no classified information in his book.

"I've merely criticized the CIA for a botch," he said, referring to its handling of the Saigon evacuation.

"I POINTED out agency errors in Vietnam and told no secrets. I did this in a responsible manner. Because I did that, the agency is trying to get everything I've earned from writing the book."

When asked what the CIA would have done if he had submitted his book for pre-publication review, Snepp said, "The agency would have torn the book to shreds."

Snepp took exception to CIA Director Stansfield Turner's testimony during the trial that publication of "Decent Interval" had hurt faith in the CIA abroad.

"Turner doesn't know what he's talking about," Snepp said. "The way to demoralize agents abroad is to demoralize the ones at home, and Turner is doing that to a T."

Snepp called for an improvement in the internal "managerial policy" of the CIA, maintaining that if the CIA properly handled the grievance and suggestions of its employees, there would be no need for books such as his.

According to Snepp, if he loses the case "we'll have a system whereunder former CIA employees will not be able to responsibly criticize the CIA. If the American people want a CIA where employees will muffle all their grievances, they'll get it."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1, 10

THE WASHINGTON POST
22 June 1978

Snepp Breached Contract, Judge Says

By Fred Barbash
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. District Court Judge Oren R. Lewis held yesterday that former CIA agent Frank Snepp committed a "willful breach of the highest public trust" by publishing his book on the American evacuation of Vietnam without Central Intelligence Agency authorization.

Moreover, Lewis said in an informal ruling against Snepp, he never said he was doing it a la the Pentagon Papers, to save the country. He did it for money.

Lewis withheld a formal ruling for a few days on the civil case and a judgment on what penalties to impose on the author of "Decent Interval," a highly critical account of what Snepp calls the "botched" evacuation.

The CIA and the Justice Department are seeking punitive damages, the proceeds from the sales of the book (about \$60,000 so far) and an order barring further unauthorized disclosures by Snepp.

Mark Lynch, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer representing Snepp, said he would appeal the decision, setting up another possible test of the CIA's authority to censor the writings of its former employees.

Snepp said afterward that if he loses the case on appeal, "I think we'll have a system where former employees cannot criticize the CIA. If the American people want a CIA that marches in bureaucratic lock step, they're going to get it."

Snepp had argued, in part, that the secrecy agreement signed by all CIA employees requires prepublication screening only if classified information is being disclosed. There were no such secrets in Snepp's book, the government has agreed.

But government witnesses, including CIA Director Stansfield Turner, said that under the secrecy agreement the CIA has the power to decide whether secrets are being divulged. By refusing to submit his book, Snepp never gave the agency the opportunity.

Agreeing, Lewis said yesterday that if the CIA is deprived of this control, "they may as well go out of business.... If all CIA agents are allowed to tell whatever they want to tell whenever they want to tell it to whomever they want to tell it, then the CIA isn't going to get much information."

The Snepp case is the second major CIA effort to bolster what it complains is its diminishing ability to keep secrets because of books and news leaks.

The agency moved successfully against former intelligence officials Victor Marchetti of the CIA, and John D. Marks of the State Department, and won in the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals the right to censor parts of their book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." That decision applied only to disclosures of classified information, however.

The agency has allowed several books to be published without prepublication review, however. That fact, Snepp and his lawyers contended, shows that the agency is just as concerned about embarrassment in its censorship as it is about secrets.

"I think the agency would have torn my book to shreds" despite the absence of classified data, Snepp said after the decision. "And that is not what the secrecy agreement is about."

Lewis' assertion that the book was written for money, Snepp said, "is just absurd. I did this book because I believed it would help improve the CIA."

Because of Lewis' belief that Snepp and others like him are in it for money, the judge said he thought that the "nominal damages" normally exacted in a breach-of-contract case "would not be a deterrent."

He termed Snepp's earnings "ill-gotten gains," the legal phrase normally reserved for funds received by some-

one who breaches a business or financial trust called a fiduciary trust. Such gains are often forfeited in civil cases.

Throughout the 1½-day-long non-jury trial, Lewis had made little effort to conceal his personal view of what Snepp, whom he generally referred to as "Snepp," had done, lecturing him angrily when he took the stand and saying at one point that "it won't make any difference" what the evidence is.

Yesterday, Lewis defended his actions and accused The Washington Post of distorting them, although he did not cite specifics. He said The Post suggested incorrectly that "I was being arbitrary" and that "I already had the decision written."

"I have gone five steps beyond what I would have ordinarily gone [in allowing defense testimony] because this is an important case," he said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-12

NEW YORK TIMES
22 JUNE 1978

Judge Says He Thinks Ex-Official Of C.I.A. Violated Secrecy Pact

By ANTHONY MARRO

Special to The New York Times

ALEXANDRIA, Va., June 21—Federal District Judge Oren R. Lewis said today that he believed Frank W. Snepp 3d, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, had deliberately and wrongfully violated a "secrecy agreement" with the agency by publishing a book about the fall of Saigon without first submitting it to the C.I.A. for review.

But the judge, who will decide the case himself, said that he would withhold a formal ruling until he had a chance to review all the testimony and evidence in the case. The suit filed by the Justice Department is for breach of contract, asking the court to award it all of the proceeds Mr. Snepp receives from the book.

"I think it was a willful, deliberate breach of contract, and a willful, deliberate breach of trust, and I think he did it for money," Judge Lewis said after hearing closing arguments today in the suit.

'No Right to Release'

At another point, he said, "So far as this court is concerned, he had no right to release that information without first submitting it for clearance."

The 75-year-old judge, who was appointed to the Federal bench in the Eisenhower Administration and who has a reputation for a sharp courtroom manner, said that he had not reached a "definitive decision" in the case, but wanted to let participants have "some idea of my thinking."

Lawyers for Mr. Snepp, however, took this as a clear sign that Judge Lewis intended to side with the Government on at least several key issues, and they began making plans today for an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Richmond.

"I'm confident that the record we developed puts us in the strongest possible position for appeal," said Mark H. Lynch,

who represents Mr. Snepp on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Mr. Snepp, who served for eight years in the C.I.A., resigned early in 1976 and wrote a detailed and highly critical account of the agency's handling of the evacuation of Saigon in the last days of the Vietnam War.

Today, outside the courtroom, Mr. Snepp said of Judge Lewis's contention that he had written the book for money, "That's the most absurd statement I've heard. I wrote the book because I thought the C.I.A. should learn from its mistakes."

Mr. Snepp also contended, as he has from the start, that he had revealed no classified information in the book that had not already been revealed by the agency itself, and thus he had no obligation to submit it for review.

The Government, in a closing argument by Glenn V. Whitaker, said that the agreements signed by Mr. Snepp required him to submit any such manuscripts to the C.I.A. so that the agency itself could decide whether they contained classified material. He said that by "flaunting" this control mechanism, Mr. Snepp had "damaged the reputation of the C.I.A. to keep secrets."

Repeated Several Times

This argument was repeated several times by Judge Lewis, who said it was "so plain and open and obvious to me" that the C.I.A. couldn't permit its agents to make such decisions on their own.

But while he said he was satisfied that Mr. Snepp, whom he repeatedly referred to as "Mr. Shepp," had broken a contract, Judge Lewis indicated that he had not decided what sort of damages, if any, should be awarded.

In much of the two-day hearing, Judge Lewis was quick to interrupt, debate and criticize Mr. Lynch and the other defense lawyers, to the point of repeatedly sustaining objections before Justice Department lawyers had risen to make them.

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS SERVICE

Date. 21 June
Item No. 3
Ref. No. 2

DISTRIBUTION II

A205

R A BYLCZCVYX A560

APM-CIA Book; 1st Ld; A052;280

BY DONALD SANDERS

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

ALEXANDRIA, Va. (AP) - U.S. District Judge Oren R. Lewis said today he is satisfied that Frank W. Snepp III wrote a book critical of the CIA "with full knowledge that he had no right to do it."

The judge withheld a formal ruling in the government's damage suit against Snepp, author of "Decent Interval," but he said:

"He did it willfully; deliberately and surreptitiously. He did it for money - there is no question he did it for money; but he didn't want anybody to know about it until a certain time."

The Justice Department filed suit against Snepp on grounds he did not submit his manuscript to the intelligence agency; for which he worked for eight years. The government did not ask for a specific monetary verdict; but it has asked Judge Lewis to put into a trust fund all of Snepp's profits from the book.

Mark Lynch, Snepp's principal attorney, said figures from the publishers, Random House, are incomplete but that so far Snepp has received only about \$60,000. He said that would have been less than the writer would have made if he had continued working for the CIA after January 1976.

Lewis, hearing the case without a jury, said "the remedy may require him (Snepp) to give up all his ill-gotten gains."

"I don't regard it as a matter of money," the judge continued.

"If I fined him \$10 million it wouldn't reduce our income taxes by a penny - not even a mill."

Lewis said he would prepare a written opinion as soon as possible; but set no specific time. He and attorneys for Snepp and the Justice Department were in agreement that whatever his ruling, the case is likely to go to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond and perhaps to the Supreme Court.

THE SUIT: 4TH GRAF

AP-NY-06-21 1256EDT

Hetz DX-4

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS SERVICE

Date. 21 June

Item No. 2

Ref. No. _____

DISTRIBUTION II

UP-056

(CIA)

(BY JOHN BARTON)

ALEXANDRIA, VA. (UPI) - U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE OREN LEWIS SAID TODAY THE CIA'S EFFECTIVENESS WOULD BE DESTROYED IF FORMER AGENTS LIKE FRANK SNEPP WERE ABLE TO VIOLATE THEIR SECRECY AGREEMENTS.

LEWIS SAID HE WOULD NOT MAKE AN IMMEDIATE RULING ON GOVERNMENT CHARGES THAT SNEPP VIOLATED HIS AGREEMENT BUT HE SHOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM PUBLISHING FURTHER INFORMATION AND HAVE HIS ROYALTIES TURNED OVER TO THE GOVERNMENT.

LEWIS SAID HE BELIEVED SNEPP'S DECISION TO PUBLISH A BOOK WITHOUT SUBMITTING IT TO THE CIA FOR CLEARANCE BEFORE PUBLICATION "WAS A WILLFUL, DELIBERATE BREACH OF THE HIGHEST TRUST, AND HE DID IT FOR MONEY."

"IT IS SO PLAIN, SO OPEN AND OBVIOUS TO ME," LEWIS SAID. "IF ALL CIA AGENTS CAN TELL WHATEVER THEY WANT TO...I DON'T HAVE ANY TROUBLE DETERMINING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT HAVE ANY COOPERATION FROM FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES."

HE SAID IF AGENTS ARE ALLOWED TO VIOLATE THEIR SECRECY AGREEMENTS, "THE CIA MIGHT AS WELL GO OUT OF BUSINESS."

WHILE DELIVERING THESE REMARKS AT THE END OF THE TRIAL, LEWIS REPEATEDLY STATED HE HAD NOT YET MADE A DEFINITIVE DECISION. HE SAID IT WOULD BE PROVIDED "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE," PROBABLY TOMORROW MORNING.

LEWIS SAID SNEPP NEVER TESTIFIED HE WROTE "DECENT INTERVAL" - IN WHICH HE ACCUSED THE AGENCY OF MISMANAGING THE SAIGON EVACUATION - FOR ANY POLITICAL PURPOSE "A LA 'THE PENTAGON PAPERS.'"

HE SAID IF HE SHOULD FIND SNEPP GUILTY, ONE PROBLEM WOULD BE TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF ANY FINE, ADDING HE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO INVOKE A MASSIVE FINE BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE RELIEF TO AMERICANS OF EVEN 1 CENT PER PERSON.

UPI 06-21 12:29 PED

Turner, Testifying in Snepp Case, Says Book by Ex-Agent Has Hurt C.I.A.

By ANTHONY MARRO

Special to The New York Times

ALEXANDRIA, Va., June 20—Adm. Stansfeld Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, said in Federal District Court here today that damage had already been done to the Central Intelligence Agency by the unauthorized publication of "Decent Interval," a book about the fall of Saigon, and that even more could result unless the Government wins its civil suit against the author, Frank W. Snepp 3d.

"If he is able to get away with this, will appear that we have no control,"

it will appear that we have no control" over intelligence secrets, Admiral Turner said after being called as a Government witness on the first day of the hearing.

He said that by allowing the book to be published without first submitting it to C.I.A. for review, Mr. Snepp, a former officer of the intelligence agency, not only had violated a "secrecy agreement" that he had signed, but also had "flaunted the basic system of control that we have." He said that this, in turn, would make other governments and intelligence forces reluctant to share information with the C.I.A. because it would appear that the agency could not protect its secrets.

Admiral Turner's testimony came as the Government began its civil suit against Mr. Snepp, in which it seeks to prohibit further distribution of his book, enjoin him from any further writing or speaking about the C.I.A., and to obtain, as damages, all royalties from the book.

All the evidence in the case, in which the Government is seeking for the first

time to affirm the validity of secrecy agreements required of C.I.A. employees, was submitted by 5:25 P.M. today, and final arguments are scheduled for tomorrow at 10 A.M.

After that, Federal District Judge Oren R. Lewis, who is hearing the case, can either give a ruling from the bench or take the matter under advisement and defer a decision until a later date.

Mr. Snepp and his attorneys have argued that he did not breach his agreement with the C.I.A. because, although his book is highly critical of the agency's performance in the last days of the Vietnam War, he did not reveal any classified information that the agency itself had not already made public.

In addition, they have tried to argue that the agency itself breached its agreement with Mr. Snepp by not affording him a mechanism for expressing his complaints about the evacuation of Saigon within the agency itself.

Proceeds Total \$60,000

They also attempted to argue today that, even if the Government showed that Mr. Snepp did breach his agreement, it had not yet been able to show any specific damage sufficient to warrant seizure of the proceeds of the book, which have totaled about \$60,000 to date.

These arguments, however, did not appear to impress Judge Lewis, who suggested that, along with the question of whether the secrecy agreement on its face violates the First Amendment protections of free speech, they would probably be argued again in Richmond, which is the seat of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

"I'm certain you're en route to Richmond," the judge told Mark H. Lynch, who is representing Mr. Snepp on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union. "I'll show you the way. It's right down Route 195."

"I know the way," Mr. Lynch replied.

Hearing a day-long session that involved constant and occasionally acrimonious bickering between Judge Lewis and Mr. Snepp and his attorneys, the 75-year-old judge said repeatedly that, in his view, the case was a simple matter of contract.

"This case is limited to one thing: whether the C.I.A. has the legal right to enjoin this man for doing what he admits he has done," Judge Lewis said at one point.

Request for Jury Denied

Largely because of this, he refused Mr. Lynch's request for a jury to hear the case, saying that all that remained to be decided were questions of law, not of fact.

Among the issues that Mr. Snepp and his attorneys wanted to raise to a jury was the question of whether he had been deceived by C.I.A. officials when he first signed a secrecy oath after joining the agency in 1968.

Judge Lewis first refused to permit this testimony because Mr. Snepp said he could not identify positively the official who, he said, had assured him that the agreement was not to be taken literally or enforced strictly, and that he would have "discretion" in deciding what could be revealed.

"I'm not going to permit him to vary the terms of the contract" on what he

recalls as the interpretation "of an unnamed man," the judge said. "I'm not going to let him rest on a phantom."

Later, however, after the jurors had been released, Mr. Snepp said that he was reasonably sure the official in question was Robert B. Griffin, whom he did not know by name but believed he recognized. But, when Mr. Griffin took the stand, he said he could not recall Mr. Snepp and could not recall giving such advice to anyone.

Mr. Snepp, who is 35 years old, a veteran of eight years in the C.I.A. and who served two tours of duty in Vietnam, said under oath that he did not think he had violated his agreement because he believed that it required him only to submit classified information for prior review.

This was greeted with a show of open skepticism by Judge Lewis, who at one point asked him if he was a college graduate at the time he signed the agreement, and who shortly thereafter asked him if he had been "well versed in the English language" at the time. Mr. Snepp, a 1965 graduate of Columbia University who majored in Elizabethan literature, replied in the affirmative to both questions.

The Government's case is being handled by Glen V. Winkler and his wife, Elizabeth Gere Winkler, and by a third colleague, Brook Hedge. They argued today that the agreement required Mr. Snepp to submit all writings for review, regardless of whether they contained classified information, and that the Government was not required to show specific damages to be awarded the proceeds of his book.

WASHINGTON POST

A. 22

X *The Trial of Frank Snepp*

THE OUTCOME of the lawsuit the government has under way against former CIA agent Frank Snepp is not as open and shut as Federal Judge Oren R. Lewis has made it sound. The government may well win the case, even on appeal, but the issues raised by Mr. Snepp deserve a lot more careful judicial consideration than they received from Judge Lewis.

Those issues all revolve around the "contract" Mr. Snepp signed with the CIA in 1968 in which he agreed to submit any manuscript he wrote for its review prior to publication. He did not do that with his recent book on the fall of Saigon, and the government is suing him for breach of contract. The case is, as they say in judicial circles, one of first impression—the CIA has not attempted previously to enforce such a contract. There are serious legal questions about the validity of the contract and its application to non-classified information. And there are other questions having to do with the understanding Mr. Snepp (and other CIA agents) had of their contractual obligations—and the effect on their understanding of the agency's failure to enforce the contract against other ex-employees.

None of these issues, and others that Mr. Snepp's

lawyers tried to raise, seemed to interest Judge Lewis. He brushed aside the need for evidence ("It won't make any difference") and appeared openly scornful of Mr. Snepp (whom he repeatedly referred to as "Mr. Shepp") when he testified in his own defense. The brief trial ended farcically with the judge saying that he 1) wanted to study all the evidence before reaching a "definitive decision" and 2) thought Mr. Snepp's action was "a willful, deliberate breach of contract and a willful, deliberate breach of trust."

Judge Lewis, no doubt, was right to handle some aspects of this case abruptly. His refusal to grant Mr. Snepp a jury trial, for instance, was predictable, since there are few, if any, issues of fact to be decided. But his general handling of the trial was injudicious, to put it mildly. His comment on Wednesday—"I have gone five steps beyond what I would have ordinarily done [in allowing defense testimony] because this is an important case"—raises questions about the way in which he handles routine cases, and even about whether he ought to be spending years as a senior judge (on call for his assignments) doing something other than filling in on the bench.

NEW YORK TIMES

A-7

Reporter's Notebook: Alarums and Explosions at Ex-Agent's Trial

By ANTHONY MARRO

Special to The New York Times

ALEXANDRIA, Va., June 22—On Tuesday, as he left the Federal Court-house here, his planned defense of Frank W. Snepp 3d shredded by a series of adverse and sometimes acrimonious rulings from the bench, Mark H. Lynch shook his head.

In the two hours he had spent in the courtroom, representing Mr. Snepp on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, Mr. Lynch had been so barged by the judge's criticisms, objections, interruptions and sharply worded, loudly voiced questions that he had seldom been able to complete a declarative sentence.

Oren R. Lewis, the Federal district judge who presided over the two days of hearings in the Justice Department's civil suit against Mr. Snepp, is usually described with words such as "croche-ty," "cantankerous" and "gruff."

The 75-year-old judge, a Republican whose tenure dates back to the Eisenhower Administration, speaks in loud, clear tones, with the slight southern drawl that is characteristic not only of the section of Northern Virginia where he has lived for four decades, but also of the area of southern Indiana where he was born in 1902.

A short, peppery man, with white hair and a deeply lined face, Judge Lewis often would sit back in his chair,

working his jaw silently like a man whose teeth were hurting him, and then explode forward in a show of great annoyance at almost any line of questioning the defense lawyers tried to pursue.

He often appeared hostile to Mr. Snepp and at times responded with scorn and disbelief to statements by the former Central Intelligence Agency officer. "What were you? Just a backwoods boy?" he snapped when Mr. Snepp testified that he did not believe the secrecy oath he had signed required him to submit the manuscript of his book, "Decent Interval," to the C.I.A. for prior review.

Although he has not yet handed down his formal ruling in the case, Judge Lewis said Wednesday that he wanted to give the parties some idea of his thinking. His thinking, he said, was that Mr. Snepp was guilty of a "willful, deliberate breach of trust" and that he had written the book criticizing the C.I.A. "for money."

Although Judge Lewis indicated he agreed with the Justice Department's position that Mr. Snepp had broken his contract with the C.I.A., some officials within the department itself have opposed it, arguing that the Government should not claim a right to censor such writings, where no classified information was involved.

One of these reportedly was Barbara

Babcock, the head of the department's civil division. On Tuesday, however, Miss Babcock appeared at court as a spectator. She told reporters that she had come to show her appreciation for the work her staff lawyers had done in the case and also because she now felt "it is a case the Government should bring."

She arrived early, took a seat and almost immediately became the focus of attention of the sketch artists for the television networks, several of whom later said they were drawing her on the mistaken assumption that she was Mr. Snepp's wife.

The book at issue, a 590-page volume that retails for \$14.95 and details what Mr. Snepp contends was a "botched" performance by the C.I.A. at the evacuation of Saigon, was admitted as an exhibit by Judge Lewis Tuesday, not only because it is central to the case but also because, he said, "one of the clerks might want to read it."

Of all the witnesses in the case, the one who appeared the most at ease was William E. Colby, the former Director of Central Intelligence, a man who has spent much of the past three years testifying under oath at Congressional hearings, in civil suits and at various other public forums.

Mr. Colby, looking tanned and fit, slipped into the witness chair with a sort

of proprietary ease, fielded all the questions with the assurance of a man who has been the same route many times before, and departed, like many officials who are accustomed to being chased by reporters, with as much speed as dignity would permit.

The courthouse here is a large, brick building dating back to the New Deal era, which, like many Federal buildings in medium-sized cities, also includes a post office. The main courtroom is large and cool, with white-painted, wood-paneled walls and the sort of elegant woodwork seldom seen in more modern public buildings.

The artistic merits of the courtroom aside, the Eastern District of Virginia often is preferred by Government attorneys for "national security" trials, since both the bench and the juries tend to be more conservative than those in the District of Columbia itself.

The same is true of the appeals court, which is located in Richmond, and which is where the Snepp cast is headed no matter how Judge Lewis ultimately decides. This has been clear from the start, and Judge Lewis told Mr. Lynch less than 20 minutes after the start of the civil suit that he would be more than happy to show him the way. "You just take Route I-95 and go south," he said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-15

NEW YORK TIMES
19 JUNE 1978

TRIAL OVER C.I.A. BOOK RAISES RIGHTS ISSUES

Snepp Cites Freedom of Speech—
Government, Its Secrecy Needs

By ANTHONY MARRO

Special to The New York Times

ALEXANDRIA, Va., June 18—The Government's civil suit against Frank W. Snepp 3d, the former Central Intelligence Agency officer who wrote a detailed account of the fall of Saigon, is scheduled to open here Tuesday with attorneys for both sides arguing that far more than a contract dispute is at issue.

The immediate question in the case, in which the trial is expected to last no more than two days, is whether Mr. Snepp was guilty of a breach of contract when he allowed his book, "Decent Interval," to be published without first submitting it to the C.I.A. for review.

But underlying this are broader issues that, according to the pretrial motions filed by attorneys for both the Government and for Mr. Snepp, involve significant questions concerning the First Amendment rights of Federal employees and the right of the Government to protect what it considers legitimate secrets.

Attorney General Griffin B. Bell contends that the issue is whether the Government can use "secrecy oaths" as a legally binding contract to protect information that it has classified.

According to Mr. Snepp's attorneys and publishers, such contracts, particularly in the absence of any Congressional or Presidential authorization, are unconstitutional and unenforceable on their face because they violate First Amendment protections of press freedom.

Effect on "Whistle-Blowers"

In addition, they argue that requiring Government workers who sign such oaths to clear all writings with their agencies would prevent "whistle-blowers" from calling public attention to serious abuses by Government agencies.

"Without information, the public is powerless to guard against governmental misconduct," said Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House, publisher of Mr. Snepp's book.

"We are near enough to Watergate to remember that governmental officials, whether elected or appointed, often withhold information not for reasons of national security, but to protect themselves from embarrassment or exposure of their own wrongdoing," he added in a statement issued after the suit against Mr. Snepp was filed.

Mr. Snepp, who served two separate tours of duty in Vietnam during his eight years in the C.I.A., left the agency in 1976. He then spent about 18 months writing his book, which is highly critical of the United States Government's handling of the evacuation of Saigon, now known as Ho Chi Minh City.

The book, which was published last November, is intimate in its detail and sometimes scathing in tone. But it apparently does not contain any classified information that the C.I.A. itself had not previously made public.

It is the issue of whether the agreement

Mr. Snepp signed required him to submit nonclassified material for review that most likely will be the focus of the legal debate, which will be argued before Federal District Judge Oren R. Lewis in the 48-year-old, red-brick courthouse here.

Mr. Snepp's attorneys, Mark H. Lynch of the American Civil Liberties Union, and John C. Sims, will argue that the agreement Mr. Snepp signed when he left the agency required only that he submit classified information for review. The Government is not contending that the book contains classified information not already released by the agency. Mr. Snepp's attorneys will argue that, therefore, he was under no obligation to submit it.

The Government's lawyers, on the other hand, are expected to argue that Mr. Snepp was obligated to submit the manuscript to the C.I.A. and to allow the agency to determine whether it contained properly classified material that he had promised not to reveal.

Only if such obligations are in force, the Government has contended in a pretrial motion, can the agency assure its sources that it is able to safeguard confidential information.

The Government has asked the court to award it, as damages, all of Mr. Snepp's proceeds from the book. It has also asked for an injunction prohibiting him from any future writings or public speeches about the agency.

Damages in Dispute

Mr. Snepp's attorneys are expected to argue that, even if Mr. Snepp is found to be in violation of a legitimate contract, the Government has not been able to show that the actual damage done to the C.I.A. is worth the money that Mr. Snepp has earned from the book—about \$60,000 to date.

The Government's lawyers, however, have indicated in pretrial motions that they intend to argue that it is well established in common law that the Government is entitled to any profits that a person obtains through a breach of contract, whether the Government can show any monetary injury or not.

THE NEW YORK TIMES (LATE EDITION)
21 June 1978

Turner, Testifying in Snepp Case, Says Book by Ex-Agent Has Hurt C.I.A.

By ANTHONY MARRO

Special to The New York Times

ALEXANDRIA, Va., June 20—Adm. Stansfeld Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, said in Federal District Court here today that damage had already been done to the Central Intelligence Agency by the unauthorized publication of "Decent Interval," a book about the fall of Saigon, and that even more could result unless the Government wins its civil suit against the author, Frank W. Snepp 3d.

"If he is able to get away with this, will appear that we have no control" over intelligence secrets, Admiral Turner said after being called as a Government witness on the first day of the hearing.

He said that by allowing the book to be published without first submitting it to C.I.A. for review, Mr. Snepp, a former officer of the intelligence agency, not only had violated a "secrecy agreement" that he had signed, but also had "flaunted the basic system of control that we have." He said that this, in turn, would make other governments and intelligence sources reluctant to share information with the C.I.A. because it would appear that the agency could not protect its secrets.

Admiral Turner's testimony came as the Government began its civil suit against Mr. Snepp, in which it seeks to prohibit further distribution of his book, enjoin him from any further writing or speaking about the C.I.A. and to obtain, as damages, all royalties from the book.

All the evidence in the case, in which the Government is seeking for the first

time to affirm the validity of secrecy agreements required of C.I.A. employees, was submitted by 5:25 P.M. today, and final arguments are scheduled for tomorrow at 10 A.M.

After that, Federal District Judge Oren R. Lewis, who is hearing the case, can either give a ruling from the bench or take the matter under advisement and defer a decision until a later date.

Mr. Snepp and his attorneys have argued that he did not breach his agreement with the C.I.A. because, although his book is highly critical of the agency's performance in the last days of the Vietnam War, he did not reveal any classified information that the agency itself had not already made public.

In addition, they have tried to argue that the agency itself breached its agreement with Mr. Snepp by not affording him a mechanism for expressing his complaints about the evacuation of Saigon within the agency itself.

Proceeds Total \$60,000

They also attempted to argue today that, even if the Government showed that Mr. Snepp did breach his agreement, it had not yet been able to show any specific damage sufficient to warrant seizure of the proceeds of the book, which have totaled about \$60,000 to date.

These arguments, however, did not appear to impress Judge Lewis, who suggested that, along with the question of whether the secrecy agreement on its face violates the First Amendment protections of free speech, they would probably be argued again in Richmond, which is the seat of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

"I'm certain you're en route to Richmond," the judge told Mark H. Lynch, who is representing Mr. Snepp on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union. "I'll show you the way. It's right down Route 195."

"I know the way," Mr. Lynch replied.

Hearing a day-long session that involved constant and occasionally acrimonious bickering between Judge Lewis and Mr. Snepp and his attorneys, the 75-year-old judge said repeatedly that, in his view, the case was a simple matter of contract.

"This case is limited to one thing: whether the C.I.A. has the legal right to enjoin this man for doing what he admits he has done," Judge Lewis said at one point.

Request for Jury Denied

Largely because of this, he refused Mr. Lynch's request for a jury to hear the case, saying that all that remained to be decided were questions of law, not of fact.

Among the issues that Mr. Snepp and his attorneys wanted to raise to a jury was the question of whether he had been deceived by C.I.A. officials when he first signed a secrecy oath after joining the agency in 1968.

Judge Lewis first refused to permit this testimony because Mr. Snepp said he could not identify positively the official who, he said, had assured him that the agreement was not to be taken literally or enforced strictly, and that he would have "discretion" in deciding what could be revealed.

"I'm not going to permit him to vary the terms of the contract" on what he

recalls as the interpretation "of an unnamed man," the judge said. "I'm not going to let him rest on a phantom."

Later, however, after the jurors had been released, Mr. Snepp said that he was reasonably sure the official in question was Robert B. Griffin, whom he did not know by name but believed he recognized. But, when Mr. Griffin took the stand, he said he could not recall Mr. Snepp and could not recall giving such advice to anyone.

Mr. Snepp, who is 35 years old, a veteran of eight years in the C.I.A. and who served two tours of duty in Vietnam, said under oath that he did not think he had violated his agreement because he believed that it required him only to submit classified information for prior review.

This was greeted with a show of open skepticism by Judge Lewis, who at one point asked him if he was a college graduate at the time he signed the agreement, and who shortly thereafter asked him if he had been "well versed in the English language" at the time. Mr. Snepp, a 1965 graduate of Columbia University who majored in Elizabethan literature, replied in the affirmative to both questions.

The Government's case is being handled by Glen V. Winkler and his wife, Elizabeth Gere Winkler, and by a third colleague, Brook Hedge. They argued today that the agreement required Mr. Snepp to submit all writings for review, regardless of whether they contained classified information, and that the Government was not required to show specific damages to be awarded the proceeds of his book.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
21 June 1978

Ex-CIA Agent's Defenses Of Viet Book Rebuffed

By Fred Barbash

Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. District Court Judge Oren R. Lewis yesterday swept aside most of the defenses of former CIA agent Frank Snepp, who is charged with breaching the agency's secrecy agreement with his recent book on the fall of Saigon.

Punctuating his rulings with strong personal criticism of unauthorized disclosures by former CIA agents, the judge said in federal court in Alexandria that Snepp was not entitled to a trial by jury, warned that "nobody has got a right to divulge classified information," and told Snepp's lawyer that the evidence "won't make any difference."

Snepp published the book, "Decent Interval," without allowing pre-publication screening by the CIA, as required by the secrecy agreement he signed when he joined the CIA. It prompted the agency to once again test its powers to censor former employees by filing a civil suit against Snepp, even though the government did not assert any classified information was revealed. The suit seeks an injunction against further revelations by Snepp, all the earnings from the book, and an unspecified amount of damages.

Judge Lewis, who has been previously noted for his sometimes opinionated and abrasive interjections in trials, rejected Snepp's request for a jury trial, saying there were no facts for a jury to decide, only legal questions for the judge.

Then, one by one, sometimes shouting his disapproval, he attacked Snepp's defense arguments, including the central one that the secrecy agreement applied only to revelations of a classified nature.

"I would have no difficulty speculating that the U.S. government and the people suffered a loss by giving away this information [in the Snepp book]," he said at one point. "It doesn't have to be about the atomic bomb."

"I don't think the government has to show that it lost \$2," Lewis said. "The real issue is whether they can enforce the written [secrecy] agreement. If they can't, then any employee of the CIA can go to work and get all the secrets and go into the novel business, isn't that right?"



FRANK SNEPP
loses request for jury trial



STANSFIELD TURNER
cites effect on CIA sources

Lewis then said he thought Snepp had a "fiduciary" responsibility to protect CIA information not unlike the responsibility of a banker in protecting the bank's money.

At one point when defense lawyer Mark Lynch commented that he wanted to get all the evidence into the record, Lewis replied almost inaudibly that "it won't make any differ-

ence." Earlier he had told Lynch that Snepp was "on the road to Richmond [the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals] and I'll show you how to get there."

The Snepp case is the second major CIA effort to legally bolster the secrecy agreement signed by agency employees. In the case of former CIA official Victor Marchetti, the agency won assurance from the court of appeals that it could censor books under the secrecy agreement insofar as they contained classified information.

This case, however, did not involve official secrets. The agency is basing its suit simply on the grounds that Snepp breached his secrecy "contract" by failing to submit "Decent Interval" for agency screening.

"We must assure our sources that they will not be exposed, possibly to death," CIA Director Stansfield Turner testified. As a result of the Snepp book and other disclosures, he said, "Over the past six to nine months we have had a number of sources discontinue work for us and a number of sources who say they are nervous about continuing and foreign intelligence agencies who have questioned whether they can do business with us."

"If he is able to get away with this, it will prove to other people that we have no control," Turner said.

Judge Lewis would not permit Turner to be questioned about the statement, saying that there had already been "enough things come out to demoralize the agency." Turner himself did not raise an objection to cross-examination.

Throughout the day, Lewis repeatedly sustained objections from the Justice Department before they were even raised and when Snepp took the stand in his own defense he spoke to him in a lecturing tone.

He asked Snepp rhetorically, "You did not understand that 'position of trust' meant that you would not divulge secrets or information of this agency? . . . Is that your understanding, that you could be the judge of what could be released and what couldn't be released without the review of the agency?"

Snepp replied: "I would never release information that is classified, sir."

"But you would decide what was classified," Lewis shot back.

Although Lewis had earlier ruled most of Snapp's defenses irrelevant, he nevertheless permitted arguments on them. Snapp and his lawyers said that the former agent had been led to believe by a CIA briefing officer at the time of his induction in 1968 that the agreement applied only to classified information. He said that numerous incidents — including authorized news briefings he held while in Saigon — only reinforced that belief.

He also argued that numerous former CIA officials as well as incumbent officials had breached the agreement in a variety of ways.

Lewis recessed the trial until this morning when he is expected to rule in the case.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-15NEW YORK TIMES
21 JUNE 1978

U.S. Judge Denies Request for a Jury Trial

by Author of Book on C.I.A.

ALEXANDRIA, Va., June 20 (UPI)—Federal District Judge Oren Lewis today denied a request by Frank Snepp, a former agent for the Central Intelligence Agency, for a trial by jury and opened his book-publishing trial with a warning that "nobody has got a right to divulge classified information."

Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, then took the witness stand and accused Mr. Snepp of breaking his word and damaging the agency by publishing "Decent Interval," a book about the fall of Saigon, without C.I.A. clearance.

In a series of stern rulings, Judge Lewis indicated that Mr. Snepp may have a difficult time beating a Federal lawsuit that seeks to make an example of him as a means of stopping other agents from writing unauthorized books based on their C.I.A. experience.

In one discussion with Mr. Snepp's attorneys, the judge said, "Nobody has got a right to divulge classified information."

A Matter of 'Semantics'

Although Mr. Snepp's attorneys said the Government had not contended that the book divulged any classified information, Judge Lewis called that a matter of "semantics" and said he disagreed with the defense view of what is classified.

The lawsuit asks to have Mr. Snepp found in breach of his pledge of secrecy to the intelligence agency by failing to allow the agency to read and censor the manuscript before publication. As punishment, the suit asks that all royalties from

the best-selling book go to the Government.

At the outset, Judge Lewis dismissed Mr. Snepp's request for a trial by jury on the ground that there were no factual disputes to be decided.

He waived aside arguments that free speech issues under the First Amendment were involved and said, "This case is limited to whether the C.I.A. has the legal right to enjoin this man from doing what he acknowledges he has done."

The central issue, the judge continued, is: "Does an individual under the basic law of a fiduciary relationship have a right to get inside information, plans, modus operandi, and then resign and divulge it to the whole wide world?"

Protecting the C.I.A.

At one point, he told Mr. Snepp's attorneys that "we are not going to try the fall of Saigon here," and, cutting off another line of questioning about unauthorized disclosure of information about the intelligence agency, added: "We are not going to make the C.I.A. be exposed any more than they have been."

Mr. Snepp's attorneys said they could show that their client had an oral agreement with officials of the agency that superseded the terms of the written secrecy oath, but Judge Lewis rejected that line of defense.

"I am not going to permit him to bury the terms of this contract," he said. "The contract is very clear."

The defense attorneys seemed disheartened, and one of them said, "Given the

court's rulings, there is not much I can do here."

In his testimony, Admiral Turner said Mr. Snepp had given him "an unequivocal affirmation" before resigning that he would honor his secrecy oath, and added: "I took Mr. Snepp at his word. I trusted him."

Although other agents have clashed with the agency over book-publishing

risks, Admiral Turner called Mr. Snepp's action "a major case" because it "flaunted" the fact that no C.I.A. censorship had taken place.

"It therefore helped to tear down the visible control of information we have at C.I.A.," he said. "In order to maintain your secrets, you must have some visible means of control. What can be disclosed is a very fine line."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
21 June 1978

Snepp Gets Early Directions To Appeals Court From Judge

By Brian Murchison
Special to The Washington Star

Less than half an hour into the trial of former CIA agent Frank W. Snepp III, a hostile U.S. District Judge Oren R. Lewis was telling Snepp's lawyers how to get to the appeals court in Richmond.

"I'm certain you're already en route to Richmond," the judge said. "You just take I-95 and go south."

Snepp, a former interrogator of war prisoners and defectors, had misgivings about the course of the proceedings under Lewis even before the trial began yesterday.

"I feel like a man who's present at his own execution," Snepp said before entering the courtroom.

Snepp is on trial for allowing his book, "Decent Interval," an account of the U.S. evacuation from Saigon, to be published without submitting it beforehand to the CIA for approval. All CIA employees, on joining the agency, sign an agreement not to disclose information without first obtaining agency permission.

THE JUDGE PLAYED an active part in the presentation of the case, constantly interrupting the attorneys to question and cross-examine the witnesses, and frequently thundering "objection sustained" to the defense's questions, even when the prosecution had raised no objection. Lewis also told Snepp's attorneys on several occasions that their evidence "would make no difference."

The case had attracted wide legal interest because of Snepp's claim of a 1st Amendment right not to be restrained from publishing his book. But Lewis quickly dismissed such arguments, declaring, "This is not a 1st Amendment case." He compared Snepp's act to stealing plans for a neutron bomb and then releasing those plans.

"Nobody has got a right to divulge classified information," the judge said as the trial began. Thomas Lynch, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer representing Snepp, noted the government had not argued that classified information was contained in "Decent Interval," but Lewis replied, almost shouting, that Lynch was "dealing in semantics."

LEWIS DEFINED the issue as whether a CIA employee has the right, "under the basic law of fiduci-

ary loyalty to an employer, to get inside information . . . and then resign and divulge to the whole world everything that the CIA did."

Lewis' first ruling was to deny Snepp a jury trial, stating that there were no issues of fact that could be handed over to a jury. Lynch argued that there were at least four issues of fact.

By denying a jury trial, Lewis eliminated defense testimony on those four issues. Lynch wanted to present testimony that Snepp's secrecy agreement with the CIA had been "fraudulently induced" by agency officers; that there was no clear evidence that the CIA had actually suffered harm by publication of Snepp's book; that Snepp had been repeatedly denied a response to grievances made to CIA officers on the subject of the U.S. evacuation from Saigon; and that the government was discriminating against Snepp in prosecuting him and not others who had divulged similar information.

LEWIS DECLARED that he had determined that Snepp's agreement with the CIA was "a clear and unambiguous contract," and he said he would forbid any effort of the defense to give testimony that Snepp had been "misled" in signing it.

Snepp's brief claimed that the agreement had been "fraudulently induced" because officers presiding at the oath had told him that the agency did not engage in assassination, and that the agreement did not cover unclassified material.

Rejecting the request for a jury trial on the injury issue, Lewis said that "the injury was clear. The American people suffered a loss when someone was allowed to publish information detrimental to their best interests."

And Lewis said that no jury was necessary to probe the non-response of the CIA's grievance mechanism because he had determined that the grievance mechanism was intended only for CIA personnel and placement matters, and not for issues such as the U.S. evacuation from Vietnam.

SNEPP TESTIFIED that a CIA official had assured him before Snepp took the secrecy oath in 1968 that it would be left to each agent to distinguish between classified and

unclassified material, and that Snepp would be free to use his discretion to determine such matters.

The CIA official named by Snepp to have made this assurance, Robert Griffin, said he could not recall having spoken to Snepp at the time in question.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner also testified yesterday, stating that Snepp's book "flouted the basic system of control we have."

"Over the last six to nine months we have had a number of sources discontinue with us," Turner said. "We have had very strong complaints from foreign intelligence sources."

Turner added, "If Snepp is able to get away with this, it will appear to other people that we have no control."

Former CIA Director William Colby testified that, while the publication of specific material may not have injured the CIA, "the reputation of not being able to exert discipline over its members has hurt the agency."

Colby said that even the act of publishing non-classified material could hurt the agency's operations.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

NEW YORK POST
17 June 1978

Spy stuff

The most diverting news in a long time is that the CIA is alive and well and operating in Moscow. There's admittedly not much cloak, and there's an alleged poison ampule for spiking drinks instead of the proverbial dagger, and no doubt critics of CIA excesses will argue all this went beyond the rules of the game.

The Russians, however, take this sort of thing in their stride, part of the tit-for-tat which goes with detente, and we're intrigued to note that in the present affair a woman is involved, as in all traditional scenarios.

Martha D. Peterson, an intrepid third secretary at our Moscow embassy, may be the best advertisement for the flagging Equal Rights Amendment since Joan of Arc. She not only took her poison ampule across darkest Moscow to place it in an old archway. With it she took a cache of gold, cameras and a set of written instructions for her Mole.

This is the stuff of the latest John Le Carre spy novel. For the Russians didn't just go to Ambassador Malcolm Toon and demand her immediate recall. They had their most popular writer of spy thrillers, Yulian Semyonov, tell the story across a full page of Izvestia — and he spared not a detail, revealing even that on her lonely mission Miss Peterson parked her car at a dimly lit spot and changed her dress!

There's obviously a new career here for Graham Green, Le Carre and all the others who've turned from actual spying to writing novels about it. The CIA might well hire them to record what's actually going on in the delegate's bar of the United Nations, and behind the scenes at sundry New Jersey motels where, only the other day, our own FBI nabbed two Soviet diplomats from their UN mission, as the phrase goes, red-handed.

Perhaps we should simply follow the late Mr. Khrushchev's advice and just swap all our spies. Alas, however, then there'd be no spy thrillers.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 38-42NEWSWEEK
26 June 1978

'We Still Need Spies'

In a supposedly sophisticated era of electronic snooping, the affair did seem somehow dated. There on page 5 of *Izvestia* last week was a photograph of an attractive young American woman named Martha Peterson undergoing interrogation at a KGB office in Moscow. Arrayed on a table before her were the contents of a classic cloak-and-dagger spy kit: a minicamera, tiny microphones, a supply of rubles, gold—and two ampuls of poison. Soviet secret police had allegedly caught Peterson red-handed in an

lowed-out stone containing the poison and the other items—in a niche. When the police closed in, the paper said, Peterson warned off her unidentified contact by shouting, "I am a foreigner!" Peterson was arrested and interrogated, but because she had diplomatic immunity, she was permitted to leave Moscow on the first available plane. And until *Izvestia* broke the story last week, the bizarre incident was hushed up.

In the early days of the cold war, when he headed the CIA, the late Allen Dulles

easy matter. Because the Soviet Union is such a rigidly policed society, recruiting Russians as spies—a task in which Martha Peterson may have been involved—is extremely difficult. U.S. intelligence operatives make a practice, therefore, of befriending Soviet bloc representatives who are often privy to the inner workings of the Kremlin and sometimes harbor anti-Soviet grievances. It was a Communist correspondent stationed in Moscow, for instance, who provided the first details about Leonid Brezhnev's escape from an assassination attempt just inside the Kremlin walls in 1969.

Technology is also part of the spy scene in Moscow. The roof of the U.S. Embassy bristles with sensitive antennas—so sensitive, in fact, that on one occasion embassy listening devices supposedly picked up snatches of a conversation inside a Kremlin limousine in which Brezhnev and former Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny discussed the merits of a masseuse named Olga. That story may well be apocryphal, but when a fire broke out in the upper floors of the embassy last summer, Soviet firemen went out of their way to destroy as much of the antenna network as they could lay their axes to.


TINFOIL ON THE WALLS

U.S. diplomats in Moscow routinely assume that all embassy offices with the exception of "safe" rooms—usually windowless chambers that appear to be wallpapered with tinfoil—are bugged. In 1964, approximately 40 eavesdropping microphones were uncovered at the embassy and some officials believe as many as 200 more simply went undiscovered. (In 1952, a bug was found in the beak of a wooden eagle on the wall of the U.S. envoy's residence.) More recently, in a case leaked to the U.S. press, officials conducting a routine security check discovered a tunnel beneath the embassy building—and in the process confronted a startled Russian who made a hasty retreat. The tunnel was connected to an air shaft and a chimney that were found to contain Soviet listening devices.

Two years ago, in response to U.S. protests, the Soviets apparently reduced their microwave bombardment of the Moscow embassy. But eavesdropping continues. Like its U.S. counterpart in Moscow, the Soviet Embassy in Washington bristles with mysterious antennas. No one knows precisely what the embassy's electronic equipment picks up in the U.S. or relays back to the Kremlin. But one high-level U.S. source maintains the Soviets used microwave gear during the 1973 Mideast war to listen in on White House conversations with the Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA.

Détente, with its easing of U.S. travel restrictions on Soviet citizens, has made Moscow's job easier. Last year alone, some 6,000 Soviets visited the U.S. as members of trade and cultural delegations and 21,000 Russian sailors took shore leave in U.S. ports. A good number

CONTINUED



Drawing by Dr. Chikman—Newsweek

An artist's conception of Peterson's arrest: End of a double life

espionage plot last summer and, among other things, wanted to know the name of the intended victim of the poison. U.S. consul Clifford Gross advised her to reply, *Izvestia* claimed, but Peterson told him: "Shut up." Gross told her interrogators: "No use asking her. She is only the executor." This time, the paper said, the "pretty CIA agent literally roared at him, 'Shut up!'"

Now back home in the U.S. and lying low, "Marty" Peterson, 32, had indeed worked for the CIA, officials in Washington conceded, although she was ostensibly employed in the embassy's consular section. One warm July evening last year, according to *Izvestia*, Soviet police tailed her as she proceeded by car, bus, trolleybus, subway and taxi to a rendezvous at a bridge over the Moscow River (sketch). The KGB men waited until they saw her place an object—allegedly a hol-

believed in dropping undercover agents behind the Iron Curtain by parachute (most of them never to be heard from again). Those methods have been declared obsolete by Jimmy Carter's CIA boss, Adm. Stansfield Turner, a staunch advocate of satellite reconnaissance, electronic intercepts, microwave listening devices and other space-age tools for gathering information.

SPOOKS AND TRENCH COATS

Even in the age of high-technology spying, there is still a basic need for what is known in the spook trade as HUMINT—human intelligence—and as the bizarre Peterson case indicates, the days of trench coats and lurking around corners are not over yet. As one U.S. intelligence analyst puts it: "We still need spies, you know."

Gathering HUMINT in Russia is no



The Woodbridge caper: Secrets not for sale

month, as Enger, Chernyayev and Soviet diplomat Vladimir Zinyakin were retrieving film of defense documents the officer had dropped off in a milk carton at a Woodbridge, N.J., shopping center, FBI agents pounced. Bail for Enger and Chernyayev was set at \$2 million and the two are in custody awaiting trial for espionage. Zinyakin, who had diplomatic immunity, was expelled from the country.

In the cold world of spying, the wages of sin can sometimes be surprisingly small. Enger and Chernyayev offered the naval officer (whose identity has still not been disclosed) a mere \$20,000 to betray his country. And Jürgen Wiegel, 32, a former West German Defense Ministry clerk currently on trial in Düsseldorf with five other West Germans accused of passing NATO military secrets to East Germany, was originally recruited for a paltry \$200. Later, to be sure, the East Germans grew more generous: the six defendants were allegedly paid up to \$900 per month plus bonuses, and East Germany's secret service even chipped in \$500 a month in alimony for Wiegel's ex-wife.

of them presumably were KGB agents. According to FBI associate director James B. Adams, there has been a marked upsurge of Soviet espionage here. "These people have total geographical access to the United States," he says. "And as more individuals have been assigned to this country, more intelligence officers have come with them." A prime target for Soviet operatives: Capitol Hill, where Congressional committees are a cornucopia of information on U.S. defense and economic matters.

Russian spies have always outnumbered American agents. For years, the Soviets have infiltrated the United Nations, and even cooks, bakers and chauffeurs at the Soviet Embassy in Washington and in consulates elsewhere in the country double as KGB agents. But the U.S. holds a sizable edge in scientific intelligence gathering. "Our technology is such that by the time they can steal it, our people have invented something better and we're ahead of the game again," one U.S. intelligence man boasts.

FILM IN THE MILK CARTON

The U.S. is well ahead of Moscow, for example, in the esoteric field of submarine monitoring. U.S. microphones planted in the seabed are so sensitive that they can identify individual Soviet submarines by the sound of their propellers and can alert Washington as to the vessels' direction. Allegedly hoping to learn about such techniques, two Soviet employees at the U.N.—Valdik Enger, 39, and Rudolf Chernyayev, 43—befriended a U.S. Navy officer aboard a Soviet cruise ship and asked him to sell information. The officer alerted the FBI, and last

ice even chipped in \$500 a month in alimony for Wiegel's ex-wife.

The rash of recent espionage cases has not deterred Moscow from recruiting prospective spies in the capitalist West. Last week, the Bonn government reported 243 known cases so far this year of West Germans having been approached by Soviet-bloc agents, and a confidential West German Interior Ministry memorandum warned single women working in sensitive posts to be wary this summer of "Communist Casanovas in swimsuits." In one particularly brazen instance, The New York Times reported last week, Soviet officials made direct contact with an unnamed senior U.S. Government official.

Sometimes the Russians can be heavy-handed. Not long ago, a KGB agent approached a U.S. diplomat on the overnight train from Helsinki to Moscow. After several glasses of vodka, the KGB man—born in Detroit—flashed his identity card and said, "I have friends who would pay you well for the plans of the FB-111 engine." So saying, the KGB man promptly fell into a drunken sleep.


Both sides live in dread of double agents. When a high Soviet official at the U.N., Arkady Shevchenko, defected to the U.S. last April, the Kremlin worried that he was selling secrets to Washington. And for more than a decade, the U.S. intelligence community was thrown into a turmoil by a hunt for a Communist "mole" who had

supposedly penetrated the highest councils of the CIA. Scores of CIA officers came under suspicion, and although nothing was proven about any of them, the careers of some never recovered. The mole hunt paralyzed the agency in some respects, not only by casting suspicion on key officials, but by persuading the CIA that it could not trust information brought by Communist defectors. One retired CIA officer calls the mole affair "the greatest disaster for Western security in twenty years."

A FRIENDLY BLONDE

Although U.S. officials refused last week to talk in any detail about Martha Peterson, NEWSWEEK pieced together much of her story. She had been posted to Moscow in 1975 after undergoing Russian-language training, and had easily fit into her new surroundings. A friendly, rather athletic-looking blonde, she worked in the embassy's first-floor consular offices, where she interviewed potential Soviet immigrants to the United States. She was a frequent guest at parties given by Moscow's foreign community, and she also practiced *taekwondo*, a Korean martial art in which she had acquired a green belt for proficiency. "She's the kind of girl who could beat a man at soccer or tennis or golf," a friend said. "She's very outgoing, very social."

Peterson did not talk much about her past, but her co-workers were faintly aware of a tragedy in her life: the death of her husband, a U.S. Navy pilot who had been shot down over Laos in 1973. Occasionally, Robert Fulton—ostensibly a first secretary for political affairs, but in fact her clandestine CIA officer—came down from the embassy's seventh floor (where CIA and political-section offices are located) to chat with Peterson. No one, however, suspected that she worked for the CIA. Nor were her colleagues any the wiser last July when they learned that she had suddenly been reas-



Discovered: Russian flees embassy tunnel

CONTINUED

signed to the U.S. for "family reasons."

Upon her arrival in Washington, Peterson reported to the State Department's Bureau of Personnel, where she was designated "over-complement"—a euphemism for no duties. She was also given an official State Department telephone number: extension 28364. But when NEWSWEEK dialed that number last week, a woman's voice mumbled that Peterson was on three weeks' leave from the "Management Advisory Office"—which merely turned out to be the personnel section where Peterson had checked in.

Peterson did not go totally underground. She visited her mother in Florida, and while there bought herself a flashy white Pontiac Firebird with red, white and blue trim (price tag: \$6,219). Then she moved back into the home she had bought before leaving for the Soviet Union, a \$90,000 town house of cream-colored brick walls in Falls Church, Va. (She had antagonized some of her more conservative neighbors by painting the roof purple.) Last week, Peterson was at home watching television. But she refused to answer the telephone or come to the door. Robert Fulton, her CIA boss in

Moscow, who had returned to the U.S. shortly after Peterson was expelled from the Soviet Union and now lives in a Cape Cod-style house in the Washington area, was only slightly more communicative than Peterson. "I understand what you are looking for," he told NEWSWEEK. "But I can't be the one to talk to you about it." Like others before her who have come in from the cold, Martha Peterson had returned from a lonely and dangerous double life in Moscow to a shadow existence at home.

—ANGUS DEMING with LARS-ERIK NELSON in Washington,
FRED COLEMAN in Moscow and bureau reports

TIME
26 June 1978

Episodes in a Looking-Glass War

Soviet and U.S. spies expose each other's capers

The short, slick spy thriller had been written to order by Russia's famed detective novelist, Julian Semyonov—the Soviet Ian Fleming. Spread over five columns of *Izvestiya* last week, it had some of the suspense but none of the humor of a James Bond story. The tale began as Martha Peterson, 32, a tall, blonde vice consul in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, drove her car to a deserted street in the Soviet capital. Quickly changing from a white dress to a black outfit that would meld into the shadows, she boarded in rapid succession a bus, a streetcar, a subway and a taxi. Satisfied that she was not being tailed, she walked to a bridge over the Moscow River and deftly thrust a stone into a chink in the wall.

Suddenly, the area was alive with agents of SMERSH—the celebrated Soviet

counterintelligence service. As the lady yelled "I am a foreigner!" to alert her Russian accomplice, who was lurking near by, the agents examined the stone she had left at the dead drop. Cleverly concealed inside were espionage instructions, miniature cameras, Soviet currency and gold. Most damning were two ampuls of a deadly poison. Peterson was charged with passing them to a Russian contact who allegedly had used the same poison in an earlier CIA plot to kill an innocent man.

There was some truth to *Izvestiya's* fiction. As some Washington officials tacitly conceded last week, the lady vice consul had indeed been involved in some Moscow capers of a type that are more or less routine in the murky world of espionage. She was a CIA agent operating under diplomatic cover in Moscow. Nabbed by Soviet counterintelligence last July, she was photographed with an array of spy gear and quietly allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. under diplomatic immunity. She was reassigned to Washington. Hours after the appearance of the *Izvestiya* story, the State Department instructed the CIA to put Peterson on leave. She immediately dropped out of sight. In answer to queries about the *Izvestiya* charges, a CIA spokesman denied only that Peterson had been involved in murder—a crime that U.S. intelligence agents are prohibited from committing by Gerald Ford's 1976 presidential order.

The *Izvestiya* story was the most dramatic salvo in a Le Carré-like "looking-glass war" that has developed between Russian and American spooks; in a sense, it is the mirror image of the East-West battle of words being conducted on the



Russia's Enger after indictment



Soviet photograph of Peterson being confronted with spy equipment by KGB

Some of the suspense but none of the humor of a James Bond thriller.

CONTINUED

diplomatic front. The Soviet decision to make a sensational public issue of the Peterson case was apparently prompted by U.S. disclosures four weeks ago that the FBI had captured three Soviet spies in Woodbridge, N.J. One of the Russians, a staff member of the Soviet mission to the U.N., had diplomatic immunity and was swiftly sent home. The other two, United Nations Employees Rudolf Chernyayev and Valdik Enger, were indicted by a grand jury on charges of passing U.S. Navy secrets and jailed with the unusually high bail of \$2 million each. FBI leaks to the press ridiculed the agents as ham-fisted operatives who had been caught with an orange-juice carton full of phony antisubmarine warfare documents that had been prepared for them by the feds.

Though the Justice Department had a strong case against the Russians, the decision to prosecute them (rather than hustle them out of the country) was made by the White House. "The Soviets were agitated, really ripped off," one State Department official said. "They accused us of changing the rules of the game." Indeed, the U.S. had deliberately violated an informal understanding between Soviet and American intelligence services that each other's spies will be discreetly ferreted out of the country when they are caught. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko complained angrily to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about the indictment of the spies, threatening that "two can play this game."

In addition to brandishing Peterson's transgressions, the Soviets have coolly demanded indemnification for damage done to their equipment by American security officers who had discovered KGB devices bugging the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Furious about the U.S. discovery of the eavesdropping equipment and subsequent news stories about it, the Soviets countered by declaring that the Americans had actually been using the apparatus to spy on the Russians.

The spy war intensified last week when the Soviets arrested F. Jay Crawford, 37, a Moscow representative of the International Harvester Co., and accused him of selling foreign currency to Soviet citizens at speculative prices—a charge that could cost him eight years in a forced-labor camp plus a five-year term of exile in the U.S.S.R. Crawford, a genial Alabaman, was driving to a cocktail party with his fiancée, U.S. Embassy Secretary Virginia Olbrish, when policemen accosted him at a traffic light and dragged him from his car. When his fiancée resisted the cops, she was bruised in the scuffle. Late last week, U.S. Consul Clifford Gross was allowed to visit Crawford at Moscow's Lefortovo Prison. Crawford appeared to be in good health but was distraught. U.S. officials insist that the Soviet allegations are trumped up. "There is no indication that he was into anything that wasn't

completely aboveboard," said a senior State Department official.

Crawford's arrest worried American businessmen in Moscow. Many fear that another representative of a U.S. firm will be arrested by the KGB so that they can have two Americans on hand to trade for the two Soviet spies held in the U.S. Washington has been adamant in advance about rejecting such a trade. Meanwhile, American firms doing business with the U.S.S.R. were reassessing the pros and cons of U.S.-Soviet trade. Many were alarmed by the fact that the Russians picked on International Harvester, which has sold the Soviets more than \$300 million worth of much needed heavy construction equipment and gas turbines. Moreover, Harvester's board chairman, Brooks McCormick, has been one of the U.S.'s most active boosters of trade between the two countries. Declared a White House aide: "Crawford's arrest is not the kind of move designed to inspire confidence in the American business community." ■



Interrogation: The KGB confronts Peterson and the U.S. consul with 'spy materials'

INTERNATIONAL

attacked the Soviet system. In the most authoritative response yet, Pravda published a 4,500-word article accusing Carter of undermining détente and of using the harshest rhetoric "since the times of the cold war." But Moscow's criticism was restrained. Earlier in the week, the Soviet news agency Tass denounced the "provocative campaign concerning imaginary 'violations of human rights' in the Soviet Union conducted in the West by reactionary peanut politicians." Twenty minutes later, Tass issued an urgent retraction of the word "peanut."

In the meantime, there was perceptible progress

in arms talks. It was likely that Vance and Gromyko would meet in Europe next month to continue negotiations on a SALT accord, and Washington officials hinted that the U.S. might come up with some new suggestions. And Moscow surprised the West last week by putting on the table a compromise plan on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe. Hitherto, the Soviets had demanded percentage cuts in East-West force levels, thus leaving the Warsaw Pact with its existing advantage. In its new proposal, Moscow suggested limiting each side to 700,000 ground troops. Even so, that did not break the MBFR logjam. According to Western analysts, Moscow understated the size of Warsaw Pact forces, and thus the size of the cut the Soviet bloc would be required to make.

NO BACKDOWN

Even so, some White House officials predicted that U.S.-Soviet relations would move into a more hopeful phase during the next several weeks. But there was no hint that Moscow and its Cuban allies would back down in Africa or on human rights. In fact, sometime soon—perhaps this week—the Soviets were expected to begin the show trials of two more prominent dissidents, Aleksandr

Ginzburg and Vladimir Slepak. "Improving relations is out of the question for the moment," said a high-ranking U.S. diplomat. "Our job now is to limit the damage." Détente was far from wrecked, but the unseemly exchange of spy charges and rhetorical attacks indicated that the damage-control experts had their work cut out for them.

—FAY WILLEY with FRED COLEMAN in Moscow and SCOTT SULLIVAN in Washington

Detente: Damage Control

Francis Jay Crawford, 37, an executive of the International Harvester Co., was driving to a Moscow party with his fiancée, Virginia Olbrish, 32, a secretary at the U.S. Embassy. But when Crawford stopped at a red light, Russian police yanked open the car door and dragged the Alabamian into the street. One officer tried to grab the car keys, and Olbrish fought him off, shouting that she had diplomatic immunity. Olbrish was left behind as Crawford was taken to Lefortovo Prison and charged with currency violations. "Every time I talk about it, I start to cry," said Olbrish, who had planned an August wedding. "I don't understand why they had to be so rough."

Détente's condition last week was best described as "guarded." Negotiations between Washington and Moscow on strategic arms limitations and European force reductions proceeded slowly but steadily, and some U.S. officials thought the Soviet Union had not taken too much offense at Jimmy Carter's tough speech in Annapolis two weeks ago (Newsweek, June 19). But other American policymakers still thought the main job at hand was damage control. Like the Crawford incident, most of last week's developments suggested that this view was closer to the truth.

CLOAK-AND-DAGGER

Pravda, the Soviet party newspaper, issued a temperate but strong critique of Carter's speech. And in seizing Crawford—along with three unnamed Soviet accomplices—the Kremlin seemed to be retaliating for the arrest in the U.S. last month of two Soviet United Nations employees, who were indicted for trying to buy U.S. naval secrets. On the same day Crawford was arrested, the Soviets made a more startling disclosure. They announced that an embassy official, an alleged CIA agent, Martha Peterson, 32,

had been caught last year attempting to pass spy materials and two poison ampuls to another agent. Normally, when a U.S. or Soviet spy is caught, the other side hushes up the affair. But the Peterson case capped a new series of revelations about the cloak-and-dagger activities of the two superpowers (following story).

"You broke the code of spying," a Soviet official complained last week to an American acquaintance. When the two Soviet U.N. employees were caught, the FBI quickly publicized the case, and Attorney General Griffin Bell decided that the U.S. would prosecute the pair rather than just expel them. At a meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance late last month, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko complained about the arrest and warned that "two can play the same game."

The Soviets held Crawford for a day before letting an American consular officer visit and later deliver a food packet and letter from his fiancée. Shocked U.S. businessmen in Moscow expected that the Kremlin would soon pick up a second American to complete its tit for tat. Americans were particularly surprised that the Soviets picked on Crawford, a colorful sort who often wears cowboy boots and a ten-gallon hat. He is an important businessman whose company has sold the Soviets more than \$300 million in equipment. After his arrest, Soviet authorities took an incomplete sales contract from his briefcase, gave it to a U.S. official—and asked that it be signed.

Carter's speech had dared the Kremlin to "choose either confrontation or cooperation" and

Crawford: Arrested



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
21 June 1978

The Good Neighbor Who Came in From the Cold

The Surprise Second Life of Marty Peterson

By Myra MacPherson

She is among the little-noticed persons who live in Washington—squirreled away in apartments and houses, often in suburbs. Friendly, but not too friendly; liked by the neighbors, but not really known. Someone who comes and goes for years of time.

And then, suddenly, the morning newspaper arrives and there she is, staring stoically out of a front page, looking not at all like a next-door neighbor.

She is now charged, one year later by the Russians, with transporting poison used to kill an unidentified person while she was in Moscow last summer. She is not the Foreign Service officer she said she was. Official Washington sources confirm: She was a CIA agent, Martha D. (Marty) Peterson. A mystery woman. As they say in the trade, it was apparently, an extremely good cover.

In some two dozen interviews with people who knew Marty Peterson in Russia and in her middle-class suburban neighborhood five miles

from CIA headquarters, there is surprise over Peterson's second life.

"One of the great exercises while in Moscow was to try to find out who were CIA among the F.S.O.s," says one American living in Moscow. "I can't recall anyone who ever even imagined Marty, which makes me think now, 'Boy she must have been a good one.'"

A Falls Church neighbor, whose garden court townhouse faces Peterson's, said, "I just couldn't believe it. That picture doesn't look anything like her."

There was nothing covert about 33-year-old Peterson's personality—the adjectives used over and over to describe her are "wholesome, outgoing, an All-American type, good-natured, ladylike, vivacious, ebullient, friendly." The kind, one Moscow coworker said, "who could get excited about a checker game." Played a piano-organ combination at parties, waved hello in the embassy snack bar to people she had met but once, offered Falls Church neigh-

bors rides home from the grocery store. The neighbor who sunbathed on her balcony and asked the teenager to cut the lawn.

About 5 feet 7, not fat but a bit hefty, with frosted-blond hair. Quite glamorous when she dressed up. Athletic. A green-belt in Tae Kwon Do, a Korean martial art. Referred to herself formally as "Mrs. Peterson." Then comes the stunning realization that these people know virtually nothing concrete about this woman described as wholesome, friendly, outgoing, good-natured.... Not where she went to school, the name of her parents, where she grew up, her maiden name, what she did before she went to Moscow.

Oh yes, there is this one thing.

Mentioned by nearly everyone—even those who say, "I barely know her at all." It was the tragedy in her life. Her husband was a Navy pilot, killed in Laos in 1973. The source is always the same, Marty Peterson. One former CIA agent knows a man who says he saw Marty and her husband together in Laos. He does not know the first name of the husband.

A computerized check of Department of Defense casualties reveals no Navy pilot by the name of Peterson, nor anyone by that name in any other branch, killed in action or accidentally in Southeast Asia.

The Pentagon is now checking its files to confirm preliminary investigations which indicate that he is a John Peterson who served in the Army Special Forces—from 1967 to 1969.

The alleged episode of Marty Peterson's cloak-and-dagger espionage is generally viewed as a retaliatory response to recent American disclosures that Soviet eavesdropping gear had been secreted within the U.S. embassy in Moscow. It also seems to be linked to the arrest in New Jersey of two Soviet citizens accused of espionage.

Marty Peterson seems caught up in the general heightening of tensions

between Moscow and Washington. In recent years, both governments have rarely publicized each other's espionage activities, allowing the quiet expulsion of apprehended spies.

The Neighborhood

The tale of Marty Peterson skulking in the streets of Moscow, planting a rock containing poison capsules in a niche of a bridge, seems absurdly bizarre in the everyday world of her Falls Church home, where homeowners are busily tracking down their enemy in these hot, humid days: crabgrass.

A tall boxwood half-conceals the door to her \$90,000 three-bedroom, cream-colored brick townhouse. From the front, it looks as if no one is home. Venetian blinds are tightly closed at windows and doorway. From the back courtyard, lights can be seen. Peterson returned there last fall on her return from Russia.

A young, clean-cut, dark-haired man in T-shirt and dark slacks comes out to get a newspaper and says Marty is expected shortly. She never shows that night. Last week one neighbor says Marty told her she was going on vacation for two weeks. Another says she was certain she was there a few days ago. Another says she has not appeared in her back yard for two weeks. Another says she took her trash out Tuesday night. The phone has been alternately busy, off the hook, not answered or answered by a man who is always vague about Marty's return or whereabouts. The man answering the door says he is a "friend of a friend." One neighbor says, "I don't know him at all but Marty is very kind and nice. She told him to cut my grass while she was gone. No, I don't know when she'll be back."

A few minutes later, the dark-haired man, dressed in a seersucker jacket and slacks, tools out of Peterson's garage in a sporty white Pontiac

CONTINUED

Firebird with a red-and-blue pinstripe trim. The \$7,000 car was purchased last August in Pompano Beach, Fla., by Martha D. Peterson. She paid cash.

Not bad for a woman who was supposed to have a junior-level F.S.O. job that paid no more than \$13,000 a year. Peterson moved into her townhouse in 1974, lived there for about a year. "Then, one day, she came over and told us she was going to Russia for her State Department job," said one neighbor. "She seemed real excited."

The Embassy, Moscow

From November 1975 to August 1977, Marty Peterson worked in several sections of the embassy in Moscow.

One bachelor who met her at the 1975 black-tie Marine ball shortly after she arrived in Moscow, remembers her as dressed all in white and "about the most attractive single woman I'd seen at the embassy up to that point. But one F.S.O. wife took me aside and explained that I shouldn't quiz her too closely about her background. That this was her first time out (at a post) since the tragic death of her husband. It seemed quite understandable that she could be protecting herself from a past painful experience." He didn't pursue her because, "I was somewhat put off hearing that, and didn't feel prepared to get into her emotional problems."

"I know this sounds kind of sexist, but at that time I thought of her as a naive young woman, a stranger in a mystifying world."

Her next-door neighbor in her Moscow apartment house recalls her as a willing catsitter when they went out of town, but that's about all. On the phone from another Iron Curtain country, he said, "Even if I knew anything, I really couldn't say. Talking on the phone here is like talking to a tape recorder. We're monitored all the time."

One woman who said, "Marty had a great sense of humor," added that there never was any talk of the past or the future, or of politics. "The center of everything was our living this ghetto existence in Russia; the present was everything."

One friend, now back in the States, described himself as "very close" to Peterson — "a simply marvelous person" — but would not talk about her. He also said he knew nothing of her background, except that her mother lived somewhere in Florida.

It seemed natural to some Foreign Service officers stationed in Russia to know little about their friends and colleagues.

"Service in Moscow is equivalent to a foxhole," said one. "There were so few places you could speak openly. Offices? Bedrooms? All are bugged. You resorted to writing on paper."

'Just a Lovely Girl'

It is also a place where a CIA agent has to live one's cover, and live it well to divert suspicion.

Marty Peterson was a vice-counsel who interviewed potential Soviet immigrants to the United States and helped American visitors with passport problems.

And that is why one March morning in 1977, just a few months before the Russians expelled her as a spy, Peterson visited the Moscow hotel room of a distraught Washingtonian. Mrs. Simon Tulchin, 75, recalls her distress following her husband's fatal heart attack during their tour of Russia.

Tulchin initially had trouble getting anyone from the embassy to come to the hotel to expedite her departure. "But the next morning this Mrs. Peterson appeared. She canceled my husband's passport so that no one could get a hold of it and stayed about a half hour. She was just a lovely girl and a credit to the Foreign Service. Very considerate. She told me about losing her own husband. She left me with the impression she wanted to do something after her husband died, to do something for her country."

The 'Espionage Rock'

The Izvestia account of Peterson's cloak-and-dagger activities sounds like a Russian version of a Hollywood version of subversion. It was, in fact, written by Yulian Semenov, Russia's most famous spy novelist.

On July 15, the Soviet newspaper reported, "A girl, working as U.S. vice consul in Moscow, got into a car and drove to the center of the city. In a poorly lit place she changed her dress, locked the car and boarded a city bus. After changing transport several times she finally hurried to the bridge linking Luzhniki with the Lenin Hills and put an ordinary-looking stone in a loophole in the arch. It was there the vice-consul was detained."

The account went on: Embassy officials were quickly summoned, while the Russians held Peterson. The "stone," the Soviets said, was cracked open and contained a microphone, photo cameras, a large sum of money, two ampules of poison and "special instructions" on how it should be used. The espionage rock was to have been retrieved by some anonymous spy.

Further, from Izvestia: When apprehended, Peterson, "started shouting, 'I am a foreigner!' Obviously the vice-consul was shouting so loudly to warn the spy who was coming to the appointment place about the danger."

The Russians claim that Peterson had previously transmitted poison used in killing an "innocent Soviet citizen who stood in the way" of a CIA-run espionage ring. (The alleged victim and the spy who carried out the execution were not identified.)

According to the Russian version: When police questioned her about the name of the intended victim of the poison, U.S. Consul Clifford Gross advised Peterson to reply. But Peterson, Izvestia claimed, told him to "shut up." Gross then allegedly told her interrogators: "No use asking her. She is only the executor." Then, the paper said the "pretty CIA agent literally roared at him, 'Shut up!'"

Those who have served in Moscow scoff at and doubt most of the details are accurate. "They are so farfetched; the Soviets will say anything," says a woman who knew Peterson in Moscow.

Persona Non Grata

Shortly after the alleged incident and her interrogation, Peterson, who had diplomatic immunity, was allowed to leave Moscow on the first available plane and was declared *persona non grata*.

Her co-workers heard that she was leaving Russia for "family reasons."

Back in Falls Church, Peterson has kept more to herself in the neighborhood for the past nine months. One neighbor whose daughter used to cut her lawn said, "I haven't even talked with her since she's been back."

Another grumbled: "That girl is so to herself, I don't know what all Guys come and go there but she doesn't associate with anyone around here...I can't understand people so close-mouthed. A girl came asking questions about her last winter. Told me she was from the CIA."

There is still an official number for her at State; the person answering informs that Peterson is "on leave." There is also an official classified biography. Two lines. Her date of birth: May 27, 1945, and her year of entry into the Foreign Service: 1975.

And at the Russian embassy, a man with a strong accent says, "We are in the same position you are in. All we know is the Izvestia story. We know nothing more of her."

And so Marty Peterson sneaks in and out of her townhouse, highly protected by a handful of friends, hiding from the press and everyone else, a shadow in the world of Cold War spying.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

THE NEW HAVEN REGISTER
11 June 1978

CIA Recruits Foreign Students On U.S. Campuses, Turner Admits

By DIANE ZAVRAS
Staff Reporter

The Central Intelligence Agency does hire foreign students on U.S. campuses but "without coercion," CIA Director Stansfield Turner disclosed Saturday.

"The CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in our country. . . very few of the 120,000 of these students," he told more than 500 faculty delegates at the national convention of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) here.

Turner, who said he was making his first public remarks on the issue of recruiting foreigners in the nation's colleges, contended methods used were "no more secretive in my opinion than much of the other recruiting that is done" in academe.

But, he said, "Let me assure you all such contracts are without coercion, entirely free and entirely a matter of choice."

On the general issue of recruiting, Turner, who was largely responding to questions from CIA critic Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, said, "We recruit today openly on about 150 different campuses just like businesses or other government agencies."

He added, "I'm sorry to have to tell you there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communications and free association."

Turner contended that it "should be very obvious" the intelligence agency is "just as dependent as the American business community and the American academic community on recruiting good U.S. students."

He told delegates attending the 64th annual AAUP convention that Halperin thought it was wrong when individuals are not informed they are being considered for CIA positions.

Yet, Turner said, "Everyone of you every year, I suspect, gets a number of letters asking who is a good graduate student, or who would be a good professor to be head of a department at another university."

"We recruit just like everybody else does. Some of it is open, some of it is not."

Amherst College President John William Ward felt freelance faculty ties should be known to college administrations.

Turner agreed that if colleges like Ward's require "all outside commitments of academic members be reported to the administration, the CIA should be no exception."

He would disagree, he said, if the CIA relationship "should be singled out as it is in the Harvard guidelines which assume only a relationship with the CIA would endanger the professor's or the school's integrity."

"And with all the opportunities today for conflict of interest, we think that is a naive assumption."

On operations, Turner pointed to the incompatibility of "having good intelligence and having 100 percent openness" and noted it was not the intelligence unit alone that had secrets.

"In the academic community, Ph.D. researchers certainly don't share their research before they publish it," he said.

"All of us have the problem of where we draw the line between complete public inspection of our activities and some degree of secrecy," he said. "We have been drawing it further and further in this country."

The AAUP Saturday approved a resolution submitted by the California delegation asking Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. to guarantee due process to faculty members whose jobs are threatened by budget cuts following last week's stunning Proposition 13 vote.

California faculty spokesmen had indicated earlier the governor may target the four-year public campuses of the University of California and California State University in \$300 million cuts sought because he considers higher education a "discretionary" rather than mandatory item.

Some 3,300 positions at California State alone may be in jeopardy, according to June Pollak, AAUP coordinator there.

A national AAUP stance was prompted partly by worry among delegations at the convention that what happens in California as a result of the historic referendum, which drastically pared property tax revenues, could reverberate through many other states and public university campuses.

The faculty group from the State University of New York notably endorsed the measure with the reminder that it had already gone through retrenchment which resulted in layoffs two years ago.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 746

THE NATION
24 June 1978

LETTERS

to make the horror real

the CIA and the scholars

Lawrenceville, N.J.

While public attention has focused on sensational misdeeds of the CIA, very little has been said about another aspect of CIA activities, which can be extremely harmful to this country. I refer to CIA influences in our leading academic institutions. Senator Church's committee, after stating that it was "disturbed" by its findings (which included occasional participation by academics in propaganda) wrote that "it is the responsibility of private institutions and particularly the American Academic Community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members. . . ." (*Academe*, June 1976.)

Recently some Ivy League colleges have been reported to permit faculty members to work for the CIA when the deans of their departments approve the topic. In view of close contacts between some university administrations and the CIA, with the latter's intermixture of basically incompatible functions of intelligence and propaganda, there can be no assurance that this measure alone will be effective.

Prof. Norman Birnbaum's recent recommendation [editorial, *The Nation*, April 1] should be expanded to prohibit any intelligence agency from participating in or administering propaganda and covert activities. Then the academic community could find it easier to prohibit as unethical any contacts between its members and institutions engaged in propaganda. . . .

Gregory P. Tschebotarioff

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

244-3540

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM All Things Considered... STATION WETA Radio
NPR Network

DATE June 14, 1978 5:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT CIA Recruitment on American Campuses

BOB EDWARDS: Last Saturday, the American Association of University Professors held a meeting in New Haven, Connecticut to discuss the issue of recruitment on American campuses by the Central Intelligence Agency. And CIA Director Stansfield Turner revealed during that meeting that the CIA was openly recruiting foreign students who are attending U.S. schools to be used as information sources when they returned home. Turner supplied that information in answer to a question from Morton Halperin, who was also a panel member representing the Center for National Security Studies.

This afternoon, NPR's Noah Adams talked with Halperin about Turner's statement.

NOAH ADAMS: Can we call this an admission?

MORTON HALPERIN: Yes.

ADAMS: It's the first time he's said it.

HALPERIN: I was surprised not by the fact. I was surprised by the fact that he was willing to admit it publicly.

ADAMS: And said it's open as recruitment as, say, IBM would come on to a campus.

HALPERIN: Well, no. He's saying that both -- everybody recruits secretly as well as openly. And what Admiral Turner said was that the CIA has a clandestine network, or a secret network of relationships with university professors and others at universities which it uses to help identify and to recruit foreign students.

ADAMS: And what's your basic concern about this? What's

OFFICES IN: NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES

Material supplied by Radio TV Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.

wrong with it?

HALPERIN: Well, what this means is that there are professors and students at universities who are getting into conversations with foreign students, drawing them out on their political views, on their political attitudes, perhaps also on their personal lives and personal attitudes, in order to decide whether that information should be passed on to the CIA, which then decides whether to approach that person to offer him or her a position as a spy, in effect, for the CIA. Which means that students who come to American universities thinking they're coming to academically free institutions, institutions separate from the state, in fact learn that their political views, which they may have given to a professor thinking he was in a discussion, when in fact the question was asked and the information was provided to the CIA.

ADAMS: As opposed to a recruiting booth set up in the student union that says, "CIA Foreign Student Recruiting."

HALPERIN: I have no problem with that. I don't even have any objection, as long as we're going to engage in foreign covert operations, to having the CIA, on its own, know that a student has come to the United States, and go see that student and say, you know, "We're interested in seeing whether you'd like to do some work for us." The objection comes when academics secretly engage in the process.

ADAMS: So it's sort of like someone sidling up to a professor and saying, "Do you know of any students that might be helpful to us in Iran...."

HALPERIN: Well, it's more than that, because the professor then just doesn't, on the basis of the knowledge that he has - incidentally acquired, say, "Well, yes, maybe this student might be interested." He will go out, as I understand the process, and engage that student in discussion. For example, he might find an Iranian student and talk to that student, draw the student out on what he thinks about the Shah, what he thinks about democracy, or other things.

For example, one technique that's been described by a former CIA [technical difficulties]...found out that a particular foreigner -- in this case, I think the person was recruited abroad, but the technique would be the same -- was very much attached to his father and very concerned about the fact that his father had recently died. And the CIA then, according to this account of a former CIA case officer [technical difficulties]. And the approach was, "Won't you carry on the important work that your father has done?" And they then gave him a bogus set of documents which tried to persuade him -- in that case, apparently successfully -- that his father had worked for the agency.

Well, those are the kind -- Admiral Turner emphasized that coercion was not used to recruit these people. But he did not say that deception was not used and that promises were not used to recruit them.

ADAMS: Is there some thought within the academic community that some professors are serving, going along with your theory, as scouts, then, for the CIA?

HALPERIN: Yeah, I think that's what Admiral Turner confirmed. That's what the Church Committee report had hinted at and what the report of a Harvard committee had asserted was being done, but without any authority for it, really. And now Admiral Turner has confirmed that they are doing this on universities.

And I think this brings us back to where the Church Committee, this old Senate Intelligence Committee, was. They said that universities ought to decide for themselves whether this behavior is proper. And there are a number of universities now that are considering rules and regulations.

The Harvard rule simply says that if you engage in this process, you have to identify yourself publicly as such a person; and that before you give the name of a foreign student to the CIA, you have to get that student's permission to do so.

And I think, given this admission, a number of universities will be deciding whether they want to adopt a similar rule.

ADAMS: Thanks very much, Morton Halperin, Director of the Center for National Security Studies.

12 June 1978

CIA director asks for better cooperation with universities

From Caroline Davidson
in New York

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has begun to campaign hard for better relations and increased cooperation between the academic world and the US intelligence community.

At the weekend, after a week of Senate cross-examination about Cuban activities in Africa, Admiral Stansfield Turner came to Yale to address the American Association of University Professors. The association, America's largest organisation of college and university teachers and research students, has been highly critical of CIA activities on the campus.

Admiral Turner told the association that the US had lost its former military, economic, and political pre-eminence. The world was growing increasingly complex, and a "mutually supported relationship between the CIA and the academic community" was more important than ever before.

Academics had helped intelligence agencies in the past by recruiting American and for-

eign students, providing information on an informal basis and undertaking paid research. This should continue in the future, Admiral Turner said. Such cooperation defended democracy and freedom, helped to prevent war, and was a contribution towards narrowing the gap between rich and poor countries.

When challenged, Admiral Turner defended the CIA's right to recruit among America's brightest graduates in competition with business and other organisations without restrictions. He said the CIA recruited "very few" of the 120,000 foreign students in American higher education. He also argued that it was wasteful for intelligence agencies to gather information by clandestine means overseas when it could be obtained by talking to academics at home.

Admiral Turner said there were many ways the CIA could help academics in return. Existing publishing programmes could be extended and information declassified more quickly. Scholars would also benefit from some CIA technology: archaeologists, for example, could use the latest aerial sur-

vey techniques in identifying and studying new sites. He did not discuss any financial reward.

Answering questions about CIA activities on campus threatening academic freedom, Admiral Turner said academics working for the CIA were not victims of coercion and were free to declare their connection publicly if they chose.

Admiral Turner, who became CIA Director in March, 1977, told the AAUP he wanted to establish a new model of intelligence for the US. Intelligence agencies should be as open as possible and subject to many different supervisory controls. All intelligence agents should be accountable for their actions, adding that he was personally involved in writing a code of ethics for the profession.

In many ways, Admiral Turner, who has overall responsibility for all US intelligence got off lightly. He was not pressed to explain the apparent suppression of university research — in certain sensitive areas, such as computer security, by the National Security Agency, a sister body to the CIA.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

WASHINGTON POST

A. 23

Charles B. Seib

Those 'Sanitized' Notes on Cuba

While the audience in the main tent was being entertained last week by the Carter-Castro argument over whether Cuba had had a hand in the Zaire invasion, an amusing little media sideshow was going on down at the end of the midway.

Call it the saga of the sanitized summary. It will tell you something about the way things work in this town.

After the May invasion of Zaire by Katangan rebels operating from Angola, the White House and the State Department couldn't seem to get together on how hard to press the charge that the Cubans and the Russians, particularly the Cubans, were behind it all. The White House took a hard line. The State Department didn't seem so sure.

That was the situation early last week when Jody Powell, the president's press secretary, took a hand. He read to several reporters a document, prepared with the help of the CIA, that summarized the administration's charges against Cuba.

It said that intelligence reports supported three main conclusions: 1) That the Cuban presence in Angola is pervasive and little is done without Cuban involvement. 2) That Katangan rebels have been armed and trained by the Cubans and possibly the East Germans for several years and that Russia has been indirectly involved. 3) That the May invasion of Shaba province was with Cuban cooperation, although there was no firm evidence that Cubans accompanied the invaders beyond Angola.

One result of Powell's briefings was a CBS television news report the next morning. Another was a page-1 story in that afternoon's Washington Star reporting that the administration, "citing reliable intelligence sources," maintained it could chart Cuban involvement with the Katangans up to the invasion jumping-off point.

While not mentioning a specific document, the Star story referred to "'sanitized' intelligence details now coming to light." It said they gave "the most detailed glimpses yet" of what was behind the U.S. charges, but added that they did not contain evidence "because the administration is afraid of compromising its sources."

Not earthshaking, to be sure, but reporters for NBC and The Washington Post asked Powell for a crack at the same material and got it.

That night, NBC News carried a report on a White House "summary of assertions" on Cuba's involvement. The next morning The Post's front page was dominated by two stories under a banner headline: "Carter Decries Castro's Failure to Stop Attack." The story on the right side of the page dealt with what the president said about Cuba at his news conference the previous day. The story on the left, under the sub-headline "U.S. Releases Summary of Its Evidence," dealt with the CIA memo.

"In a reaction to continued questioning of President Carter's charges of Cuban complicity in the invasion of Zaire," the left-hand story began, "the

White House yesterday made available a summary of evidence on which the president based his accusations."

This treatment stretched the facts in a couple of ways. In no sense was the document "released." It was "made available" only in a limited sense. The reporters were allowed to see it but were not allowed to take copies with them. In fact, The Post went further than Powell wanted it to go when it disclosed that the story was based on an actual document.

Further, as the story itself made abundantly clear, by billing the docu-

The News Business

ment as a "summary of evidence" The Post gave it far too much status. It was a summary of the administration's charges and notably short on evidence.

Whatever its flaws, the heavily played story got quick results. Reporters, members of Congress and others asked the White House for copies of the document The Post said had been released.

The initial White House reaction was to say that there wasn't any release. But the pressure grew, particularly from Capitol Hill, and before the day was over, Powell decided to make the document, which he describes as "briefing notes," truly available.

In the meantime, a New York Times reporter turned up a copy on his own, which brings us to the final act.

172

WASHINGTON POST

SEIB EDITORIAL

The next morning, June 16, The Times reported on page A10 that the administration "has added a new dimension" to its efforts to substantiate Carter's charges against Cuba.

Until the previous day, The Times said, the administration had refused to make public any documentation of the charges. "But yesterday, Jody Powell . . . authorized disclosure [of the CIA memo] to reporters on a private basis."

The Times went on to quote at length from the 800-word document. Like the earlier reports, it described it as "sanitized" and noted that it lacked details to support its assertions.

So finally the document was out. And since it was indeed "sanitized" to the point of sterility, it hasn't changed the situation one iota.

Why all the secrecy in the first place? The document was not classified, and it contained nothing remotely threatening to intelligence operatives. Why wasn't it released to the public at the start, instead of being farmed out to individual members of the press on a more or less confidential basis?

Powell's answer is that the document did not contain verifiable details and could not for intelligence reasons. Therefore, as an official White House release it would not have satisfied the press and would have served only to generate pressure for details that could not be given.

He's probably right about that. Nevertheless, those sanitized briefing notes of his got a lot of mileage in their brief run.

2 of 2

FBI S

FBIS 18

AFP: NKOMO ADMITS CUBANS, CHINESE TRAINING GUERRILLAS

PA230502Y PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 0440 GMT 23 JUN 78 PA

(TEXT) COPENHAGEN, JUNE 23 (AFP)--CHINESE AND CUBANS ARE HELPING TO TRAIN CADES OF THE RHODESIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BUT ARE TAKING NO PART IN THE WAR AGAINST THE SALISBURY REGIME, JOSHUA NKOMO, ONE OF THE FRONT'S JOINT LEADERS, SAID HERE LAST NIGHT.

MR. NKOMO, SPEAKING AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, SAID HE FORESAW A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ENDING THE CONFLICT IN UP TO 10 MONTHS' TIME.

ALTHOUGH THE FRONT'S GUERRILLAS RECEIVED MILITARY AID FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, THAT DID NOT MAKE THE MOVEMENT INDEBTED TO THE SUPPLIERS, HE ADDED.

MR. NKOMO, TOURING SCANDINAVIA AFTER A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, WAS TODAY SCHEDULED TO VISIT DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER KNUD BOERGE ANDERSEN.

23 JUN 0535Z RLL/HMC

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 46

THE ECONOMIST
17 JUNE 1978

Africa

Claims and counterclaims

Washington, DC

The quarrel between Presidents Carter and Castro over last month's invasion of Zaire has reached a new pitch. Mr Carter squarely blames the Cubans for the raid launched from Angola into the mining province of Shaba, formerly Katanga. Mr Castro has denied the charge. In a long talk with two American congressmen, the Cuban leader said Mr Carter was given "absolute lies" about Zaire. In direct conflict with the administration, Mr Castro insisted that Cuban troops had neither trained nor armed the Katangan exiles in north-east Angola since early 1976. Carefully choosing his targets, Mr Castro blamed the president's national security adviser, Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, not the department of state, for what he claims was misinformation.

The White House stiffly rejects this latest blast. The belief there is not only that Mr Castro did nothing to stop the raid but that Cuban forces helped to arm and train the rebel invaders. Except for an initial momentary hesitation, this has been the line of the administration (including the state department) since shortly after the raid took place in the middle of May. To support its position, the White House on Tuesday, June 13th, began sharing with the press some of the evidence pointing towards Cuban involvement earlier given to congress.

According to the White House this evidence suggests that the Cubans supported the 1977 invasion of Shaba (to what precise extent was left unclear), maintained training camps for Katangan secessionists in Angola after that raid, and were in control (with East Germans) of rebel troops earlier this year. The administration says it can trace Cuban support up to last month's invasion.

The administration's evidence drew mixed reactions when the director of central intelligence, Admiral Stansfield

Turner, testified to various members of congress in recent days. The house and senate leaders appeared to accept that the various bits of intelligence supported the president's claim. The reaction from the senate foreign relations committee was more sceptical. Its chairman, Senator John Sparkman of Alabama, found the administration's case not proved, as did Senator Frank Church of Idaho, the chairman-to-be, and Senator George McGovern. The president did get support from Senator Jacob Javits of New York, a Republican, and from the house interna-

tional relations committee.

An intriguing, and so far unexplained, element is what transpired between the Cuban government and the state department immediately after the Shaba raid. At his earlier press conference on May 25th, Mr Carter said that Mr Castro had known about the raid in advance and "obviously done nothing" to have it stopped. What the public did not know at the time was the following: on May 17th, a few days after the invasion, Mr Castro had called in the American diplomat who represents United States interests in Havana, Mr Lyle Lane; Mr Castro told Mr Lane that he had heard rumours of the impending invasion and had tried, unsuccessfully, to have it stopped. According to Mr Castro, Mr Lane's response suggested that Washington had accepted the Cuban leader's word on this. In Washington, this is denied. When asked why this apparently important exchange was not disclosed until last weekend, administration officials replied that it was not believed.

A View From Havana

An Abiding Cuban Reality: The Image of U.S. Hostility

By Strobe Talbott

Time-Life News Service

HAVANA — It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the United States long ago threw away the influence it now would need to make Castro change his behavior in Africa or anywhere else.

This is a country where one of the most abiding and oppressive realities is the nearly two-decade-old hostility of the Goliath to the north. That hostility is not just an abstraction, invoked and inflated by Cuban propaganda (although there is plenty of that). It is a palpable fact of life — particularly of economic life.

"The blockade," as the Cubans call the U.S. embargo, comes up in almost every conversation, and it makes the United States a permanent scapegoat for everything from severe rationing of basic foodstuffs to the difficulty in keeping cars in running order (the streets of Havana are a living museum of automotive classics from the 1950s and even antiques from the 1930s).

Shortages and hardships that might otherwise be blamed on this country's massive involvement in Africa are commonly attributed to what is seen here as an unrelenting

U.S. campaign of siege and subversion.

THE SUNNY setting and Caribbean rhythms in the background make the Cuban variety of totalitarianism no more benign than the Slavic and Oriental ones. But one senses that even the thought control and spartan discipline are easier for these people to accept in the face of a real and constant threat from the north. The reminders of that threat are everywhere.

The unsurpassed beaches of Santa Maria del Mar are dotted with pillboxes built in the early 1960s. The so-called committees for the defense of the revolution, which provide an auxiliary police system, were set up largely to prevent anti-Castro terrorists from setting fire to cane fields and blowing up buildings. Angolan children, many of them war orphans, now at school in Cuba snap to attention and greet their "comrade-visitors" by reciting in unison a little speech about how the Angola's MPLA has survived "a Bay of Pigs in Africa."

The front page of "Granma," the Communist Party newspaper, features an article quoting William Colby as saying that if Fidel Castro is still alive, it is not for lack of trying by the CIA.

A political leader on the Isle of Pines talks bitterly about the frustration of trying to build a citrus processing plant with Argentine help when the United States has a monopoly on the necessary licenses. A party first secretary in southern Cuba recalls flying to Florida and Texas shortly after the revolution to try to pick up a shipment of planes bought by the Batista regime — and being told that neither the planes nor the purchase money were available to the Castro government.

THE RUSSIANS are as unpopular as they are ubiquitous. They careen around the city crammed into Soviet-built Fiats like clowns in circus cars, speaking egregious Spanish and generally throwing their weight around. In many ways the Soviets behave the way the American Mafia chieftains and consiglieres used to back in the late 1950s — and, appropriately, the Soviets live in many of the hotels and apartment buildings put up with Mafia money.

But the Russians are indispensable. They buy sugar from the Cubans and sell them their oil and their Bulgarian wine. And their approximately \$2 million a day in aid keeps this island economically afloat.

However, the Soviets do not tell Castro what to do in Africa. Or if they do, they do not need to.

As seen from the United States, Cuban policy in Africa appears to be a new departure and a new outrage. But as seen from here, and certainly as seen by Castro himself, it is part of an old struggle that the United States started and that offers the United States very little basis for righteous indignation.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4

WASHINGTON STAR
18 JUNE 1978

Castro Says CIA Helping Rebels Against Angola

NEW YORK (AP) — Fidel Castro charged that the CIA is conducting "covert operations" inside Angola and is aiding the efforts of pro-Western rebels to bring down the Angolan government, the three major U.S. television networks reported yesterday.

The Cuban president's claim came in a strong, point-by-point counterattack to President Carter's charges last Wednesday that Cubans had trained Angola-based rebels who invaded and terrorized southern Zaire in mid-May.

According to the news reports Saturday, Castro invited reporters from NBC, CBS and ABC to Havana for a private interview, specifically to answer Carter's charges. The correspondents flew to Havana from Panama, where they had been covering Carter's visit to sign the Panama Canal treaties.

"We know from very truthful sources that the CIA recently established contact with UNITA and promised UNITA support from the U.S. government," Castro said through a translator.

UNITA, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola, is one of two pro-Western rebel factions defeated by the Marxist forces of President Agostinho Neto when Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975.

Carter reportedly had no comment on Castro's remarks, but a White House official said the charges of CIA operations "were absurd," NBC said.

Answering Carter's charge that Castro could have done more to stop the invasion of Zaire by Angola-based rebels had he wanted to, the Cuban ruler said:

"We do not rule Angola. Angola is ruled by the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and President (Agostinho) Neto. We have no right to use on our own our troops in Angola."

His voice forceful and animated, his expression stern, Castro said that Cubans were not the world's policemen, in response to Carter saying he should have told other leaders about the impending invasion.

"What are we being asked, to become universal advisers? To become gendarmes of the world? We are not gendarmes," Castro said.

"We have no obligation of any kind to interfere in these questions . . . We are not going to play the game of interventionism."

Castro said he could not comply with Carter's suggestion that he pledge Cuba and the Neto government to prevent future border crossings.

"We cannot pledge anything. The most we can do if we have any information . . . is to inform the Angolan government, that is to give them our opinions. But we cannot pledge anything on our own."

21 June 1978

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Subpoena Castro!

To assess the current spat over Cuban complicity in the invasion of Zaire's Shaba region, it helps to remember the 1975 flap in which it was first learned that the Soviets had a naval base in Somalia.

Defense Secretary James Schlesinger revealed the base, but Somalia denied it and the Soviets sneered about a "mirage." When the Secretary released aerial photos, Congress scratched its collective head. The photos showed housing vans, oil tanks, communications gear, fences, big buildings, storage bunkers, piers, ships and so on, but were not detailed enough to turn up brawny-looking Russians. So two delegations of Congressmen, plus one of press, trooped off to the Somalian port of Berbera to see for themselves. While the Somalis tried to hide everything, it quickly became evident that yes, the Russians were there. For our own part, we thought we had seen the height of silliness, but at least the investigators went to Berbera, not Moscow.

Now comes the Cuban flap. The Cubans sent an army to install the current government in Angola, have done the same in Ethiopia and have dallied in numerous other African countries as well. The Angolan government probably could not survive without continuing Cuban military support. Cuba admits having given military training to Katangan rebels, at least up until 1976. The rebels launch an invasion of Shaba from Angolan territory. President Carter accuses the Cubans of complicity in the raid, and Cuba heatedly denies it.

Wanting to get to the bottom of the matter, Congressmen Stephen Solarz and Anthony Beilenson charter an investigating expedition. But this time they head not for Shaba, but for Havana. They want Fidel Castro's side of the story personally. He denies it.

Sen. McGovern, who has received similar assurances from the Cubans, demands to see Mr. Carter's "evidence." Summaries of intelligence, sanitized to protect sources, are released to Congress. Sen. McGovern declares the matter unproven. Rep. Solarz says the evidence is only "circumstantial and hearsay in character." In a dispute with the U.S. President, in short, Mr. Castro is presumed to be innocent until the President can prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, there is a difference between a court of law and an intelligence agency. The CIA does not have subpoena powers in Angola or Cuba. Even the best intelligence could seldom withstand the kind of scrutiny Sen. McGovern and Rep. Solarz suggest. But after reviewing the evidence, Senate Majority and Minority Leaders Byrd and Baker, House Speaker O'Neill and Minority Leader Rhodes, among others, have pronounced themselves satisfied that the Cubans were indeed involved in the invasion.

The question that needs answering is why Sen. McGovern and Rep. Solarz see their role in this as one of defense lawyer for Mr. Castro. The obvious answer is that they're afraid that Mr. Carter will actually start to do something to make the conquest of Africa more difficult for the Cubans and their Soviet backers. So, taking advantage of the inherent uncertainties of intelligence work, they set out to impugn Mr. Carter's credibility as a means of heading off this incipient policy change.

They are, not so incidentally, getting a lot of help from within Mr. Carter's own Executive Branch. In leaks to the press, some administration officials declared themselves not satisfied with the quality of the intelligence data. High-ranking administration members spoke at length — anonymously—to the press, worrying that election-year pressures would force the President to feed the rabble with Red-baiting rhetoric, and in the process damage the delicate structure of the administration's fledgling African policy.

What the United States can or should do about the Soviet-Cuban adventures in Africa is a serious issue deserving serious debate. Anyone in Congress or elsewhere is certainly entitled to his view that it does not matter if Communists overrun the continent. But it would seem to us that the President of the United States is entitled to a certain benefit of the doubt in a public dispute with a tin-horn dictator with a long record of mischief-making. And that Sen. McGovern and the rest ought to be able to make their case without guerrilla raids on the President's credibility, raids that damage not only Mr. Carter but the office he holds.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
21 JUNE 1978ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 13AThe Vietnam tradition

U.S. policy in Africa looks familiar

By K. Ohene-Frempong, MD

The recent conflict in the Shaba province of Zaire is slowly becoming the focus of foreign power intervention in the tradition of the Vietnam War. The Western powers and now, the "new" China, have chosen to use this civil rebellion as the stage for confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Much publicity has been given to the alleged involvement of Cubans in the training of the exiled Kantangese opposed to the government of President Mobutu. What the American public has not been told are the issues underlying the local uprising and whether the Mobutu regime deserves this Western show of "support," regardless of the involvement of the Soviet or Cuban presence.

It is well known in Western political circles that Mobutu's government is corrupt and unpopular, and that Mobutu himself has used his political position to amass incredible wealth. It is no secret that he does not have much support in large sections of Zaire, especially in Shaba, the former Katanga province.

The truth is that despite his serious faults the Western powers led by the U.S. have found Mobutu as a perfect ally. He depends upon them for his political survival and they depend upon him for CIA-inspired activities in that region of Africa.

Mobutu insures easy access to the mineral wealth of Zaire by Western

mining giants. Mobutu serves as the CIA channel to the civil strife in the neighboring Angola. Recently the American public has been told the truth behind the Kissinger-inspired U.S. involvement in Angola through the FNLA. Many Americans have probably forgotten that in June 1975 U.S. Ambassador to Zaire Deane Hinton was expelled by Mobutu who accused the CIA of masterminding a plot to overthrow him.

It is for this same Mobutu that the Carter Administration is jeopardizing world peace by escalating his local strife into a major East-West confrontation.

The Carter Administration had started on a progressive African policy through the efforts of Ambassador Andrew Young, but now it appears the cyclic itch of U.S. foreign policy makers to muscle up to the "Communists" has gained the upper hand, and better judgment has been thrown out. The fact is that Africa is a poor choice for the U.S. to use to confront the Soviet Union.

The U.S. has demonstrated in the past, a great knack for supporting the locally unpopular side in many conflicts: Vietnam, Chile, Iran are examples.

In Africa the U.S. supported Portugal against Angola and Mozambique, and supported and gave moral backing to the white-supremacist regimes of southern Africa.

It has only been through the recent efforts of Andrew Young that

the U.S. is beginning to regain some trust among the progressive African leaders.

The U.S. continues to make an issue out of the presence of Cuban military personnel in some African countries, but at the same time several units of French troops had been in Africa long before the recent Kolwezi attack, and in Chad and Mauritania some of these troops are actually in combat. Such a double standard in foreign policy only serves to weaken the U.S. image in Africa.

The countries hosting Cuban forces have expressed no unhappiness with their presence, and in a few areas the Cubans are actually serving to preserve stability and to discourage conflict. The U.S. has troops all over the world, apparently for the same purpose.

The sudden concern of the Western powers over the security of Africa is ludicrous and totally suspect. Rhodesian troops have raided Mozambique and killed thousands of refugees with impunity.

The response from the Western powers have been nothing more than verbal condemnation at the U.N. There was never any Western-backed effort to form an African security force to ensure the security of the borders of Mozambique. The recent meeting of the former Western colonial lords of Africa and the U.S. to discuss the security of Africa reminds one of the Berlin conference of 1859 on the partition of Africa.

There is not even token representation from the Organization of African Unity! The sad truth is that the Western powers are going to use their tremendous economic leverage in Africa to force some poor nations to send their unwilling troops to Zaire to prop up a corrupt government so that Western mining interests will be serviced.

I hope with all progressive Africans that this blatant attempt to force the continent into East-West confrontation and to use Africans against Africans in the interest of former colonialists will not lead to further bloodshed. The only loser will be Africa.

(Dr. Ohene-Frempong is a native of Ghana, who has been studying in the United States.)

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-5

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
21 June 1978

An Olive Branch to Angola

Switch From Confrontation On Africa Signaled by U.S.

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Encouraged by signals from Angola, the Carter administration is beginning to back away from the possibility of an African confrontation with the Soviet Union and Cuba and to emphasize the possibility of cooperation.

The administration now has hopes that Soviet and Cuban influence might be used to stabilize Zaire's Shaba provincial border with Angola, defusing the situation that raised alarm in Washington during a Katangan invasion last month.

And in the other part of Africa where the administration recently became alarmed about the Communist countries' intervention, Ethiopia, officials now see a waning of Soviet and Cuban ties.

These new perceptions lay behind Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance's speech yesterday on the administration's African policy. The speech had been read in advance by President Carter and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

VANCE AND BRZEZINSKI had been at the center of a struggle over Carter's African policy since the massive Soviet and Cuban military buildup in Ethiopia last winter.

Changing circumstances have now transmuted that struggle. This means it did not simply end with a winner, the way politicized American policy debates are often seen to end — in a national approach to high policy that puts it on the level with basketball championships.

But some officials take the attitude that patience has been the key to the changing situation, and they are more inclined to credit Vance with that quality than Brzezinski.

Early this year Brzezinski sought leverage to restrict the Communist intervention in the Horn of Africa by suggesting that it would affect negotiations of a new strategic armaments limitations treaty, SALT II. State Department officials were alarmed, thinking that diplomacy does not work that way.

CARTER COMPROMISED by warning that the intervention might make ratification of SALT II harder.

The invasion of Shaba province by Katangan forces from Angola last month caused new suggestions from Brzezinski's office that the United

States needed to confront Soviet activities in Africa. The invasion came after a coup in Afghanistan and other developments heightened fears of some officials that the Kremlin was making worldwide gains.

Acting on White House instructions, the head of central intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, made soundings on the possibility of reinvolving the CIA in Angola, from which it had been restricted in 1975. These were rebuffed on Capitol Hill.

Then the White House began publicizing intelligence reports of Cuban involvement in the Shaba invasion. This led to a now-subsiding argument with Cuba, which denied involvement, and congressional skepticism, which remains.

IN AN ATMOSPHERE of worsening relations with the Soviet Union, Carter said at Annapolis on June 7 that "the Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation."

The Soviets angrily answered that they were not the ones seeking confrontation. In an appearance on the Hill Monday, Vance gave a soft answer to that anger while emphasizing the cooperative possibilities for Soviet-American relations.

Vance's speech yesterday held out an olive branch to the Soviets and Cubans in the form of a message to Angola.

"We believe it could be helpful to increase our consultations with the Angolan government and begin working with it in more normal ways in order to improve the prospects for reconciliation between Angola and Zaire, as well as for achieving a peaceful settlement in Namibia," Vance told the U.S. Junior Chambers of Commerce in Atlantic City.

State Department officials have taken the position in the past that nothing happens in Angola without Cuban knowledge and even permission, since Cuban technicians virtually run the country. They have also assumed that Soviet influence is strong there, although there have been differences between Moscow and Havana on Angolan internal politics.

THESE ASSUMPTIONS implied that any willingness now of the Angolan government to work with the United States on a reconciliation with Zaire would mean Cuban and Soviet cooperation.

A senior State Department official said this country had received indications of Angolan responsiveness to Western and African concern about further trouble on the Zaire border.

"We are encouraged to believe that (the Angolan) government has a positive attitude about the need to stabilize the border there," the official told reporters while discussing Vance's speech.

This pointed to an expectation of some form of cooperation, even if deliberately indirect and unacknowledged, between Washington and Moscow — as well as between Washington and Havana — instead of the confrontation that Carter mentioned.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B 7THE WASHINGTON POST
18 June 1978*Joseph Kraft*

An African Test for Vance

Jimmy Carter has a powerful case against the actions of Cuba in Africa. But by overstating the evidence of secret intelligence, he has allowed the case to be muddled and trivialized by Fidel Castro and by members of the Congress and the press.

Now the American position in Africa has to be restated anew in full perspective. That task devolves upon Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and provides an interesting test of whether he is truly equal to the commanding role his many well-wishers have been staking out for him.

The case against Cuba is written on the map. It is a tiny island with less than 10 million people. It normally figures in world affairs only as a producer of sugar. It lives next to a superpower with security responsibilities that girdle the globe.

Common sense dictates that the Cubans should be careful not to put their finger in the American eye for less than vital reasons. The careful behavior of Finland toward its neighbor the Soviet Union is the appropriate model for Cuba and the United States.

But in Africa, where he has no vital interest, Castro has been systematically

sticking it to the United States on behalf of the Russians. Cuban troops, ferried to Africa by the Russians, backed an anti-American faction in the Angolan civil war and now maintain that group in power by the presence of 20,000 men.

The Cubans have equally provided the military manpower, 17,000 troops, that maintains the Soviet presence in Ethiopia. Worse still, if the projected Anglo-American plan for a Rhodesian settlement breaks down, the Cubans may be pitched into a civil war in that country.

They would then be lined up with African states and radical black Rhodesians in a fight against Rhodesian whites and moderate blacks. The Cubans would thus be acting as surrogates for the Russians in a racial war acutely embarrassing to the United States.

To be sure, the American case in all these matters is far from perfect. This country, largely because of loyalties to the corrupt regime in Zaire, chose to support a losing faction in Angola. It backed Somalia, which was the aggressor in the fighting that brought the Cubans into Ethiopia. It has raised black hopes in ways that increase the likelihood of civil war in Rhodesia.

But whatever the American faults, the Cubans simply had no business in Africa at all. They have been acting as proxy for the Russians with intentions clearly inimical to the United States. That is an unwise and dangerous policy, and Carter had every right to lay it on the Cubans when an invasion from Angola threatened the dismemberment of Zaire.

Unfortunately, the president, instead of stating the general case, made a specific allegation based on secret intelligence. "We," he said at a news conference in Chicago on May 25, "know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping" the forces that attacked Zaire.

In fact, the evidence is far from clear. Castro has denied the charge and given American congressmen a story to the effect that Cuba actually tried to block the invasion from Angola. Since then certain elements of the Congress and the press have had the field day they always have when a president is caught saying something he cannot prove.

Almost everybody is now confused, and some part of the public must have the incorrect impression that Carter is

wrong and Castro right. What is required is a thorough exposition of American policy in Africa. Vance has undertaken to make it in a speech Tuesday in Atlantic City.

It is a tall order. Vance will have to square American policy in Africa with this country's global interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He will have to explain particular actions in Angola, Zaire, Ethiopia and Rhodesia. He will have to show that a relatively conciliatory position in Africa does not mean a cave-in to Russia around the world.

But it is a fair test, given the rivalry between the secretary and the president's chief White House adviser on foreign policy, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Those who doubt Brzezinski's judgment have been urging the president to give primacy to Vance. The president seems to be moving in that direction. But even the secretary's strongest supporters have to ask themselves a question that will come up for testing in the Atlantic City speech. The question is whether Vance actually has the qualities required for giving the president the guidance he needs in foreign policy.

©1978, Field Enterprises, Inc.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
19 June 1978

Nkomo Sees CIA Role in Angola War

Rhodesia Guerrilla Leader Denies Cuban Combat Aid

United Press International

Joshua Nkomo, a guerrilla leader fighting the Rhodesian government, says the CIA has continued to interfere in the affairs of Marxist Angola.

Nkomo, citing "those who know," said on CBS' "Face the Nation" program yesterday that they "believe (anti-government) Angolan forces do get some aid from the United States" that is funneled through South Africa.

(Cuban President Fidel Castro, in weekend interviews, also charged the CIA has established new contacts with Angolan insurgents.)

Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, is believed to have 8,500 men located in Zambia, which also shares a border with Angola.

NKOMO PREDICTED "victory" for his guerrilla forces against the Rhodesian government in the next six to 10 months.

"We have reached the hump," he said, adding that his group would establish a socialist state in Rhodesia.

"Socialism is an ideology very close to our own way of thinking as opposed to capitalism," he said.

He called attempts by the United States and Britain to reach a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia "out of date."

Nkomo denied a recent report attributed to him that Cuban military advisers were operating with his troops.

"Cuba is one of the countries that has positively answered our need for assistance," he said, saying the help has ranged from sugar to training of young black guerrillas.

But he denied Cuban military advisers were working with his men.

"WE HAVE ASKED ALL countries . . . to come forward to aid us," he said, but the United States and other Western nations have refused because Nkomo's troops are fighting "a brand of facism which gives profits" to corporations with interests in the United States.

He said he also gets arms from

Russia and help from East Germany that has ranged "from a pin to huge equipment to light our school" that he has established for young blacks. He said the United States did, however, through the United Nations, send \$500,000 for the building of the school.

He called President Carter's statements on African "nice sounds and noises" that have not been put into action.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-20

THE WASHINGTON POST
19 June 1978

Castro, Guerrilla Leader Charge Continuing CIA Role in Angola

By Warren Brown.

Washington Post Staff Writer

Cuban President Fidel Castro and Joshua Nkomo, a guerrilla leader fighting the Rhodesian government, charged in separate television interviews yesterday that the Central Intelligence Agency has continued to interfere in Angolan affairs in violation of congressional restrictions outlawing such involvement.

"We know from very good sources that recently the CIA established contact with UNITA in Angola and . . . promised U.S. assistance," Castro said on "Issues and Answers" (ABC, WJLA).

He claimed the assistance to UNITA, the pro-Western United Front for the Total Liberation of Angola, "constitutes a very serious involvement in Angola's interior affairs."

Nkomo, speaking on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WTOP), said his information about U.S. "assistance" to UNITA's fight against Angola's Marxist central government came from "those who know."

These sources say they "believe [UNITA] Angolan forces . . . do get some aid from the United States" by way of South Africa, Nkomo said. "I have no reason to believe that the CIA is not aiding South Africa to aid some dissidents in Angola to over-

throw the government [because] the United States has not recognized the legitimate government of Angola."

In 1976 Congress approved an amendment by Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) prohibiting U.S. involvement in Angola. But Carter administration officials reportedly have been studying the possibility of seeking repeal of the amendment to enable the United States, through a third party, to provide aid to UNITA.

Clark has strongly opposed that idea.

For his part, Castro insisted that the United States presently is interfering in Angola's domestic policy by working with UNITA. "I declare it so, in a fully responsible way. We know that from very good sources," he said without elaboration.

His charges were the latest in a frequently loud, often confusing media war between himself and President Carter.

Carter has accused the Cuban president of working in tandem with the Soviet Union to stir unrest on the African continent, and of aiding and abetting the Katangan rebels who invaded Zaire last month. Castro, as he did in the interview aired yesterday, has repeatedly and passionately denied those charges.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 42NEWSWEEK
26 June 1978

FIDEL KEEPS ON PITCHING

Fidel Castro was a gentle persuader. Relaxing on a sofa in Havana's Palace of the Revolution, his holstered revolver lying on a shelf, the President of Cuba held court through a long night last week for visiting Democratic Congressmen Stephen Solarz of New York and Anthony Beilenson of California. Castro declined to blame Jimmy Carter for his "brutal" charges that Cuba had armed and trained the Katangan rebels who invaded Zaïre last month, and that Havana was a co-conspirator in the attack. "I think Mr. Carter has been confused and deceived," Castro said to the congressmen and a group of reporters. "But I do not think Mr. Carter has deliberately resorted to this himself." The Cuban leader exuded sweet reasonableness for nine straight hours, but at times his message grew strident. The American line "is not half a lie," he insisted. "It is an absolute, total, complete lie. It is not a small lie, it's a big lie. It is not a negligible lie, it is an important lie."

At a press conference the next day, Carter refused to back down. "The fact is that Castro could have done much more had he genuinely wanted to stop the invasion," the President declared. "He could have interceded with the Katangans themselves. He could certainly have imposed Cuban troops near the border, because they are spread throughout Angola." But the President's case was far from conclusive, in part because he could not reveal—and therefore endanger—his intelligence sources. Some congressmen, and some members of his own Administration, worried that Carter was relying too heavily on thin evidence—or, worse yet, deliberately overstating his case against Castro. The dispute persuaded his critics that Carter had turned Castro's African adventures into an unnecessary foreign-policy tangle for himself.

Castro claimed last week that he had tried to head off the Katangan raid from the time he first heard "rumors" of it last February. He told his American visitors



Stephen Shalom

Castro and Solarz: 'Carter has been confused'

that he decided two years ago to discourage the rebel claims on Zaïre's Shaba Province. He feared that the Katangan cause could destabilize Angola and attract Western intervention, Castro said, and would divert resources from his main targets—white-ruled Rhodesia, South Africa and Southwest Africa.

Goodwill: Castro also professed great hurt that Washington had ignored what he regarded as his restraint toward such U.S. projects as the Panama Canal treaties and the U.S.-British peace effort in Rhodesia. But in a goodwill gesture to the congressmen, Castro promised to allow 1,600 Cubans who hold dual Cuban and American citizenship to emigrate to the U.S. Other Cuban officials hinted that Havana might agree to release Lawrence Lunt, 34, a CIA agent who has been imprisoned in Havana for thirteen years, in exchange for Lolita LeBron, 37, one of the Puerto Rican nationalists who fired on the U.S. House of Representatives in 1954.

Carter was not impressed with Castro's defense, but he did shift the tone of his attack. Although he insisted that "we have firm proof" of Cuban involvement in the invasion, the President tried to

change the focus of the debate. He built a more general case of bad conduct against Castro, declaring that, at the very least, the Cuban President should have warned the Organization of African Unity about the impending attack and "notified the world at large that an invasion... was in prospect."

Sources? The Administration also compiled a four-page summary of the evidence gathered by the CIA. It asserted that Cuba began training the Katangans in 1975, that Cuban advisers helped plan the rebels' attack on Shaba Province in March 1977 and that Cubans accompanied last month's invasion force on at least part of its march to Zaïre. The report cited a "consistency of evidence from a wide variety of sources"—but

for security reasons listed none of them.

Carter vetoed a suggestion of some of his advisers to criticize the two congressmen who had held what one aide called a "prayer meeting" with Castro. But that did not stop the grumbling in the White House. "If Attila the Hun disagreed with a President of the United States," complained press secretary Jody Powell, "some people would automatically rush to the support of Attila."

Still, a number of people judged the Administration's case against Castro to be sketchy. "If I had to bet my last dollar on it, I'd bet the Cubans were involved in the training of the Katangans," said Democratic Sen. Dick Clark of Iowa, an authority on Africa. "But the evidence I've seen doesn't prove that... The whole thing has been played up more by the Administration than one might think would have been necessary." As a result, Fidel Castro was able to turn his Katangan embarrassment into a propaganda asset. And Jimmy Carter once again raised doubts about the U.S. response to Castro's Africa challenge.

—STEVEN STRASSER with THOMAS M. DeFRANK and LARS-ERIK NELSON in Washington

ARTICLE APPEARED

ON PAGE 30-32

TIME

26 June 1978

It's Carter vs. Castro

The two leaders argue about Cuba's role in Zaïre

I don't really desire to get into a public dispute with Mr. Castro through the news media," protested Jimmy Carter at the start of his press conference last week. In fact, however, he was already deeply involved in a shouting match with the Cuban Premier over Havana's involvement in last month's invasion of southern Zaïre.

For the second time in 14 months, Zaïre's Shaba region, once known as Katanga province, had been invaded by Katangese rebels who had fled to neighboring Angola in the mid-1960s and were now trying to regain their homeland. Everybody agreed that the Katangese had once fought for the Portuguese against the Angolan guerrilla armies but switched sides to the strongest of these groups, Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which later came to power. Even Castro conceded that throughout this period and until some time in early 1976, the Cubans in Angola had helped train and arm the Katangese because they were fighting with the Popular Movement against two rival liberation groups.

Carter's argument last week seemed to be that Castro, who has admitted knowing of the invasion plan in advance, should have taken decisive action to stop it. Of Castro's 20,000 troops in Angola, Carter charged, 4,000 were located in the northeastern region of the country where the Katangese were based. At the very least, Carter implied, Castro could have notified neighboring countries, or the Organization of African Unity, or the "world at large," of impending trouble.

Some of Carter's details were a bit fuzzy. He alluded to "a story published, I think, in TIME magazine the last week in May" and recalled that "later Castro informed one of our own diplomats that he knew about the impending invasion ahead of time and that he attempted to notify President Neto of Angola and was unsuccessful." TIME's cover story on Africa reported that Castro had called in Lyle

Lane, the ranking U.S. diplomat in Havana, and told him he knew of the invasion in advance and had tried unsuccessfully to head it off. Castro told Lane he had indeed notified Neto, who was unable to deter the Katangese.

Two days before Carter's press conference, Castro told his side of the story to a group of visiting American Congressmen and journalists; his account clashed with Carter's on a number of key points. Castro insisted that after the Popular Movement triumphed over its rivals in early 1976, the Cubans stopped helping the Katangese. He maintained that there had been no contact between them and his military or civilian personnel since that time.

Castro singled out Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski as the villain in the Administration who prevailed on the President to "perpetrate this absolute lie" about the Cuban involvement. Gesturing with one of his long Cohiba cigars, Castro said: "We have never lied, either to our friends or to our enemies. We may keep some things private, and we may be discreet, but we have never used lies as an instrument of politics."

Later, in an interview with TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Castro insisted that Cuba's goals in Africa were peaceful ones. "We are not a military power," he said. "We have no nuclear weapons, no navy, no strategic forces. We are just a small country whose most important raw material is its spirit, the willingness of our people to sacrifice and demonstrate solidarity with other peoples. In the current cases mentioned most often, Angola and Ethiopia, we have prevented two historic crimes: the occupation of Angola by South Africa and the disintegration of the Ethiopian state as a result of foreign aggression." At week's end, Castro took the offensive. He told American TV interviewers that the CIA recently offered UNITA, a rebel group inside Angola, support in its fight against the Popular Movement's Neto. Responded a White House aide: "That is absurd."

Meanwhile, the Carter Administration was trying hard to convince Congress that it "had the goods" on Castro, as one White House official put it. CIA Director Stansfield Turner was dispatched to Capitol Hill with what he called "35 pieces of disparate evidence." In addition to charts, maps and accounts furnished by captured Katangese soldiers, the evidence included a letter sent by the Katangese rebel leader Nathaniel Mbumba to President Kenneth Kaunda requesting permission for the rebels to cross Zambian territory on their way to Shaba. The letter, which was not shown to Congress, supposedly said that Cuba had been "helpful" in planning the attack.

Congressmen were not altogether impressed. "That letter reminded me," said one, "of a politician soliciting aid by saying, 'Support me because I've got so-and-so backing me up.'" Remarked Congressman Charles Diggs, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa: "I don't think there was a soul in that room who came away convinced." But on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, New York Republican Jacob Javits concluded that the Administration was correct in its assessment of Cuban activity, although others were not so sure. Many felt the Administration's concern about the Communists was getting in the way of the main goal of U.S. African policy—namely, bringing an end to white minority rule.

At week's end the White House seemed to be trying to downplay the controversy, if only because it realized that without documentation the dispute might never be resolved. Nonetheless, the Administration was sticking to the main conclusions of its intelligence reports: that the Cuban presence in Angola is all-pervasive today; that Cuban assistance to the Katangese insurgents has never stopped; and that last month's Shaba invasion took place with the cooperation of both the Cubans and the Angolan government.

Whatever the truth about the degree of Cuban involvement, it seemed clear that both Washington and Havana were seeking to exploit the issue for their own purposes. The Carter Administration was trying to demonstrate that the Cubans had broken one of black Africa's most sacred political principles: respect for the sanctity of existing national boundaries. In a larger sense, Washington was emphasizing to both Moscow and Havana that the buildup of Soviet-Cuban influence throughout Africa must be ended if East-West détente is to be strengthened. Castro's motives in denying any involvement with the Katangese might be defensive ones: to dissociate his regime from a dubious, and worse, a failed venture.

While the debate continued, eight Western governments (plus Japan and Iran) met in Brussels and agreed to put up at least \$70 million to rescue the Zaïrian government of President Mobutu Sese Seko from bankruptcy during the next three months under a stringent formula that British Foreign Secretary David Owen called "a monitorable plan for economic assistance." After some earlier protest, Mobutu now seemed ready to accept a few restrictive conditions on how he spends Zaïre's money. Mobutu is also expected to seek increased military assistance from the West. At week's end, Zaïrian intelligence sources claimed that Katangese rebels have again begun massing, threatening to renew the insurgency. ■

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 13

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
20 June 1978

Bob Wiedrich Spying charges all show business

THE EXCHANGE of espionage charges between the United States and Soviet Russia may reflect a deadly form of show business. But it is show business nonetheless.

Everybody is spying. We do it. They do it. The Third World countries do it. And all in the constant drive to get the drop on potential enemies before they can get the drop on the other side.

That's why nobody should get too uptight about the charges and countercharges that some people claim are making a shambles of what remains of detente between Washington and Moscow.

It is political shadowboxing. And if detente has gone the way of all diplomatic charades, it isn't because some Central Intelligence Agency agent got caught in beautiful downtown Moscow or his Soviet counterpart tripped himself up in Manhattan.

The two superpowers were spying on one another long before Richard Nixon embraced the word "detente" to define a supposedly new era in relations with the Soviets.

They continued doing so throughout the era of allegedly more friendly relations.

And the boys and girls of the intelligence services will keep on performing their chores whether relations with the Kremlin go sour or sweet.

THAT IS THE NAME of the game. And it is heartening to hear that there is no move on Capitol Hill to impose unrealistic curbs on American intelligence operations overseas.

It is only within the continental United States, especially in espionage cases involving American citizens, that congressional committees are preparing strict guidelines that will clearly define the boundaries of domestic national security work.

What brings the situation to mind again is the reminder about the nature of international espionage that two recent incidents in Moscow dramatized for Americans.

In one, U.S. security personnel discovered a secret shaft leading into the American Embassy in Moscow. The shaft contained substantial amounts of Russian eavesdropping equipment.

A DAY LATER, the Soviets attempted to counter the accusations with a few of their own, explaining that the gear had only been installed to jam American eavesdropping paraphernalia at the embassy.

That didn't sit too well with the world press. Diplomats greeted the Soviet ploy with horselaughs.

SO THE RUSSIANS dusted off a stale tale about an American woman consular employee who had been sent home last summer after having been caught dropping off a packet of espionage materials for a CIA stooge in Moscow.

Even the Russians admitted that disclosing that story was intended to dampen "anti-Soviet hysteria" in the U.S. characterized by the arrest of two Russian-United Nations employees on spy charges in New Jersey.

The exchange of carefully manipulated bellyaching may have shaken up some Americans concerned that the Washington love fest with Moscow might be ending.

But it didn't mean a thing to those observers who recognize diplomatic feinting at its best. They knew immediately that raising hell about a few spies and the tools of their trade meant little in the deadly game of blunting an opponent's intelligence apparatus.

FIRST OFF, most of the significant and productive espionage techniques today involve few human beings.

Sure, it's fun to occasionally flip an enemy intelligence operative into a double agent. And it is better yet when that agent happens to occupy a sensitive post.

But the real espionage work is done today by sophisticated, computerized, transistorized electronic eavesdropping equipment and satellites, none of which wears trench coats, burrows beneath foreign embassies, or delivers lethal highballs to eliminate the opposition.

That doesn't mean that American officials here and abroad shouldn't always be on their toes to guard against the more personal forms of electronic snooping like bugging an ambassadorial bedroom.

Take, for example, the time former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Clarence Kelley was reprimanded for accepting \$335 worth of drapery valances installed in his home by FBI technicians.

A White House intelligence expert later privately explained that no outside worker could ever be permitted to perform work in a high official's home for fear a listening device might be left hidden behind.

AND REMEMBER the days when former President Nixon and Henry Kissinger visited the Kremlin as overnight guests. Whenever they had something secret to discuss, they did so in a cruising American limousine.

That is the stark reality of life at the level of government. Flushing the toilet or playing a radio loud won't drown out what a sensitive listening device wants to hear.

People in every government take the necessary precautions and make a public show of getting upset about the discovery of such techniques only when it suits their political purposes. Otherwise, they don't beef because everybody is doing it.

So don't get too concerned when the commissars and the Democrats in Washington start hollering at one another over finding bugs in their respective bonnets. It's only show business.

MOBILE REGISTER
24 May 1978

Russian spies working as CIA, FBI assailed

The arrest of three Russian spies in New Jersey Saturday underlines the folly of the continuing attempts by some congressmen and the media of this nation to undermine the effectiveness of the FBI and CIA.

It was the FBI which cracked the modern-day spy ring in New Jersey which, we might note, is the third incident of Soviet espionage to be uncovered in this country in recent months.

The FBI has an extremely difficult challenge in combatting foreign espionage due to the fact that the United Nations headquarters in New York and foreign embassies in Washington and elsewhere are known to have virtually

as many spies as they have diplomats.

Our State Department would allow these subversives to run amuck, obtaining whatever U.S. defense secrets they might desire, and it is reassuring to know that the FBI and CIA are protecting our secrets as best they can.

But critics of the two intelligence agencies continue hammering away at their foundations, trying to undermine public confidence in what amounts to our first line of defense against our enemies in peacetime.

The situation unfortunately serves as yet another example of Washington, including the national media, failing to recognize and report on the difference between friend and enemy.

WATERBURY REPUBLICAN, (CONN.)

3 June 1978

Soviet spying not new

It has been 18 years since then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge told the United Nations that a hidden microphone had been found in the eagle's beak of the Great Seal of the United States in the U.S. embassy in Moscow. The seal had been a gift to the American ambassador from the Russians.

Moscow hasn't changed since then. But the United States has.

It is not surprising that a hidden microphone has been found in the chimney of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union does not handcuff its spies or hold the infamous KGB up to public ridicule. The Kremlin uses its intelligence network to the fullest.

The disturbing aspect of the story is not that the Soviet Union is spying on us. The real fear is that the American Central Intelligence Agency is not spying on them. If the CIA is being prevented from protecting American security because of the criticism and restraints of recent years, then this nation has itself—not the Kremlin—to blame.

The Kremlin tried to spy on the U.S. embassy in the past, and got caught. They are trying to spy on the embassy at present, and got caught. And they will try to spy on the embassy in the future. We hope they will be quickly caught.

Americans also hope there will be a CIA to spy right back!

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
19 June 1978

A dangerous game

Soviet-American relations have seemed in recent days to degenerate into a petty but dangerous game of tit for tat.

A painful blow, in Russian eyes, was struck May 20 with the publicized arrests of two Soviet citizens in New Jersey on spying charges. A Soviet diplomat was expelled in the same case because he enjoyed immunity, but the pair facing prosecution did not have diplomatic status as employees of the United Nations.

The Kremlin also was stung recently by public disclosure of another elaborate eavesdropping system in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, along with colorful accounts of American technicians tracing the electronics to a nearby apartment building.

Foreign Minister Gromyko is reported to have warned, during his last visit to this country, of the possibility of retaliation for the New Jersey incident, which he and other Russians see as violating an informal agreement to handle such embarrassments quietly. In a frank bid for offsetting publicity, *Izvestia* last week put out details of the year-old apprehension, with spy equipment, of a woman CIA employee who had U.S. diplomatic standing in Moscow.

But the game appears to have taken a more somber turn with the detention in Moscow of an American on charges of violating Soviet currency law. The incident begs for attention because of the undisguised and unnecessary harshness with which the arrest was made. F. Jay Crawford was dragged from his car while he was waiting with his fiancée at a stop light. Also notable is the defendant's identity as a representative of International Harvester Company, which does a major volume of busi-

ness and generally promotes trade relations with the Soviet Union. Whether or not there is valid evidence against the American, gentler handling would have been expected in relatively normal times.

All this has been happening against a background of acrimonious exchanges between the superpowers, inspired in large part by Russian-Cuban intervention in Africa, and embellished by President Carter's belittling assessment of Soviet society and economics in his Annapolis address.

A word of caution may be in order. Competition in counter-espionage and related flackery is one thing. But if the Kremlin is going to take out its ire on American citizens who happen to be within reach as business people, sightseers or cultural exchangees, it could achieve unintended results.

If Mr. Crawford is shown to the world to be a victim of Soviet injustice and uncivilized police methods, this will not induce Western business interests to push for greater trade with the Soviet Union and — especially to the point — put their sales and technical experts under the thumb of Russian cops. If the suspicion spreads that what happens to Mr. Crawford might happen to anyone, the chilling effect on tourism could be noticeable. As for participants in cultural and professional exchange programs, some of these already had been considering boycotts of travel to the USSR because of the severe sentencing of Yuri Orlov in a classic Soviet human rights case. The retaliatory mood in Moscow will do nothing to reverse this tendency.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

THE WASHINGTON POST
17 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3

Court of Appeals Rules NSA Is Protected From Disclosure

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The National Security Agency cannot be forced in a lawsuit to disclose whether it has intercepted the communications of specific individuals or groups through its secret monitoring capabilities, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled here yesterday.

The ruling upheld a claim of "state secrets privilege" made by the secretary of defense and makes NSA virtually immune from suits by such individuals or groups, according to attorneys involved in the case.

Calling the state secrets privilege "absolute," U.S. Circuit Judge Roger Robb said, "a ranking of the various privileges recognized in our courts would be a delicate undertaking at best, but it is quite clear that the privilege to protect state secrets must head the list."

The ruling came in an American Civil Liberties Union suit filed on behalf of 27 individuals and groups active in Vietnam war protests. They claim their international wire, telephone and cable conversations were illegally monitored by NSA at the request of law enforcement and intelligence agencies here.

The suit was an outgrowth of disclosures that more than 1,200 Americans were included on "watchlists" used by NSA between 1967 and 1973 under the code names Project Minaret and Project Shamrock. Once a name was on a "watchlist," NSA computers could scan intercepted communica-

tions and locate messages pertaining to that name.

Other defendants in the lawsuit included the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI and three international communications corporations that cooperated with the projects.

The National Security Agency, which has been rarely if ever sued, said it could not even respond to allegations that certain people or groups had been monitored because to do so would "severely jeopardize the intelligence collection mission of NSA by identifying present communications collection and analysis capabilities."

In addition to a public affidavit by the secretary of defense, a classified affidavit was presented in secret to the court to support the claim of state secrets privilege and an NSA official gave secret testimony.

U.S. District Court Judge June L. Green upheld the claim of state secrets privilege in connection with Project Minaret—carried out as part of NSA's regular monitoring programs—but denied the claim in connection with Project Shamrock. The Shamrock materials came from a special program of monitoring telegraphic traffic leaving or coming into the United States.

The plaintiffs appealed, saying they objected to the secret proceedings involved in Green's decision and that the state secrets privilege was being invoked too broadly by NSA. The government appealed as well, saying the

Shamrock materials also should be protected from disclosure.

Judge Robb, writing for himself, U.S. Circuit Judge Malcolm Wilkey, and senior U.S. District Court Judge Ronald N. Davies of North Dakota, agreed completely with the government viewpoint.

Robb described the foreign intelligence gathering process "in this age of computer technology" as being "more akin to the construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger affair."

"Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate," Robb said.

Robb said he had reviewed the materials at issue and that confirmation or denial that certain persons or groups had been monitored "would disclose NSA capabilities and other valuable intelligence information to a sophisticated intelligence analyst."


For example, he said, a foreign government or organization that had dealt with a plaintiff whose communications were intercepted could "at the very least be alerted that its communications might have been compromised or that it might itself be a target."

ACLU attorney Mark Lynch said the ruling means NSA cannot be successfully sued by individuals, because no one can establish that their conversations have been picked up by the agency.

"There's no way to get at NSA, because there's no way we can establish standing," Lynch said. Lynch also expressed concern that the opinion "will encourage other agencies" to make the same claim.

The ruling has no direct effect on the other defendants in the case. The NSA claim of privilege was the only issue on appeal at this point.

26 June 1978



Eavesdropping On the World's Secrets

Breaking foreign codes, tapping the Kremlin itself—America's electronic snoopers have now displaced the CIA as the nation's top intelligence gatherers. For an exclusive look at an agency shrouded in secrecy—

Two events, 5,000 miles apart, are calling attention to the worldwide operations of America's most important but one of its least known espionage organizations.

In Moscow at the end of May, American agents discovered a secret shaft with Russian electronic devices in the U.S. Embassy. The Soviets insisted that they planted the devices as a defense against the embassy's sophisticated electronic eavesdropping operation, presumably run by the National Security Agency.

In Zaire in mid-May, Katangese rebels staged an invasion from neighboring Angola. President Carter maintains that he has conclusive evidence of Cuban involvement. The evidence includes messages intercepted by the National Security Agency.

What is this agency, and how does it operate? How has it managed to emerge unscathed—in fact, almost unmentioned—while other U.S. intelligence arms were being pummeled by congressional investigations or the press over the past two years?

Actually, NSA, with its extraordinary skill at electronic snooping, is rated as Washington's single most important source of intelligence, an importance that has been increased substantially by the recent sharp cutback in secret operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

With listening posts around the world, in space, air and on land and sea, NSA not only monitors the communications of other governments but gathers and analyzes the radar transmissions of potentially hostile ships, planes and land stations. It tries to crack the codes of other nations and also devises the codes that protect American secrets.

Information gathered by NSA has warned Presidents of impending war, prevented a major terrorist attack in this country and headed off at least one assassination attempt.

Two hurdles. Now, NSA's electronic espionage network is threatened by two developments. One is a revolution in encoding technology that is making it easier for America's rivals to keep secrets and vastly more difficult for the U.S. to crack the incredibly complicated codes that are coming

into widespread use. Coupled with this is an explosion in the volume of communications, making it more and more difficult to screen out information of value.

The other threat is new laws and regulations designed to protect the privacy of citizens, which agency officials fear may endanger their ability to do their job.

Many Americans have never heard of the National Security Agency. Most of those who know of the agency's existence have no clear idea what it does. This fuzziness NSA takes great pains to promote. Here, gleaned from interviews with experts in and outside government and from examination of official unclassified documents, is a sketch of America's superspy outfit, its achievements, its problems and a look at its future:

Is NSA Listening In?

By almost any standard of measurement, NSA is a huge agency. With more than 1.3 billion dollars a year to spend on its day-to-day operations, substantially more than the CIA gets, it soaks up almost a third of the nation's intelligence budget. Nearly 20,000 persons work in its nine-story headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., and thousands more man remote listening posts, funneling in information from ships, planes and land bases around the world. According to those who have visited NSA headquarters, it is, once you are past the fences and armed guards, much like any other federal office building, more modern than the Pentagon but not quite as attractive as the CIA headquarters.

NSA has been described as a giant electronic vacuum cleaner, scooping up all sorts of radio and wire communications, pouring them into the computers at Fort Meade, 15 miles north of Washington, and spewing out the world's secrets for the use of the President, other top government officials and military commanders in the field.



Sources of information for NSA range from simple little wiretap or electronic bugging devices to multimillion-dollar satellites that monitor the telemetry signals sent out during other countries' missile tests. Airplanes, ships and submarines constantly listen in on others' communications and record their radar signals. Technicians in ground stations collect the same type of information.

With this kind of worldwide intelligence-gathering network, largely shrouded in secrecy, questions have been raised as to whether the agency is spying on Americans as well as on foreigners. Congressional investigators learned

CONTINUED

NSA's Greatest Coup

Telephone conversations between limousines of Soviet leaders and Kremlin offices were monitored for years—until the operation was "blown" in early 1960s by pressleaks.



in fact, that NSA had obtained and distributed information about Americans in two operations. In one, code-named Shamrock, NSA received copies of overseas telegrams handled by three telegraph companies over a period of nearly 30 years. In the other, code-named Minaret, NSA used lists of names supplied by other government agencies to screen international messages for information about Americans.

These documented abuses by NSA plus the secrecy with which it surrounds itself have helped to feed suspicions about other questionable activities it may be conducting. One of the most persistent rumors is that the agency routinely eavesdrops on telephone calls within this country.

The rumor is largely false. But there is just enough basis in fact to lend it credibility.

The agency does sometimes listen to telephone conversations. This was confirmed by congressional investigators who learned that NSA had, from 1967 to 1973, monitored telephone traffic between the U.S. and Latin America and passed on information to federal drug agents.

When Russia tunes in, NSA also overhears conversations intercepted in the U.S. by the Soviet Union, which has its own worldwide electronic snooping operation. Similar efforts by other countries are severely limited by high costs. The Russians have used their embassy in Washington, their consulate in San Francisco and two offices in New York to intercept microwave transmissions, usually on channels leased by business firms, carrying conversations among Americans. When this intercepted material is sent back to Russia, NSA listens in, and some messages among Americans in this country end up in NSA files.

But when the average American picks up the phone, the chances that NSA is listening in are close to zero. There are two reasons for this, one legal and the other technological.

By law and presidential directives, NSA is barred from gathering intelligence by deliberately listening in on communications within the U.S., except with a warrant or approval from the Attorney General. Under its own rules, the agency says it only intercepts those communications in which at least one terminal is outside the country.

Technological problems limit the volume of phone conversations NSA can monitor, even where it is legally free to do so. It is possible to intercept telephone transmissions and, using a sophisticated computer, to sort out some individual phone calls, although new telephone equipment now coming into service will make this virtually impossible. But, even where a conversation can be intercepted, no computer has been developed that can understand the spoken word and print the message.

This means that, whenever phone calls on a certain circuit are important enough, the agency must assign humans to listen to each conversation and sort out the valuable information, a time-consuming and expensive task that sharply limits the number of calls that can be monitored.


No such technical barrier, however, protects other forms of communications such as tele-

grams, telex or data flowing from one computer to another.

Any transmitted message designed to be picked up on paper, whether by an ordinary printer machine or a high-speed computer, is grist for NSA's mill. In a document filed recently in a lawsuit, government lawyers gave this description of how NSA works: "The mission of the National Security Agency is to collect foreign intelligence, and it accomplishes this mission by intercepting the radio or wire transmissions of foreign governments."

To do this, NSA intercepts microwave transmissions relayed through the atmosphere and catches messages returning to earth from communications satellites. It probably taps into communications cables when necessary to intercept messages sent over leased lines by foreign governments. U.S. attorneys hinted at this when they de-

A Record of Success— And Setbacks



U.S.S. *Liberty*, electronic spy ship, was attacked by Israelis while eavesdropping on Mideast war in 1967.

CONTINUED

scribed how, from 1945 to 1975, the agency routinely received from Western Union International, ITT World Communications and RCA Global copies of millions of overseas telegrams. Significantly, the court document stressed that this was only a secondary source for NSA and "complemented its primary source, which was its own interception operations."

All this raw material is funneled back to NSA headquarters where computers compare it against checklists of requested information. Analysts then sort through the data and send the information on to the appropriate agencies.

Success Stories Barely Surface

People who have had an inside look at the agency are almost rapturous in their praise of what it does.

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), who headed a Senate investigation of the intelligence community, said of NSA: "Its expansive computer facilities comprise some of the most complex and sophisticated electronic machinery in the world. . . . The value of its work to our national security has been and will continue to be inestimable."

NSA's operation, relying heavily on advanced computers, is much more sophisticated than that of the Soviet Union, which also makes a major effort, by use of electronic eavesdropping, to learn the secrets of other governments. The Russians have two competing agencies similar to NSA. One is run by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoye Bezopasnosti, or KGB, the state security police and intelligence agency, and the other by the Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie, or GRU, the military-intelligence directorate. Together they employ tens of thousands of clerks and analysts to perform the kind of sorting and analysis done for NSA by computers. NSA, on the other hand, has been able to cut its use of manpower in half over the past decade.

A few NSA success stories have leaked out:

- In the mid-1950s, the CIA tunneled under the border dividing West from East Berlin and tapped into three underground communications cables carrying 158 circuits. For months, NSA listened in on the line going from the Soviet military headquarters in East Germany to Moscow.

- NSA got wind of a major terrorist attack and tipped off the FBI in time to prevent the operation.

- An attempt on the life of a prominent American in a foreign country was thwarted because of information intercepted by the agency.

- Just before the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, NSA came up with hard information that an attack by the Arabs was imminent, but the information was discounted because such an attack did not make military sense.

- The agency reportedly learned the Soviet bargaining position in the first strategic-arms-limitation talks, giving American negotiators an enviable advantage.

- For years, NSA eavesdropped on the conversations of Premier Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders as they chatted with each other and with the Kremlin over the radiotelephones in their cars.

NSA's Military Role

Although NSA serves the White House, State Department, the CIA and other government agencies, it is still part of the Defense Department, and much of its effort is focused on military intelligence. It has always been headed by a military man since its establishment in a secret directive by President Harry Truman in 1952. Directing NSA now is Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman, 47, a Texan who has spent most of his naval career in intelligence.

The agency listens in on messages sent back during Soviet missile tests. It listens to Soviet pilots and tank commanders talking to each other over their radios. It listens for the brief "squirts" of information that missile submarines flash to satellites. American ships and planes continuously record the signals sent out by radar sets of other nations so the locations of potentially hostile radar and their frequencies can be charted by NSA.


Sometimes this routine practice of eavesdropping on military communications suddenly becomes of overwhelming importance.

When the Soviet Union placed some of its airborne units on alert at the time of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, NSA flashed word to the White House. President Nixon startled the world by placing the U.S. strategic nuclear force—bombers, submarines and missiles—on alert.

In another area, NSA works with the military services to monitor and analyze all the electronic signals sent out by planes, tanks, ships and other military equipment of foreign nations.

By carefully studying this information, it is possible to learn a great deal about the performance and weaknesses of potential enemies in the event of war. "Much of what we know about the characteristics of some of the most ad-

Supersonic SR-71 monitors radio and radar signals worldwide.




Underground cables to Soviet Army headquarters in East Germany were tapped in tunnel under border dividing Berlin.



Cryptologists William H. Martin and Berton F. Mitchell defected to Russia in 1960, allegedly carrying NSA secrets. Mitchell now may return to the U.S.



Russia's NSA Strikes Back



Electronic eavesdropping equipment, planted by Soviets in secret tunnel at U.S. Embassy in Moscow, was discovered in May.

vanced Soviet weapons," says a Pentagon intelligence official, "comes from intelligence collected by NSA."

Breaking the Codes

All nations use codes to protect their secret communications. But much of the military traffic is uncoded.

If Soviet transport planes move into the Middle East, for example, the pilots check in with air-traffic controllers in English, the standard international language for airmen. It was thus relatively simple for NSA to count the Antonov 22 cargo planes as they carried military supplies to Ethiopia in advance of the attack on Somali forces in the Ogaden region earlier this year.

Often, the volume of radio traffic itself tells a great deal. For that reason, many experts at NSA headquarters concentrate on "traffic analysis" to keep track of what potentially hostile forces are preparing to do. To handle large volumes of coded messages, the U.S. and other major governments use electronic encrypting devices. All these systems work with a "key," a short series of letters, digits or symbols to code and decode a message.

Such systems have two weaknesses. A secret code can be broken by the "brute force" approach in which a computer tries one possible code key after another until the message can be read. The other weakness is that the key itself is crucial to the security of a country's system. If anyone gets careless, the secret code may be compromised.

NSA's cryptanalysts have the world's most sophisticated computers at their fingertips for the "brute force" approach. But NSA also watches for lapses by others to crack codes that are, theoretically, unbreakable. Sometimes, however, intelligence authorities are tempted to do things an easier way, by stealing a code book. Ramsey Clark tells how, when he was Attorney General, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover bargained him with requests for permission to break into a foreign mission at the United Nations to obtain cryptographic materials. Clark says he turned him down repeatedly, and finally Hoover stopped asking.

The secret of any successful code-breaking operation is to find the weakest link in the other fellow's system, whether it be a poorly constructed code, sloppy procedures or a weak-willed code clerk. "In any system, you look for mistakes," says Francis J. Cross, who has just retired after a career as one of the FBI's top code breakers. "If there are no mistakes, you don't read the message."

Tackling the Supercodes

A big problem facing NSA is that new encrypting devices becoming available threaten to make it much easier for even unsophisticated governments to protect their secrets by using very difficult codes. Ironically, it is the U.S. National Bureau of Standards, with the cooperation of NSA, that developed these new devices.

The Data Encryption Standard, as the bureau calls its system, is a scheme for encoding and decoding that can be built into an electronic device smaller than a matchbook. When a message is fed in, the device mixes it up, divides it in half, adds the key to one half, mixes the two halves back together again and runs the whole thing through a series of "gates" designed to prevent any code breaker from working back through the system. Then the whole process is automatically repeated 16 times.

All this takes a few microseconds. Experts brought together by the Bureau of Standards calculated that, within a few years, a computer capable of cracking the code by the "brute force" approach could be built. But such a computer would cost millions of dollars, and it would have to test a million code keys every second for 2,284.9 years to check every possibility.

The new data-encrypting standard is required for use by government agencies to protect the moving of information from one computer to another. Federal Reserve banks use it to message transfers of some 100 billion dollars a day back and forth across the country. It is also available to businesses to protect their secrets.

The law forbids exporting codes or coding devices without permission, but sale of the encrypting devices in several foreign countries has already been approved. It is thus possible that some nations, whose less sophisticated systems make them likely targets for NSA's efforts, will dry up as sources of intelligence. "Unfortunately, I think this is going to make life much more difficult for NSA," says Seymour Jeffery, the Bureau of Standards official who guided development of the new coding system.

A few mathematicians suspect that NSA, which studied the new system for two months before giving its approval, found a "trapdoor" that will permit it to read everybody's messages. But if there is a flaw, no one outside the agency has found it. NSA, as usual, isn't talking.

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, who headed the Defense Intelligence Agency, agrees that increasingly sophisticated coding systems are a serious problem for NSA. "Deciphering is a far greater job than encrypting, and the difference is growing," he says. "As a result, the amount of effort involved is on a steep upward curve while the expectation of success is heading downward. This means more money, more people and more computer power."

On the other hand, the increasing sophistication of encoding systems has an advantage for NSA, which also has the responsibility for making sure that the codes used throughout the government to protect U.S. secrets remain uncrackable. Although defectors have on several occasions endangered the security of American codes, there is no known instance since creation of NSA in which the codes themselves have been broken by foreign intelligence.

To keep the odds in its favor, NSA goes to such extremes to protect its secrecy that it makes the operations of the

CIA and the FBI seem like an open book. At NSA headquarters, in fact, they say that the initials stand for "Never Say Anything." Laws making it a crime to disclose anything about the government's cryptologic operations as well as a tight employee-security system have spared NSA from the public embarrassment suffered by other intelligence agencies in recent years. Both the U.S. and Russia overhauled their code-breaking operations in 1960 after two NSA employees, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, defected to the East in the last big breach in NSA security. Mitchell is reportedly eager to return to the U.S.

Is It Constitutional?

Now this extraordinary secrecy—necessary as it may be—is creating a double problem for NSA. It nurtures suspicions about what the agency may be up to. At the same time, it makes it very difficult for the agency to respond publicly to demands that its operations be restricted to protect the rights of Americans.

The aim of those concerned about the danger posed by NSA is to make sure that the spy organization cannot in the future eavesdrop on Americans and pass their secrets on to other agencies for improper purposes.

Congress is trying to write legislation that will permit the agency to gather foreign intelligence without violating the privacy of Americans. But this is proving more difficult than might be assumed. Some experts doubt that the vacuum-cleaner methods used by NSA can be made to conform to the Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable search. Legislation under consideration would permit NSA to intercept communications that didn't "target" Americans and then require a warrant before information could be passed along to law-enforcement agencies. The critics say this is not enough to satisfy the constitutional prohibition against government snooping.

One authoritative source says NSA officials, while deeply concerned about the impact of new laws and rules on their operations, nevertheless feel the agency will be better off with a clear-cut understanding of what it can and cannot do. They are said to feel that the so-called charter for NSA contained in legislation under consideration will protect the rights of Americans while permitting the agency to do its work. They are much more concerned about the possible impact of legal restrictions on how the agency carries out its mission overseas.

A different approach to the privacy issue is proposed by Mark Lynch, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer representing a group of persons who think their communications were intercepted during the Vietnam War. He says a big part of the problem could be avoided if NSA would throw away the material scooped up by its electronic vacuum cleaner as soon as it has been screened for foreign-intelligence information. Lynch explains that this would prevent the government from going back through a person's communications, gathered without a warrant over a period of years, and using that information against him.

Graham, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, disagrees. He says a great deal of material must be saved because it may later prove to be useful. In the case of the tunnel under the Berlin border, he recalls, the tapes kept by NSA were later used to break up an espionage operation.

Partly because of the agency's low profile, NSA emerged virtually unscathed from the intelligence scandals that lacerated the CIA and the FBI. But this supersecret organization clearly is headed for closer scrutiny. □

The foregoing article was reported and written by Associate Editor Orr Kelly.

People of the Week®

NSA's Chief: Tough But Soft-Spoken

Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman may be the only officer who has received the Navy's highest noncombat award—the Distinguished Service Medal—for the quality of his congressional testimony.

From 1974 to 1976, when congressional committees were digging deeply into the secrets of the intelligence community, Inman was director of naval intelligence and, later, vice director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Day after day, he was dispatched to Capitol Hill as the Pentagon's point man to head off the damage that intelligence insiders feared from the wide-ranging probes.

What persuasive arguments Inman used behind closed doors in his talks with members of Congress and their staffs are still locked in secrecy. But this is how the citation accompanying the medal praises him: "His singularly exceptional ability to articulate effectively to the congressional select committees on intelligence the inestimable importance of sensitive intelligence efforts ... decisively contributed to the continued capability of the defense intelligence community."

Another award. During that same period, Inman was carrying out a major shake-up in the Defense Intelligence Agency's vital data-processing operation—trying, in the words of one insider, "to make sense out of a dog's breakfast of an organization." Partially as a result of that work, he won the Defense Superior Service Medal for "achievements unparalleled in the history of intelligence."

A native of Rhonesboro, Tex., Inman graduated from the University of Texas in 1950 and was commissioned in the Naval Reserve in 1952. Since then, most of his career has been spent as a specialist in intelligence, with posts ranging from assistant naval attaché in Stockholm to assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the Pacific Fleet during the Vietnam War.

He received his third star on July 20, 1976, when he was 45—an unusually rapid advancement for an officer not graduated from Annapolis. On July 5, 1977, he became director of NSA, responsible for a budget of more than 1.3 billion dollars and thousands of employees operating in near-total secrecy throughout the world. Tough, but soft-spoken, Inman, unlike heads of some U.S. agencies, has a passion for anonymity.

Because, as an intelligence specialist and thus a restricted line officer, Inman is not eligible for a major naval command, his career is theoretically at its peak now. "But," added one friend, "you can bet he'll be around for a good long time after he finishes his tour at NSA. Bobby Inman is a national asset."



Admiral Inman

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-13

THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER
16 June 1978

INTELLIGENCE

Carter correct in refusing to share data

IT ALL SEEMED so easy in the fall of 1976 when presidential candidate Jimmy Carter proclaimed to a national television audience:

"Every time we've had a serious mistake in foreign affairs, it's been because the American people have been excluded from the process. If we can just tap the intelligence and ability, the sound common sense and the good judgment of the American people, we can once again have a foreign policy to make us proud instead of ashamed, and I'm not going to exclude the American people from that process in the future as Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger have done."

Who, having heard that solemn assurance, would have guessed that Mr. Carter, 15 months later, would be refusing to turn over to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee documentary evidence to support the administration's allegations that Cuba trained and equipped the recent Angola-based invaders of Zaire?

An understanding of the scope of Cuban and Soviet involvement in the Zairian invasion is, of course, indispensable to a shaping of U.S. policy.

It is quite true that the administration made its raw data about Cuban activity in Africa available to the House Intelligence Committee, whose chairman, Rep. Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.), described himself as "satisfied" that administration allegations are rooted in fact.

But it is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, not the House Intelligence Committee, that has challenged the President to substantiate his charges.

Despite the paradoxical position in which he finds himself, President Carter is correct in protecting the nature of the evidence the nation's intelligence-gathering and -assessment agencies have assembled on the invasion of Zaire. Congressional committees—and, in particular, their staff members—are known to leak like sieves.

It is a sad commentary on the state of affairs in the nation's capital when a President cannot entrust crucial information to those who are presumed to be his partners and counselors. But facts are facts, and Mr. Carter has chosen the course of prudence.

18 JUNE 1978

BETTY BEALE:

EXCERPT:

Representative Bill Cohen and Larry Pressler must have been warmed by all the assurances that they will win their Senate races. And one table was heated a bit by a lively conversation between Rep. Jonathan Bingham and National Security Council spokesman Jerry Schecter over Cuba's involvement in Zaire.

Schecter said it was natural that Castro didn't want to be associated with "an armed invasion where Europeans were brutally massacred and pregnant women suffered atrocities."

Bingham, who spent two years in military intelligence and had "the highest record of any member of Congress in supporting Carter" his first year, said he wasn't convinced by the evidence he heard from CIA Director Stansfield Turner that Cubans helped with the Katangan attack. As to Castro's participation in Angola and Ethiopia, Bingham said, "I don't believe he's doing this just because the Soviets tell him to. I think he wants to play a big role." "He wouldn't be playing any role if the Russians weren't for it," put in Jayne Ikard.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2

NEW YORK TIMES
17 JUNE 1978

New Actions on Alleged Nazi War Criminals Expected

By HOWARD BLUM

Special to The New York Times

The controversy surrounding the Federal Government's continuing investigation of 147 alleged Nazi war criminals living in this country will receive new focus this month with several developments in Congress.

Among these developments, which are coming after years of delay in many cases, are the following:

¶The House is expected to approve a \$2 million appropriation for a Nazi War Crime Litigation Unit, which has begun to work but does not yet have a full staff.

¶The House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on immigration will convene special hearings at which it plans to ask the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense to produce files detailing the agencies' associations with alleged Nazi war criminals. The chairman, Representative Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania, may extend these hearings into a full-scale investigation of why the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not act on some of the cases for more than 30 years.

¶The House Judiciary Committee is expected to vote Tuesday on a bill introduced by Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman, Democrat of Brooklyn, that for the first time would officially bar from the country and make liable for deportation all aliens known to have persecuted others because of race, religion or national origin. The bill, which is also supported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a Justice Department agency, has been delayed for two and a half years in committee.

The Justice Department is currently prosecuting 12 war crimes cases and plans to present an additional eight indictments to grant juries by August. Representative Holtzman points out, however, that "the Government has been involved in the prosecuting of

some of these cases for at least a decade."

In the 33 years since the end of World War II, only one war criminal, Mrs. Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan of Queens, has been sent back to Germany to stand trial.

"The existence of individuals accused of being Nazi war criminals still living freely in this country," said Representative Holtzman, "is a very sordid chapter in the history of our country. What is needed most of all is means to bring these cases into the courtroom."

The anticipated appropriation for the Nazi War Crime Litigation Unit is an attempt, according to a committee report to create "a concerted effort by I.N.S. to bring these cases to a final conclusion as quickly as possible."

"Prior to the formation of this special unit," said David W. Crosland, counsel to the I.N.S., "there was no coordinated effort to handle these cases. Investigations were handled by lawyers with varying degrees of competence and there was too much diffusion of responsibility so that often cases just were not followed up on."

The special unit now consists of four lawyers and two paralegals, and there are plans to hire three investigators. It is headed by Martin Mendelsohn, a 35-year-old lawyer who was hired by Mr. Crosland from private practice.

Mr. Mendelsohn, who described his role as "the official Nazi hunter for the U.S. Government," plans to interview witnesses in the Soviet Union before the end of this year. Previously, the State Department, despite the apparent willingness at the Soviet Gov-

ernment, had prohibited Federal investigators from interviewing witnesses in Communist countries.

Representative Holtzman, however, said she was disturbed by the delays in setting up this unit. "The Justice Department announced in August 1977 that they will set up a special Nazi unit," she said, "and it wasn't until October that Mendelsohn was on the job and it wasn't until May 1 of this year that the fourth lawyer began work. And still they haven't hired any investigators."

"I don't like the way the Federal bureaucracy works," Mr. Crosland said, "but it's just a fact of life we have to deal with. We wanted to staff the unit as quickly as possible, but we also wanted to hire the best people and that takes time. And as soon as Mr. Mendelsohn began last October he had to start trying cases in the courtroom so he just did not have the time to conduct interviews."

Sources for C.I.A.

Another result of past Congressional criticism of the immigration service was a recent General Accounting Office report that found that the C.I.A. had used 21 alleged Nazi war criminals as "sources of information," paying seven of them, and that as recently as 1972 the F.B.I. had a "confidential relationship" with two alleged war criminals but had not paid them.

Additionally, while the report concluded that "it appears that the I.N.S. was not involved in a deliberate effort to suppress information," it said the service had failed to investigate half of the cases in which it had received allegations before 1973.

Despite its findings, the report has been criticized by the man who requested it, Representative Eilberg. "The report doesn't give us answers," he said. "It doesn't name names. It just raises more questions."

month, Representative Eilberg plans to demand the entire case files of accused Nazis associated with the F.B.I. and C.I.A.

The C.I.A., according to a spokesman, has not decided whether it will comply with the subcommittee request for complete files. According to sources close to the special litigation unit, the F.B.I. has refused to provide Federal attorneys with information to assist in the prosecution of current cases. The bureau would not comment on the matter.

Among the Government's 12 current cases, all of which have come under Mr. Mendelsohn's supervision, are those of Frank Walus of Chicago, whose citizenship was ordered revoked last month, and Feodor Federenko, who is currently undergoing denaturalization proceedings in Fort Lauderdale,

Fla. Mr. Walus allegedly executed Jews in Poland. Mr. Federenko, whose trial ended yesterday, is accused of torturing and killing Jews as a concentration camp guard. A verdict is expected in a few weeks.

In a Manhattan case, deportation proceedings against Boleslavs Maikovskis have been interrupted pending the appeal of his claim that he denied the right to plead the Fifth Amendment in response to all questions.

Suspected war criminals cannot be tried in this country for war crimes. They can only lose their citizenship and then, in separate proceedings, be deported.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2

PARADE MAGAZINE
WASHINGTON POST
18 June 1978

Q. Steve McQueen, the Hollywood superstar, was seen in Japan in person this year. He was supposed to be on some supersecret mission for the Central Intelligence Agency. Can you reveal it?—Amy Henderson, Charlotte, N.C.

A. McQueen was in Tokyo as the plaintiff in a \$1 million damage suit. He sued four Japanese companies for using photographs in 1973 from one of his movies, "Le Mans," without his permission. The four companies were Dentsu, Japan's largest advertising agency; Matsushita Electric Industrial, a major appliance maker; Yakult, a beverage company, and Towa, a film distributor. McQueen claimed that Matsushita and Yakult used photos of him in a car racer's uniform to advertise their products on TV and in print, that Towa and Dentsu planned the ad campaigns. McQueen's presence in Tokyo was neither secret nor connected with the CIA.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
19 June 1978

Washington Whispers.

Recent discovery of bugging devices in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was not made accidentally by Navy Seabees. That was a "cover story." CIA technicians did the job—on a special mission to search for suspected electronic-monitoring equipment planted by the Russians.

Real reason the White House refuses to turn over proof of Cuban involvement in Zaire to anyone in Congress except members of intelligence committees, according to one White House official: "Too many lawmakers leak highly classified information like a sieve."

THE WASHINGTON POST

16 June 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-14

Intelligence Bill Called 'Overreaction' to Abuses

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

Former U.S. intelligence officers protested yesterday that a Senate plan for restructuring the nation's intelligence community would come close to stopping all covert operations.

Continuing a series of intelligence establishment complaints about the omnibus bill, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers assailed it at a Senate hearing as far too restrictive, "an overreaction to a few abuses of the past," in the face of a growing Soviet threat.

Association President Richard G. Stilwell, a retired Army general who once served as the Central Intelligence Agency's chief of covert actions for the Far East, said his organization also feels that the bill is mislabeled in being called "the National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978."

"The word 'reform' has an unfortunate connotation which is an affront to the thousands of dedicated employees of the intelligence community who were never aware of, [and never] participated in, the very few transgressions which led to the many sensational charges of the past few years," Stilwell told the Senate Intelligence Committee.

A dissenting voice came from Morton Halperin, director for the nonprofit Center for National Security Studies, who protested that the bill already represented an unwise retreat in many respects from changes advocated in 1976 by the first Senate Intelligence Committee under Frank Church (D-Idaho).

The record shows that not only have the intelligence agencies consistently chosen to ignore the law in the past and do the things which they knew to be illegal, it also shows that they gave a broad interpretation to all of the authority which they did have," Halperin said.

But where the Church committee recommended that covert operations be limited to extraordinary situations, Halperin told the committee, the proposed Senate measure, S. 2523, would seek to control them largely by requiring reports on such undertakings to just one committee in each house of the Congress, rather than the current number of four in each house.

Under current law, covert operations can be undertaken only on a presidential finding that they are "important to the national security." The Senate bill would require that they be "essential to the conduct of

the foreign policy or the national defense."

But while Halperin contended that such a finding would be more and more lightly made, Stilwell charged that the bill, as written, "is virtually a decision to stop all clandestine operations, not only positive collection and counter-intelligence but also covert action."

In addition to other presidential approvals required by the bill, all covert operations "must be reviewed and personally approved by the president," Stilwell said. "We submit that this mountain of red tape . . . is an intolerable burden on the highest levels of government."

The head of the retired spy group, which claims more than 2,500 members, was even more critical of proposed controls on surveillance of foreign intelligence operations in this country. The Senate has already approved legislation to require the issuance of judicial warrants for such surveillance.

Stilwell denounced the idea, insofar as it applies to "agents of foreign powers," as "incredible . . . unnecessary" and even "unconstitutional." He said it ought to be called "An Act to Convey Fourth Amendment Rights on the Soviet Embassy and all KGB Officers in the United States and All Other Foreigners."

Committee Chairman Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) said he was surprised to hear such outspoken objections to bringing the federal judiciary into the picture. "Are you afraid we're not going to be able to find a federal judge we can trust?" Bayh wondered.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 21

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 June 1978

Cambodia Claims CIA, Vietnam Fomented Coups

TOKYO (AP)—American and Vietnamese agents helped foment three unsuccessful coups against the Cambodian government since the Khmer Rouge Communists seized power in April 1975, Deputy Premier Ieng Sary said yesterday.

"There was an attempt to topple our government in September 1975, as well as one in 1976 and 1977," Ieng Sary told reporters in Tokyo. "We have managed to put down all such attempts at subversion."

The Cambodian leader, here on an unofficial visit, said the CIA and Vietnamese secret service had encouraged the attempts at overthrow.

A spokesman for the CIA in Washington denied Ieng Sary's charge, calling it "preposterous."

Asked about reports from Yugoslav journalists and Swedish diplomats who visited Cambodia earlier this year, Ieng Sary denied their assertions that Phnom Penh, the capital, appeared empty.

"About 200,000 people live there," he said. He went on to say that the initial evacuations soon after the Communists took over in April 1975, was only a "temporary" step. "However, the people are now satisfied with country life and they do not want to return to the city," he said.

At the end of the fighting Phnom Penh held almost 2 million people.

Refugees have said thousands of persons died in the forced evacuation. Ieng Sary said such reports were "fabrications intended to defame democratic Cambodia."

After the war ended, he said, "85 percent of our people became sick with malaria and could not walk. That was the reason for the evacuation of Phnom Penh. It was a necessary measure in order to prevent people from dying." He said most of the malaria cases had been cured.

Ieng Sary said the worst postwar problem has been hunger.

"Many people have died of starvation," he said. "In the course of the

war, much damage occurred to our country. Many cattle and water buffalo were destroyed, and therefore, we had a lack of food."

He added: "I would like to emphasize that we have not relied on foreign aid for food, and now we have overcome all of our food problems and we have even enough to export."

Ieng Sary reiterated Cambodia's position that it is willing to negotiate its border dispute with Vietnam "with the precondition that Vietnam must promise to respect our territorial integrity."

"They must promise not to attempt to interfere in our internal affairs, to attempt coups and must promise not to wage aggression," he said.

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 June 1978

Cuba Offers U.S. a Swap Of Prisoners

Former CIA Aide Puerto Rican Woman Would Be Exchanged

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Staff Writer

In the midst of the increasing tension in U.S.-Cuban relations, Cuba secretly has offered to exchange an American agent imprisoned in Havana for a Puerto Rican woman convicted of a 1954 terrorist attack on the U.S. Congress.

Carter administration sources said yesterday the Cuban proposal, which was relayed to Washington by an East German lawyer, would involve the swap of Lawrence K. Lunt, an American held by the Cubans since 1963, for Lolita LeBron, who is serving a 25-to-75-year U.S. prison term.

Because of the indirect way in which the offer was made, the sources stressed, U.S. officials are uncertain about whether it is a serious proposal that has the full backing of President Fidel Castro's government.

The sources added that the matter has been referred to the White House for a still pending decision on whether the State Department should make direct contact with Havana and explore the possibilities of negotiating an exchange of the two prisoners.

Complicating the situation, the sources said, has been the deterioration in relations caused by President Carter's accusations that Cuba helped to train and equip the rebels who invaded Zaire last month.

Cuba has denied the charges emphatically, and, in an interview Monday with The Washington Post, Castro said U.S.-Cuban relations are now at their lowest point since the beginning of the Carter administration.

In addition, Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.), who also talked with Castro on Monday, told reporters after his return to Washington yesterday that Castro had said he couldn't release political prisoners like Lunt "under existing circumstances." Solarz quoted Castro as saying, "Nobody in Cuba would understand it."

For different reasons, Lunt and LeBron have become political symbols who excite strong emotions among various groups with the power to cause problems for U.S. foreign policy.

Lunt, 54, who has been a cattle rancher in Cuba, has admitted that he acted as a contract agent collecting information for the Central Intelligence Agency. He is beginning the 14th year of a 30-year sentence imposed by the Cubans, and his plight frequently has been cited by U.S. conservatives who oppose any moves toward better relations with Cuba.

LeBron, 37, was one of four Puerto Rican nationalists who began firing pistols at random from a spectators' gallery in the House of Representatives on March 1, 1954. The shooting spree, in which four congressmen were wounded, was intended to dramatize demands for Puerto Rican independence from the United States.

In the years since, she has become a symbol of national pride for many of the 3.2 million people on that U.S. commonwealth island. In March, when she was given a brief furlough from prison to return to the island for her daughter's funeral, thousands turned out to greet her as a national heroine.

She has never recanted her views about the need to free Puerto Rico through armed struggle; and, administration sources note, to release her from prison now could create the risk of her becoming the rallying symbol for a new upsurge of nationalist terrorism on the island and the mainland.

Castro repeatedly has accused the United States of practicing colonialism in Puerto Rico. As a result, the sources said, the administration has to consider whether the prisoner exchange offer was intended as a propaganda ploy to stir unrest and trouble for the United States in the Caribbean.

The offer came to Washington's attention as the result of another multinational prisoner swap that took place in April and May. That complicated transaction saw the release of an Israeli pilot held in Mozambique; an American student imprisoned in East Germany; and a convicted Soviet spy serving a term in a U.S. federal prison.

The central figure in arranging that swap was Wolfgang Vogel, an East German lawyer who has negotiated a large number of prisoner exchanges between East and West Germany, and who helped engineer the return of American U2 spy plane pilot Francis Gary Powers from the Soviet Union. Among those who dealt with Vogel in the three-way swap was Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.). According to the sources, Vogel used him to pass along to the State Department the message that Cuba was willing to discuss a Lunt-LeBron swap.

WASHINGTON STAR
10 JUNE 1978

Soviets Appear Baffled By Carter 'Clarification'

By Marsh Clark
Time-Life News Service

MOSCOW — Were it not so serious, the increasingly deep rift in Soviet-American relations might be considered bad comedy.

The latest and most bizarre development involves a subterranean spy passage discovered under the U.S. Embassy here. The State Department yesterday dismissed as "absurd" Soviet charges that electronic devices found in an embassy chimney linked by a tunnel to Russian territory were protective devices aimed at foiling U.S. espionage.

The Keystone Cops character of this affair does not ameliorate the somber aspects of the deterioration in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Far more substantive was President Carter's commencement speech this week at his alma mater, the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

The address seemed to many Western diplomats here a curious mixture of contradictions. In one sentence he was conciliatory, in the next threatening.

"IT CERTAINLY seems like the president is a man with people pulling hard on his left arm, others nearly tearing off his right leg, everybody pulling him in different directions," said one Western diplomat.

If Westerners here had difficulty fathoming the Carter message, the Soviets seemed downright baffled.

The government news agency Tass, which is usually loquacious, called the speech "strange" — and then subsided into uncharacteristic silence. It later attacked Carter for asserting the Soviet bloc is armed beyond its security needs, accusing the United States of striving to surround it with bases.

Indeed, Carter's statement that "the Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation" was the kind of oversimplification that makes the dialogue so difficult. Carter knows — or should know — that the true nature of the present relationship falls somewhere in between the two extremes of all-out confrontation and true cooperation.

FOR EXAMPLE, during the last week a number of contradictory events have taken place. Two American guides at a U.S. agricultural exhibition in Kiev were asked to leave

the Soviet Union for supposedly "slandering" Russia and behaving "tactlessly" and "rudely" towards visitors to the show.

Moscow authorities arrested a leading Soviet Jew, Vladimir Slepak, who has been trying to emigrate to Israel for eight years. This arrest will further embitter American Jewry and place more strains on congressional approval of a possible strategic arms disarmament treaty as well as on revision of the Soviet-American trade agreement.

The Soviet press has continued to flail at Western involvement in Zaire, calling it "gunboat diplomacy," a curious metaphor when applied to an almost completely landlocked country.

Soviet newspapers have kept up their criticism of Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, saying he is "speaking in a language of the most frosty days of the Cold War."

BUT DURING THE last week other events occurred that demonstrate the diverse, businesslike and even friendly aspect of Soviet-American relations.

Meetings started Thursday in Helsinki, Finland, between delegations from the two countries seeking to establish controls on the production of so-called "killer satellites."

Carter angrily denied that details of the crucial disarmament negotiations will be adversely linked with what he sees as Soviet shortcomings in Africa and in the field of human rights.

Moscow — and many other Soviet cities — are filled with American tourists. A wide range of cooperative activities continue in full swing. There are over 200 joint projects in the cultural, athletic and scientific spheres that involve basketball players, heart transplant surgeons, pig farmers and oceanographers, among others.

The Soviet Union continues to depend on the import of American grain (13.6 million metric tons so far this year) to help it overcome its wheat and corn shortages.

These largely non-political programs proceed without interruption whatever the rhetorical climate.

ON BOTH SIDES there appears to be a desire not to permit the present misunderstandings about tunnels, spies and dissidents to destroy the relationship.

ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
15 May 1978

Join the CIA and tell all to get rich quick

By Walter T. Ridder

Washington

If a young man should come to me one of these days and ask me how to get ahead in life and make a lot of money, I would be tempted to reply, "Join the Central Intelligence Agency, work for it a couple of years or so, then quit and write a book about it. The shekels will roll in."

"THEN, TOO," I might continue, "you can become an instant personality. You can appear on national television, revealing all the secrets you know about and castigating the people with whom you worked and the work in which you were engaged. You can appear on national and local talk shows. Your agent will arrange lecture bookings."

"In every city in which you appear, you will be interviewed by the local newspaper and invited to more parties than you can possibly attend. In short, that's the way to the good life."

The recent spate of revelations by former CIA operatives raises the question of whether an organization such as the CIA is viable in our type of democracy.

IF EVERY man and his brother or sister who worked for the outfit dashes into print to tell ALL the work of the agency is obviously going to be stultified. Such works pinpoint foreign agents who worked for the U.S. government and bring their lives into danger.

Recruiting of spies, to call them by their right name, is made immeasurably more difficult. Laying bare the CIA's methods of operation equally obviously gives a leg up to the intelligence agencies of other governments.

Now, granted that many of the CIA's procedures and operations have been questionable or downright reprehensible. What was originally conceived as literally a central intelligence agency was over a period of time converted into something quite different. Rather than report on what was happening, the empha-

sis was laid on making things happen.

The art of making things happen entails acts which most Americans find repugnant. Assassinations, poisonings, invasions and other weapons in the armory of the so-called "dirty tricks" department are not compatible with the average American's idea of legitimate peacetime operations.

BLOWING the whistle on some of the CIA's more nefarious and more bizarre activities was probably a salutary thing. Like all good things, however, it can be driven too far.

Whether we like them or not, intelligence operations are of vital import to our government. The nature of the sad world in which we live is such that our government must attempt to find out what is going to happen or is likely to happen. Otherwise it would be conducting a blindfold foreign policy.

The running of an intelligence operation is complicated enough without having the added burden of not knowing who will leap into print or on television screens to spill the beans.

The CIA has sought to protect itself to some extent by asking would-be employees to sign an agreement not to go public without the express consent of the highest CIA authorities. Recent events have shown that some people regard that agreement as simply a scrap of paper.

OUR CONSTITUTION protects freedom of speech. It is difficult to see how curbs can be placed on former spooks who find it a moral imperative to confess what they had been doing, while feeling no moral obligation to live up to an agreement they had voluntarily signed.

Intelligence activities have always produced problems for the moralist. Moral or immoral, intelligence is a necessity to our government. One asks whether the recent books have done the CIA more harm than good.

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-7

NEW YORK TIMES
30 JUNE 1978

President Orders Liberalization Of Procedures on Classified Data

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 29 — President Carter signed an executive order today that significantly liberalizes procedures governing the classification of Government documents.

"While some material must be classified," the President said, "the Government classifies too much information, classifies it too highly and for too long. These practices violate the public's right to know, impose unnecessary costs, and weaken protection for truly sensitive information by undermining respect for all classification."

The executive order limits sharply the extent and duration of such classifications as "confidential," "secret," and "top secret" and reduces the number of agencies that have classification authority.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1978

New Carter Order Issued to Overhaul Data Classification

By Edward Walsh
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter, in a decision White House officials contended will make more information available to the public, issued an executive order yesterday overhauling the government's system for classifying documents.

The order, the result of a year-long administration review of the existing system, for the first time establishes seven broad categories of information that may be classified if disclosure of the information would cause "identifiable" damage to the national security.

White House officials argued that the changes will result in fewer documents being classified as "top secret," "secret" or "confidential." But the question remained whether the categories in the order are so broad that they will result in no significant change in the classification practices.

"There is no improvement in what can be classified in the first place, and there may be more confusion overall," said one congressional staff member who worked with the administration on the order. This aide contended that the categories, in effect, may serve to "legitimize" past classification practices.

But mixed with that criticism was praise for other sections of the order, intended to speed up and generally ease the system for declassifying documents.

"I would be less than candid if I did not say that I am not completely satisfied with this order," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden (D-Del.). "However, I believe the order is a marked improvement over existing policy."

The order reduces the length of time information may be classified, reduces the number of agencies with classification authority, requires that the public interest in disclosure be considered in declassification decisions and establishes a new government office to oversee the declassification process.

Six of the categories in the order cover everything from military plans and weapons to "foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States" and "scientific, technological or economic matters relating to the national security."

The seventh, catch-all category covers any other matters "related to national security and which require protection against unauthorized disclosure" in the opinion of the president or other top officials.

Briefing reporters at the White House, Rick Neustadt of the domestic policy staff and Deanna Siemer, the Defense Department's general counsel, said they could not estimate how a reduction in classified information would result from the order.

They also conceded that much will depend on how the new system is administered by government officials with classification power, each of whom will decide when disclosure of information would cause "identifiable" damage to the national security.

"The president is directing officials to be more restrictive" in the use of their classification authority, Neustadt said.

"On the whole, I think you will find fewer things are classified," he added. "With vigorous oversight, I think it will be substantial."

Under the order, according to the White House officials, most documents will be automatically declassified after six years. Previously, about half the documents classified by the government were declassified after six to 10 years, with the other half remaining classified for 30 years.

The Carter order reduces the 30-year classification period to 20 years. As a result, Neustadt said, the number of pages declassified during the next 10 years will increase from 350 million to about 600 million.

Eleven government agencies that deal primarily with domestic matters will lose their classification authority under the order, and another five agencies will have their power reduced. In most cases, these agencies

had little need for and rarely used their power to classify documents, officials said.

The order also requires that most documents be classified on a "section-by-section" basis rather than as a whole.

The new office created by the order, the Information Security Oversight Office, will be part of the General Services Administration. A congressional staff aide familiar with the drafting of the order said that suggestions that this office be given greater authority by placing it in the White House or executive office of the president were turned down because of Carter's promise to hold down the size of his staff.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-9

WASHINGTON STAR
24 JUNE 1978

Some of the Objects Missing From Museum

Excerpts from the National Journal's list of "unlocated" works of art, by artist and the year and agency to which they were loaned.

W.H. Holmes, "A Maryland Meadow, Watt's Branch, Near Rockville," 1/25/46, President Harry Truman.

Houdon, "Thomas Jefferson," 12/3/46, White House.

Houdon, "George Washington," 12/3/46, White House.

A.P. Barney, "Village Street," 9/18/59, OMB.

R.F. Seymour, "Tree Study," 2/1/61, OMB.

A. Thayer, "Male Wood Duck," 8/8/62, President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (defunct).

B.E. Jacques, "Hampstead Heath, London," 3/1/63, OMB.

F. Palmer, "Catskill Mountains," no date, Council of Economic Advisers.

G. Antreasian, "New Mexico II," no date, CIA.

J. Ross, "Farm," no date, CIA.

G. Antreasian, "Shield," 10/21/77, CIA.

N. Adams, "Galm," no date, CIA.

Bill Moss, "Oyster Shell Mounds, Crystal, Fla.," 1/69, White House.

James Rosenquist, no name, 1/69, White House.

D. Thompson, "New Orleans," 2/69, White House.

G. Catalano, "The Canal," 2/69, White House helicopters.

L. Sturges, "Spring," 2/69, White House helicopters.

R. Crossman, "Clock Tower, Rouen," 2/69, White House helicopters.

G.E. Burr, "Winter Evening," 2/69, White House helicopters.

E.T. Thompson, "Acadian Fishing Village," 2/69, White House helicopters.

A. Warhol, "Flowers," 9/69, White House.

Frank Skinner, "A Picardy Orchard," 5/70, White House helicopters.

B. Jacques, "Dandelion in Grass," 7/70, OMB.

W. Drews, "Arizona Evening," 7/70, OMB.

W.H. Holmes, "Maryland Wheat Field," 5/72, President Nixon.

Charles Culver, "Ducks," 6/72, Camp David.

Ted Kautsky, "Tidewater Creek, Oregon," 6/72, Vice President Agnew.

J. Dalrymple, "Map of N.H., Md., Pa., Va.," 8/72, Camp David.

Kurz & Allison, "Battle between the Monitor & The Merrimac," 8/72, Camp David.

D'Arcangelo, "Landscape II," 5/73, White House.

Sam Francis, "List Poster," 10/73, White House.

Cleve Gray, Untitled, 10/74, White House.

George Story, "Abraham

Lincoln" 1/75, White House.

Charles Henry, "Landscape," 12/74, President's Commission on White House Fellowships.

Sir Aston Webb, "Locksmith's Shop," 12/74, President's Commission on White House Fellowships.

I. Kerr, "Dogs & Sled . . .," 12/74, President's Commission on White House Fellowships.

L. Ochtman, "A Morning in Summer," 3/75, Vice President Rockefeller.

Arthur T. Hill, "After a Storm, Amangansett," 3/75, Vice President Rockefeller.

W. Granille Smith, "Grey Day," 10/75, Vice President Rockefeller.

Minerva Chapman, "Garden at the Tuileries, Paris," 6/75, White House-Vice President Rockefeller.

C. Moorepart, "Water," 9/67, CIA.

W.P. Robins, "Old Shoreham Cottage," 9/67, CIA.

C. Stuever, "Old Houses in Bavaria," 9/67, CIA.

STAT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-1,5

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1978


The Art Squad, Search-and-Retrieve

By Jo Ann Lewis

A three-person art squad has been formed to sweep the White House, Executive Office Buildings, Blair House and Camp David in search of 257 works of art, currently listed as "unlocated" by the National Collection of Fine Arts.

The search-and-retrieval mission is part of a new strategy adopted by NCFA following press reports last week stating that some art loaned to White House staffers since 1946 has long since been moved or removed from the walls for which it was borrowed.

The task force will scour the hundreds of offices involved as soon as the newly assigned members have been given security clearance, "which could happen within 24 hours after the names are received by us," accord-



ing to Peter Kyros, deputy chairman of the Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities who is coordinating White House cooperation in the search.

Floor plan in hand, the art squad will "literally have to case every office in the new and old EOB, the White House, Blair House and Camp David to complete their job," according to NCFA Registrar Robert Johnston. "And if we find things that have

been sent or taken somewhere else, we'll hunt them down till they're found."

Dr. Joshua Taylor, director of NCFA, met with Kyros on Wednesday, just before leaving for a scheduled three-week vacation, and was assured "full cooperation" in the search for the 160 prints, 68 watercolors, 23 paintings, four sculptures and two pastels outstanding. Taylor had written Kyros earlier in the week formally requesting clearance and easy access for the art squad.

"We'll need it," says Johnston. "I've tried checking out items in EOB before, and I know what it's like. You can do it if you have the cooperation of everyone there and can move freely, but people in individual offices have had a real reluctance to let me

in. I think it would be easier if someone came with us this time, to clear the way."

Hand-picked for the mission (which could take weeks, according to Johnston) are the museum's associate curator of prints and drawings, Tina Norelli, and two members of Johnston's staff, Deborah Jensen and Thomas Bower. Donald McClelland, coordinator of the lending program, has been detailed to reconnoiter Camp David.

How would the denizens of EOB react if the art squad burst into their offices asking to see their etchings? "Well, I'd figure they must be following up on those pictures they lost over here, and I don't know what I'd do. I don't know how you could keep them out," said one. But, she added, "we really don't have anything in here worth looking at—at least it doesn't look very important."

In the wake of stories which appeared in the press last Friday, the NCFA has received two phone calls pinning down the location of seven works on the "unlocated" list. Four prints were reported to be hanging at the CIA, "which is where they're supposed to be," according to Johnston, "and three watercolors have been located at the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). These were signed out to the Executive Office Building in 1963."

The NCFA lending program to the executive branch began informally in 1929, and until 1975 made works of art available to various government officials, with no apparent guidelines. The same year the rules were tightened to include only officials of cabinet rank or higher, and borrowers were required to personally sign a loan agreement as any other museum would have to do.

Also in 1975, NCFA undertook an inventory of all outstanding loans to the executive branch, 496 in all. Since that time all but the 257 which came to light last week have been located

or returned. Twelve items were returned from the White House in April, others in late May. Some have been reacquired and returned to the borrowers under the new strictures.

"You must remember," said Taylor, "that until 10 years ago the NCFA was only an office and a few galleries behind the elephant in the Museum of Natural History." The one storage room they had is now used as a nurse's office. "They were grateful to have some place to hang the works."

More professional and systematic caring for the collections began when the museum moved into the renovated Patent Office Building just a decade ago.

And does the NCFA expect that, after this grueling task, most of the works will be found? "I do, I really, really do," says Johnston, "but just in case, I'm keeping my fingers crossed."

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9



Entrance sign for CIA headquarters

By R. Norman Matheny, staff photographer

Conflicting views of U.S. intelligence

For variety's sake, here are three other recently published books on the U.S. intelligence empire, including something light, something heavy, something scathing.

Portrait of a Cold Warrior, by Joseph B. Smith. New York: Putnam. \$10.95.

For those who would like to escape the moralizing tone of much of the literature on the Central Intelligence Agency — both pro and con — this is the closest you can get to a lighthearted account from a one-time practitioner of the clandestine arts. Includes interesting new material on CIA work in the Philippines.


The Armies of Ignorance, by William R. Corson. New York: The Dial Press/James Wade. \$12.95.

For those who want something weighty, former Marine colonel and intelligence specialist Corson traces the history of the intelligence establishment from the Revolutionary War up to President Carter.

Uncloaking the CIA, Edited by Howard Frazier. New York: The Free Press. \$12.95.

For those who want a collection of some of the shrillest denunciations from some of the most scathing critics.

D. S.



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 75

CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW
MAY/JUNE 1978

SIGNIFICANT 1977-78 BOOKS

*The Year
in Books*

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY ERA, by Douglas Blaufarb, *The Free Press*, 1977, \$12.95.

The CIA develops its strategy for maintaining the postwar *Pax Americana*.

DECENT INTERVAL, by Frank Snepp, *Random House*, 1977, \$14.95.

Pax Americana collapses in Vietnam. Ultimate civil libertarian importance of this book may lie in the Justice Department suit against Snepp. The government maintains that he violated his oath of secrecy with the CIA, and that his profits should be attached.

TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW, by Morton Halperin and Daniel Hoffman, *New Republic Books*, 1977, \$8.95.

THE ARMIES OF IGNORANCE, by William Corson, *Dial*, 1977, \$10.95.

Massive and muddled tracing of American intelligence network.

HIDDEN TERRORS, by A. J. Langguth, *Pantheon*, 1978, \$10.00.

The story of the abduction and murder of Dan Mitrone by Uruguayan revolutionaries. Mitrone, on loan from the U.S. Government, had been training the national police in the use of torture and other "nonregular" techniques dear to the hearts of all civil libertarians.

DULLES, by Leonard Mosley, *Dial*, 1978, \$12.95.

The story of John Foster, Allen, and Eleanor.

THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS, by James Q. Wilson, *Basic Books*, 1978, \$10.00.

LEGEND: THE SECRET WORLD OF LEE HARVEY OSWALD, by Edward Jay Epstein, *McGraw-Hill*, 1978, \$12.95.

Contains some interesting speculation about the relationship between the CIA and the KGB, and illuminates the recent power struggle within the CIA.

UNCLOAKING THE CIA, edited by Howard Frazier, *Macmillan*, 1978, \$10.95.

COMMAND DECISION AND THE PRESIDENCY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND ORGANIZATION, by R. Gordon Hoxie, *Reader's Digest Press*, 1978, \$15.00.

The foreword is by Gerry Ford. Needless to say, this is not an argument for further presidential restraints.

HONORABLE MEN, by William Colby, *Simon and Schuster*, 1978, \$10.95.

Colby takes a few pot shots at the Rockefeller Commission in this memoir.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11

THE WASHINGTONIAN
July 1978

BOOKNOTES

Putnam's has a hot fall list, including a new Art Buchwald collection titled *The Buchwald Stops Here*; Joseph Goulden's *The Million Dollar Lawyers*; Mario Puzo's novel about Las Vegas, *Fools Die*; Edward Jay Epstein's novel, *Cartel*, about the CIA and treachery in the Mideast; and Lucy Moorhead's guide to Washington social life, *Entertaining in Washington* . . .

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 32-34

THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
25 June 1978

CRIME

By Newgate Callendar

A subject very much in the news the last few years has been the activity of the "spooks" in the C.I.A., and Shelly Gross has taken up the subject in **HAVANA X** (Arbor House, \$8.95). He has written a novel about the C.I.A. hiring the Mafia to take out a contract on Fidel Castro. The contract's price, \$2 million. The Mafia settles on a Cuban-born financier who is having difficulties. But he is relatively young, a war hero and a specialist in hand-to-hand combat. He takes the assignment and infiltrates Cuba. Then he has all kinds of double crosses to contend with. He also has Cuban security breathing down his neck. This is a man-hunt novel, filled with action. The ending is somewhat contrived, but not beyond belief. Mr. Gross writes well and also has a cynical view of the men who run the world.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
28 June 1978

CIA Says SALT Won't Cut Soviet Spending on Arms

By JEROME CAHILL

Washington (News Bureau)—Agreement on a new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union would not "slow the growth of Soviet defense spending significantly," the CIA said yesterday.

In a study presented to the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, the CIA predicted that the Soviets over the next two or three years will be increasing their defense outlays, but at a somewhat lower rate than their 4% to 5% longterm growth rate, because some new missile, submarine and fighter aircraft programs are nearing completion.

But during the early 1980s, the intelligence agency said, "We expect the Soviets to begin testing and deploying a number of the new weapon systems under development," probably boosting outlays to their longterm rates.

The study said that the Soviet economy, which has been slowing in the 1960s and 1970s, will slow even more so in the 1980s. This has caused "concern" but will likely reduce defense spending "only marginally," the CIA said.

According to the intelligence agency, the Soviets currently are devoting only about 10% of their total defense spending to intercontinental attack forces subject to the SALT negotiations. A SALT agreement, the study said, "would probably reduce the rate of growth of total Soviet defense spending by only about 0.2% per year."

In the 1976-77 period, Soviet economic growth was lower than any time since World War II "and the situation is likely to worsen," with annual growth rates of 4% through 1980 falling off to 3% or 3.5% from 1981 through 1985, the agency said. It attributed the lackluster outlook to a decline in the Russian labor force and an inability to improve productivity.

The 14-page analysis said several members of the present leadership in the Kremlin "will almost certainly pass form the scene" in the next five years, leaving no heir-apparent to President Leonid Brezhnev. It predicted that a caretaker regime would assume authority, continuing current policies.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 26

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
28 June 1978

Soviet Trade With Less-Developed States Reached a Record \$12.2 Billion Last Year

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

NEW YORK — Soviet trade with the world's less-developed nations reached a record \$12.2 billion last year, giving the Communist superpower both a hard-currency trade surplus and increased access to valuable raw materials, such as oil, iron ore and phosphates.

This trade represents the fastest-growing sector of Soviet commerce. It represents about 14% of the Soviet total, compared with 29% with Western nations and 57% with other Communist countries, mostly those of Eastern Europe.

According to a new study by the Central Intelligence Agency, business with the less-developed lands last year gave Moscow a \$1.2 billion hard-currency surplus, due mostly to sale of weapons—particularly in the Mideast—for cash. This was up from an \$800 million hard-currency surplus in 1976.

Overall, the Soviet trade surplus is even larger. The CIA study says: 1977 Soviet exports totaled \$7.9 billion, while imports were only \$4.3 billion. Much of this exchange was through barter arrangements, but the agency says Moscow is clearly moving toward less complex hard-currency deals that give the Soviet Union cash to spend in the West for finished products.

In dollar figures, the growth rate is misleading, however. According to the CIA study, Soviet trade with less-developed countries grew from \$2.8 billion in 1969 to \$9.4 billion in 1976 and then to \$12.2 billion last year. About half this increase, though, is

due to changed currency-exchange rates and rising prices for commodities; the other half represents an actual increase in the physical volume of goods exchanged.

Moscow's big seller to the less-developed countries is armaments, totaling about \$2 billion in each of the past two years. Petroleum exports earned \$500 million in 1976 and probably more last year, though the agency didn't give a dollar estimate. The Soviet Union's main hard-currency purchases were grain, sugar and other foodstuffs from Latin America, it added.

Among the imports growing in importance, the CIA says, are oil and natural gas, iron ore, bauxite and phosphates. In all cases, it concludes that Moscow has stepped up such purchases because domestic production of these basic raw materials is lagging behind state plan goals. Although Moscow tries hard to export machinery—as well as arms—to Third World states, it imports relatively few manufactured products from them.

In recent years the CIA study concludes, the Soviet market has become increasingly important to many poor nations. Moscow often provides arms and machinery on lenient terms, even if it demands scarce hard currency in payment. It also offers assured long-term deals for raw materials that can't always be sold easily in volatile non-Communist markets. The Soviets, in addition, will often import consumer goods that can't be sold in the West due to their poor quality, according to the CIA.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1978

CIA Sees Soviet Arms Outlay Rising SALT or Not

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency yesterday discouraged any idea that a new U.S.-Soviet strategic arms agreement would enable both superpowers to reduce defense spending.

"Conclusion of a SALT II agreement along the lines currently being discussed would not, in itself, slow the growth of Soviet defense spending significantly," predicted the CIA in the unclassified version of a report submitted to the Joint Economic Committee.

Since the Carter administration has repeatedly pledged to keep up with the Soviet Union militarily, the view from the CIA is for higher and higher defense budgets in both nations, strategic arms agreement or not.

While the CIA's assessment may give ammunition to critics of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), President Carter has based his pursuit of a SALT agreement not on saving money but on making the world less dangerous by reducing the nuclear arsenals commanded by Washington and Moscow. Therefore, his pursuit is expected to continue.

Even though the Soviet economy is in no great shape today and will slow down further in the 1980s, CIA said in its 14-page report, "all of the evidence available to us on Soviet defense programs underway and planned suggests that the long-term upward trend" in Moscow's military spending "is likely to continue into the 1980s."

From 1967 to 1977, the agency said in its report, Soviet defense spending increased by about 4 to 5 percent a year, taking between 11 to 13 percent of the gross national product and absorbing about one-third of the metal industry's output.

"There is no indication that economic problems are causing major changes in defense policy," the CIA said, although "modest alterations" may be under consideration.

Like the United States, the Soviet Union spends most of its defense money on nonnuclear forces — the troops, tanks, ships and artillery for World War II-type warfare. They would not be covered under a SALT agreement and thus would continue to drive up Soviet military spending, barring some negotiated limit on non-nuclear forces.

"Spending for intercontinental at-

tack forces subject to SALT II limitation constituted a little over 10 percent of total defense spending and grew at a slower pace than the total," the CIA said in assessing Moscow's 1967-77 outlays.

In that same period, Soviet nervousness about both their front and back doors was reflected in CIA estimates that the Kremlin doubled its spending for forces along the NATO and Chinese borders.

The CIA, in this latest of several reports on Soviet defense spending, tried to pick out the significant trends. It did not make any direct comparisons with U.S. spending.

In assessing the 1967-77 period and analyzing what is likely to happen next, these were among the findings:

- Soviet bomber. "The Soviets may also be developing a new long-range bomber. If such a bomber were to be deployed, it could be introduced into Long Range Aviation units by the early 1980s."

- SALT impact. A strategic arms control agreement along the lines proposed by the Carter administration "would probably reduce the rate of growth of total Soviet defense spending by only about 0.2 percentage points per year. The resulting savings would amount to less than 1.5 percent of total defense spending projected through the early 1980s in the absence of an agreement."

- Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW). "The Soviets probably will give a greater priority to the open-ocean ASW mission and to increasing production of nuclear-powered attack submarines. Continued procurement of the Backfire bomber is also likely, and introduction of a new long-range ASW aircraft is possible."

- Soviet research. "The resources allocated" to military research "will continue to grow into the 1980s."

- Cruise missile defense. "By the early 1980s we expect deployment of new low-altitude, surface-to-air missiles and one or more modified interceptors designed to engage low-flying targets," like the cruise missile President Carter has decided to build for the 1980s instead of the B1 bomber.

William Perry, Pentagon research director, has said the Soviets' greatest weakness in defending against the cruise missile is lack of "look-down" radars. The CIA said "the Soviets will probably deploy new ground-based, air-surveillance radars and airborne warning and control aircraft." These aircraft carry look-down radar.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-6NEW YORK TIMES
30 JUNE 1978

C.I.A. Expects a Rise in Soviet Military Outlays

By DREW MIDDLETON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 29—The Soviet Union's military spending in the first years of the next decade is expected by the Central Intelligence Agency to increase by 4 to 5 percent annually, continuing the present trend.

The United States has pledged a 3 percent increase in military spending to allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Russians in the early 1980's will begin testing and deploying a number of new weapons systems now under development according to a research paper of the C.I.A. These include the next generation of strategic missiles, planes, including a long-range bombers, and submarines.

The agency's judgment is that "while the Soviet leaders are clearly concerned about present and impending economic problems, there is no indication that they are contemplating major changes in defense policy."

No Heir Apparent Identified

Although the paper assumes that within the next five years several of the Soviet leaders, including presumably Leonid I. Brezhnev, "will almost certainly pass from the scene," it identifies no heir-apparent and believes that abrupt changes in military spending are unlikely.

The Soviet political institutions and leaders who support defense programs, such as the military and the managers of military industries and Communist Party and government leaders whose constituents depend on military production, are likely to retain their influence on the military program.

The agency's estimate show that Soviet military spending properly increased from the 35 to 40 billion ruble range in 1967 to the 53 to 58 billion ruble range in 1977, measured in 1970 prices. A ruble is \$1.60 at the official rate of exchange.

Under a broader definition, including expenditures for internal security forces, civil defense, military stockpiling, foreign military assistance and space programs,

defense spending grew from the 40 to 45 billion ruble range in 1967 to the 58 to 63 billion range in 1977.

According to the narrowed definition, military spending amounted to 11-12 percent of gross national product. The United States figure for 1977 was 6 percent. Some experts on the Soviet military, among them Prof. Richard Pipes of Harvard, believe that the Soviet figure is closer to 15 percent.

The C.I.A. notes that during this 10-year period, Soviet spending for investment accounted for 26 percent of G.N.P. and spending for health and education for 6 to 7 percent.

Research Outlays Estimated

To the United States and its allies, the most alarming figure in the agency's estimates would appear to be those for research, development, testing and evaluation of new weapons and equipment.

The agency concedes that it "cannot speak with confidence" in this field, but

says the information is based on published Soviet statistics and government statements on the financing of research and evidence on particular projects. These suggest that outlays for research and development account for almost one quarter of the total military spending.

The projected United States figure of \$12.5 billion for those programs in fiscal year 1979 is well below one-quarter of the United States military budget.

A major difference in American and Soviet military outlays is in personnel costs. The Soviet ground forces increased between 1967 and 1977 from 1.2 million to 1.7 million. During this period, spending for personnel was 16 percent of total spending compared with 56 percent in the United States.

Soviet spending for strategic missiles and bombers took a little over 10 percent of total spending for forces subject to the second strategic arms limitation treaty now being negotiated.

"For the next two or three years, Soviet defense spending will continue to grow," the agency said, "conclusion of a SALT II agreement along the lines currently being discussed would not, in itself, slow the growth of Soviet defense spending significantly."

Concern in the Atlantic alliance over a threat in Central Europe is supported by C.I.A. figures on outlays for Soviet forces in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. These forces include not only the army, but tactical aviation.

The C.I.A. said that the expansion and modernization of tactical aviation and the modernization of the ground forces provided Soviet forces in Central Europe "with a better capability to wage both conventional and theater nuclear war."

The Soviet buildup along the Chinese frontier occurred during the same period. It accounted for a little over 10 percent of total military spending, with the Russians doubling the number of divisions and increasing the number of tactical aircraft five-fold.

WATERVILLE SENTINEL (Maine)

13 June 1978

The Oil Glut

The current glut of oil has, inevitably, brought into question President Carter's projections of a world energy shortage. The President's energy estimates come in part from the CIA which has predicted that the Soviet Union, now the world's No. 1 oil producer, will be importing 3.5 million barrels of oil a day by 1985. The Soviets insist they will be exporting in rather substantial quantities by the mid-'80's. Nobody really knows.

Critics inside and outside the government think Mr. Carter is taking a big gamble depending on the CIA's estimates. If these estimates are wrong, so the reasoning goes, the Carter program to shift American dependence from oil to coal, nuclear, and solar energy will

push industry and the nation into an expensive change-over process we can ill afford at a time of some economic distress.

These critics miss the point. Certainly, the CIA estimates may be inaccurate. Oil may not run short 'til the mid-1990's — perhaps even 'til the mid-21st century. No one knows what untapped and undiscovered reserves may still be lying locked within the planet's storehouse depths. But the fact remains that Earth's mineral treasures are finite. They are going to run out some day. It makes a lot more sense to convert to renewable sources of energy under a deliberate, planned program than under the pressure of severe shortage — with all the dangerous international political tensions that will involve.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

OKLAHOMA CITY JOURNAL

11 June 1978

What Evidence?

CIA Director Stansfield Turner has testified before congressional committees — in secret — to show what he calls a "preponderance" of evidence to support the President's contention that Cuba was actively involved in the invasion of Zaire. Similarly, the President hosted meetings with leaders of Congress in the White House to convince them he had the facts to support his statements — again in secret.

The secret nature of these briefings poses a problem. The President has been asked to substantiate his charges by third world countries, at least some of whom seem genuinely to want the truth from conflicting claims. Why should not they and the American people be shown hard

evidence of Cuban involvement?

Perhaps national security considerations prevent the administration from revealing all its evidence, or sources for it. But surely there are some hard facts available which will settle the matter. Certainly the Cubans know the extent of their involvement in the invasion, as do the Russians. The White House is missing an excellent opportunity to gain support from third world nations by demonstrating Cuba's culpability publicly.

More important than world opinion is the simple fact the American people are entitled to know the facts, up to the very narrow point of security precautions, if any really apply in this case.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-13

THE WASHINGTON POST
24 June 1978

Clayton Fritchey

Cuba: Playing Follow the Leader?

Who do the Cubans think they are? Americans? They go rampaging around the world as if, like the United States, they had a "Manifest Destiny." Insufferable! No wonder President Carter is outraged.

After all, who empowered Castro to usurp America's established role as policeman of the world? Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but even so, as Jimmy Carter says, there's a limit.

Take Africa, for example. According to the CIA, Cuba has 12,000, or 17,000 or 25,000 men in Ethiopia. What are they doing there? Well, in their impertinent way, they reply by asking what 40,000 U.S. troops are doing in South Korea.

Our answer is that we were invited in, and we are still there to guard against a potential invasion by North Korea. Also, if we suddenly pulled out, South Korea's military dictatorship might be overthrown by dissidents who want to establish a democratic government.

Castro tries to counter this by insisting that Cuba likewise was invited in by the Ethiopians to help them defend themselves against an actual invasion by neighboring Somalia. What red-blooded American is going to believe that, even if it is true?

Cuba, like the rest of the world, ought to realize by now that the United States in principle is against foreign military or para-military interventions, although, of course, there are times when a great power must rise above principle, as in our Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.

As every fair-minded person knows, however, we did this only for Cuba's own good, so there is no call for Castro treating this as a precedent for intruding in other countries like, for instance, Angola, where three rival liberation groups (or tribes) fought for power after the colonial Portuguese government collapsed.

Not even the boastful Castro can claim he got to Angola ahead of us. Although the United States never gave up on the Portuguese until the end, we for years took out insurance by secretly giving aid to Holden Roberto and his ineffectual National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

Later, after the Portuguese fled, the CIA also covertly supported Joseph Savimbi and his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which got help, too, from President Mobutu of Zaire and from the whites of South Africa, which did not endear us to the continent's blacks.

Meanwhile, the Russians had for years been supporting the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola headed by Agostinho Neto, who now heads up the Angolan government in Luanda after winning the civil war with the help of Cuban troops who poured in when the CIA stepped up its campaign.

In short, Castro beat the United States at its own game, which is intolerable enough, but now he claims his forces are "stabilizing" Angola, and he doesn't even give Andrew Young, our U.N. ambassador, credit for saying it first. It's rank plagiarism.

Congress has just heard expert testimony that Cuban support recently helped Neto put down an internal challenge by a radical dissident faction backed by Moscow. Moreover, Castro's men are safeguarding the Gulf Oil installation at Cabinda which, with the blessing of Neto, continues to flourish as the country's largest private enterprise.

In any case, "stabilization" is a specialty of the United States. We made it famous in 1965 when we invaded the Dominican Republic at the time a military coup overthrew the democratic government of Juan Bosch. Like the Cubans in Angola, our troops stayed on for some time, and they stabilized the country so well that the leader of the coup has been in power ever since, although he has just lost an election—which the military almost upset.

If the Cubans have to imitate us, why can't they pay attention to what we preach instead of what we practice? Our Monroe Doctrine, for example, strictly forbids foreign interventions anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, and, as the Russians can testify after the Cuban missile crisis, we mean it—with one exception.

Since the turn of the century, we have reserved for ourselves the exclusive right to guide our often misguided neighbors into the path of U.S. righteousness and, if necessary, to send in the Marines or the CIA or both to make sure that Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama and Guatemala, among others, got the point. But how much gratitude have we got for it?

For a small island with only 9 million people, Cuba has been making quite a dent internationally. Nonetheless, Castro is suffering from delusions of grandeur if he thinks Pax Cuba can match or top Pax Americana. "It is time," says Henry Kissinger, "that one overcomes the ridiculous myth of the invincible Cubans." But he failed to note that the myth flourishes only in the United States, chiefly in the White House. However, the Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt, didn't miss the point. He says: "It would be strange indeed if the United States, with 220 million people should be hypnotized by Cuban military adventures on another continent."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-6

BALTIMORE SUN
26 JUNE 1978

Tanzania chief voices concern over CIA actions in Africa

By HENRY A. TREWHITT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania expressed great faith yesterday in President Carter's intentions but great skepticism about what the Central Intelligence Agency is up to in southern Africa.

In a television interview (ABC's Issues and Answers), Mr. Nyerere declared Mr. Carter to be "a democrat, liberal," and dedicated to black majority government in Africa.

A long exchange of letters between them, he said, had relieved some of his anxieties about American policy, but not others.

Though plainly more tolerant of Soviet

activity than American activity in Africa, Mr. Nyerere confessed that he trusted neither fully. Both, he said, were motivated by self-interest on a stage wider than Africa.

At the same time, he said, he believed the CIA, working directly or indirectly with South Africa, is supporting opponents of Agostinho Neto's Marxist government in Angola. That campaign, he claimed, was one of the reasons for the 20,000 Cuban troops—whose presence he approves—in Angola.

Mr. Nyerere expressed tolerance, but nothing more, for the Anglo-American effort to promote negotiations between rivals for power in Rhodesia. As promised, he said, he would attend the conference of the rivals, and of leaders from surrounding states, if the British and the Americans could arrange it.

But "hopeful is too strong a word" to describe his attitude, he said. "My own belief is that it will be a useless meeting."

The United States and Great Britain are trying to bring black and white leaders of the so-called internal settlement in Rhodesia together with black guerrilla leaders now outside the country. The prospects, never good, have been dimmed further by the massacre of 12 persons (missionaries and members of their families) in Rhodesia near the border of Mozambique.

Mr. Nyerere and the leaders of four other surrounding black-governed countries demand an immediate transition.

His remarks reflected all the current ambiguities of the changing situation in

southern Africa.

He praised Mr. Carter for keeping his distance from the pan-African peacekeeping force proposed by France. The French objective, Mr. Nyerere declared, was to retain as much control in Africa—especially in Zaire, where the force would have intervened first—as possible.

On the other hand, he said he and Mr. Carter still had differences over the Soviet-Cuban role in Africa. Besides Angola, 20,000 Cuban troops with Soviet advisers are stationed in Ethiopia.

The way to force withdrawal of Cuban troops, Mr. Nyerere said, was to remove the reasons for their presence. That meant, in his judgment, stopping antigovernment forces in Angola—the point at which the CIA entered his perspective.

Asked whether he would urge the withdrawal of the Cubans at that point, he avoided a direct answer. There simply would be no need for their presence, he explained.

Mr. Nyerere expressed greater worry about the African goals of some of Mr. Carter's advisers than those of the President himself. He confirmed diplomatically that he meant especially Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser.

Mr. Brzezinski has stated explicitly his alarm about Soviet strategic objectives in Africa. By contrast, Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State, has tried to avoid confrontation, aiming instead at removing the reasons that Africa is fertile ground for Soviet intervention.

In the end, Mr. Nyerere recognized that both superpowers are concerned with their global interests, not their African interests alone.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-7

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1978

Carter: Unaware of Angola Aid Bid

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter said yesterday he had no prior knowledge of a visit his director of central intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, paid this spring to Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) to discuss possible covert aid to rebels in Angola.

The Turner-Clark meeting convinced the senator, who is chairman of the subcommittee on African affairs, that the Carter administration was seriously considering covert aid through France to rebels fighting against Angola's Marxist government. Carter said yesterday, however, that he had never intended to send weapons to Angola, directly or indirectly.

The Washington Post first reported on the Turner-Clark contacts in late May, but yesterday's press conference was the first in which the president was asked about the incident. In effect, Carter washed his hands of it.

At first he said "there was never any plan put forward to send back-door weapons to the [Angolan] rebels because that would have been in violation of the American law," a reference to a legislative rider authored by Clark forbidding aid to any Angolan faction.

"I don't believe any responsible person in my administration would have violated the so-called Clark amendment," the president said.

Pressed further by Martin Schram of Newsday, who noted that Turner presented a written plan to Clark outlining a program of covert arms aid to Angolan rebels, Carter said he "didn't have any idea that the CIA director had even talked to Sen. Clark about it."

Carter said he understood that Turner had only gone to Clark to discuss "what involvement would be possible in Angola... within the bounds of the law."

It was reported in May that Clark felt the administration was looking for ways to avoid or overcome the

constraints of the Clark amendment by seeking his approval for the plan.

According to Turner in later testimony, a committee of the National Security Council authorized his visit to Clark. The idea of exploring aid to Angolan rebels to try to tie down Cuban troops now supporting the Angolan regime was encouraged by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, according to administration officials.

Responding to another question yesterday, Carter again defended Brzezinski, asserting that Brzezinski's critics sometimes pick on him, "insinuating I am either ineffective or incompetent or ignorant, that I don't actually make the decisions, but that my subordinates make them for me."

"I make the decisions, and I want to be responsible for those decisions once they are made," Carter said.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1,12

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 June 1978

Crawford Freed; 2 Newsmen Accused

U.S.-Soviet Bargain Leads to Release

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—American businessman Francis Jay Crawford was released from the KGB's Lefortovo Prison last night and taken by police to Moscow's Intourist Hotel where he had a tearful, emotional reunion with his fiancée, Virginia Olbrish.

Crawford and Olbrish, 32, cried and kissed in the doorway of the hotel room he has rented for his two years of duty here.

The 38-year-old Moscow representative of International Harvester was released as Soviet authorities, after a day of confusing delays, kept their end of a bargain with the United States, which has freed two alleged Soviet spies from jail in America.

Crawford was arrested June 12 when Soviet police stopped his car and dragged him away.

After he was returned to the hotel last night, Crawford and Olbrish, a secretary at the U.S. Embassy, went back downstairs to retrieve his personal belongings from the rear of the shiny black Chaika limousine in which he had ridden away from 15 days in the prison run by the Soviet secret police.

As reporters and gray-haired, tight-lipped Harvester executives milled around him, Crawford said little about his stay in prison beyond the fact that he was obviously "glad" to be out. His round face worked with emotion as he gripped his fiancée, and he said he would have "a statement" tomorrow.

Soviet authorities have alleged that Crawford, who is product manager for the International Harvester sales and service office here, "systematically sold large amounts of foreign currency at speculative prices to Soviet citizens." Crawford reportedly has denied the allegations. Tass, the Soviet news agency, has said that three Soviets have been implicated as accomplices. It did not name them.

Seasoned Western diplomatic sources here have viewed his arrest and detention as little more than a Soviet maneuver to set up a swap for the two Soviet employees of the United Nations who have been accused of trying to pass U.S. Navy secrets to Moscow.

The two men, Rudolf Chernayev and Vladimir Enger, were arrested and held in jail awaiting trial in New Jersey. The arrest and public disclosures of the charges against them by the U.S. government broke with recent practice between the two governments. Previously persons suspected of espionage usually have been quietly expelled, so as to keep the atmosphere of relations between the two capitals from becoming inflamed by practices each covertly recognizes the other engages in.

The Carter administration decision to go ahead with a full public prosecution of the two Soviets came at a time when relations between the two capitals have been deteriorating over such crucial issues as the strategic arms limitation talks, and Soviet military intervention in Africa.

Under the terms of the agreement, Crawford is considered to be technically in the personal custody of U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon. He is to be on call for Soviet authorities who are investigating the allegations against him. The two accused spies are similarly technically in the custody of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington, available for legal proceeding in their case.

Crawford's release had a lifting effect on the atmosphere among the U.S. businessmen, journalists and diplomats living here who have watched with dismay as the deteriorating relations between Washington and Moscow have meant new harassments of Americans by the Soviet government. But the sense of relief was minimized by the latest Kremlin move against Americans.

Earlier yesterday, the Soviets notified two American reporters here that they are to appear today in a Moscow city court as defendants in what apparently is a complaint of slander lodged against them by the state television radio combine. The reporters are Craig Whitney of The New York Times and Harold Piper of the Baltimore Sun.

Reports of Crawford's impending release reached here from Washington about midnight Monday, but attempts to find out if he had already been freed were fruitless. This morning, it turned out that the chief U.S. consular officer, Clifford Gross, had to go through a series of formalities before Crawford could be released. He went to the Foreign Ministry and obtained special documents giving permission for Crawford to be freed, an unusual act under Soviet criminal law. Defendants here are frequently held incommunicado for months at a time before their trial.

Gross then went to the Moscow prosecutor's office, for what U.S. Embassy officials had understood would be a quick meeting prior to obtaining final permission to set the Alabamian free.

But Soviet lawyers balked and Gross finally made it to Lefortovo in late afternoon, only to be told after talking with officials there that the KGB intended to return Crawford personally to his room at the Intourist.

He finally appeared there about 6 p.m., dressed in a red flannel shirt, jeans and his ever-present cowboy boots—this pair black—barely keeping his composure.



HAROLD PIPER

... reported on dissidents



CRAIG WHITNEY

... ordered to court

A Civil Suit in Moscow

With police state perversity, the Soviet Union seems to be in the process of turning a post-Stalinist liberalizing revision of its legal code into an instrument for harassing American reporters.

Hal Piper of *The Sun*, the senior U.S. correspondent in Moscow, and Craig R. Whitney, of the New York Times bureau, have been summoned to appear in Kalanchevskaya City Court today. The charge is one of slander probably arising from stories both wrote last month challenging the credibility of a television broadcast in which a well-known Georgian dissident, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, recanted his criticisms of the Soviet system.

The press department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry has informed Mr. Piper and Mr. Whitney that the civil suit has been brought by Gosteleradio, the state television and radio administration, evidently on the ground that it had been defamed. If the situation were not so outrageous, it would be laughable.

According to American experts in Soviet law, a civil slander provision was included in the 1961 fundamental principles of civil law in order to give aggrieved Soviet citizens a chance to sue the state-controlled press. Before, none had recourse against published but unproven condemnations.

Two years ago Alfred Friendly, Jr., then a correspondent for Newsweek magazine, cited this statute in a suit filed against the Moscow Literary Gazette

for alleging he was an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency. The suit was not pursued to its conclusion, but the gesture must have rankled.

In the middle of May, according to Mr. Piper's dispatches, Tass quoted Mr. Gamsakhurdia as saying that Mr. Friendly, with whom he was acquainted, had produced "an adverse effect" on him. Then came the nationwide TV program in which the Georgia dissident allegedly confessed his supposed crimes and mistakes. Shortly after, Mr. Piper and Mr. Whitney were in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, where friends of the dissident noted his changed appearance in the broadcast and speculated the program had been spliced together.

The Sun, of course, deplores this harassment of its Moscow correspondent. Mr. Piper is a careful, probing, highly professional journalist whose work for four years has been relatively free of Soviet attack. Indeed, President Leonid Brezhnev said last October that *The Sun's* reporting on the new Soviet constitution was "more or less" objective.

It is sad to see the Kremlin converting a liberal provision in its civil code into a bludgeon against the Western press. This not only defies protections for journalists in the Helsinki accords but damages détente. Soviet authorities would be well advised to stop the whole travesty and get on with more positive activities.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1-8

THE NEW YORK TIMES
27 June 1978

2 Soviet Citizens and American Released to Their Ambassadors

*Ex-U.N. Aides Held on Spy Charges and U.S.
Businessman in Moscow Free Pending Trials*

WASHINGTON, June 26—Two Soviet citizens, each being held on \$2 million bail on espionage charges, were released today in the custody of Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union, and an American businessman being held in a currency-violation case in Moscow was turned over there to Ambassador Malcolm Toon.

State Department officials said that the move, negotiated by the State and Justice Departments with the Soviet Government, removes a major source of tension in relations between the two Governments but for the moment falls short of a straight release of the individuals involved.

Officials said that the two Soviet citizens, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, will still have to stand trial. And the American, F. Jay Crawford, a representative of International Harvester, is still under investigation.

Hearing in Newark

The first signs of the arrangement came in Newark, when Federal District Judge Frederick B. Lacey approved a request by Assistant United States Attorney Edward Plaza to release the two Soviet employees of the United Nations in Ambassador Dobrynin's custody.

The two, Rudolf P. Chernyayev and Valdik A. Enger, were arrested May 20 in a shopping center in Woodbridge, N.J. Neither one was entitled to diplomatic immunity.

A third Soviet citizen seized with them, Vladimir P. Zinyakin, was allowed to return to the Soviet Union because he was attached to the Soviet mission to the United Nations and did have immunity.

The Soviet authorities strongly protested the high bail that had been set despite Ambassador Dobrynin's promise that the men would appear in court. Judge Lacey twice refused to lower the bail.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, told Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance on May 31 that "two can play at the same game" and said that the continued publicity and detention of the men violated an unofficial understanding between the two countries about spies.

On June 12, Mr. Crawford was seized in his car in Moscow and taken to prison, where he remained until today. The Soviet press said he was being investigated on currency violations.

On the day Mr. Crawford was seized, the Soviet Government newspaper, Izvestia, disclosed that last July, Martha Peterson, a vice consul in the American Embassy, had been detained on espionage charges and permitted to leave the Soviet Union quietly as part of an unwritten agreement not to publicize such spy cases.

High-Level Negotiations

Because of the concern expressed by the Russians in this case, high-level negotiations had gone on for some time within the United States Government and with the Russians. The State Department felt that it made no sense from a foreign policy point of view to continue to make an issue over the two Soviet nationals because Americans in Moscow would always be a hostage to retaliation.

White House officials said that President Carter personally approved the arrangement last Friday on the recommendation of Mr. Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser. Mr. Carter was told that the Soviet Government had added its assurances to those of Ambassador Dobrynin.

In Newark, in a letter to the court, Ambassador Dobrynin assured Judge Lacey that the defendants would be available for all court appearances. Mr. Plaza told the judge that the United States was satisfied by the Ambassador's assurances that they would appear in court.

"These assurances are given with the greatest respect for the jurisdiction and responsibilities of this court," Mr. Dobrynin said in his letter.

"In view of the assurances contained in the letter, the United States requests the release of these two men," Mr. Plaza said.

Mr. Chernyayev, a personnel officer at the United Nations, and Mr. Enger, a political affairs officer, were indicted on charges that they had paid an unidentified American naval officer more than \$20,000 in exchange for American defense secrets. It was disclosed last month that the officer had cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ever since his first contact with the Russians last August.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

OWENSBORO MESSENGER INQUIRER (Kentucky)

24 June 1978

This time, the CIA boss liked the questions

By JIM STOMMEN

Messenger-Inquirer

Stansfield Turner is certainly accustomed to facing questioners.

As director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he is used to having to come up with answers for Congressional committees, the occupant of the Oval Office and an inquisitive press. It isn't always a pleasant task.

Friday afternoon, Admiral Turner was being besieged by questions at every turn, and was enjoying every minute of it. The questioners were primarily the youngsters from throughout the U.S. who are in Owensboro to join with Turner and other celebrities in the American Academy of Achievement's weekend retreat.

During an informal rap session that brought the youths and adult honorees together, Turner was among the most popular targets for questioning. And he added to his answers an expression of his views about the youngsters and what they mean to the future leadership of this country.

"I tell you," he said, "I'm really impressed by what you people know . . . these are great questions."

The questions ran the gamut, from recruiting practices of the CIA ("We have people who go out to 150 college campuses every year, where they set up a table and put up a sign that says 'CIA' and go about recruiting bright people") to the agency's relationship with President Carter ("It's outstanding.").

Turner tackled an admittedly loaded question in assessing the relative intelligence capabilities of the U.S. and Russia. "They're better in human intelligence," he said, adding that the Russians "flood the market" with operatives. But the U.S. is better in "technical" intelligence, Turner said. He noted that agencies not only have to collect information, but then have to have the ability to research and analyze it. "You can do a better job of that in an open society than in one that is closed."

He touched several times on the restrictions against the CIA today, noting that the agency cannot initiate a "covert" action without the approval of the National Security Council, the signature of the President and notification to eight congressional committees. In such notification, Turner must be specific as to objectives of the covert action, but is not required to divulge any information that might put a CIA operative in danger.

On the relationship between the FBI and the CIA, which has been rocky in the past, Turner said, "They're the boss inside this country, we're the boss outside . . . it's a matter of teamwork."

He noted that he has greater accessibility to the president than any past CIA director, with a once-a-week in-person briefing with Jimmy Carter and six-days-a-week written briefings.

Asked about the relationship between his agency and the public, again something that has been very rocky in the past, Turner called it "improving, and we hope we deserve it."

He added that the agency is far more public in what it is doing than has been the case in the past, including the releasing of large numbers of unclassified studies and a general sense of openness in comparison with past operations. That openness explains his coming to Owensboro for the Academy of Achievement event. "This group is a particularly good forum," he said. "I'm really persuaded that you need to get to this age level to get a fair hearing. These are the brightest kids in the U.S. today."

CONTINUED



—Tom Hamilton, Messenger-Inquirer

CIA Director Stansfield Turner fields questions from students at the Executive Inn Rivermont Friday following afternoon seminars.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1978

Gathering of the Greats— And Hopes of Tomorrow

The Mighty Meet 370 Young Achievers
At the Olympus of Excellence

By Judy Bachrach

EXCERPT:

OWENSBORO, Ky.—

It is called The American Academy of Achievement: their 17th annual Salute to Excellence described as "A Gathering of the Greats." Debby Boone with her newly permed hair; Howard Jarvis, ornery papa of Proposition 13; jockey Steve Cauthen, the new object of mini-lust among schoolgirls; editorial cartoonist Tony Auth; CIA Director Stansfield Turner; FBI Director William Webster; Col. Harland Sanders at 87; Armand Hammer, Occidental Petroleum chief; a 12-year-old genius enrolled in pre-law and pre-med at the University of Southern California; German anti-terrorist Col. Ulrich Wegener; Edward Asner, who came originally because Cloris Leachman told him to; Olivia de Havilland who arrived because Judge John Sirica asked her to; John Sirica who was there because Leon Jaworski once asked him to come; Helen Hayes, because "Brian Reynolds is a very persuasive man, as you know."

Stansfield Turner, one of the gods of achievement this year, is here because Judge John Sirica, one of the gods of achievement last year, asked him to come. The CIA director, seated before his beef-and-potato dinner, flashes his best Navy-recruiting smile at the three California young achievers across from him, allowing it to settle finally on a high-school graduate whose name-tag reads "Cassandra Shafer, Student Leader of the Year."

"They call you Cassie or 'Cassandra'?" asks the CIA director.


"Cassandra," the girl replies archly, "they call you Stansfield or Stan?"

"Stan," replies the CIA director, clearly taken aback.

"Except his mother," offers Turner's wife, "his mother calls him Stansfield."

Judge Frank Johnson, another of this year's honorees, drops his fork to ask the girl if she realizes she is talking to the CIA director.

"OH MY GOSH," squeals the stricken Cassandra, appalled at her faux pas. Her tone turns conciliatory. "I always liked the CIA. Ever since I read Mrs. Pollifax, the Spy."



The talk gradually turns to other things: to the concept of racial equality.—Turner asks the students if they think it exists in the United States; to Judge Johnson who quotes the Rev. Jesse Jackson: "Jackson said, 'From now on, it's up to you.' I certainly agree." And finally—to the problems in black education:

"It sort of feeds on itself," says Turner. "They don't have a lot of educated people, they don't have an esteem for education, they don't have a background for it."

Cassandra's eyes search the huge ballroom. "There certainly are very few blacks around the room," she says.

Earlier in the conversation, Turner offers the young achievers a little explanation of how the CIA works: "In addition to spying, we have to take the products of spying and understand it."

"I didn't think the head of the CIA would go around saying the word 'spy,'" marvels a young man named Brad. "It kind of has a bad connotation about it."

"I want to be a spy," says Cassandra, smiling.

"Cassandra," says the grateful Turner, "You apply to us when you graduate."

"Cassandra," says Judge Johnson, "You just wiped yourself out with that 'Stan' business."

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E 20THE NEW YORK TIMES
25 June 1978

Why Censor Non-Secrets?

"Roarin' Oren," they call him in the Federal courthouse in Alexandria, Virginia, and in a case this week, United States District Judge Oren R. Lewis demonstrated why. The suit involves Frank Snepp, a former C.I.A. agent who last year published a book about the fall of Saigon. The Government sued because he did so without submitting it, as pledged, for approval before publication. To many, the case involves a complex clash of principles — the Government's need to keep secrets versus the public's need to learn about the misdeeds or failings of Government. But it seemed simple to the 75-year-old Judge Lewis:

Repeatedly, he shouted at Mr. Snepp and his lawyers, interrupting sentence after sentence. The judge said he had not yet reached a "definitive decision," but still felt obliged to proclaim that what Mr. Snepp had done "was a willful, deliberate breach of trust . . . and I think he did it for the money." As columnist Mary McGrory wrote when the Government applied to Judge Lewis for a summary judgment, "you could probably find no more summary judge." One need not wonder why the Justice Department filed the case in his district in the first place. He behaved the way one would have expected. But the problem is not the judge. It is the case. We thought it a crude business when the Government filed it last winter. It now appears cruder still.

The Government not only has a right but a duty to protect important secrets. That is why C.I.A. employees sign pre-publication clearance agreements. But it is hard to maintain much sympathy for the Government's problem in protecting secrets in this case. The Government, it turns out, does not contend that the Snepp book reveals classified information. *There are no secrets here.*

That alone justifies asking Attorney General Bell why he brought this case. He says it is needed to estab-

lish the principle that secrets can be protected with breach-of-contract suits. But that principle has already been established, in a case involving another former C.I.A. employee, by the Federal Court of Appeals in Richmond. And even that court limited its ruling to material that in fact involved secrets; the First Amendment, the court said, forbids prior censorship "with respect to information which is unclassified or officially disclosed."

Why is the Attorney General so determined to seek a contractual right to censor non-secrets when he already has that right to protect secrets? Probably because, if that right is to be effective, the Government has to know about a book in time to insist on approving it. But this book was produced and distributed stealthily; by the time the C.I.A. found out about it, it was too late. The agency was left needing a new sword to rattle against others with the same idea. It should be recalled that C.I.A. is right now cutting down its staff and releasing 800 operatives — 800 potential Frank Snepps.

Breach-of-contract suits are, however, a clumsy sword and by resorting to them it seems to us that the Government is shirking its dual duty to protect free speech and to protect secrets. There are more direct and effective ways to do the latter. For example, former C.I.A. Director William Colby has advanced a sophisticated and sensitive approach. Pre-publication review, though not required, would be available to present and former officials. But there would also be a narrow law forbidding their reckless disclosure of secrets. Would-be authors determined to avoid pre-censorship could take their chances of prosecution. And the Government would at last be able to seek to punish those who blow important secrets. Relying on a plan like this is surely preferable to relying on the thunderings of an injudicious judge.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 48WASHINGTON STAR
24 JUNE 1978

The trial of Frank Snepp

Half an hour into the trial of former CIA agent Frank Snepp, Judge Oren R. Lewis dispelled any suspense that might have attached to the well publicized case. Referring to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, the judge said to Mr. Snepp's counsel, "I'm certain you're already en route to Richmond," and added, "You just take I-95 and go south."

At the end of the day-and-a-half trial in U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Judge Lewis declared Mr. Snepp violated his CIA contract in publishing his book critical of the American evacuation of Vietnam without agency review. The judge said he had not reached a "definitive decision" and would review all testimony before formally ruling. But he said he wanted to let the participants have "some idea of my thinking."

That "some idea" was blunt. "I think it [Mr. Snepp's publication of *Decent Interval*] was a willful, deliberate breach of contract, and a willful, deliberate breach of trust, and I think he did it for money," the judge said after listening to closing arguments. (Judge Lewis had rejected Mr. Snepp's request for a jury trial, saying there were questions of law involved in the civil suit, not questions of fact.)

The Snepp case, as we noted here in March when the government filed charges, has evoked a great deal of overheated sloganeering, from both sides: Frank Snepp as hero for blowing the whistle on the CIA's alleged bumbling; Frank Snepp as scoundrel for casually violating a contract for personal enrichment.

At the time, we said, "The freedom to blow one's whistle is hardly at issue. Mr. Snepp voluntarily accepted a limitation on that freedom when he joined the CIA. Perhaps those who feel as strongly as do Mr. Snepp and his publishers about First Amendment rights ought not sign contracts that limit them." The testimony before Judge Lewis provided no convincing reasons to alter that view — though, equally, it hardly will dent the slogans in which the Snepp case has been publicly cast.

Judge Lewis said he had determined that Mr. Snepp's agreement with the CIA was "a clear and unambiguous contract" — and flattened the efforts of Mr. Snepp's attorneys to broaden the trial beyond that dimension. Soundly, it seems to us — though Judge Lewis's absolutism on CIA prerogatives will provide ammunition for the simplifiers who deny legitimacy to government secrecy as an article of faith.

Mr. Snepp contends that, among other reasons, he did not submit his manuscript for CIA review for fear "The agency would have torn the book to shreds" because of its unflattering portrayal of CIA operations in Vietnam. His assumption might have held — though we cannot know, because Mr. Snepp chose not to test its validity.

In a case of related interest several years ago, the CIA won the right in court to delete before publication portions of the *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, by former agent Victor Marchetti and John Marks, on the basis that it contained classified material. The book, critical of the agency, nevertheless was finally published. The CIA has not said that Mr. Snepp's book contained secret material, only that he did not adhere to his contract. His assumption, therefore, may be a few bricks shy of a persuasive load.

Judge Lewis's judgment of Mr. Snepp's motives was perhaps too harsh; we suspect zeal more than hope of profit stimulated his authorship — and that complicates the question of fidelity. To justify ignoring one's oath in the name of a higher responsibility requires a rare combination of certitude and humility — an equation that is beyond a court of law to factor.

In the Snepp case, a narrow focus is appropriate. As we said earlier, "According to Mr. Bernstein, Mr. Snepp's publisher, 'the case amounts to repression by lawsuit.' We would call it, less dramatically, enforcement of contract." So the matter seems still.

25 JUNE 1978

MARY McGRORY: Under Judge Lewis, law leans toward the powerful

If the law is "a ass," as Dickens wrote of another judicial proceeding, the law is a bully in the Alexandria court of federal Judge Oren R. Lewis.

His Honor, it became clear during the indescribable trial of Frank Snepp III, the ex-CIA official who wrote *Decent Interval* without the agency's permission, is really Patton in a black robe. What he did to the case was the moral equivalent of leading a tank column over it.

The government, according to him, can do no wrong. He does not care if Snepp disclosed a single syllable of classified information. The question for him is simply a breach of contract or of fiduciary trust.

The Justice Department sent three lawyers to argue the case. They were superfluous. The irascible judge did their work. "Any objection?" he would ask before Snepp's lawyer could finish a question.

"Objection sustained," he barked before the Justice Department could clear its throat.

He permitted no reading from documents that had been admitted into evidence. He was indignant that a paper marked secret had been produced for the defense.

He turned to Elizabeth Whittaker, the Justice Department attorney, in a gallant fury. "I never required you to give any secret information. They will take advantage of you whatever you do, lady or man."

Making a heavy out of Mark Lynch, the easy, buoyant, American Civil Liberties Union lawyer who was trying to defend Snepp, was something only a judge whose mind is made up would attempt. But judicial detachment is not something Lewis even makes a pass at. His preoccupation that he might be caught making any kind of judgment about the Vietnam War, the fall of Saigon or the CIA consumed him.

Like most conservatives and many

individualists, the judge has a gnawing concern about protecting the powerful. The law, which has an eye out for the weak, comes second.

But if Judge Lewis's solicitude seemed misplaced, it was on a par with the kind that has lately been exhibited by the Supreme Court.

The court has, within the last three months, moved to guarantee the safety of the snail darter and the federal judge and thrown the press to the wolves.

The decision in the snail darter case, regarded separately, can be seen as a glorious victory for the environmentalist. But taken with the brusque ruling in the Stanford case, which urges the press to pull up its socks and take its chances with unannounced police searches, it makes you wonder if the Constitution is, in fact, a living document.

What is grating about the two decisions taken together is the excruciating concern that Chief Justice Warren Burger reveals for the "intent of Congress" in the "Endangered Species Act" — as contrasted with the airy disregard in the Stanford decision, written by Justice Byron R. White, for the intent of the authors of the Constitution when they wrote the Fourth Amendment — not to mention the First.

Burger discourses at length about the conflicting claims of laws passed by Congress — one which authorized \$100 million for the nearly completed Tellico Dam, and the other which mandated the preservation of "the critical habitat" of rare fish.

"It would be difficult to balance the loss of a sum certain against a congressionally declared incalculable value, even if we had the power to engage in such a weighing process, which we emphatically do not," he writes sonorously.

Someone might point out to him that the goddess of liberty is holding scales for the very purpose of weigh-

ing such matters.

Justice White says "tut-tut" to the protest of the Stanford University Daily, which was raided without warning by a police search team, even though none of the staff was suspected of wrongdoing.

White gives us fatuous, quantitative comfort: there have been "very few instances since 1971 involving issues of warrants for searching newspaper premises."

If such a decision had been on the books at the time of Watergate, there might not have been a need for the White House plumbers; and several newspapers might have been receiving the police, on deadline, in their "critical habitat."

Earlier, Justice White — a Kennedy appointee, it should be remembered — gave us the doctrine of absolute immunity for federal judges. The case was outrageous: an Indiana judge, simply on request from a mother, issued an order for

the sterilization of her 15-year-old daughter. The girl, who was told she was having her appendix removed, sued the judge on discovering her situation.

Justice White again took the lofty view that people shouldn't make a fuss when they fall victim to the law which presumably protects them.

"Despite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results, the doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the best interests of the proper administration of justice," he wrote.

Justice Potter Stewart humanely dissented: "I think what Judge Stump did was beyond the pale of anything that could sensibly be called a judicial act."

There is a bright side, perhaps, to these travesties. They could prove a greater deterrent to crime than the death penalty, mercy and justice being most readily available to the CIA, the snail darter, the federal judge.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2 ETHE NEW YORK TIMES
25 June 1978

The Nation

In Summary

Of Snepp, Secrecy And Government's Contractual Rights

It is usually unwise to predict how a judge will rule, but in the suit against Frank W. Snepp 3d there is little doubt that the Government is about to win the right to seal the lips of Federal family members, even as they leave home. Unless an appeals court later says otherwise, a ruling expected this week will make it easier to enforce secrecy oaths as a legitimate feature of Government contracts with employees in sensitive jobs.

Technically, the question before Federal Judge Oren R. Lewis is narrow. Should Mr. Snepp, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, be ordered to pay the Government civil damages by forfeiting the proceeds (\$60,000 so far) from his book about supposed agency bungling during the United States evacuation of Saigon? Judge Lewis withheld a formal decision, but he made it clear during a non-jury proceeding in Virginia last week that he sided with the agency. To the judge, Mr. Snepp had "no right" to publish "Decent Interval" without clearance; it was, he said, "a willful, deliberate breach of contract."

That contract required Mr. Snepp to submit writings for review, but he says it applied only to classified material, and nothing about the Saigon evacuation in 1975 was secret, only embarrassing. The Government insists that the agency alone can determine what is classified, and, in any event, Mr. Snepp "damaged the reputation of the C.I.A. to keep secrets."

If upheld by the judge, as expected, this argument would strengthen the Government's hard line against a proliferation of books and articles about the intelligence network. Unlike the Snepp matter, the main legal precedent deals with undisputedly classified information. In that case, a Federal appeals court allowed agency censors to delete passages from "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.

NEWSDAY
23 June 1978

A One-Sided Hearing on CIA Censorship

"I'm certain you're en route to Richmond," a federal judge told a defense attorney this week in Alexandria, Va. "I'll show you the way. It's right down Route I-95."

Richmond is where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is located, and District Judge Oren Lewis pointed the defense attorney there in no uncertain terms: An appeal was all but guaranteed by the judge's blatant bias against defendant Frank Snepp, an ex-CIA agent who had published a highly critical book about the agency's performance in Vietnam without obtaining prior approval.

Snepp stands accused of violating his contract with the CIA, which the government contends covers any publication involving the agency, whether classified information is divulged or not. Even the government doesn't claim that Snepp's book contains secrets or classified data not already revealed by the CIA itself.

Talk about a kangaroo court. The facts were not in dispute, Judge Lewis told Snepp, and denied him a jury trial. He then informed Snepp's lawyer that the evidence "won't make any difference." And apparently it didn't. Lewis ruled against Snepp after a day-and-a-half trial

peppered with admonitions and scoldings of the defendant. He wouldn't even allow the defense to cross-examine CIA director Stansfield Turner, who testified for the prosecution. In short, the trial was so one-sided that it must have been an embarrassment even to the government.

The questions raised in the Snepp case are serious ones that merit more than cursory attention, not just by the courts but by the administration, Congress, the CIA and the public. Judge Lewis obviously had his mind made up before the trial began; we hope the appeals court will send the case back for a fair hearing.

A 'Judicial' Travesty

If there is an annual national prize for most un-judicial conduct of the year — and if there isn't, there probably ought to be — it should be awarded right now, today, to Federal District Judge Oren H. Lewis, 75, of Alexandria, Va., even though the calendar year is only exactly half gone. The arbitrary awarding of the palm to Judge Lewis at this time, thus neatly foreclosing on any rival nominations for a full six-month period, would be not one whit less arbitrary than the courtroom misbehavior that won Lewis our nomination.

The case involved was that of Frank Snepp, who was the target of an action for civil damages by his former employers, the CIA, for publishing an unauthorized book on the agency, and the reason that the punitive proceedings were brought in civil court rather than in criminal court is that no law was broken, since none of the information appearing in Snepp's book involved any kind of classified information.

And what so distinguished Judge Lewis's performance in this case (he had been known to behave eccentrically before, though never as eccentrically as this) was that he did not just make up his mind without fully hearing out both sides, but apparently did it before he even went in the courtroom. Not to put too fine a point on it, his role playing in the little theatre that a courtroom sometimes provides was not that of a jurist seeking after even-handed justice, playing by the rules of the game, but something more like that of someone who was fantasizing himself as Director of the CIA, that is as someone who had been transmogrified into the identity of one of the two litigants before him.

This was true, even though the real CIA head of the moment — Admiral Stansfield Turner — was there to give the CIA's side of the story, which he did well, as usual. We say "as usual" because the predictable CIA line in matters such as this is always represented as if it had been written on stone tablets.

Judge Lewis was so protective of "his" agency, in fact, that he would not allow Admiral Turner to be cross-examined by defense counsel, even though the official CIA representative on the scene had said he was perfectly willing to be cross-examined.

The proceedings opened with the Judge refusing the defense's request for a jury trial, and things proceeded to go rapidly downhill from there, with Lewis lecturing the defendant for his presumptuousness in doing *anything* of which the CIA might disapprove, even after he was a free agent. The trial jurist would anticipate objections to the ex-agent's testimony before counsel for the complainants had even asked for them, one of the more interesting points that we imagine will be brought to the attention of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals at Richmond, once the foregone District Court ruling is formally entered, and the appeal carried forward by Snepp's attorneys.

At one point in the district court trial proceedings, Judge Lewis interjected that Snepp and his lawyers were already "on the road to Richmond," and added that if they did not know how to get there, "I will show you the way."

We suspect that the irascible lower court jurist may have already done some of the appellate court's work for it, but by the same token, the peremptoriness with which he wielded his gavel, — as in not allowing Admiral Turner to be cross-questioned, may leave much of the district court's undone work to be done at first hand, so to speak, by this same Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 13CHICAGO TRIBUNE
26 June 1978

Angola lament: A CIA agent remembers

By Rogers Worthington

THERE IS NO way of knowing exactly when the disillusionment began for CIA badge number HW469. But it all crystallized one hot August day in 1975 when he stood on the bare African veld of central Angola during a battlefront tour with guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi.

HW469 felt "an almost mystical objectivity" about the CIA and the things he had done, "the pointlessness of my operations in Lubumbashi (Zaire), the brutality and betrayals of Viet Nam, the empty cynicism of the case officer's role." Savimbi was impatient to move on. For a moment HW469 resented him, with his clear objectives and clean conscience.

"He was that rare coincidence of history, a throwback to the great tribal leaders of Africa . . . a far cry from the conflicting values and goals of

America, and of the CIA in its middle-aged mediocrity."

A year and a half later HW469's disillusionment had passed the point of no return and he was making the rounds of the half-dozen or so checkout offices a resigning CIA officer is required to visit. There was an office for working out a cover story for future employers; an office to turn in the special black diplomatic passport; another to turn in all classified materials; one to settle travel claims; still another to deposit one's badge with; and a final one to sign an agreement not to divulge any CIA secrets or publish anything about the agency without first submitting it for clearance.

IT WAS SIMILAR to the agreement he had signed upon entering the agency 12 years before, when he proudly believed he was joining an elite body devoted to ultimately noble causes.

But this time HW469, CIA case officer John Stockwell, 40, wasn't going to sign. His perceptions of the CIA had changed drastically in the last few years. In his mind he had already joined the ranks of his whistle blowing predecessors, Philip Agee, Victor Marchetti, and Frank Snepp, and he had resolved to write a book telling all he knew about his last mission as chief of the CIA's Angola Task Force.

Stockwell's book, "In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story" (W.W. Norton, \$12.95), details that mission from beginning to end, a \$31 million "economy-size, no-win war" he believes was ill conceived and ill executed. As Stockwell tells it, the operation approved by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was at first a limited effort to prevent the victory of the MPLA, the most pro-Marxist of the three Angolan guerrilla groups vying for power in the political

vacuum left by the departing Portuguese colonialists.

Code named IAFEATURE, the operation began in total secrecy barely three months after the fall of South Viet Nam. Stockwell says it eventually came to include an odd supporting cast of CIA subsidized European mercenaries, Zairean paracommandos, and even a South African armored column. Hundreds of tons of weapons, ammunition and equipment were dispatched by the CIA to Zaire, he says, and then moved to the Angolan guerrilla bases on Holden Roberto's FNLA and Savimbi's UNITA by Zairean and South African C-130s.

THE POLITICAL categorizations of pro-Western and pro-Communist were complicated by the sources of aid for each of the guerrilla groups. While the FNLA and UNITA were both labeled pro-Western, both also received support and advisers from the Chinese. Some UNITA fighters received training from the North Koreans as well.

Back in Washington and Langley, Va., the CIA's role in the war was conducted at a hectic pace through an increasingly complex web of congressional restrictions. United States military advisers as such were never sent to Angola lest the ire of a Viet Nam-sensitized Congress be aroused. But Stockwell has charged that 24 CIA advisers were there during the fighting and for more than mere intelligence-gathering.

"Some hopped in and out of Angola, others left only to get their laundry done. They were in the country full time," he said. Stockwell himself was there for 10 days.

He has also charged that the CIA played a role in South Africa's entry into the war and that Soviet-Cuban escalation was a response to U.S. escalation of the fighting.

REGARDLESS OF who escalated first, the Soviets poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the MPLA, quickly dwarfing the American effort. The arrival of some 12,000 Cuban troops upped the ante more for the MPLA.

What in the beginning had been a limited conflict that Stockwell believed could have been quickly resolved by a couple of C-47 gunships ("Puff the Magic Dragon") eventually deteriorated into a rout by Cuban troops armed with deadly Soviet-made 122 mm. mortar rockets. The revelation that white South African troops were fighting on the pro-Western side had already lost the propaganda war. But only when President Ford signed an amendment temporarily prohibiting use of defense funds in Angola did the CIA, its own war chests empty, finally acknowledge defeat.

It was all a bit much for Stockwell, who says he at first tried to talk his immediate superiors out of U.S. involvement. Resignation had occurred to him then, he said, but the offer to run the task force was too flattering to refuse. After spending most of his career in the field in Africa and Viet Nam, IAFEATURE was a rare opportunity for Stockwell to be in on a covert paramilitary operation at headquarters level. It was a sure way for an ambitious GS14 to pave the way to GS16.

But today John Stockwell could care less about such things. It has been more than a year since his resignation was final and longer since IAFEATURE and the Angola Task Force was dismantled. He spent much of the intervening time writing his book at a lakefront cabin in central Texas.

CONTINUED

STOCKWELL WAS born in Texas and later attended college there. If he has a second home, though, it is Africa. He spent eight years of his youth in the Congo, where his engineer father built a hydroelectric plant for a Presbyterian mission. After college and a stint in the Marine Corps he returned to Africa as a CIA case officer and spent much of his career there.

His missionary school background was of some concern to the CIA officer who recruited him in 1964. "He asked me, 'Do you really have the guts to get out there in a tough world and mix it up with people and do your thing?'"

IN AFRICA HE has done many things, short of physical violence, which is where he said he had drawn the line with the recruiter. But the things he says the CIA as a whole has done in Africa bother him most.

"We installed Mobutu in power, we plotted the death of Lumumba, we juggled other politicians out of office, we mounted a United Nations operation to suppress the pro-Western succession of Katanga. As a result, the Katangese were chased across the border into exile. They are now black Africa's Palestinians. In the meantime, Mobutu has raped the Katanga," he said.

"Some day, Stockwell, you're going to have to face your conscience." This is what Stockwell says CIA director Stansfield Turner said in a phone conversation when Stockwell told him of the book he had written. The book draws on classified material and Stockwell did not submit it for agency approval, as required by his secrecy oath.

But he had dealt with both his conscience and his career before he left the agency. Although he had resolved to tell all about IAFEATURE, he had also resolved not to reveal the names of colleagues in the field, something Philip Agee, the first of the publishing whistle-blowers, had made a point of doing.

STILL, STOCKWELL had spent months agonizing over the break with the agency and the security of a \$20,000-a-year pension it guaranteed. He had thought about it each day as he jogged down and back the towpath that led to the agency's grassy lawns. His jogging increased to 10 miles a day, 15, and then 20 one Sunday, all the way down the towpath further and further, and then, painfully, back again.

The final break, the day he turned in his badge and walked out the front door of CIA headquarters and past the statue of Nathan Hale for the last time, John Stockwell wasn't feeling any pain.

"It wasn't a painful thing because mentally I was deep into what I was going to do. By that time I was mature enough to have thought this thing out very carefully and had made my peace with myself."

Stockwell says this with a straight-ahead look through unflinching sky blue eyes that give a slight hint of the institutional rebel he admits to being. At 41, he is fit (a double black belt in judo) and handsome enough to play leading man in his own life story. But there is an ingenuous quality about him that seems strangely out of keeping with his CIA background. It is a quality shared by most of the published CIA whistle-blowers; one that can be best described as a chainlike sequence of innocence corrupted, innocence disillusioned, innocence enlightened.

"INNOCENCE IS A form of insanity," Stockwell says, quoting Graham Greene from "The Quiet American," one of the earliest and most perceptive novels about U.S. involvement in Viet Nam. Stockwell readily admits to having been an innocent of sorts himself early in his CIA career. But in his book he goes out of his way to portray himself as conscientious villain as well as victim of his own naivete.

"I had done a lot of things in the name of the CIA: recruited agents; bugged foreign embassies; run covert operations — even hired prostitutes to be used against Soviet and Chinese officials."

The prostitutes had nothing to do with the Angolan operation. But the idea of a CIA officer as sub rosa pimp was irresistible for "60 Minutes" interviewer Mike Wallace, who seized on the subject when Stockwell appeared on the show in May.

"I still don't consider that to be as immoral as recruiting someone to commit treason. When you seduce someone into betraying their own government, you are corrupting them. You are inducing them to put their lives in jeopardy," he said.

SUCH THOUGHTS ARE heresy within the CIA among those who have not begun to cross over the line that Stockwell has crossed. To them, they are the thoughts of people who do not fully understand the needs of national security.

Even among his closest friends in the agency, those who basically agreed with him but regretted his going public, there is unspoken strain. The day he appeared on "60 Minutes" Stockwell called to tell them there was something on the show worth seeing.

"But none of them called me back. I rather think that they won't. Maybe after some time goes by and it cools off, then probably one, two, or six of them will write me a letter."

In the meantime, Stockwell ponders his future. He has thought about writing a novel set in Africa, and his intense contact with journalists since his book came out has prompted thoughts of being a correspondent from Africa and making documentaries.

The possibilities are new and strange and uncertain and he is both giddy and nervous about the freedom that confronts him after 12 years as an agency man. There is only one certainty.

"I don't know what I'm going to do with my life or how I'm going to make a living. But I know I'm not going to work for another bureaucracy."

SATURDAY REVIEW

8 July 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 40

SATURDAY REVIEW: OUTLOOKS

What Is an American to Think About the CIA?

WHEN THE ANGOLAN civil war was making headlines two years ago, the American people, disillusioned and weary over their intervention in Vietnam, were assured by their government that the United States was in no way involved.

At the time, I was at a meeting of Americans and Russians in Jurmala, on the Baltic Sea. The Americans at the meeting—a Dartmouth Conference—protested the Soviet-backed Cuban invasion of Angola. One of the Russian delegates charged that the United States itself had forcibly intervened in Angola. This seemed to me to be an absurd statement, and I said so. The United States had supported a policy of self-determination. I quoted the unequivocal denial of CIA officials before a congressional committee of any U.S. involvement. I said the charge that had just been made by the Russian delegate could only be regarded as offensive and contrary to the spirit of the Dartmouth meetings.

Now comes the book *In Search of Enemies*, by John Stockwell, head of CIA operations in Angola, revealing that the agency was in fact deeply engaged in subversive and paramilitary actions there. Stockwell states that the CIA deliberately lied to Congress and the American people about our role in Angola. His book provides documentary evidence of CIA involvement, which he himself directed. Even more serious are his disclosures about the wide range of illegal activities elsewhere in which, Stockwell says, the CIA has been engaged. With devastating effect, Stockwell shows that the net result of our clandestine activities has often been to worsen situations, sometimes with a brutally unnecessary loss of human life.

The effect of Stockwell's book has been to make me even more indignant than I was over the accusation by the Soviet delegate. One of the proudest possessions of any American is his belief in the integrity of his government. We have extolled the heritage of a society in which government is bound by law no less than the people themselves are. The constitutional design does not give the government the right to deceive its people.

One puts down *In Search of Enemies* with the mounting conviction that if

the CIA stays in the business of subversion, assassination, and dirty tricks, the future of free society in America may not be as secure as most people think. For what John Stockwell has done is to document what is in effect an undeclared war by the CIA against American institutions. CIA officials would never admit that their actions have endangered the freedoms they are sworn to protect. Indeed, they would insist that what they have done is to uphold America's interests in a world of plot and counterplot. They contend that the Soviet Union must not be given a clear field for extending its influence through undercover exploits.

As Stockwell sees it, this rationale by CIA officials is a form of extreme self-deception. He says that the United States has actually been weakened by clandestine exploits, of which Vietnam is a prime example.

As a former top undercover executive in the CIA, Stockwell should know what he is talking about when he says that CIA secret operations abroad have added up to a profound liability; that thousands of people have been killed as the result of its arbitrary and incompetent decisions; that whatever good the CIA may have done has been heavily offset by the wanton abuse of power by men who have had large sums of money at their disposal but who do not have to submit to the same kind of accountability that applies to other officials of the government. In this sense, the main achievement of the CIA has been to confirm the fears of the American Founding Fathers concerning the exercise of power outside the system of checks and balances.

What has happened with the CIA is especially ironic because few other government agencies have attached higher importance to recruiting young people of intelligence, integrity, and talent. John Stockwell was one of this group. He was to discover, however, that he was not told the truth about the agency or about the work he was expected to do. Like the others, he was drawn into a net from which it was difficult to extricate himself. He was seduced by the feeling that he was at the center of things and was intoxicated with the power that went with the job. He had secret funds at his disposal for bribing foreign officials and for carrying out undercover operations. His personal

life-style was made most congenial: His expense allowances made it possible for him to enjoy perquisites generally available only to ambassadors.

Stockwell received his baptism of fire—which is to say undercover subversion—in Vietnam. This experience disabused him of the notion that clandestine operatives could remain free of incompetence, corruption, and abuse of power. His biggest assignment came when he was appointed head of a secret paramilitary operation in Angola. The operation ended in a fiasco in which American miscalculations and ineptness contributed almost as much to the eventual disaster as did the Cuban invasion. The record shows that Stockwell's own analysis and advice were generally ignored as the United States plunged recklessly ahead in a vain attempt to shape the course of events.

What is most shocking about the episode in Angola, it seems apparent from this book, is that our policy in the field ran directly counter to the announced policy in Washington. It was a clear case of the CIA's superimposing itself on constitutional government and lying to the Congress to conceal its own illegal manipulations.

The disturbing, fundamental question that emerges from this book, of course, is that if the CIA can interfere in the politics of other governments, often to the detriment of their peoples, and if it can engage in assassinations and beatings outside the United States, what is there to prevent it from doing the same things *inside* the United States? The men in the CIA were given the means to carry out their own designs. If the President should stand in the way of those designs, how do we know that the highly sophisticated assassination capacity of the CIA would not be turned on the President himself, or on anyone else who seeks to block the CIA?

It was naïve to suppose in the first place that such an agency could be brought into being without becoming a Frankenstein. It is even more naïve to suppose that it can go on in its present form without unhooking the government it was created to protect.

This, it seems to me, is the message of *In Search of Enemies*. John Stockwell has shown a great deal of courage in writing this book. Do the American people have the courage to act on it?

—N.C.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-4

THE WASHINGTON POST
29 June 1978

Woman Suing CIA For \$33 Million

The wife of an American executed in Angola sued the CIA yesterday for \$33 million, charging the agency duped her husband and other volunteers into fighting in Africa and then abandoned them rather than reveal its covert role in Angola's civil war.

Sheila Gearhart's U.S. court damage suit immediately became an issue in Congress, with Rep. Robert Dornan (R-Calif.), introducing a resolution asking the House to investigate CIA involvement in Angola.

With Gearhart and her son Michael, 9, in the House gallery, Dornan delivered a eulogy to Daniel F. Gearhart,

who was executed by firing squad in Angola on July 10, 1976. Dornan said there is "new evidence" suggesting Gearhart and other U.S. mercenaries were lured to Angola by the CIA.

Gearhart, of Kensington, filed suit alleging the CIA and top U.S. officials had abandoned her husband to his own defense and characterized him as a "criminal" unworthy of official U.S. support.

She told reporters her husband was no "mercenary" and had volunteered because he had been persuaded "there was a just cause and reason to do so."

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

de Denial

Approved For Release 2009/04/20 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501240001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 36

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
29 JUNE 1978

Widow Sues CIA Over Angola Vet

Washington (UPI) — Sheila Gearhart of Kensington, Md., whose husband Daniel was an American soldier of fortune captured and executed during the Angola civil war in 1976, filed a 133 million damage suit yesterday charging that her husband's death resulted from CIA "treachery."

Mrs. Gearhart said that the CIA recruited her husband and other volunteers through propaganda, then sent them into a hopeless trap without warning them of the risk they faced.

In order to conceal "illegal" U.S. involvement in the Angolan war, Gearhart charged, the CIA and the State Department denied her husband the public support that would have spared him execution two years ago.

The suit was filed in Federal Court against the CIA, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former CIA Director William Colby and other officials.

A Paid Volunteer

Gearhart, a paid volunteer in the U.S.-backed National Front for Liberation of Angola, was captured in Sao Salvador, was tried and executed by a firing squad on July 10, 1976, near Terra Nova, the suit said.

Gearhart, who filed the suit on behalf of herself and her four children, insisted that her husband should not be referred to as a "mercenary." Asked why he volunteered, she said, "He felt there was a just cause and reason to do so."

3 July 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 19

Periscope

TO DIE IN ANGOLA

"In Search of Enemies," a book by ex-CIA agent John Stockwell charging CIA involvement in Angola's civil war, has prompted a widow's planned lawsuit against the U.S. Government and some of its former officials, including Henry Kissinger and William Colby. The suit was to be filed this week by Sheila Gearhart of Kensington, Md., who saw Stockwell in a TV interview, then read his book and decided on the basis of its allegations to take legal action over the death of her husband, Daniel Gearhart. An American mercenary who joined a pro-Western force fighting in Angola, Gearhart was captured, tried and executed by the Angolan Government in 1976. Mrs. Gearhart, who wants \$33 million in damages for herself and her four children, charges that the CIA and the State Department recruited her husband "by treachery and deceit," sent him to Angola on an illegal mission, then disowned him while he was on trial. Stockwell is willing to testify in Mrs. Gearhart's behalf.

29 JUNE 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10A

Angola Widow Suing The CIA

WASHINGTON (UPI) — The widow of an American executed in Angola sued the CIA Wednesday for \$33 million, charging the agency duped her husband and other volunteers into fighting in Africa and then abandoned them rather than reveal its covert role in Angola's civil war.

Mrs. Sheila Gearhart, of suburban Kensington, Md., filed suit alleging the CIA and top U.S. officials had abandoned her husband, Daniel F. Gearhart, to his own defense and characterized him as a "criminal" unworthy of official U.S. support.

She told reporters her husband was no "mercenary" and had volunteered because he had been persuaded "there was a just cause and reason to do so."

Her suit named the intelligence agency, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former CIA Director William Colby and other lesser officials as defendants.

Gearhart and two Europeans were executed July 10, 1976, by Angola's newly-victorious Marxist government following a trial in which they were convicted of being mercenaries in the hire of the country's defeated, western-backed guerrilla forces.

The suit apparently will draw upon the recently published allegations of John Stockwell, former head of the CIA's Angola Task force, that the agency encouraged badly bungled private efforts to import mercenaries into Angola in 1976.

A Gearhart spokesman said Stockwell had agreed to testify on Mrs. Gearhart's behalf.

The suit claims the CIA knew that Sao Salvador, where Gearhart was captured, "had become a trap for anyone without access to air escape from the rapidly advancing Cuban onslaught," but that the agency failed to warn him.

When Gearhart was brought to trial, the suit said, U.S. officials "did deliberately distort the truth which resulted in denial of the best defense" in order to conceal the "illegal" U.S. role in the civil war.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

29 JUNE 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED

ON PAGE 2

News in Brief

The widow of American soldier of fortune Daniel F. Gearhart, who was executed by the Angolan government in 1976, filed a \$33 million "wrongful death" suit against the CIA in federal court in Washington. Mrs. Sheila Gearhart, of Kensington, Md., charged in the suit that her debt-ridden husband, father of four, was lured into Angola by deceit by the CIA and the State Department. Gearhart, 34, testified after his capture in Angola that he was recruited to fight in Angola by Fresno crop duster David Bufkin.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-15NEW YORK TIMES
30 JUNE 1978

Widow Accuses C.I.A. In Angola Execution

WASHINGTON, June 28 (AP)—The wife of an American who was executed as a mercenary by the Angolan Government two years ago accused the Central Intelligence Agency today of having lured her husband to his death.

The woman, Sheila Sullivan Gearhart, asked a Federal District Court in Washington to award her \$33 million in damages. Among defendants listed in the suit were the C.I.A., William E. Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence, and former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Daniel F. Gearhart, a former Green Beret who had fought in Vietnam, was tried by the Angolan Government on charges of being a mercenary and was executed on July 10, 1976.

The suit charges that the C.I.A. lured him to Angola through "treachery and deceit" that it transported him to the African nation and that it failed to warn him that the city of Sao Salvador, Angola, was about to fall and that he was likely to be captured.